MONCLOVA v. US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 8/11/2016. (ld, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
MARIELIZ MONCLOVA
:
:
Civil Action No. 15-7383 (MCA)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
:
ASSOCIATION, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
____________________________________:
ARLEO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant Residential Home Funding
Corporation’s (“RHF”) motion to dismiss pursuant, Dkt. No. 14, and Defendant U.S. Bank
National Association, as Trustee, on behalf of the Holders of CSMC Mortgage-Backed PassThrough Certificates, Series 2007-1 (“U.S. Bank”) motion to dismiss and to join RHF’s motion to
dismiss, Dkt. No. 18. Pro se Plaintiff Marieliz Monclova (“Plaintiff” or “Monclova”) opposes the
motions. Dkt. No. 20. The Court has decided the motions on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s 164-paragraph Complaint contains various conclusory allegations, isolated
citations to case law and statutes, and is overall difficult to follow. On September 19, 2006,
Plaintiff entered into a Mortgage and Note with RHF, the original lender, for property located at
138 Third Avenue, Newark, New Jersey 07104 (the “Property”). Compl. ¶ 17, Dkt. No. 1; see
also id. Ex. A, Mortgage; id. Ex. B, Note.
RHF sold and transferred the Mortgage to CSMC
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Mortgage-Backed Trust 2007 (“CSMC”). Id. Ex. D. U.S. Bank serves as Trustee for CSMC. Id.
At some point, the Property was foreclosed upon and on February 3, 2015, U.S. Bank purchased
the Property at a Sheriff’s sale. Id. Ex. C, Notice of Foreclosure Sale/Auction. Plaintiff filed this
Complaint on October 9, 2015. Compl. It appears that a majority of this action challenges the
validity of the underlying foreclosure proceeding in the state court. Plaintiff seeks to set aside the
foreclosure sale and enjoin Defendants from evicting her. Id. ¶¶ 1, 28, 35, 43; see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 25,
33, 34, Ex. C (challenging Defendant’s standing to foreclose); id. ¶ 28 (claiming wrongful
foreclosure based on dispute of title and ownership of property). Plaintiff asserts four causes of
action: (1) “Truth and Lending Act Disclosure Non-Compliance, Unauthorized Use, Failure to
Comply with Notice Requirements,” id. ¶¶ 45-71; (2) “Accounting—Failure to Perfect Security
Interest Per U.C.C,” id. ¶¶ 72-105; (3) “Actual/Constructive Fraud/Attempted Fraud, Trespass on
the Case,” id. ¶¶ 106-143; and (4) “Injunctive Relief,” id. ¶¶ 144-164. Plaintiff makes a demand
for the following relief: (1) void the foreclosure sale; (2) stay/void any foreclosure auction sale;
(3) stay/void any warrant to evict; (4) permanently enjoin Defendants from foreclosing and
evicting Plaintiff; (5) find lack of standing to foreclose; (6) vacate the non-judicial foreclosure
default and order against Plaintiff; (7) punitive damages in the amount of $329,600 for
fraud/attempted fraud by concealment; and (8) costs of suit incurred by Plaintiff. Id.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the facts
in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). Dismissal is inappropriate even where “it appears
unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.” Id. The
facts alleged, however, must be “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
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(2007). The allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id. Accordingly, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it provides a
sufficient factual basis such that it states a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
For allegations sounding in fraud, Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading standard:
namely, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake,” but
“[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The circumstances of the fraud must be stated with sufficient particularity to
put a defendant on notice of the “precise misconduct with which [it is] charged.” Lum v. Bank of
Am., 361 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2004). “To satisfy this standard, the plaintiff must plead or allege
the date, time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure of
substantiation into a fraud allegation.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir.
2007).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and holds
him to a less stringent standard than those filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, the “Court need not . . . credit a pro se plaintiff’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions.’” D’Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, No. 10-4558, 2010 WL 3719623, at *1 (D.N.J.
Sept. 10, 2010). The Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported
conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d
187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations and “threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice”
to prevent a motion to dismiss. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
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III.
ANALYSIS
RHF and U.S. Bank move to dismiss the entire Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim. U.S. Bank also argued, inter alia, that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction based on various preclusionary doctrines, including the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res
judicata, collateral estoppel, and the Entire Controversy Doctrine. Dkt. No. 22. The Court agrees.
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case based on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts “from exercising appellate
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments” because such appellate jurisdiction rests solely with
the United States Supreme Court. In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Lance
v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006)). Relevant here, a claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman “if the
federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can
only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with an issue adjudicated by a state court
when (1) the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered
in order to grant the requested relief, or (2) the federal court must take an action that would negate
the state court’s judgment. Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined with the foreclosure proceeding in state
court. Plaintiff’s claims would require the Court to take action that would negate the state court’s
judgment. For example, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants lacked standing to foreclose, and that
they did not have a valid interest in the property. In her TILA claim, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ failure to make certain disclosures renders the Mortgage “null and void.” Compl. ¶
50. Plaintiff also seeks to set aside the foreclosure sale and permanently enjoin Defendant from
foreclosing. Time and again, the Third Circuit has held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
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federal courts from providing relief, as here, that would invalidate a state court foreclosure
decision. See, e.g., Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 152 (3d Cir.
2008); Ayres–Fountain v. E. Sav. Bank, 153 F. App’x 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2005); Gibbs v. Gov’t Nat’l
Mortg. Assoc., No. 15-2601, Dkt. No. 37 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2016); In re Madera, 586 F.3d at 232
(holding that Rooker–Feldman barred mortgagors’ TILA claims for rescission of mortgage, given
that favorable judgment on rescission claims would necessarily negate state-court foreclosure
judgment). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
B. Failure to State a Claim
To the extent any of these claims would not be barred by Rooker-Feldman, they still fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count One is entitled “Truth in Lending Act Disclosure Non-Compliance,” “Unauthorized
Use,” and “Failure to Comply with Notice Requirements.” Id. ¶¶ 45-71. Plaintiff claims that
Defendants failed to disclose facts and terms in the Mortgage and Note, used false and misleading
information, failed to inform her of the meaning of words, transfers of interests, and payment of
fees, in violation of 12 C.F.R. 226.17(c)(1). Id. ¶¶ 48-50. Next, Plaintiff alleges Defendants
fraudulently concealed and failed to give proper notice of the true terms and conditions of the loan.
Id. ¶ 55. She also claims that Defendants failed to give her proper notice where the note was
recorded. Id. ¶ 56. She also alleges that the foreclosed amount is invalid. Id. ¶ 60.
Plaintiff’s TILA allegations are vague, wholly conclusory, and thus insufficient to state a
claim. It is unclear what facts or terms were not disclosed in the Mortgage and Note, and why
such nondisclosure was improper. Plaintiff also asserts general allegations of fraud against
Defendants that fail to comply with Rule 9(b). Finally, there are no allegations, other than
conclusory statements, stating or suggesting that Plaintiff relied to her detriment on the alleged
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TILA violations. See Vallies v. Sky Bank, 591 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2009)(“In the context of
TILA disclosure violations, a creditor’s failure to properly disclose must cause actual damages;
that is, without detrimental reliance on faulty disclosures (or no disclosure), there is no loss (or
actual damage).”). Count One, therefore, fails to state a claim.
Count Two is for “Accounting—Failure to Perfect Security Interest Per U.C.C.” Compl.
¶¶ 72-105. It is unclear from this count exactly what Plaintiff is claiming. Plaintiff has not cited
any statute or case law—and the Court cannot find any—that creates “Accounting” as an
independent cause of action. 1
Count Three is for “Actual/Constructive Fraud/Attempted Fraud, Trespass on the Case.”
Compl. ¶¶ 106-143. Plaintiff claims that Defendants made false statements by knowingly using
false or misleading information and by concealing the true nature of the transaction and its
connections to a securitization process. Id. ¶¶ 111-131. This count, like the others, is difficult to
comprehend, and appears to assert general allegations of fraud. The allegations of fraud are not
pled with particularity and therefore fail to comply with Rule 9(b).
These allegations also fail to state a claim. The fraud claims are all tort claims based solely
on the contractual relationship created by the Mortgage and Note. The economic loss doctrine
“prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement only flows
from a contract.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 66 F.3d 604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995);
see also Perkins v. Washington Mut., FSB, 655 F. Supp. 2d 463, 471 (D.N.J. 2009) (negligence
claim barred); Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v Bergen Brunswig Drug Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565
(D.N.J. 2002) (fraud claim barred). This Count is therefore defective as a matter of law under the
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To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that the Note was not properly transferred, or that Defendants
did not have a valid interest in the loan to foreclose, the claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman, as
discussed supra.
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economic loss doctrine.
Count Four is for “Injunctive Relief.” Compl. ¶¶ 144-164. In this Count, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief against Defendants and an Order setting aside the foreclosure sale, and enjoining
Defendants from foreclosing on and evicting Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 149. Injunctive relief is not a cause
of action, but only a remedy. See Educ. Impact, Inc. v. Danielson, No. 14-937, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9467, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2015); Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91
(D.N.J. 2011). Accordingly, this claim fails.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 14, 18, are
GRANTED. Given that the Court doesn’t have subject matter jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff’s
claim, it would be futile to allow her to re-plead. The Complaint is therefore DISMISSED with
prejudice. This case is hereby closed. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.
Date: August 11, 2016
/s Madeline Cox Arleo__________
MADELINE COX ARLEO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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