SINGH v. DIESEL TRANSPORTATION, LLC et al

Filing 9

OPINION AND ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, granting 7 Motion for Sanctions; etc. ***CIVIL CASE TERMINATED. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 3/8/16. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MALKIT SINGH,

Civil Action No.: 15-7930 (JLL)
Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

V.

DIESEL TRANSPORTATION, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of an unopposed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
6) and an unopposed Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 7) filed by Defendants Diesel Transportatio
n,
LLC and Kwaku A. Menu (the “Moving Defendants”). These Motions were filed on Januar
y 11,
2016, and Plaintiffs opposition to same was due by February 2, 2016. On February 12,
2016—
more than a week afler Plaintiffs opposition was due—the undersigned received an
email from
Plaintiffs counsel seeking an adjournment of the pending Motions. (ECF No. 8).
The Court
granted Plaintiffs request, and informed Plaintiff that his “opposition is due no later than
March
7, 2016,” (Id.). For the second time, Plaintiff has failed to comply with the filing deadlin
e. The
Court declines to permit Plaintiffs failure to oppose to delay the resolution of the pendin

g Motions

any longer.
Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the papers submitted by the Moving Defend
ants in
support of their pending Motions, and for the reasons stated below, this Court grants
the Moving
Defendants’ Motions for Dismissal and Sanctions.
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1

The Moving Defendants seek dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of
personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 6, “Defs.’ MTD Br.”).

1

Specifically, the Moving Defendants

argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter because, based upon
a cursory reading of Plaintiff’s Complaint, there is not complete diversity between the parties
sufficient for this Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at 1-3). The Court agrees.
On November 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant action before this Court, alleging claims of
negligence and respondeat superior against all Defendants, resulting from injuries that he sustained
in a trucking accident which occurred in Nebraska on May 27, 2014. (ECF No. 1, Complaint,
“Compi.”). The Complaint alleges that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
diversity statute. (Id.

§ 1332, the

¶ 8). This federal statute “gives federal district courts original jurisdiction

of all civil actions ‘between

.

.

.

citizens of different States’ where the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000.” Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332).

The Complaint states that “Plaintiff, Malkit Singh is a resident of Hudson County, in the State
of New Jersey.” (Compl.

¶ 2). The Complaint also alleges that Defendants Maihi Trucking Inc.

and Avtar Singh are residents of Jersey City, New Jersey. (Id.

¶ 5-6). The Court further notes

that Plaintiff has not alleged any other basis for federal jurisdiction over this matter. Nor does it
appear from the face of the Complaint, which alleges only negligence and respondeat superio
r
liability, that Plaintiff has attempted to assert “federal question jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C.

§

1331.

As the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, it need not consider
the Moving Defendants’
additional argument for dismissal—namely, that this Court also lacks personal jurisdiction
over the Moving
Defendants.

2

“For over two hundred years, the [diversity jurisdiction] statute has been understood as
requiring ‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.” Lincoln Ben. Life.
Co.,
800 F.3d at 104. “Complete diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multip
le
defendants, no plaintiff be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks
Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he and
two
Defendants reside in New Jersey, therefore negating any grounds for diversity jurisdi
ction.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Compl
aint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Plaintiff’s Counsel Shall be Liable to Defendants for Sanctions

The Moving Defendants also filed a Motion for Sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 as against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney, Ms. Yana Rubin, Esq. (ECF
No. 7,
“Defs,’ Sanctions Mot.”). The Moving Defendants explain that, prior to filing their motion
s
seeking dismissal and sanctions, counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel to highlight the fact
that this
Court clearly lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action. (Id. at 2-3, citing Declar
ation of
Jared P. DuVoisin, Esq., Moving Defendants’ Attorney, “DuVoisin Deel.”
¶J 5-6). In addition to
explaining the jurisdictional deficiencies to Plaintiffs counsel during a phone conver
sation,
Defense counsel emailed a letter to Ms. Rubin detailing the Moving Defendants’ positio
n as to this
Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (DuVoisin Dee!.

¶J 5-6, Ex. A).

Despite having the benefit of advance notice from Defense counsel as to the jurisdi
ctional
defects that are evident upon a plain reading of the Complaint, Plaintiffs counse
l has neither
responded to Defense counsel nor withdrawn the Complaint to refile in an approp
riate jurisdi

ction.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides, in pertinent part, that:
By representing to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whethe
r
by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented
3

party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.
.

.

.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
Thus, Rule 11 “imposes a duty on counsel to make an inquiry into both the facts and the
law
which is ‘reasonable under the circumstances” prior to filing a Complaint. Zuk v.
Eastern Penn.
Psych. Inst. of the Medical College ofPenn., 103 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 1996). The Court
finds
that Plaintiffs counsel failed to make the appropriate inquiry into the law of diversity
jurisdiction
prior to filing the instant Complaint on Plaintiffs behalf.
As discussed above, the jurisdictional defect here—namely, the lack of complete diversi
ty—
was apparent from a plain reading of the Complaint. The Court finds that the obviou
sness of this
error of law, in conjunction with Plaintiffs counsel’s failure to withdraw the Compl
aint even after
being appraised of its deficiencies by Defense counsel, as well as Plaintiff’s counse
l repeated
failure to oppose the pending Motions, necessitate the “fashioning [of] sanctio
n[sj adequate to
deter undesirable future conduct.” DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2005);
see also
Cohen v. Kurtzman, 45 F. Supp. 2d 423 (D.N.J. 1999) (Lechner, J.) (granting defend
ants’ motion
for sanctions based upon a complaint that improperly alleged diversity jurisdi
ction where
“[plaintiff] and his counsel clearly failed to perform even a modicum of legal
research into
diversity jurisdiction as it relates to the naming of a partnership as a party to an
action” and where
plaintiff and his attorney disregarded defense counsel’s suggestion that
they withdraw the
complaint in light of the jurisdictional deficiencies).

4

Accordingly, the Court will grant the Moving Defendants’ unopposed Motion for Sanctions as
against Plaintiffs counsel, and will award the Moving Defendants “reasonable counsel fees and
2
costs incurred in preparing their motion to dismiss.” (Defs.’ Sanct. Mot. at 5).
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS on this

‘ day of March, 2016

ORDERED that the Moving Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction (ECF No. 6) is hereby GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; and it is further
ORDERED that the Moving Defendants’ motion for sanctions (ECF No. 7) is hereby
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel, Yana Rubin, Esq., is hereby liable to the Moving
Defendants for reasonable counsel fees and costs incurred in preparing the Motion to Dismiss; and
it is further
ORDERED that the Moving Defendants are hereby directed to submit a certification and
proof of attorneys’ fees and costs to this Court and to Plaintiffs counsel by March 15, 2016; and
it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel may challenge the content of the certification
submitted by the Moving Defendants by submitting any opposition thereto no later than March 22,
2016; and it is further

ORDERED that after the resolution on the issue of the amount of attorney’s fees and costs
to which the Moving Defendants are owed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to close this
matter.

IT

IS SO ORDERED.

JOS1 £. UNARES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

The Moving Defendants seek costs and fees as against both Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney;
however, Rule
11 (c)(5)(A) precludes the imposition of monetary sanctions “against a represented party for violating
Rule 11 (b)(2).”
Therefore, the Court imposes sanctions only against Plaintiffs attorney, Ms. Yana.

5