MOORE v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE et al

Filing 42

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 9/12/16. (sr, )(N/M)

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT Of NEW JERSEY

LEROY MOORE,
Civil Action No. 15-6751 (ILL)
Plaintiff,
v.

:

OPINION

MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S:
OFF ICE, et al.,
Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge:
Currently before the Court are the motions (ECF Nos. 17, 36) of Defendants seeking to
dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff, Leroy Moore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Plaintiff has filed responses to both motions. (ECF Nos. 23, 38). Also before this
Court is Plaintiffs request for leave to file an interlocutory appeal.

(ECF No. 35).

For the

following reasons, this Court will grant Defendants’ motions, will dismiss all of Plaintiffs
remaining claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief, and will deny Plaintiffs
request as moot in light of the dismissal of his remaining claims.

I.

BACKGROUND

As this Court has previously summarized the basic factual assertions made by Plaintiff in
his complaint and amended complaint, only a brief recitation of the background facts and
procedural history of this matter is necessary for the purpose of deciding the motions currently

before this Court. Following this Court’s prior screening orders and opinions (ECF Nos. 2-3, 10,
14), only a single claim remains in this case: Plaintiffs assertion that Defendants Celentano and
Laspino maliciously instituted prosecutorial proceedings against him in violation of his
constitutional rights, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. That claim arises out of the following

factual background.
On August 28, 2009, while conducting a search of Plaintiffs home, police officers,
including Defendants Celentano and Laspino, arrested Plaintiff for various drug related charges.
(See Criminal complaint, Document 4 attached to ECF No. 17 at 3 5-36).

One of the charges filed

against Plaintiff was that he possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it within 1000 feet of
“Nathan Hale Elementary School” on August 28, 2009. (Id.). These charges were filed against
Plaintiff by way of a complaint signed by Defendant Celentano. (Id.). In August of 2012, the
Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office sought and obtained an indictment against Plaintiff for
numerous drug charges, including charges that Plaintiff possessed with the intent to distribute
cocaine within 1000 feet of a school on August 28, 2009. (Indictment, Document 4 attached to
ECF No. 17 at 38-42). The indictment, however, listed the particular school as the Columbus
Elementary School, rather than the Nathan Hale Elementary School. (Id. at 41). Neither the
complaint nor the indictment list the exact street address where Plaintiff was arrested or where the
underlying conduct occurred. (Id. at 35-42).
On May 24, 2013, Plaintiff pled guilty to some, but not all of the charges raised in that
indictment.

(See Judgment of Conviction, Document 4 attached to ECF No. 17 at 44-47).

Among the charges to which Plaintiff pled guilty, however, was count 14 of the indictment, which
charged Plaintiff with possession with intent to distribute cocaine within 1000 feet of Columbus
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Elementary School. (Id.). Plaintiff was sentenced for these guilty pleas on October 31, 2013.
(Id.). Plaintiff does not suggest that he has in any way invalidated these convictions. In his most

recent amended complaint and briefs, however, Plaintiff attempts to assert that he was never
indicted nor convicted of the charge Celentano raised in his complaint

—

possession of cocaine

within 1000 feet of Nathan Hale Elementary, and thus received a favorable termination as to that
charge. (See, e.g., ECF No. 12).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must ‘accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to
relief.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 30$ n. 3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 200$)). According to the Supreme

Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter’ to show that [its]
claim[s] [are] facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Dempster, 764 F.3d at 30$ (quoting, in full, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67$).
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B.

Analysis

1.

Whether the Court can consider the Documents Supplied by Defendants without

converting their motions into motions for summary judgement

Before turning to the merits of Defendants’ motions to dismiss, this Court must first
determine whether it can consider the documents provided by Defendants without first converting
their motions into motions for summary judgment. As the Third Circuit has explained,
“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the
allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indtts., Inc., 998 f.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993); see also Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.
2010). “However, an exception to the general nile is that a
‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’ may
be considered ‘without converting the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig.,
114 f.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Digital Equip.
Corp., $2 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996), superseded on other
grounds by PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)). “The rationale
underlying this exception is that the primary problem raised by
looking to documents outside the complaint lack of notice to the
plaintiff— is dissipated ‘[w]here the plaintiff has actual notice
and has relied upon these documents in framing the complaint.” Id.
(quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993)).
“[W]hat is critical is whether the claims in the complaint are ‘based’
on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic
document was explicitly cited.” Id.
—

.

Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit has likewise held that
publically available court transcripts which are directly related to the issues at hand may be
considered without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment as such

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transcripts qualify as matters of public record. See, e.g., Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268
(3d Cir. 2007).
In this matter, Defendants have submitted copies of the criminal complaint filed against
Plaintiff by Celentano in 2009, Plaintiffs 2012 indictment, Plaintiffs judgment of conviction on
that indictment, and a transcript of Plaintiffs plea hearing in the Superior Court of New Jersey in
which Plaintiff pled guilty to, inter alia, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1000
feet of Columbus Elementary School in support of their motions to dismiss.

In his various

amended complaints, Plaintiff has directly referenced, and indeed attached, portions of
Celentano’s complaint and his indictment in support of his claims. (ECF Nos. 9, 12). Plaintiff
has likewise directly referenced his plea hearing and guilty plea and sentence in his most recent
amendment. (ECF No. 12 at 2). Thus, given that Plaintiffs plea hearing is a matter of public
record, and Plaintiff has clearly provided and relied on the information contained in the complaint,
indictment, and judgment of conviction, this Court is free to consider the plea hearing transcript,
criminal complaint, indictment, and judgment of conviction in deciding these motions to dismiss
without having to convert them into motions for summary judgment. Schmidt, 770 f.3d at 249;
Sands, 502 F.3d at 268.

2. Plaintiffs Malicious Prosecution Claim Must be Dismissed

Following this Court’s prior screenings, only one claim remains in this case: Plaintiffs
claim that Defendants Celentano and Laspino maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his
constitutional rights, a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
5

§ 1983. In his brief in response to the

first motion to dismiss, however, Plaintiff specifically states that he does not oppose the motion to
dismiss as to Defendant Laspino, and essentially wishes to abandon that claim and seek redress
only against Defendant Celentano.

(ECF No. 23 at 1-3).

This Court will therefore dismiss

Plaintiffs claim as to Laspino without prejudice as Plaintiff has chosen to abandon that claim.
The question that remains before this Court, then, is whether that claim must also be dismissed as
to Celentano, the sole remaining Defendant.
As this Court previously explained to Plaintiff, a

§ 1983 claim for malicious prosecution

has the following elements:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in [the plaintiffs] favor; (3) the defendant
initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant
acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff
to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered [a] deprivation of liberty
consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.
Halsey v. Pfetffer, 750 f.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting, in full, Johnson v. Knorr, 477

F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007)). Thus, that the proceedings in question tenninated in Plaintiffs favor
is a requirement and prerequisite for the bringing of a malicious prosecution claim. Id.
In order for the conclusion of a criminal matter to qualify as a favorable tennination, the
“criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused.”
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009). Where the prior case terminated in a

manner not indicative of innocence, no favorable termination occurred. Id. The Third Circuit
has thus suggested that favorable termination can be shown where a grand jury refuses to indict,
the prosecution formally abandons the charges, the indictment or information is quashed, the
defendant is acquitted, or the defendant receives a favorable final order from the trial or appellate
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courts disposing of his case. Id.; see also Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002).
The favorable termination element, however, applies to a “proceeding” and not a particular charge
or offense, and the Third Circuit has therefore held that an acquittal on one charge will not satisfy
the favorable teniiination element where the criminal defendant was convicted on a different
charge arising out of the same conduct. Kossler, 564 F.3d at 187-89.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed as to
Defendant Celentano because Plaintiff ultimately pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
within 1000 feet of a school, albeit Columbus Elementary rather than Nathan Hale Elementary
school, and thus was, at the very least, convicted of a charge which arose out of the same conduct
as that raised in Celentano’s complaint

—

Plaintiffs possession of cocaine when he was arrested

following a search of his home on August 2$, 2009. As a result, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs
case did not terminate in a fashion indicative of his innocence, and he did not receive a favorable
termination under the rubric set forth in Kossler.
Plaintiff in turn argues that he was never actually indicted based on the events claimed in
Celentano’s complaint, that Celentano’s complaint deals with an alleged fiction that Plaintiff was
arrested at his home rather than in another location several blocks away, and that he could not be
in two places at once. Plaintiffs argument rests entirely on his assertions that he was actually
arrested at this other location, that Celentano’s complaint is based on this other location, and that
the indictment instead dealt with his allegedly fabricated arrest at his home. Initially, this Court
must note that neither the complaint nor the indictment specify the place at which Plaintiff
possessed with intent to distribute cocaine, instead both specify that he did so on August 28, 2009,
within 1000 feet of a school. The two documents, do, however, specify two different schools,
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which are about a mile apart from one another, Nathan Hale Elementary and Columbus
Elementary, both of which are in Carteret, New Jersey. (Document 4 attached to ECF No. 17 at
3 5-42). In pleading guilty to the count of the indictment charging him with possession within
1000 feet of Columbus Elementary, Plaintiff admitted to both the possession and his having been
within 1000 feet of the school, and thus essentially admitted to his having been arrested at his
home rather than the other location, which Plaintiff essentially admits in his briefing in stating that
his home, and not the other location, are within 1000 feet of Columbus Elementary. (Document
3 attached to ECF No. 36 at 44-45).
Plaintiffs argument rises and falls with his contention that the complaint and his guilty
plea concerned entirely separate events.

Plaintiff contends that Count 12 of the indictment,

possession with intent to distribute, dealt with the events charged by Celentano, but that he pled to
Count 14, which charged him with being within 1000 feet of a school, which he now contends
never happened and to which he only pled guilty because he was forced to by the alleged
underhanded actions by Defendants. Plaintiffs contentions, however, are utterly without support
in Celentano’s complaint and the indictment.

Celentano’s complaint charges Plaintiff with

various crimes occurring on August 28, 2009.

The indictment charges these same crimes,

including drug possession, possession of a weapon, and possession of a police scanner, on that
same date. Other than the change in the name of the school charged and some of the weights
involved, they clearly deal with the same pattern of events, and thus the complaint and indictment
concern the same basic conduct. Plaintiff pled guilty to one of the charges arising out of that
conduct

—

possession with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school

—

and thus has not

received a favorable termination as his criminal matter did not tenriinate in a maimer suggesting
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his innocence. See Kossler, 564 f.3d at 187-89. That Celentano may have named the wrong
school in his original complaint does not change that outcome. In making his arguments, Plaintiff
attempts to parse his indictment and the prior complaint in a way which splits hairs entirely too
finely, and makes distinctions which are not present in the documents themselves.

Because

Plaintiff pled guilty to the possession within 1000 feet of a school charge, he did not receive a
favorable termination, and his claim must therefore be dismissed without prejudice at this time.1
Indeed, in making his argument, Plaintiff exposes that his challenge goes directly to the
heart of the logic behind requiring the favorable tenilination element. In opposing the motion to
dismiss, he specifically states that his claims are based on the allegation that he was not actually
arrested at his home, but rather in a different location, and that his conviction was based off of
false information, false reports, and false facts presented to a grand jury placing him at his home
at the time of his arrest. Plaintiff essentially directly alleges that his entire criminal prosecution
was the result of false facts asserted by Celentano, and argues facts which, if proven true, would
undermine the validity of his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of
a school, implicating the Heck doctrine which resulted in the adoption of the favorable termination
requirement in the first instance. See Kossler, 564 F.3d at 187-89; see also Heck v. Thtrnphrev,
512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994). Thus, it is clear from Plaintiffs complaints, the documents Plaintiff
and Defendants have provided which this Court may consider as explained above, and Plaintiffs
own allegations in opposition to the motions to dismiss, that Plaintiff has not received a favorable
termination.

This Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiffs sole remaining claim, malicious

Because the Court reaches this conclusion, it need not address Defendants argument that, if
Plaintiff did receive a favorable termination in May 2013, his claims are time barred.
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prosecution as to Defendants Laspino and Celentano, without prejudice for failure to state a claim
for which relief may be granted.

3. Plaintiffs request for leave to file an interlocutory appeal

Also before this Court is Plaintiffs request (ECF No. 35) for leave to file an interlocutory
appeal of this Court’s screening Order (ECF No. 3) which dismissed Plaintiffs non-malicious
prosecution claims as time barred.

Because this Court has now disposed of Plaintiffs last

remaining claim by determining that Plaintiff has not received a favorable termination and thus
cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution until such time as he has had his guilty plea
invalidated, Plaintiffs request for leave to file an interlocutory appeal is moot as the order
accompanying this opinion will essentially be a final order and Plaintiff will no longer require
leave to appeal this Court’s orders as to his current complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismiss
all of Plaintiffs remaining claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief
may be granted, and will deny Plaintiffs request for leave to file an interlocutory appeal as moot.
An appropriate order follows.

H9rf7Jose Linares,
States District Judge
?‘Pited
.

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