DAVIS et al v. YATES et al

Filing 38

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 06/07/2017. (ek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DARRYL DAVIS, et al.,
Civ. No, 156943 (KM) (JBC)

Plaintiffs,
V.

OPINION

SHERRY YATES, et al.,
Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs, Darryl Davis and Steven Grohs, are civilly committed persons currently
residing at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in Avenel, New Jersey. They are proceeding pro

se with an amended civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983. Presently pending

before this Court is the motion of defendants Sherry Yates and Sarah Davis (the “movants”) for
partial dismissal of the amended complaint. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in
whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party
bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d
744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must take all allegations in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Worth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts inc., 140 F.3d
The movants also cite to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l),which provides for dismissal of a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, based on the arguments presented in their
motion, it appears clear that the movants are bringing their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Phillips v.

County

o/Allegheny, 5 I 5 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.

2008) (“reasonable inferences” principle not undermined by later Supreme Court Twombly case,
infra).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed
factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
“entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiffs right to relief above a
speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also Umland v.
PLAJ’/CO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has “facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcrofl v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[tihe plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement’

...

it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009).

Where, as here, plaintiffs are proceeding pro Se, the complaint is “to be liberally
construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).
Nevertheless, it must meet some minimal standard. “While a litigant’s pro se status requires a
court to construe the allegations in the complaint liberally, a litigant is not absolved from
complying with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds
pro se.” Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

2

III.

BACKGROUND

The amended complaint arises from allegedly inadequate heating in the STU, particularly
in the winter of 2014—15. The amended complaint names as defendants Sherry Yates
Administrator at the STU, and Sarah Davis

—

—

Superintendent at the STU.
2

Plaintiffs state that the heating system was activated for their housing unit in October 15,
2014. Right away there were problems with the system. Among the problems were leaking pipes,
formation of stalactites, and flooding. When the steam pipes failed, this led to freezing air
entering the housing unit through the ventilation system. At one point, the ventilation system was
shut down. This led to twenty-degree air being blown directly into the housing unit through a
vent. Because of the cold wind from the vents, housing unit officers brought in space heaters and
placed them near their desks.
On or about December 23, 2014, Sarah Davis visited the housing unit. Mr. Grohs then
complained to her about the temperature of the unit. Ms. Davis said she was aware of the
problem and returned with woolen blankets to be distributed to residents who requested them.
Grohs then complained that he was allergic to wool. Davis told Grohs that she would look into
providing him with a cotton blanket, but he was never provided with one.
With respect to Sherry Yates, plaintiffs allege that:
During the [rn]onths of December 2013 through to March 2014,
and when plaintiffs’ assigned housing unit was freezing cold,
Defendant Yates visited the housing unit several times, for reasons
unknown, and she signed the daily log book or her visits to South
housing unit were otherwise recorded in the same.
(Dkt. No. 31 at p. 11)

2

The amended complaint also names a John Doe defendant.
3

The amended complaint alleges that Ms. Davis and Ms. Yates had to have known that
outside freezing air was entering the housing unit. For example, plaintiffs allege that, “[wihen
1)efendants Yates and Davis were at the officer’s desk, they would have had to see the housing
unit officer’s personal space-heaters, that they were using, as they were in plain sight.” (Id. at
1
p. 6)
In Count I, plaintiffs assert that the movants are liable under the Fourteenth Amendment
for their failure to provide safe conditions of confinement. In Count II, plaintiffs allege that the
movants are liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for their abuse of power based on the
conditions of confinement. Finally, in Count III, plaintiffs allege that defendant Yates is liable
under a theory of supervisory liability. The amended complaint seeks damages, as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.
Davis and Yates have filed a partial motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Both
movants seek dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim. Additionally, Yates seeks a
dismissal of all claims for damages claims against her because the amended complaint fails to
allege her personal involvement. Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition to the partial
motion to dismiss, and the movants have filed a reply. The matter is fully briefed and poised for
decision.
IV.

DISCUSSION

The movants make two points in their partial motion to dismiss. First, the movants allege
that the Count II fails to state a substantive due process claim against them under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the allegations do not set forth facts that “shock the conscience.” Second, defendant
Yates argues that the claims for monetary damages against her should be dismissed because
plaintiffs have failed to allege that she was personally involved in the purported violations.

4

A.

Count 11
Count II of the amended complaint asserts that the defendants are liable under the

Fourteenth Amendment for their “abuse of power.” Both sides interpret this as a substantive due
process claim, and spend a great deal of time in their briefs discussing whether the rnovants’
alleged actions (or inaction) “shocked the conscience.” The standards governing civilly
committed persons such as plaintiffs, however, are more specific. My prior opinion in this case
stated the applicable standards at length:
A conditions-of-confinement claim brought by a civilly committed
person is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324—25 (1982) (concluding that
Fourteenth Amendment rather than Eighth Amendment applies to
involuntarily committed patients claim of safe conditions of
confinement);Artisv. McCann,No. 11—3613, 2013 WL 2481251,
at *3 (D.N.J. June 10, 2013) (stating that the rights of involuntarily
committed patients “more appropriately arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment” as opposed to the Eighth Amendment). The
Fourteenth Amendment requires that committed persons not be
subjected to conditions that amount to punishment, Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979); Southerlandv. Cni’y. ofHudson, 523 F.
App’x 919, 921 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that the central question in
deciding whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim is whether the
conditions constituted “punishment”), or exceed the proper bounds
of professional discretion, see Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 32 1—22.
A central issue, then, is whether the conditions of confinement
cross the line that separates institutional administration from
punishment:
A court must decide whether the disability is
imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether
it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an
expressed intent to punish on the part of the
detention facility officials, that determination
generally will turn on whether [it has] an alternative
purpose and whether it appears excessive in
relation to that purpose.... Thus, if a particular
condition or restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
...

5

objective, it does not, without more, amount to
“punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or
condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court may
permissibly infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not be
constitutionally inflicted upon [civilly committed
inmates].
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538—39; see also Hubbardv. Taylor (Hubbard I,
399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), Hubbard v.
Taylor (fIubbardJI, 538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). To
constitute punishment, a deprivation must be both serious and
intentional:
Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both
objective and subjective components. As the
Supreme Court explained in Wilson v. Setter, 501
U.S. 294, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed. 2d271 (1991),
the objective component requires an inquiry into
whether “the deprivation [was] sufficiently serious”
and the subjective component asks whether “the
officials act{ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Id. at 298, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S. Ct. 2321,
115 L.Ed. 2d 271. The Supreme Court did not
abandon this bipartite analysis in Bell, but rather
allowed for an inference of mens rea where the
restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, or where the
restriction is excessive, even if it would accomplish
a legitimate governmental objective.
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Bell,
441 U.S. at 53 8-39 & n. 20). As to the “objective component,” the
court must consider “whether these conditions cause inmates to
endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended
period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in
relation to the purposes assigned to them.” Hubbard IJ 538 F.3d at
233 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That analysis
must encompass the totality of the circumstances within an
institution. See Id. (“In conducting this excessiveness analysis, we
do not assay separately each of the institutional practices, but
[instead] look to the totality of the conditions.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). See Cruz v. Main, No. 10—5605,
2011 WL 3625068, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2011) (analyzing civilly
committed plaintiffs conditions of confinement claim using a
totality of the circumstances analysis); see also Daniels v. Taylor,
6

No. 13—5510, 2014 WL3955372,at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2014)
(“In analyzing whether condition of confinement violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, a court considers the totality of the
circumstances within an institution.”) (citing Garcia v. Lancaster
Cnty. Prison, No. 13—2018, 2014 WL 176608, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
15, 2014) (citing Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 160; Jones v. Diamond,
636 F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981), overruled in part on other
grounds, int’l Woodworkers ofAm, AFL—CIO v. Champion Int’l
Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Wright v. All.
Cnty. .Justice Facility, No. 10—6101, 2010 WL 5059561, at *6
(D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2010) (considering the totality of the alleged
deprivations to determine whether plaintiff had stated a Fourteenth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim).
...

Davis v. Yates, No. 15-6943, 2016 WL 5508809, at *5

(D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016).

As to temperature conditions, I wrote:
[Plaintiffsj ‘“have a right to adequate ventilation and a right to be
free from extreme hot and cold temperatures[,] ‘{b]ut the
Constitution does not give inmates the right to be free from all
discomfort.” Kates v. Bledsoe, No. 11-0391, 2013 WL 4417656,
at ** (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2013) (quoting Shelby Cnty. Jail Inmates
v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1986)), afj°d, 547 F.
Appx. 93 (3d Cir. 2013); Crosby v. Georgakopoulos, No. 03-5232,
2005 WL 1514209, at *6 (D.N.J. June 24, 2005) (“Prisoners have a
right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from extreme hot and
cold temperatures.”) (quoting Freeman v. Berge, No. 03-0021,
2003 WL 23272395, at *12 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 17, 2003)).
...

Davis, 2016 WL 5508809, at *7
I find that Count II of the amended complaint sufficiently states a Fourteenth Amendment
conditions-of-confinement substantive due process claim. The plaintiffs complain of the freezing
temperatures in their housing unit. They also describe how the freezing temperatures affected
them personally, alleging that they would shiver uncontrollably for hours and days at a time, and
that they suffered severe dry and cracked skin as well as acute pain to their lower back and legs.
(See Dkt. No. 31 at p. 2) That is a sufficient allegation. See Yelardy v. Taylor, No. 03-1032,
1
2006 WL 680660, at *9 (D. Del. Mar. 14, 2006) (“Yelardy alleges that his cell is so cold he is in

7

constant pain, suffering from ‘aching bones,’ for which he was prescribed medication. He further
alleges that his pain is exacerbated by the fact that he was not been able to procure enough
blankets to keep him warm. This combination of conditions potentially amounts to punishment.”)
(citing Crosby, 2005 WL 1514209, at *6).
Sarah Davis is adequately alleged to have had personal knowledge of the freezing
conditions, in that she visited the unit and indeed delivered blankets. Yates’s personal
3
knowledge and involvement are adequately alleged as well. See Part IV.B infra.
,

I make no factual findings as to the existence or severity of these conditions, or the
defendants’ liability for them. I rule only that the amended complaint, if taken as true,
sufficiently alleges a Fourteenth Amendment claim against the movants. The motion to dismiss
4
Count II of the amended complaint is therefore denied.
B. Defendant Yates’s Personal Involvement
Defendant Yates separately argues that claims for monetary damages against her should
be dismissed because the amended complaint does not allege that she was personally involved in
the acts alleged. As I noted in the prior opinion, such an allegation of involvement is required:
[A] § 1983 plaintiff cannot rely solely on a respondeat superior
theory. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d
Cir. 2005) (“Section 1983 liability cannot be found solely on the
basis of respondeat superior”). Instead, a plaintiff must allege that
a supervisor had a personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. See
Rode v. Dellaczrete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
“Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
I do not suggest, of course, that Ms. Davis should be faulted for attempting to help the inmates by
delivering blankets to them; quite the opposite. The issue for present purposes is simply one of
knowledge.
Although no one raises the point, Count II might well be duplicative of Count 1. As this matter
proceeds, the claims might be streamlined.
8

With respect to supervisors, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has
recognized that “there are two theories of
supervisory liability, one under which supervisors
can be liable if they established and maintained a
policy, practice or custom which directly caused the
constitutional harm, and another under which they
can be liable if they participated in violating
plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or,
as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129
n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation and alteration marks
omitted).
Parkell v. Danberg, No. 14-1667, 2016 WL 4375620, at *9 (3d
Cir. Aug. 17, 2016); see also AM ex rel. IMK v. Luzerne Cnty.
Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
Davis, 2016 WL 5508809, at *7
1 find that the conditions-of-confinement allegations of the amended complaint
adequately allege that Yates was personally involved. In the original complaint, the only
allegation of Yates’s personal involvement was that she “was aware that since October, 2014, the
heating system for the South Unit was in a state of disrepair and otherwise was not functioning
properly.” (Dkt. No. 1-1 at p. 1) 1 found that allegation to be too general and conclusory to
1
make out a plausible factual claim.
The amended complaint, however, adds more specific allegations against Yates. For
example, the amended complaint states as follows:
During the Months of December 2013 through to March 2014, and
when Plaintffs’ assigned housing unit was freezing cold,
Defendant Yates visited the housing unit several times, for reasons
unknown, and she signed to daily log book or her visits to South
housing unit were otherwise recorded in same.

9

(Dkt. No. 31 at p.1 1 (emphasis added)) To be sure, the dates at the beginning of this paragraph
(December 2013—March 2014) are outside the relevant period (the winter of 2014—15). The
paragraph states, however, that Yates visited the housing unit on specified dates and when the
housing unit was freezing cold. I read this paragraph liberally, but admittedly it could be clearer.
That paragraph is supplemented by other factual allegations, which are also directed at
Yates’s personal awareness of the freezing conditions on the housing unit. For example, the
amended complaint alleges that housing unit officers brought in space heaters because frigid air
was blowing from the exhaust vents. (See Dkt. No. 31 at p.9) While at the officers’ desks, Yates
would allegedly have seen the space heaters, which were in plain sight; if so, she could readily
have inferred that the residents, too, required some protection from the cold. (See Dkt. No. 31 at
1
p. 6)
The amended complaint sufficiently alleges Yates’s personal involvement, based on her
position of authority and circumstances suggesting her knowledge of the freezing cold
temperatures in the housing unit. Yates’s motion to dismiss the damages claims against her will
therefore be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendants Sherry Yates and Sarah Davis for
partial dismissal of the amended complaint is denied. An appropriate order will be entered.
DATED: June 7, 2017

KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

10