MURNANE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 25

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 8/21/18. (cm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHRISTOPHER MURNANE,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 15-7704 (KM)

vs.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,

OPINION

Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

I write primarily for the parties and thus do not explain the entire factual
and procedural history. The plaintiff, Christopher Murnane, was denied 551
benefits and appealed that decision to this court. On February 10, 2017, I
issued an opinion and an order affirming the denial of benefits by the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALl’). (ECF nos. 20, 21.)
On February 20, 2017, Mr. Murnane made a motion for reconsideration.
(ECF no. 22.) Mr. Murnane’s counsel explained that she had obtained approval
from the U.S. Attorney for an extension to file a reply brief in the briefing for
the initial appeal but that this request for extension accidentally did not get
filed. (Id. at 1.) As a result, the Court’s order and opinion was issued before the
reply brief could be considered by the court.
Mr. Murnane’s motion for reconsideration essentially lays out the
arguments he would have made in that brief. Because those arguments would
not have altered the result, the motion is denied.

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LEGAL STANDARD

I.

The standards governing a motion for reconsideration are well settled.
See generally D.N.J. Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary
remedy,” to be granted “sparingly.” NL Indus. Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). Generally, reconsideration is granted in
three scenarios: (1) when there has been an intervening change in the law;
(2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when necessary to correct a
clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See North River Ins. Co. v.
CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995); Carmichael v.
Everson, No. 3-cv-4787, 2004 WL 1587894, at *1 (D.N.J. May 21, 2004). Local
Rule 7.1(i) requires such a motion to specifically identify “the matter or
controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge
has overlooked.” Id.; see also Egloff v. New Jersey AirNat’l Guard, 684 F. Supp.
1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988). Evidence or arguments that were available at the
time of the original decision will not support a motion for reconsideration.
Damiano v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., g75 F. Supp. 623, 636 (D.N.J. 1997); see
also North River Ins. Co., 52 F.3d at 1218; Bapu Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
No. 7-cv-5938, 2010 WL 5418972, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2010) (citing P.
Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J.
2001)).
II.

DISCUSSION

In general, Mr. Murnane argues that (a) the Commissioner did not obtain
any relevant, updated documents before Mr. Mumane’s hearing or before
review by the Appeals Council; and (b) the Commissioner failed to evaluate Mr.
Murnane in accordance with SSR 1 l-2p.
A. Failure to Obtain Relevant Documents
Mr. Murnane argues that certain documents were necessary to evaluate
his SSI claim but that the Commissioner failed to update these documents
after March 2013. These documents include an updated work history, earnings
records, and other work-related documents. Mr. Murnane further argues that
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the Commissioner relied too much on his own self-reported work history,
rather than on these documents. This, he says, led to the Commissioner’s
being unable to fully or fairly evaluate whether he engaged in “substantial
gainful activity.” He particularly takes issue with the Commissioner’s negative
assessment of his credibility regarding his own work history.
Nowhere does Mr. Murnane cite authority that the Commissioner was
obligated to update these documents after their initial submission. In fact, he
concedes that he had the burden to obtain at least one of those documents (the
State DVR, Arc Project HIRE records). (ECF no. 22, at 4 n.3.) He also cites no
authority for the proposition that the Commissioner was not entitled to rely on
Mr. Murnane’s self-reported work history. Further, as I explored in the
previous opinion, the AW’s decision regarding Mr. Murnane’s “residual
functional capacity” was supported by other evidence, including a state agency
psychologist and the consultative examiner. (ECF no. 20, at 8.)
I therefore reject this first ground for reconsideration.
B. Failure to Adhere to SSR 11-2p
Mr. Murnane argues that the AW failed to evaluate his disability in
accordance with SSR ll-2p, Titles Hand XVI: Documenting and Evaluating
Disability in YoungAdults, 2011 WL 4055665. SSR l1-2p requires that special
considerations apply to the evaluation of the conditions of individuals between
18 and 25 years of age. In the previous opinion, I found that “the AU gave due
consideration to all of the evidence, made findings, and gave reasons for them”
and that the AU supported the determination of Mr. Murnane’s intellectual
disability “with specific findings based on the evidence in the record as a
whole.” (ECF no. 20, at 8—9.) Taking another look at the record, the AU
considered factors particular to young adults and appropriately evaluated
them, together with other factors. (See, e.g., R. 24—26 (evaluating plaintiffs age,
educational history, school records, and work history).) Mr. Mumane, in trying
to show that the AU failed to adhere to this standard, cites evidence, such as
the testimony of Mr. Murnane’s mother, that was in the record and was
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considered by the AW in the decision. I do not find the AW failed to adhere to
SSR ll-2p.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Murnane’s motion for reconsideration is
denied. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

Dated: August 21, 2018

t

j
K4WIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

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