CHARLOT v. LYNCH et al

Filing 15

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 3/21/16. (DD, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1)1STRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VILAIRE CHARLOT,
Petitioner,

Civ. No. 15-7706 (KM)

V.

WARDEN CHARLES GREEN,

OPINION

Respondent.
The petitioner, Vilaire Chariot, is an immigration detainee currently lodged at the Essex
County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a petitio
n for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

2241 challenging his continued immigration

detention. On January 20, 2016, this Court denied Mr. Chariot’s habeas petition without
prejudice. This Court determined that Mr. Chariot had been in post-removal immigration
detention for only approximately one month. Thus, he was not entitled to federal habeas relief
as
the length of his post-removal immigration detention was not approaching the six-month time
frame still presumed reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
On February 16, 2016, this Court received a letter from Mr. Chariot. The letter makes
three main points. First, Mr. Chariot challenges his order of removal. Second, Mr. Chario
t
complains about the conditions of his confinement at the Essex County Correctional Facility.
Finally, Mr. Chariot argues against his continued immigration detention. Mr. Chariot does not
state the exact purpose of this filing with this Court. It is possible that Mr. Chariot has filed this
letter seeking reconsideration of this Court’s prior Opinion and Order that denied his habeas
petition without prejudice because he does (at least in part) complain about his continued
immigration detention. Accordingly, I will order the Clerk to reopen this action so that the issues

Mr. Chariot presents in his letter, construed as a request for reconsideration of my earlier order,
can be discussed and analyzed.
Motions for reconsideration are filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
and are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) which allows a party to seek reconsideration by the
Court in matters in which the party believes the judge has “overlooked.” See Carney v.
Pennsauken Twp. Police Dep’t, No. 11—7366, 2013 WL 4501454, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2013)
(citations omitted). “The standard fbr reargument is high and reconsideration is to be granted
only sparingly.” Yarrell v. Bartkowski, No. 10—5337, 2012 WL 1600316, at *3 (D.N.J. May 7,
2012) (citing United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994)). To be successful on a
motion for reconsideration, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate: “(I) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when
the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice.” Max’s Seq/bod Café ex rel. Lou—Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677
(3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Berry v. Jacobs IMC’, LLC, 99 F. App’x 405, 410 (3d
Cir. 2004).
Mr. Chariot’s letter meets none of the requirements for this Court to grant his request for
reconsideration. Indeed, Mr. Chariot’s letter raises new issues about the validity of his order of
removal and his conditions of confinement that were not previously raised as issues in his habeas
petition. At the outset, this Court notes that “[a] motion for reconsideration cannot be used to
‘relitigate old matters, raise argument[,j or present evidence that could have been raised prior to
the entry of judgment.” Boretslcy v. Governor ofNew Jersey, 433 F. App’x 73, 78 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Wilchomhe v. Tee Vee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Michael
Line!, Inc. v. Viii., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir.2005))).

Even if this Court were to consider Mr. Chariot’s new claims, however, they would not
entitle him to federal habeas relief.
Mr. Charlot’s letter appears to contest his order of removal. Such a challenge cannot be
brought in this Court. The REAL 1D Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other
habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title,
a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in
accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means
for judicial review ofan order oJ’removal entered or issued under
any provision ofthis chapter, except as provided in subsection (e)
of this section. For purposes of this chapter, in every provision that
limits or eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to review, the
terms “judicial review” and “jurisdiction to review” include habeas
corpus review pursuant to section 2241 or Title 28, or any other
habeas corpus provision, sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and
review pursuant to any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutoly).
8 U.S.C.

§

1252(a)(5) (emphasis added). The REAL ID’s modifications to former law

“effectively limit all aliens to one bite of the apple with regard to challenging an order of
removal, in an effort to streamline what the Congress saw as uncertain and piecemeal review of
orders of removal, divided between the district courts (habeas corpus) and the courts of appeals
(petitions for review).” Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, the REAL ID Act effectively strips a District Court ofjurisdiction to
review a habeas petition challenging an order of removal. See Urquiaga v. Hendricks, No. 12—
2368, 2012 WL 5304206, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2012) (citing Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. United
States, 549 F.3d 235, 244—45 (3d Cir. 2008); Appiah v. United Stales Customs & immigration
Serv., No. 11—317, 2012 WL4505847, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2012); Gallego—Gomezv. Clancy,
No. 11—5942, 2011 WL 5288590, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 2, 2011), afJ 458 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir.
d,
7
2012); Calderon v, Holder, No. 10—3398, 2010 WL 3522092, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2010)); see
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also Duvall v. Attorney Gen. United States, 436 F.3d 382, 386 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The sole means
by which an alien may now challenge an order of removal is through a petition for review
directed to the court of appeals.”) (citation omitted); Jordon v. Attorney Gen. United States, 424
F.3d 320, 326 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he [REAL ID] Act expressly eliminated district courts’ habeas
jurisdiction over removal orders.”).
Mr. Charlot next complains about the conditions of his confinement at the Essex County
Correctional Facility. Such a conditions-of-confinement claims cannot simply be appended to a
request for reconsideration of a habeas petition. They must be brought in a civil rights action
under 42 U .S.C.

§ 1983. See Woodruff v. Williamson, 362 F. App’x 263, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2010);

see also Brown v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 601 F. App’x 85, 86 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding district
court properly dismissed habeas petition where petitioner raised claims associated with his
conditions of confinement since they are not cognizable habeas claims); Learner v. Fauver, 288
F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the ‘core of habeas’the validity of the continued conviction or the fact or length of the sentence-a challenge,
however, denominated and regardless of the relief sought, must be brought by way of a habeas
corpus petition. Conversely, when the challenge is to a condition of confinement, such that a
finding in plaintiffs failure would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, [a civil rights
action] is appropriate.”).
Finally, Mr. Chariot’s letter complains about the length of his continued immigration
detention. His detention, one month at the time of my prior order, is now about three months in
duration. It still does not approach the six month threshold of Zadvydas, so the mere passage of
time provides no basis for reconsideration. Nor does Mr. Chariot’s letter state any intervening
change in controlling law, new evidence that was previously unavailable to him when this Court

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ruled on his habeas petition, or any need to correct a clear error of
law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice. Accordingly, he fails to show that this Court should
reconsider its denial of
his habeas petition without prejudice.
The letter received by this Court on February 16, 2016, which has
been construed as a
request for reconsideration, will be denied. An appropriate order will
be entered.

DATED: March 21, 2016

KEVIN MNULTY
United States District Jud e

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