BRIGHT v. TYSON et al

Filing 37

LETTER ORDER/OPINION denying 30 Motion to Appoint Pro Bono. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 8/16/2016. (seb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHAMBERS OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING
COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT ST.
ROOM 2064
NEWARK, NJ 07101
973-645-3827

STEVEN C. MANNION

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

August 16, 2016
LETTER ORDER/OPINION
Re:

D.E. 30, Second Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel
Bright v. Tyson
Civil Action No. 15-cv-8038 (SDW)(SCM)

Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court upon review of Plaintiff, Michael Bright’s (“Mr. Bright”)
renewed Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel.1 The Court previously denied Mr. Bright’s application
to appoint counsel.2 For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bright’s renewed Motion is denied.
First, thus far Mr. Bright has been able to adequately present his case. A lack of formal legal
training alone is insufficient to warrant the appointment of counsel.3 Courts typically also do not
appoint counsel despite a plaintiff’s lack of access to a prison law library.4 While his papers may
“lack the force and clarity one expects from an attorney, this does not mean that [his] request for
counsel should be granted.”5 Although Mr. Bright claims that he only has a high school education,
no legal education, and limited access to legal materials and the law library, he has demonstrated an
ability to articulate the legal relief he seeks.6 He has also filed motions and reply briefs without the
assistance of counsel.7 Mr. Bright’s ability to pursue his claims are not impeded by his professed
limitations. For these reasons, the first Tabron factor weighs against appointment.
1

(ECF Docket Entry No. (“D.E.”) 30). The Court will consider Mr. Bright’s request under the Tabron
post-threshold factors. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Parham v. Johnson, 126
F.3d 454, 461 (3d. Cir. 1997).
2

(D.E. 3, Opinion at 14).

3

See, e.g., Hooks v. Schultz, No. 07-5627, 2010 WL 415316, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2010).

4

See Brown v. Grey, No. 14-4800, 2016 WL 3388301, at *2 (D.N.J. June 14, 2016) (additional citations
omitted).
5

Id.

6

(D.E. 30 at 3-4 and 9-10).

7

See, e.g., (D.E. 1, Complaint et al); (D.E. 12, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss); (D.E. 31, Motion to Amend Complaint).
1

Second, the legal issues underlying Mr. Bright’s case are not complex. Case law regarding
actions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 is well developed and courts usually do not appoint pro bono
counsel in such instances.8 Mr. Bright asserts that the number of claims and defendants makes this a
factually complex case and presents complex legal issues in determining liability.9 The factual and
legal issues have not changed since the Court’s previous denial to appoint pro bono counsel. Thus, the
second Tabron factor also weighs against appointment of counsel.
Third, Mr. Bright has not demonstrated an inability to conduct discovery regarding his
allegations. Courts “consider the extent to which prisoners and others suffering confinement may
have trouble pursuing their claims.”10 “Courts should further consider that ‘it may be difficult for
indigent plaintiffs to understand the complex discovery rules’ in investigating their claims.” 11
Appointment of counsel may be warranted when a case requires a significant degree of factual
investigation, extensive discovery requests, expert testimony, or compliance with complex discovery
rules.12
While Mr. Bright claims that factual discovery will be difficult, he has neither shown nor
demonstrated undue difficulty in trying to obtain relevant institutional records and documents, apart
from stating that he is “locked up and has no ability to investigate facts.”13 Mr. Bright is a party to the
incidents from which his claims arise, thus he is familiar with the facts of his case. Courts have found
that a plaintiff’s first-hand knowledge of events decreases his burden regarding factual discovery.14
Unlike in cases where documents are missing or where defendants are resistant in responding to
discovery requests, such situations do not appear to exist in the present matter.15 It appears that Mr.
Bright was denied access to a video recording of the incident underlying his present claims during a
disciplinary hearing; however, it is unclear whether he has encountered similar difficulty during
discovery for the present matter.16 Mr. Bright has access to the discovery tools in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
to investigate his claims. At this time, the third Tabron factor weighs against appointment of counsel.
8

Brown, 2016 WL 3388301, at *2 (additional citation omitted).

9

Id. at 7 and 10.

10

Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156.

11

Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 503 (3d. Cir. 2002) (citing Parham, 126 F.3d at 460).

12

Brown, 2016 WL 3388301 at *1 (citing Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155).

13

(D.E. 30 at 3 and 8).

14

See Terrell v. Hendricks, No. 11-00832, 2012 WL 2341418, at *3 (D.N.J. June 15, 2012) (additional
citation omitted).
15

See Stallings v. Cruz, No. 15-7488, 2016 WL 3946772, at *3 (D.N.J. July 18, 2016) (citing Montgomery,
294 F.3d at 503–04, finding that plaintiff’s inability to participate in factual discovery was persuasive
to warrant appointment of counsel where missing key records prevented him from building a sufficient
case through document requests and he encountered significant resistance in responding to discovery
motions, including defendants’ failure to respond to plaintiff’s interrogatories); Wolfe v. Kaminski, No.
14-1956, 2015 WL 4126562, at *3 (D.N.J. July 8, 2015) (“Courts often deny applications for pro bono
counsel where plaintiffs do not demonstrate that it will be difficult to obtain relevant records.”).
16

See (D.E. 30 at 6).
2

Fourth, the extent to which this case may turn on credibility determinations is unclear.
“[W]hen a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations, appointment of counsel may be
justified.”17 Mr. Bright asserts that there is conflicting testimony, and that there will be a credibility
contest between the parties.18 At this stage of litigation, it is premature for the Court to determine
credibility issues.
Fifth, at this juncture, it is unclear whether expert testimony is required. This case involves
constitutional violations against prisoner correctional officers and a medical staff personnel for failure
to protect and failure to intervene.19 Mr. Bright believes that this case may require expert testimony.20
Given the nature of his allegations, the case appears to depend more on the facts deduced rather than
on any expert testimony. Thus, the fifth Tabron factor currently weighs against appointment.
Mr. Bright does not discuss the sixth factor, whether he can afford counsel on his own behalf.
The Court previously granted Mr. Bright’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, and acknowledges
his limited financial means.21 Although this factor weighs slightly in his favor, indigency alone, absent
satisfaction of other Tabron post-threshold factors, does not warrant the appointment of counsel.22
Because the balance of factors weights against appointment of counsel at this time, Mr.
Bright’s renewed Motion is denied.
SO ORDERED.

8/16/2016 2:45:23 PM

c (via ECF):
All Counsel

17

Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155.

18

(D.E. 30 at 3 and 9).

19

See (D.E. 3 at 1-2).

20

(D.E. 30 at 2).

21

(D.E. 2).

22

See Christy v. Robinson, 216 F.Supp. 2d 398, 410 (D.N.J. 2002).
3

c (via U.S. Mail R.R.R.):
Michael Nathaniel Bright
Prisoner No. 454004, SBI No. 000918130A
Northern State Prison
168 Frontgate Road
P.O. Box 2300
Newark, NJ 07114

4