SANDERS v. NEWARK NJ POLICE DEPARTMENT 4TH DISTRICT
Filing
6
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 11/18/15. (sr, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MICHEAL SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 15-73 11 (KM) (JBC)
:
OPINION
V.
NEWARK N.J. POLiCE DEPARTMENT 4TH
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Micheal Sanders, is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Bayside
State Prison in Leesburg, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint under
42 U.S.C.
§
1983. This matter was administratively terminated without prejudice because Mr.
Sanders had not paid the filing fee or submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Now he has filed an application to proceed informapauperis. The Clerk will therefore be
ordered to reopen the case, and Mr. Sanders’s application to proceed informapauperis will be
granted.
The Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
l915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A
to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be permitted to proceed
past screening except as to one defendant.
II.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of the complaint are taken as true for purposes of this Opinion. Mr.
Sanders names several defendants in the complaint: (1) Officer Walker; (2) Lt. Gonzales; (3)
l)etective Marshal; (4) Detective Bouie; and (5) the Newark NJ Police Department
th
4
District.
The claim is that the individual defendants used excessive force in connection with Sanders’s
arrest.
The complaint alleges that Mr. Sanders was arrested for burglary on October 19, 2013, in
Newark, New Jersey. 1-le was placed under arrest and handcuffed without resisting. Nevertheless,
the named defendant officers allegedly used excessive force against him. Mr. Sanders alleges
that Officer Walker hit him a dozen times; Detective Bouie kicked him eight times; 1)etective
Marshal stamped on him ten times; and Lieutenant Gonzales punched him ten times. Mr. Sanders
suffered injury to his right eye, lost eighty percent of his vision and sustained multiple fractures.
Emergency surgery was required.
Mr. Sanders seeks money damages.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983 for certain violations of
his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
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Thus, to state a claim for relief under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege first, the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.
Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104—134,
§ 801—810, 110 Slat. 1321—66
to 1321—77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding informapauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B),
§ 1915A(h), or brings a
§ 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that fbr dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§ l997e(c)(l)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in
AshcroJi v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court’s
screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPjvIC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
3
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, inc. v. Deinpsler, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir.20l4)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U .S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.20l3) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Individual Defendants
Mr. Sanders claims that the individual defendants used excessive force in the course of
arresting him. Claims of excessive force during arrest are governed by the Fourth Amendment.
See Rivas v. City ofPassaic, 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). The use of force will be analyzed to determine whether it was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. That reasonableness inquiry
“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Id. at 396.
The complaint alleges that the named officer defendants hit, punched and kicked Mr.
Sanders, even though he did not resist arrest and was handcuffed. He suffered fractures and loss
4
of vision. Those allegations are sufficient to permit Mr. Sanders’ excessive force claims against
the individual defendants to proceed past screening.
B. Newark NJ Police Department
th
4
District
The complaint alleges that the individual officer defendants worked at the Newark Police
Department
District. It contains no other allegations as to why the 4’ District should be held
liable.
A New Jersey municipal police department is not technically the proper entity to be sued;
it is but a department of city government. As this Court has stated:
A New Jersey municipal police department is not an independent
entity with the capacity to be sue and be sued, but only “an
executive and enforcement function of municipal government.”
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14—118. The case law under Section 1983
uniformly holds that the proper defendant is therefore the
municipality itself, not the police department. See Jackson v. City
ofErie Police Dep’t, 570 F. App’x 112, 114 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (“We further agree with the District Court that the police
department was not a proper party to this action. Although local
governmental units may constitute ‘persons’ against whom suit
may be lodged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a city police department is
a governmental sub-unit that is not distinct from the municipality
of which it is a part.”) (citation omitted); see also Bonenberger v.
Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (Court “treat[s]
the municipality and its police department as a single entity for
purposes of section 1983 liability”); Michaels v. State ofNew
Jersey, 955 F. Supp. 315, 317n.1 (D.N.J. 1996) (Newark police
department not a proper party).
Santa Maria v. City of Elizabeth (Ni), No. 15-3243, 2015 WL 2414706, at *5 (D.N.J. May 20,
2015).
Even if I were to construe the complaint as being asserted against the City of Newark,
however, it would not survive screening. In a Section 1983 action, a municipality cannot be held
vicariously liable for the acts of its officers via respondeat superior. See Rode i’. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). And the complaint fails to make any allegations of an
unconstitutional policy or custom that would create municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’l of
Social Servs. New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnly., 757 F.3d
99, 110—11 (3d Cir. 2014) (complaint must plead facts to support Monell liability); McTernan v.
5
For these reasons, Mr. Sanders’s complaint fails to state a claim against the Newark
th
Police Department 4 District are invalid as as a matter of law. The claims agains the
t
Newark
Police Department
th
4
District will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint will be permitted to proceed against the
individual named defendants. The complaint will be dismissed with prejudice agains the
t
th
Newark NJ Police Department 4 District for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be
granted. An appropriate Order will be entered.
Dated: November 18, 2015
/1((,!
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Jud
City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating to satisfy pleading standa
rd for
Monell claim, complaint “must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly
that custom
or policy was”); Karnio v. Borough of Darby, No. 14-2797, 2014 WL 4763831, *6
at
(E.D. Pa.
Sept. 25, 2014) (same). So even a claim against the City would be dismissed, albeit
without
prejudice.
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