OLIVERAS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 20

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 3/13/17. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
IRAIDA JIMENEZ OLWERAS,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civ. No. 15-cv-8431 (KM)

OPINION

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. For the reasons
stated herein, the appeal will be denied and the decision of the Commissioner
will be affirmed.
Plaintiff here, Iraida Jimenez Oliveras, applied for SSI benefits on
September 20, 2011, claiming a disability onset date of November 11, 2010.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her claim on October 28,
2011. Following two motions for reconsideration of that denial, the SSA again
denied her application on March 21, 2012. On April 7, 2012, Ms. Oliveras
appealed that denial and requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (AU).
On September 23, 2013, a hearing was held before the Hon. Donna A.
Krappa, AU. (Transcript at R32—56) Ms. Oliveras, who was represented by
1
counsel, appeared and testified with the aid of an interpreter. A vocational
expert (“yE”), Rocco J. Meola, also testified. At the end of the hearing, Judge

Citations to pages of the administrative record, filed at ECF no. 11, are in the
form “R”.
1

Krappa held the record open for submission of supplemental medical reports,
which she received and considered. (R19) By written decision dated May 12,
2014, the AU

denied the application for SSI, finding that Ms. Oliveras was not

disabled within the meaning of the SSA. (R19-31) On June 6, 2014, Ms.
Oliveras appealed that denial to the Appeals Council. (R8— 10) The Appeals
Council, after considering additional evidence (R4—5), denied review on
September 9, 2015 (R1—3), rendering the AU’s decision the final decision of the
Secretary.
Ms. Oliveras filed this appeal from the Commissioner’s denial of SSI
benefits on December 3, 2015. (ECF no. 1) Because the appeal was not filed
within the 60 day limitations period, the government moved to dismiss it. (ECF
no. 4) In a Memorandum and Order dated May 12, 2016, I applied equitable
tolling to the limitations period and denied the motion to dismiss. (ECF no. 9)
The record was filed. (ECF no. 11) Ms. Oliveras then filed her plaintiff’s
brief (“P1. Br.”, ECF no. 14). The Commissioner filed a brief in response (“SSA
Br.”, ECF no. 17).
I.

2

The matter is now fully briefed and ready for decision.

STANDARDS, AU’S CONCLUSIONS, STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

The SSA Five-Step Process

To be eligible for SSI benefits, a claimant must meet the income and
resource limitations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382. A claimant must also show that he is

unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in
death or that has lasted (or can be expected to last) for a continuous period of
not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A); see, e.g., Diaz v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 503 (3d Cir. 2009).

Previously, counsel for Ms. Oliveras had filed a Local Rule 9.1 statement of her
contentions in support of her appeal (ECF no. 12), and the Commissioner, mistaking it
for her brief, had filed a brief in opposition (ECF no. 13). When Ms. Oliveras filed her
actual brief, the Commissioner realized the error, and sought and obtained leave to file
an amended version of her prior brief. (ECF nos. 15, 16) The operative briefs on appeal
are thus the ones cited in text above (ECF nos. 14 and 17).
2

2

Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Social Security
Administration (the “Commissioner”) has established a five-step evaluation
process for determining whether a claimant is entitled to SSI benefits. 20
C.F.R.

§ 4 16.920. This Court’s review necessarily incorporates a determination

of whether the ALAJ properly followed the five-step process prescribed by
regulation. The steps may be briefly summarized as follows:
Step 1: Determine whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the onset date of the alleged disability. 20 C.F.R.

§

416.920(b). If not, move to step two.
Step 2: Determine if the claimant’s alleged impairment, or combination
of impairments, is “severe.” Id.

§ 4 16.920(c). If the claimant has a severe

impairment, move to step three.
Step 3: Determine whether the impairment meets or equals the criteria
of any impairment found in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. A. (Those Part A criteria are purposely set at a high level,
to identify clear cases of disability without further analysis.) If so, the claimant
is automatically eligible to receive benefits; if not, move to step four. Id.

§

416.920(d).
Step 4: Determine whether, despite any severe impairment, the claimant
retains the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant work.
Id.

§ 416.920(e)—(f). If not, move to step five.
Step 5: At this point, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to

demonstrate that the claimant, considering his age, education, work
experience, and RFC, is capable of performing jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.

§ 4 16.920(g); see Poulos v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 9 1—92 (3d Cir. 2007). If so, benefits will be denied; if
not, they will be awarded.
B.

The AU’s Findings

AU Krappa properly followed the five-step process. Her findings may be
summarized as follows:

3

Step 1

At step one, the ALJ determined that Ms. Oliveras has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since September 20, 1011. (R 22

¶

1)

Step 2

At step two, the AU found that Ms. Oliveras has the following severe
impairments: “a spinal disorder; fibromyalgia; arthritis; and headaches.” (R22

¶

2)
Step 3

At step three, the AU

determined that Ms. Oliveras does not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1.
(R22

¶

3)

Step 4— RFC/Past Relevant Work

At step four, “[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record,” the AU
found that Ms. Oliveras has “the residual functional capacity to perform the

exertional demands of light work as defined in 20 CFR 4 16.967(b) except
specifically, she is able to: lift/carry 20 lbs. occasionally and 10 lbs. frequently;
stand/walk for 6 hours in an eight hour work day; sit for 6 hours in an eight
hour work day; and perform unlimited pushing and pulling within the weight
restriction given. Moreover, regarding the postural and environmental demands
of work, I find that the claimant is able to perform jobs: that require occasional
use of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; that require frequent (as opposed to
unlimited) use of ramps or stairs; and that require frequent balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and/or crawling. The claimant is only able to
perform jobs that do not require her head to be kept in a fixed position.” (R23
4)
The AUJ concluded that Ms. Oliveras is capable of performing past
relevant work as a parking attendant. That job does not require activities
outside of her residual functional capacity. (R25 ¶5) Accordingly, the AU
concluded that she has not been under a disability, as defined by the SSA,
since September 20, 2011, the date her application was filed. (R26 ¶6)
4

¶

C.

This Court’s Standard of Review

As to all legal issues, this Court conducts plenary review. See Schaudeck
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). As to factual issues,
this Court must adhere to the AU’s findings as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004)

§ 405(g)). Where facts are disputed, this Court will “determine

(citing 42 U.S.C.

whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the
findings.” Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial
evidence “is more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
[un evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the AU’s
leniency should be shown in establishing the
findings
the Secretary’s responsibility to rebut
claimant’s disability, and
it should be strictly construed. Due regard for the beneficent
purposes of the legislation requires that a more tolerant standard
be used in this administrative proceeding than is applicable in a
typical suit in a court of record where the adversary system
prevails.
.

.

.

.

.

.

Reefer v. Bamhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). When there is substantial evidence to support the AU’s
factual findings, however, this Court must abide by them. See Jones, 364 F.3d
at 503 (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g)); Zimsak, 777 F.3d at 610—il (“[W]e are

mindful that we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
finder.”).
This Court may, under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), affirm, modify, or reverse the

Commissioner’s decision, or it may remand the matter to the Commissioner for
a rehearing. Podedwomy v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984); Bordes v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 235 F. App’x 853, 865—66 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential).

5

Remand is proper if the record is incomplete, or if there is a lack of substantial
evidence to support a definitive finding on one or more steps of the five step
inquiry. See Podedwomy, 745 F.2d at 221—22. Remand is also proper if the
AU’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or support for its conclusions, or if it
contains illogical or contradictory findings. See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
220 F.3d 112, 119—20 (3d Cir. 2000). It is also proper to remand where the
AU’s findings are not the product of a complete review which “explicitly
weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the record. Adorno v.
Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
II.

DISCUSSION
The argument section of Ms. Oliveras’s brief on appeal contains two

points:
A.

The AU did not conduct a full residual functional capacity
assessment

B.

The AU should not have found Ms. Oliveras capable of light work.

Those two contentions on appeal focus on the step 4 finding that she possesses
the residual functional capacity to perform light, unskilled work, particularly
3
her past relevant work as a parking lot attendant. I conclude that the AU’s
findings contain no legal error and are supported by substantial evidence.
A.

Step 4: RF’C

At step 4, the AU

found that Ms. Oliveras’s impairments, although real,

do not disable her, but only limit her residual functional capacity to perform
any but light, unskilled work. In particular, the AU found that she could
perform relevant past work as a parking lot attendant. Ms. Oliveras disputes
the AU’s assessment of her RFC, claiming that it did not properly take all of
the evidence into account.
At step 2, the AU found severe impairments consisting of a spinal disorder,
fibromyalgia, arthritis, and headaches. At step 3, however, the ALl found that those
impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or equal a listed impairment. In
her Local Rule 9.1 statement of issues (ECF no. 12), the claimant disputed that step 3
fmding, but in her formal brief (ECF no, 14) she no longer presses that argument.
6

(a) General—(1) Residual functional capacity assessment.
Your impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such as pain, may
cause physical and mental limitations that affect what you can do
in a work setting. Your residual functional capacity is the most you
can still do despite your limitations. We will assess your residual
functional capacity based on all the relevant evidence in your case
record. (See § 404.1512(d) through (e).)
(2) If you have more than one impairment.
We will consider all of your medically determinable impairments of
which we are aware, including your medically determinable
when we assess your
impairments that are not “severe,”
residual functional capacity.
.

.

.

(3) Evidence we use to assess your residual functional capacity. We
will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the
We will consider any
relevant medical and other evidence
statements about what you can still do that have been provided by
medical sources, whether or not they are based on formal medical
We will also consider descriptions and
examinations
observations of your limitations from your impairment(s), including
limitations that result from your symptoms, such as pain, provided
by you, your family, neighbors, friends, or other persons.
.

.

.

.

.

.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 and 4 16.945 (2016).
Ms. Oliveras cites medical evidence that she suffers from an impairment
or impairments. But the AU’s decision does not deny that such impairments
exist, nor does it gloss over them. The step-by-step analysis, and particularly
the RFC, quoted in full at p.1., supra, acknowledge the claimant’s impairments
and find that they very significantly limit the kind of work she can do.
The claimant cannot prevail by pointing to evidence that might support a
finding of disability. Her burden here is to show that the AU’s finding of nondisability was not supported by substantial evidence, a different matter, Of
course she may also obtain a remand by showing that the AU ignored or failed
to deal with evidence. And Ms. Oliveras does assert here that the AU failed “to
consider and explain [her] reasons for discounting all of the pertinent evidence
before [her] in making [her] residual functional capacity determination.” (P1. Br.
27, quoting Bryan v. Commissioner, 383 F. App’x 140, 150 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121)).

7

The Burnett claim focuses on the AU’s alleged failure to deal with
evidence of an upper extremity impairment. I must note at the outset, however,
that I disagree with one premise of the argument: i.e., that the AU did not find
any upper extremity impairment. She did: the RFC limits the claimant to lifting
or carrying 20 lbs. occasionally and 10 lbs. frequently, and to pushing and
pulling within those weight restrictions. (R23 ¶4) The musculoskeletal system
is of course interconnected, but those lifting and pushing activities are
performed directly with the upper extremities—i.e., the arms and hands.
Ms. Oliveras faults the AU’s discussion of her claims of pain and her
self-reported limitations in the performance of her daily activities. The AU.J,
while noting the limitations associated with the claimant’s impairments, noted
that she handles her own personal care, pays bills, cares for pets, drives her
son to school, prepares food, shops, drives, watches television, reads, listens to
music, and pays bills. (R25) Ms. Oliveras cavils that the AU’s opinion omitted
qualifying language she had used at times, such as “with help,” or “when not in
pain.” Also included in function reports, she points out, were complaints of
difficulty in performing certain tasks because of left arm impairments, pain,
and tingling. (P1. Br. 30)
The AU’s opinion demonstrates that she carefully considered Ms.
Oliveras’s complaints of pain and her accounts of her daily activities. That the
AU

focused on Ms. Oliveras’s live testimony, rather than her written reports

(which are largely cumulative) does not undermine her findings. With regard to
facts specifically relating to upper extremity impairments, the AU duly noted
that Ms. Oliveras claimed to have quit her job because of pain; that she was
under the care of a rheumatologist, Dr. Goldberg; that she is able to walk one
or two blocks, stand 20-30 minutes and sit 20-30 minutes; that she can lift 10
pounds, but is unable to hold anything for a long period of time; that she takes
Lyrica (sometimes prescribed for fibromyalgia), Imitrex (prescribed for
migraines), and pain medication; that she has radiating pain from her neck to
her head; that she has weakness in her arms and hands. (R23—24)

8

In short, I can see no important deviation from the message Ms. Oliveras
says the AU

should have carried away from her subjective account, and the

message the AU did carry away. The AU’s findings in this regard were largely
in the claimant’s favor, and provided the foundation for going forward and
considering whether the medical evidence was consistent. She found that Ms.
Oliveras’s complaints were consistent with the impairments, but discounted
their severity to some degree in light of the medical evidence. (R24)
I move on to the medical evidence. With specific reference to upper
extremity impairments, Ms. Oliveras faults the AU’s decision for failing to deal
with the following medical evidence:
February 2010 complaints of back, hand, knee and wrist pain and
diagnosis of possible synovitis of the hands (citing R345; Ex. 3F (Dr.
Ibarbia));
May-June 2010 emergency room visits with left elbow pain and
swelling, and diagnosis of arthritis (citing R343—45, 402—03, 311; Exs. 3F
(Dr. Ibarbia), 7F (Dr. Argulla), 2F ([progress notes; illeg.]));
February 2011 diagnosis of possible synovitis and positive
Finkelstein maneuver of wrists, requiring Kenalog injection (citing R336,
Ex. 3F (Dr. Goldberg))
March 2011 positive Tinel’s sign, tenderness and limitation on
motion of shoulders, but carpal tunnel syndrome and cervical
radiculopathy ruled out after ‘normal” EMG/NCS (citing R355 Ex. 3F);
November—December 2012 exam revealing diffuse tenderness of
shoulders, elbows, wrists, and hands, followed by right subacromial
injection (citing R484, 480, Ex. 8F (Dr. Ibarbia));
February 2013 exam revealing deficit in right hand strength and
decreased sensation at the right C5 and C6 distributions (citing R473.
Ex. 8F (Dr. Ibarbia));
March 2013 similar finding, plus tenderness of shoulders, elbows,
wrists, and hands, and positive impingement signs (citing R467, Ex. 8F
(Dr. Ibarbia));
March 2013 MRI of right shoulder revealing
tendinopathy/tendinitis and associated bursitis, leading to June 2013
repeat subacromial injection and trigger point injections (R467—68, 585,
Exs. 8F (Dr. Ibarbia), 1OF (Dr. Ibarbia)).

9

(P1. Br. 28-30)4
I find that the AU

did give careful consideration to the medical evidence.

The AU cited, revealed her familiarity with, and substantively discussed the
very exhibits cited, and covered their subject matter in substance.
An upper extremity impairment was not always isolated or distinct in the
evidence. That, however, is because the diagnoses tended to be organized by
medical condition, rather than by part of the body. Thus upper extremity
problems were subsumed in the discussion of fibromyalgia, “a disorder
characterized by widespread musculoskeletal pain.” See Mayo Clinic website,
www.mayciinic.orgLc1iseases-conditionsfjromya1gia/basics / definition! con20019243. That condition, however, was found non-disabling. Likewise, the
discussion of arthritis involved the shoulders and arms, but the condition was
found non-disabling. The shoulder problems, too, would potentially affect the
use of the upper extremities, but were analyzed and not found severe enough
to be disabling. Likewise the neck problems, although the relation to the
extremities is less clear. Considered in this light, the AU’s discussion
discharged her duty to analyze the evidence.
The fibromyalgia, wrote Judge Krappa, was
diagnosed by Dr. Joseph (Exhibit 1 iF) and Dr. Ibarbia of New
Jersey Physicians (Exhibit 8F).... Examination findings have been
consistent with diffuse tenderness in the spine, shoulders, and
hips; however, the claimant’s range of motion is normal except for
limitations in the lumbosacral spine (Exhibits 3F, 5F, 8F, 1 OF).
Clinical findings do not specify any tender points as delineated in
the evaluation of fibromyalgia in Social Security ruling 1 2-2P.
(R24)
The AU

also cited the evidence of arthritis, affecting the shoulder and

arm, and discussed the extent to which medical evidence did or did not
corroborate its severity:
It is possible to quibble with Ms. Oliveras’s characterization of the evidence. For
example, she sometimes omits qualifiers such as “mild” and “moderate” when
summarizing the doctors’ findings. The larger point, however, is that the AU
adequately considered the evidence in arriving at her conclusions.

4

10

Dr. Goldberg, a rheumatologist at New Jersey Physicians has
diagnosed the claimant with arthritis (Exhibits 3F, 5F); however,
the results of right shoulder and left elbow x-rays have shown no
evidence of bony destructive pathology, fracture or dislocations
(Exhibit iF) and there are no other x-ray results of joints.
Laboratory findings have shown normal values for ANA, RA, RF
and ESR (Exhibit 3Fk, pgs. 28, 31—33). Additionally, the results of
nerve conduction studies (“NCS”)/electromyography (“EMG”) of the
upper extremities showed no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome
or cervical radiculopathy (Exhibit 3F, pgs. 34—35)
(R24)
The AU

discussed the evidence of neck pain, which at least in some

cases might indicate an upper extremity limitation. Not to any severe extent
here, however:
In regard to the claimant’s complaints of neck pain, the results of
cervical MRI scan performed in February 2013 showed disc
herniation at C 4—5 and C 5—6 levels moderately impressing the
thecal sac (Exhibit 1 iF, pg 5), but there is no evidence of nerve
root impingement and no evidence of neurological deficits. The
results of a lumbosacral MRI scan performed in October 2011 were
negative (Exhibit 3F, pg. 33); however, a subsequent MRI scan
performed in October 2013 showed moderate disc bulging at L 4—5
level moderately impressing the thecal sac, but no nerve root
impingement and no significant spinal stenosis (Exhibit 13 F).
(R24) In the RFC, however, the AU ruled that Ms. Oliveras could not perform a
5
job that required her to hold her head still.
Dr. Goldberg, the AU noted, prescribed pain medication. A sacroiliac
cortisone injection produced only temporary relief, however, and the claimant

While the case was on review by the Appeals Council, Ms. Oliveras submitted a
report of a lumbar MRI on June 26, 2014. This indicated a left herniation of the L4-5
intervertebral disc causing mild stenosis of the left foramen, but no stenosis of the
spinal canal (R6 13). Also submitted was a cervical MRI which indicated a bulge of the
C3-4 intervertebral disc, but no significant narrowing and no significant hypertrophy
of the facet joints (R6 11). There was a central posterior herniation of the C4-5
intervertebral disc and a right herniation of the C5-6 disc causing moderate stenosis
of the spinal canal (Tr. 612). The Appeals Council reviewed them but concluded that
they would not require a remand. (R2) This is insufficiently material, in my view, to
require a so-called ‘sentence six” remand for consideration of new evidence. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 2001).
11

refused to attend physical therapy (which she found painful). Overall, Dr.
Goldberg described the symptoms as “moderate.” (R24)
Ms. Oliveras also faults the AU

for failing to include any limitation in the

RFC related to her headaches. The AU considered the relevant evidence, noted
that the headaches were not accompanied by any neurological deficit, and
noted that they responded to medication, at least to a degree:
[T]he claimant has been diagnosed by her treating primary care
physician, Dr. Rizzo, with migraine headaches; she has been
prescribed Fioricet, Imitrex (Exhibit 2F) Treatment record[s] from
Dr. Joseph dated March 28, 2013, state that the symptoms of the
claimant’s migraines are doing better on Keppra (Exhibit 1 iF, pg.
2). There is no evidence of any associated neurological deficits;
moreover, although the claimant testified that she has
concentration and memory problems, there is no evidence of these
complaints in the record.
(R24—25)
All of these findings were rooted in the evidence. Although no opinion
could possibly cite and summarize the hundreds of pages of this lengthy
medical record, it is clear that the AU reviewed and discussed the opinions
and diagnoses of the very doctors cited by Ms. Oliveras now. Indeed, the AU
accepted those diagnoses and opinions for the most part. The fact remains that
none of those doctors stated or implied an opinion that Ms. Oliveras’s
impairments, alone or in combination, were so serious that they would disable
her. Rather, these seem to be chronic health problems with which,
unfortunately, many a person has to live and function.
I find it significant that the AU, despite the State agency medical
consultants’ contrary opinion, gave the claimant the benefit of the doubt and
found that Ms. Oliveras did suffer from some severe impairments. In doing so,
the AU specifically alluded to the medical evidence of fibromyalgia, spinal
degenerative disc disease, and the reports of the pain management specialists
at New Jersey Physicians. (R24, citing exhibits) In a balanced ruling, the AU
took all of the evidence into account and found that those impairments

12

substantially limited the work the claimant could do, but did not preclude her
altogether from working. Substantial evidence supported that determination.
B.

“Light” Work

Ms. Oliveras next disputes the AU’s conclusion that she was capable of
“light work”—in particular, her prior relevant work as a parking lot attendant.
This contention is really her attack on the RFC in a different guise. What
Ms. Oliveras is saying is that, given the medical evidence, her RFC should have
been more restrictive (the issue discussed above), and that if it had been, she
would have been found incapable of light work, including her former
employment.
I have already upheld the AU’s finding as to the RFC, which did of
course shape the AU’s subsequent findings. The AU

heard the VE’s testimony

that, given the restrictions of the RFC, Ms. Oliveras could perform her prior
work. That prior job, parking lot attendant (DOT #915.473-010), is performed
at a light level of exertion. The AU accepted the VE’s opinion that the job
duties of a parking lot attendant fall within the RFC as she had defined

it.6

Other evidence points in the same direction. Common sense suggests
that the job of parking cars would involve sitting and short walks in alteration.
Ms. Oliveras herself suggested that she can, perhaps must, alternate between
the two. Her statement that she can walk only a block or two is uncorroborated
by other evidence. Indeed, the treating physicians on whose opinions she relies,
Drs. Goldberg and Ibaria, prescribed walking for exercise as part of their
treatment. (See R361, 505, 510, 513, 526, 528, 531, 484)
The AU’s determination that Ms. Oliveras could perform her past
relevant work was supported by substantial evidence.

Point IV.B of Ms. Oliveras’s brief devotes some discussion to the general
definition of light work. The VE did testify on that subject. In the end, however, the
AU did not rely on light work in general, but on Ms. Oliveras’s former job as a parking
lot attendant. The AU made no step 5 finding as to Ms. Oliveras’s ability to perform
other “light work” jobs that exist in the national economy.
6

13

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the AU’s decision is AFFIRMED. A
separate order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: March 13, 2017

t(
1
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

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