ALI v. CITY OF NEWARK et al

Filing 96

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 5/11/2018. (jr)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil Action No. 15-8374 (JLL)
CHINEDU IBRAHIM ALT,
OPINION

Plaintiff,
V.

CITY OF NEWARK, et a!.,
Defendants.

LINARES, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants the State of New Jersey and the
Administrative Office of the Courts of New Jersey’s (“State Defendants”) Motion for Summary
Judgment, (ECF No. 76), and Defendant the City of Newark’s (“City Defendant”) Motion for
Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 77). Both motions are brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. (ECF Nos. 76, 77). Plaintiff Chinedu Ibrahirn All has filed opposition to both
motions, (ECF Nos. 86, 87), and Defendants have replied thereto, (ECF Nos. 90, 92). The Court
decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the
reasons stated herein, State Defendants’ Motion is granted, and City Defendant’s Motion is denied.

I.

BACKGROUND’

Plaintiff is a deaf individual who primarily communicates in American Sign Language
(“ASL”). (St. Defs. SMF
New Jersey.

¶

I). On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff received a traffic citation in F anwood,

(St. Defs. SMF

¶

3).

Upon going online to pay the Fanwood ticket, Plaintiff

discovered that he had two outstanding tickets from Newark, New Jersey that were issued in June
2015.

(St. Defs. SMF

¶

4).

Through a relay service provided by the “Sprint Mobile IP”

application, Plaintiff contacted the Newark Municipal Court and indicated that he wanted a hearing
for the two tickets, because he did not know why the tickets were issued. (St. Defs. SMF

¶J 6—8).

The representative for the Newark Municipal Court, Ms. Charisse Jones, told Plaintiff that his
hearing was scheduled for July 21, 2015 at 4:00 p.m. (St. Defs. SMf

¶ 9).

Plaintiff informed Ms.

Jones that he is deaf and required an ASL interpreter for the hearing. (St. Defs. SMF

¶

10). In

line with the appropriate protocol, Ms. Jones typed “interpretor [sic] required (hearing impaired)”
into the case notes associated with Plaintiffs two tickets so a municipal court administrator can
secure an interpreter before the hearing. (St. Defs. SMF

¶J 11—12).

However, Ms. Sandra Henderson, the municipal court administrator assigned to the Judge
presiding over Plaintiffs hearing, did not look at the case notes and was not otherwise notified
that an ASL interpreter was needed. (St. Defs. SMF

¶J 2 1—22).

Ms. Henderson admitted that she

did not usually review the case notes for a first appearance, because “97 percent of the time there’s
nothing there.” (St. Defs. SMF

¶

22). On July 21, 2015 at 3:47

p.m.,

Plaintiff arrived at the

Newark Municipal Court and, after failing to find an interpreter, approached a courtroom officer

This background is taken from the parties’ statements of material facts, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. (ECF
No. 76-2, State Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of facts (“St. Defs. SMF”); ECF No. 79, City Defendant’s Rule
56.1 Statement of facts (“Ct. Def. SMF”); ECf Nos. 86, 87, Plaintiffs Response to Defendants’ Statements of fact
and Supplement; and ECf Nos. 90-1, 92-2, Defendants’ Replies to Plaintiffs Supplemental facts). To the extent
that Plaintiff admits to any Material facts as stated by Defendants, the Court will cite only to “St. Defs. SMf” and
the relevant paragraph number.

named George Vazquez. (St. Defs. SMF

¶

14). Plaintiff advised Officer Vazquez that he is deaf

and asked where the ASL interpreter was. (St. Defs. SMf ¶ 15). Officer Vazquez directed Plaintiff
to sit and wait while lie searched for an interpreter. (St. Defs. SMf ¶ 16). Plaintiff remained seated
in the courtroom for two hours without any update as to the interpreter or his hearing. (St. Defs.

SMFIJ 17).
At 6:15 p.m., a

court

clerk approached Plaintiff and asked for his name, but Plaintiff could

not understand her. (St. Defs. SMF

¶

1$). After Plaintiff showed the clerk his tickets, Plaintiff

was directed to approach Municipal Judge Vanessa Williams-Powell. (St. Defs. SMF ¶ 19). Judge
Williams-Powell learned that Plaintiff was deaf after Plaintiff pointed to his right ear to signal that
he could not understand her, and a court officer told the judge that Plaintiff was deaf (St. Defs.
SMF

¶ 20).

Upon realizing that Plaintiff was deaf, and because no interpreter was present, Judge

Williams-Powell adjourned Plaintiffs hearing to August 7, 2015 at 4:00 p.m. (St. Defs. SMf

¶

23, 28). Both Officer Vazquez and Ms. Henderson testified that it is appropriate procedure for a

hearing to be adjourned when a party requests an interpreter, but none are available that day. (St.
Defs. SMF

¶ 24—25).

After the hearing was adjourned, Officer Vazquez wrote the words “guilty” and “not
guilty” on a piece of paper and showed it to Plaintiff, who then pointed to “not guilty.” (St. Defs.
SMF

¶ 26).

Officer Vazquez subsequently asked Plaintiff to sign a “Hudson Notice,” which is an

acknowledgment that the party understands their right to be present at all stages of a trial and the
party’s obligation to be present for any scheduled conference or stage of the trial. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 27).

Plaintiff refused to

sign

the Hudson Notice and stated that he has “to have an interpreter

with [him] before [he] sign[s] the paper.”

(St. Defs. SMF

¶

29).

Upon hearing Plaintiffs

statement, Judge Williams-Powell told Plaintiff “[i]f you can read, you can sign [the Hudson

3

Notice],” and “[the interpreter] is not going to interpret something that is in writing, that you can
read.” (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 29).

Officer Vazquez wrote “reftised to sign” on the Hudson Notice and

handed it to Plaintiff. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 2$).

At some point during or after the July 21, 2015 proceeding, Ms. Henderson wrote and
highlighted the word “deaf’ on a document associated with Plaintiffs file to ensure that she
remembered to obtain an ASL interpreter for the next hearing. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 30).

Though the

Newark Municipal Court’s exact procedure for obtaining an interpreter back in 2015 is contested
by the parties, (St. Defs. SMF ¶ 31; ECf No. $7-i

¶ 31), it is undisputed that Ms. Henderson failed

to arrange for an interpreter for Plaintiffs August 7, 2015 hearing. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 32).

Ms.

Henderson claims her failure to obtain an interpreter was “purely an oversight.” (St. Defs. SMf

¶

32). After the July 21, 2015 proceeding, Plaintiff used the “Sprint Mobile IP” application to call
the Newark Municipal Court and arrange for an ASL interpreter. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 34).

Like his

original call to Newark Municipal Court, Plaintiffs request for an interpreter for his August 7,
2015 court date was placed into the case notes associated with his two tickets. (St. Defs. SMF

¶

35).
On August 7, 2015, Plaintiff returned to the Newark Municipal Court and showed a written
note to Officer Vazquez which said: “May I please know if my sign language interpreter is here?”
(St. Defs. SMF

¶

37). In response, Officer Vazquez, who was close enough that Plaintiff could

read his lips, told Plaintiff, “you need to pay attention because I know you could hear me.” (St.
Defs. SMF ¶ 38). A different officer took Plaintiffs note and “never came back.” (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 39).

Plaintiff then sat in the courtroom for three hours, unsure if an interpreter was available or

was going to show up. (St. Defs. SMf

Eventually, Plaintiff was asked to approach the

¶ 40).

presiding judge, Municipal Judge Michael Hackett.

4

(St. Defs. SMF

¶

41). The prosecution

indicated to Judge Hackett that it was not ready to proceed, because an ASL interpreter and the
police officer who issued the tickets were both not present. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 42).

Accordingly,

Judge Hackett dismissed the case pertaining to Plaintiffs tickets for lack of prosecution. (St. Defs.
SMF

¶ 43).

Officer Vazquez exchanged hand written notes with Plaintiff to communicate that his

case was dismissed and that the tickets were gone. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 44).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff qualified for an ASL interpreter. (St. Defs. SMf

¶ 2).

Mr.

James Simpson, who was the Director of the Newark Municipal Court, investigated Plaintiffs
claims.2 (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 45—46).

At the conclusion of his investigation, Ms. Henderson was

suspended for one day, and the Newark Municipal Court implemented new protocols for
processing ASL interpreter requests received through the call center. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 47—51).

This new procedure requires call center personnel to complete and submit “Certified Court
Interpreter Request Forms,” which is the same form used to process in-person interpreter requests.
(St. Defs. SMFf 51).
After his municipal court case was dismissed, Plaintiff brought this action against
Defendants. (ECf No. I). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (I)
Violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.

§

12131 etseq.,

against all Defendants; (II) Violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C.

§

794, against all Defendants; and (III) Violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

(“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A.

§

10:5-1, et seq., against City Defendant. (ECF No. 13 (“FAC”)

¶

50—

$2). Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment finding that all Defendants have subjected Plaintiff to

unlawful discrimination in violation of the ADA and RA and that City Defendant also subjected
Plaintiff to discrimination in violation ofNJLAD. (FAC at p. 10—11). Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin

2

Mr. Simpson’s investigation was prompted by the commencement of this action. (St. Defs. SMF I 46).
5

Defendants from implementing any policy or procedure “that denies deaf or hard of hearing
individuals meaningful access to and full and equal enjoyment of Defendant’s facilities or
programs.” (FAC at p. Ii). Additionally, Plaintiff requests that Defendants be ordered to develop
and implement a policy prohibiting future discrimination and ensuring that Defendants will
consider the communication needs of deaf individuals, and to train all their employees about the
rights of individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing. (FAC at p. 11). Finalty, Plaintiff requests
compensatory damages pursuant to the ADA, RA, and NJLAD; punitive damages pursuant to
NJLAD; reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees; and any other relief the Court finds appropriate.
(FACatp. 11).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when, drawing all reasonable inferences in the

non

movant’s favor, there exists no “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242. 255 (1986). “[T]he moving party must show that the non-moving party has failed to
establish one or more essential elements of its case on which the non-moving party has the burden
of proof at trial.” McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLF, 494 F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Cetotex
Corp.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322—23 (1986)).
The Court must consider all facts and their reasonable inferences in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. See Pa. Coat Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 f.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). If a
reasonable juror could return a verdict for the non-moving party regarding material disputed
factual issues, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[A]t
the summary judgrrient stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to detennine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”).

6

III.

ANALYSIS

A. State Defendants
Titte II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
U.S.C.

§ 12132. The term “public entity” is defined as “any State or local government” and

includes “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State.
or local government.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1213 l(1)(A)—(B). The United States Supreme Court has found

that Title II of the ADA abrogates state sovereign immunity. United States v. Georgia et aL, 546
U.S. 151, 159 (2006); Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004).
Similar to the ADA, the RA states that “[nb otherwise qualified individual with a disability
in the United States

.

.

.

shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 794(a). Under the RA, “program or

activity” means the operations of “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government” or “the entity of such State or local government
that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each other State or local
government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local
government.” Id.

§ 794(b)(1). For a claim under either the ADA or RA, Plaintiff must show he:

“(I) has a disability; (2) was otherwise qualified to participate in a [public] program; and (3) was

denied the benefits of the program or was otherwise subject to discrimination because of (his]
disability.” Stone v. NJ Admin. Office of the Courts, 557 F. App’x 151, 153—54 (3d Cir. 2014)

7

(quoting Chambers cx rd. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. ofPhi/a. 3d. ofEthtc., 587 F .3d 176, 189 (3d
Cir. 2OO9)).
Here, State Defendants concede that Plaintiff was entitled to an interpreter. (St. Defs. SMF

J 2). In their brief. State Defendants assume, without conceding, that Plaintiff can show a prima
fade case for a violation under the ADA and RA. (ECF No. 76-1 at 12 n.2). Furthermore. State
Defendants do not raise sovereign immunity in their brief and recognize that State and local
government employers can be vicariously liable for their employee’s ADA and RA violations. (Id.
at 6). Instead, State Defendants advance two arguments: (i) that the Newark Municipal Court is
not a “program” provided by the State Defendants; and (ii) that the Newark Municipal Court
employees are not employees of the state in order for State Defendants to be vicariously liable for
their ADA and RA violations.4 (Id. at 5—6). As explained below, the Court is persuaded by these
arguments and grants State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
First, the Newark Municipal Court is not a “program” provided by the State Defendants
under New Jersey state law. This is because State Defendants do not establish, fund, provide
resources to, maintain, or direct the day-to-day operations of municipal courts in New Jersey, like
the Newark Municipal Court.

See N.J.S.A. 2B:12-l (explaining that municipal courts are

established, maintained, and directed solely by the municipality). Plaintiff argues that the State
Defendants retain some control over the Newark Municipal Court because the municipal courts
are part of the state court system and follow the State Defendants’ “disability accommodation
policies.” (ECF No. $7 at 2—3). The Court is

not

convinced by this argument. Even if the Newark

The legal principles governing the ADA and RA are generally the same, with limited exceptions. CG i’. Pennsvh’ania
Dept offdttc., 734 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2013). One of these exceptions is the fact that the RA also requires the
allegedly discriminating entity to receive federal funding. Id. at 235 n.10 (citations omitted).
State Defendants raise a third argument that. in the event they are found to be liable under the ADA and RA. Plaintiff
is not entitled to compensatory damages or injunctive relief. (ECf No. 76-1 at 12, 16). However, because the ADA
and RA claims do not apply to State Defendants, the Court need not address this third argument.

$

Municipal Court follows some policies set by the State Defendants, interpreter services are made
available and provided by the Newark Municipal Court,

not

State Defendants, (St. Defs. SMF

¶

55). See Chishoim v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 324 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Harvard v. State,
2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1559 at *40 (Law Div. June 29, 2016) (“The holding in Chisohn
stemmed from the fact that

.

.

.

interpreter services are an administrative, county function”).

Therefore, even when viewing all facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that access
to the Newark Municipal Court is not a program provided by State Defendants.
Second, State Defendants have carried their burden in showing that the Newark Municipal
Court employees are not employees of the state for vicarious liability purposes. Though the Third
Circuit has yet to address the issue, several other courts have held that an employer can be
vicariously liable for its employee’s ADA and RA violations. See, e.g., I IV cx rd. Wilson v. Sch.
3d. of Seminole Ctk’., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Ctv.. 302 F.3d
567, 574—75 (5th Cir. 2002). Here, several employees and judges of the Newark Municipal Court
can be implicated for failing to provide Plaintiff with an ASL interpreter, including, most notably,
the municipal court administrator Ms. Henderson. (St. Defs. SMF

¶ 22, 29,

32). However, these

individuals are employees of the county, not the state, under New Jersey law. See N.J.S.A. 2B:1210(a) (“A county or municipality shall provide for an administrator and other necessary employees
for the municipal court and for their compensation.”). Municipal court judges are also considered
part of the county, and not the state. See Id. at 2B: 12-7 (“[Jjudges of municipal courts shall be
paid annual salaries set by ordinance or resolution of the counties or municipalities establishing
the court.”). Because both the ADA and RA apply to programs provided by a public entity, and
because the Newark Municipal Court and its employees are not provided or employed by State

9

Defendants, State Defendants cannot be held liable for the ADA and RA claims alleged by
Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court grants State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
B. City Defendants
Plaintiff also brings claims against City Defendant under the ADA, RA, and NJLAD. (Sec
generally FAC). As stated above, a claim under the ADA or RA requires Plaintiff to have a
disability, otherwise qualify to participate in a public program, and have been denied the benefits
of that program or have been subject to discrimination because of his disability.

Stone, 557 F.

App’x at 153-54 (quoting Chambers cx rd., 587 F .3d at 189). Pursuant to NJLAD, it is “unlawful
discrimination” for “any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee
of any place of public accommodation directly or indirectly to refuse, withhold from or deny to
any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, or to
discriminate against any person in the furnishing thereof.. on account of.
.

.

.

disability.” N.J.S.A.

10:5-l2(f’)(l); see also State v. P.E., 284 NJ. Super. 309, 316 (Ch. Div. 1994) (noting that under
NJLAD “the courts are required to ensure equal access”). In Stone, the Third Circuit noted that,
“[b]ecause the NJLAD ‘relies on the same analytical framework’ as the ADA, claims under it can
be addressed alongside those under the ADA.” 557 F. App’x at 1 54 (quoting McNemar v. Disney
Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds bvMontrose Med. Gip.
Participating Say. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 780 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001)).
City Defendant first argues that Plaintiff has not met the standards for the various statutes
because (1) the Newark Municipal Court is a separate entity and (2) Plaintiff was not denied any
right because he had access to the court. (ECF No. 7$ at 1—2). Unlike State Defendants, City
Defendant has failed to carry its burden for summary judgment. First, to find that City Defendant
is separate from the Newark Municipal Court would be contrary to the facts in the record and New

10

Jersey state law, which indicates that a municipal court is provided by a municipality. See N.J.S.A.
23:12-1 (explaining that municipal courts are established, maintained, and directed solely by the
municipality). furthermore, Newark Municipal Court employees, who perform the administrative
service of obtaining an interpreter, are provided by City Defendant. See Id. at 23:12-10(a) (“A
county or municipality shall provide for an administrator and other necessary employees for the
municipal court and for their compensation.”). Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that the
Newark Municipal Court was a program of City Defendant, or alternatively that City Defendant is
vicariously liable for the violations committed by the Newark Municipal Court’s employees.
City Defendant’s second argument is that Plaintiff was not deprived of any right because
he had access to the court, as indicated by the fact that his traffic tickets were eventually resolved.
(ECf No. 78 at 8—12). To even suggest that Plaintiff was provided “reasonable accommodation”
or that his municipal court case ran its “natural course” fails to appreciate the uncontested facts in
the record. For example, Plaintiff was never provided an interpreter despite multiple requests, was
accused of faking his disability, was subjected to pleading “not guilty” by pointing at a piece of
paper, and was told to sign the “Hudson Notice” despite stating he needed an interpretel- present.
(St. Defs. $MF ¶ 14, 17, 22, 26—28, 38, 40). Just because the municipal court case was ultimately
dismissed for lack of prosecution does not by any means translate to Plaintiff having the same
access to the court as someone without a disability.5 Lane, 541 U.S. at 532 (“[A] State must afford
to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard in its courts.”) (citations and quotations
omitted). At the very least, because Plaintiff asserts that the lack of an interpreter denied him “the
right to effectively communicate,” (ECf No. 86 at 7), there is a material dispute as to whether

As stated above. the case was dismissed because the prosecution’s witness and an interpreter were not present at the
second hearing. (St. Defs. SMf j 42).
11

Plaintiff was denied access to the court. Therefore, the Court rejects City Defendant’s second
argument.
City Defendant then argues that, even if it can be held liable under the statutes, Plaintiff is
not entitled to compensatory damages or injunctive relief. (ECF No. 7$ at 2). The Court addresses
each of these arguments separately and rejects them both.
Compensatory relief cannot be given to a plaintiff under the ADA or RA without a showing
of intentional discrimination. S.H. cx rd. Dttrrell v. Lower Merion Sc/i. Dist., 729 F.3d 24$, 262
(3d Cir. 2013). To show intentional discrimination, the Third Circuit uses a deliberate indifference
standard and applies a two-prong test: “(1) knowledge that a hann to a federally protected right is
substantially likely, and (2) a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 263 (citations and
quotations omitted). “Deliberate indifference does not require a showing of personal ill will or
animosity toward the disabled person.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). City Defendant
argues that the first prong is not met because there is no evidence that the Newark Municipal Court
was on notice that Plaintiff would be deprived access to an ASL interpreter. (ECF No. 7$ at 15).
As for the second prong, City Defendant argues that Ms. Henderson’s failure to provide Plaintiff
with an ASL interpreter was “purely an oversight.” (Id.; St. Defs. SMF ¶ 32). The Court disagrees
with Defendant because there are sufficient facts to find that the Newark Municipal Court was on
notice, based on Plaintiff’s repeated requests for an ASL interpreter to multiple court employees.
(ECF No. 7$ at 11—13; St. Defs. SMF ¶J 20, 23). Additionally, the second prong can be met based

on the undisputed fact that Ms. Henderson failed to provide Plaintiff with an interpreter despite
being present at the July 21, 2015 hearing and leaving a note for herself that an interpreter was
needed. (St. Defs. SMF

¶J

30—32). Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that the Newark

Municipal Court, and by extension City Defendant, acted with deliberate indifference.

12

The final issue for the Court to consider is whether Plaintiff has standing for injunctive
relief. “[I]n ‘ADA cases, courts have held that a plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief
unless he alteges facts giving rise to an inference that he will suffer future discrimination by the
defendant.” Prpor v. NCAA, 28$ F.3d 54$, 561 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff seeks, among other things, injunctive relief enjoining City Defendant from
implementing any policy or procedure “that denies deaf or hard of hearing individuals meaningful
access to and full and equal enjoyment of Defendant’s facilities or programs.” (FAC at p. 11).
Additionally, Plaintiff wants the Court to order City Defendant to develop and implement a policy
prohibiting future discrimination and ensuring that Defendants will consider the communication
needs of deaf individuals. (Id.).
City Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief because the
Newark Municipal Court already implemented new procedures, making it unlikely that Plaintiff
will be deprived of an interpreter in the future. (ECF No. 7$ at 16). It is undisputed that the
Newark Municipal Court implemented a new policy following the events of this case. (St. Defs.
SMF

¶J 47—51).

However, Plaintiff correctly

points out

that “the mere voluntary cessation of a

challenged practice does not render a case moot.” (ECF No. $6 at 15). City Defendant has not
asserted any facts which show that the new policy sufficiently removed the impediments to
Plaintiffs access to an ASL interpreter. (See general/v ECF No. 78). Additionally, Plaintiff may
appear before the Newark Municipal Court again in the future, as evidenced by the fact that
Plaintiff has already received another traffic ticket. (ECf No. 86-1

J 27).

Viewing these facts in

a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court determines that it is not appropriate to dismiss
Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief at this time. Based on these findings, City Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

13

IV.

CONCLUSION

F or the aforementioned reasons, the Court hereby grants State Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and denies City Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate
Order follows this Opinion.

Dated: MayIV, 201$.

Chief Judge, United States District Court

14