RASHDUNI v. MELCHIONNE
Filing
13
OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 7/26/2016. (seb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CLAUDE RASHDUNI,
Civ. No. 15-8907 (KM)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
V.
PETER J. MELCHIONNE,
Defendant.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
Claude Rashduni brings this action pro se alleging violations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). Defend
ant
Hon. Peter J. Meichionne, J.S.C., is the judge who presided over child custod
y
proceedings. According to Rashduni, Judge Meichionne has wrongfully
vacated
a joint custody agreement, ordered him to pay $750 per week in child suppor
t,
and terminated his visitation rights. At times Rashduni states that Judge
Meichionne applied no legal standard at all, but elsewhere he challenges the
standard that the judge applied, i.e., “best interests of the child.” The compl
aint
seeks damages, reversal of all of Judge Meichionne’s orders, and injunctive
relief on behalf of all persons deprived of custody of their children.
Before the court are Mr. Rashduni’s motion to void all orders filed by
Judge Meichionne (ECF no. 6), and Judge Meichionne’s motion to dismiss
the
complaint (ECF no. 11). For the reasons that follow, I will grant the motion
to
dismiss the complaint and deny the motion to void the state court orders.
This
opinion should be read in conjunction with another, filed today in a compa
nion
case, Rashduni v. Dente, Civ. No. 16-240. (A copy is attached for ease of
reference.)
1
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
to
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
Motor Co.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) may be raised at any time. Iwanowa v. Ford
are either
67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437-38 (D.N.J. 1999). Rule 12(b)(1) challenges
RAL
facial or factual attacks. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDE
PRACTICE
§ 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2007). The defendant may facially challenge
does not
subject matter jurisdiction by arguing that the complaint, on its face,
Iwanowa, 67
allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
allegations
F. Supp. 2d at 438. Under this standard, a court assumes that the
s to a
in the complaint are true, and may dismiss the complaint only if it appear
of subject
certainty that the plaintiff will not be able to assert a colorable claim
based on
matter jurisdiction. Id. The jurisdictional arguments made here are
allegations
the allegations of the complaint. Accordingly, the Court will take the
(3d
of the complaint as true. See Gould Elecs., Inc. v. US., 220 F.3d 169, 178
Cir. 2000).
2. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
aint, in whole
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a compl
or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated.
g a motion
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In decidin
and view
to dismiss, a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true
, 422 U.S.
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin
s Inc., 140
490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. u. Mirage Resort
515 F.3d
F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
ined by
224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (“reasonable inferences” principle not underm
later Supreme Court Twombly case, infra).
detailed
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain
factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
2
conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual
allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a
speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also
Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has
“facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[tjhe plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement’
it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (2009).
...
Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro
Se,
the complaint is “to be
liberally construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, it must meet some minimal
standard. “While a litigant’s pro se status requires a court to construe the
allegations in the complaint liberally, a litigant is not absolved from complying
with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he
proceeds pro Se.” Thakar v. Tan, 372 Fed. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted).
II.
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
3
A.
Damages Claims: Threshold Grounds
1. Eleventh Amendment immunity
Judge Meichionne asserts that jurisdiction is lacking because, in his
official capacity, he enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, which is of jurisdictional
power of
stature, renders the states immune from certain claims: “The Judicial
equity,
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
s of
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizen
Const.
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
of
Amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment incorporates a general principle
against
sovereign immunity that bars citizens from bringing suits for damages
465
any State in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
of Florida
U.S. 89, 100—10 1, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908 (1984); see also Seminole Tribe
Jordan,
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Edelman v.
134
415 U.S. 651, 662—63, 94 5. Ct. 1347, 1355 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana,
U.S. 1, 10, 10 S. Ct. 504, 505 (1890). Although Congress may in some
ity, it
circumstances possess the power to override a state’s sovereign immun
332,
did not do so when it enacted Section 1983. Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
n 1983
342 (1979). Monetary claims for deprivations of civil rights under Sectio
bar. Will
are therefore subject to the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 58 (1989).
,
As a judicial officer of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County
See
Judge Meichionne is within the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.
App’x
Robinson v. New Jersey Mercer County Vicinage-Family Div., 514 Fed.
of the
146, 149 (3d Cir. 2013) (New Jersey county court was “clearly a part
official
state of New Jersey,” so “both the court itself and its employees in their
capacities were unconsenting state entities entitled to immunity under the
233,
Eleventh Amendment”) (citing Benn v. First Judicial Dist. Of Pa., 426 F.3d
240 (3d Cir. 2005)); Dongon
V.
Banar, 363 F. App’x 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2010)
ity
(“[T]he state courts, its employees, and the judges are entitled to immun
4
under the Eleventh Amendment... .“) (citing Johnson v. State of N.J., 869 F.
Supp. 289, 296-98 (D.N.J. 1994)).
2. Amenability to Suit as “Person”
Judge Meichionne also asserts the closely related ground that he, in his
official capacity, is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.1
§
Section 1983 imposes liability on “e]very person, who, acting under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” subjects
a person to a deprivation of certain rights. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (emphasis added).
“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under 1983.” Hafer V. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26, 112 S. Ct. 358, 362 (1991)
(quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312). An action against a State
agent in that agent’s official capacity is considered an action against the State
itself, not one against a “person.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105
S. Ct. 3099, 3104 (1985).
As a state official, Judge Meichionne is not amenable to a suit for
damages because he is not a “person” under § 1983.
3. Judicial Immunity
Judge Meichionne enjoys absolute judicial immunity from claims, like
these, based on his judicial acts. See Dongon, 363 F. App’x at 155 (“[J]udges
are entitled to absolute immunity from liability based on actions taken in their
official judicial capacity.”) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983)).
See also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 5. Ct. 286 (1991); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
1
The Eleventh Amendment and § 1983 “person” grounds are parallel, but
distinct. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66—67, 109 S. Ct.
2304, 2310 (1989) (“This does not mean, as petitioner suggests, that we think that the
scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983 are not separate issues.
Certainly they are. But in deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of 1983,
§
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a
reading of § 1983 that disregards it.”). Cases, including mine, have for brevity run the
two issues together. See, e.g., Eridl v. New Jersey, 5 F. Supp. 3d 689, 696 (D.N.J.
2014) (McNulty, J.). Either way, the disqualifying factor is that the defendant is, or
acts on behalf of, the State.
5
(1967); Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d
Cir. 2009). All of the damages claims asserted here are based on rulings that
Judge Meichionne made in the state child custody proceedings. Against such
claims, whether asserted against him in his official or individual capacity,
Judge Meichionne is absolutely immune. See Ludwig v. Berks Cty., 313 F.
App’x 479, 482 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In his personal capacity, Judge Keller has
absolute immunity from liability for his judicial acts.”) (citing Azubuko v. Royal,
443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)).
B.
Injunctive Relief Claims
Mr. Rashduni asks that this Court vacate all the orders entered by Judge
Meichionne regarding child custody and child support in his case. He further
seeks injunctive relief on behalf of all persons deprived of child custody.
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish
[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
[2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief,
[3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
[4] that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (line breaks and
numbering added); accord American Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v.
Sidamon-Eristoff 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). The first two factors are
essential: A court may not grant injunctive relief, “regardless of what the
equities seem to require,” unless plaintiffs carry their burden of establishing
both a likelihood of success and irreparable harm. Adams v. Freedom Forge
Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000); accord Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson
& Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1990).
There is a threshold bar to injunctive relief as a matter of statute. As
amended in 1996, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
6
declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C.
572 F. App’x 68, 71 (3d Cir. 2014) (in
§ 1983. See also Mikhail v. Khan,
§ 1983 action based on state child
custody case, “claims for injunctive relief also are barred because Mikhail did
not allege that any judge violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief
was not available in his case”); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir.
2006) (applying § 1983 injunction exclusion in action against judge who had
dismissed two actions filed by plaintiff).
In addition, and in the alternative, I note that the plaintiff makes no
substantial showing on the merits. A state court does not err when it applies
the “best interests of the child” standard. Mr. Rashduni cites cases requiring a
“clear and convincing” standard of proof. Those cases, however, involve a Stateinitiated proceeding to terminate parental rights. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982); B.S. v. Somerset, 704 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2013). The
allegations in such cases commonly involve such matters as abuse and neglect,
and take on a quasi-criminal aspect. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756, 769—70.
This case, by contrast, is a dispute between parents over which shall
have custody. In a custody dispute, there are “no government accusations of
fault or the government acting in an adversarial role against the parents.”
Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 990
(9th
Cir. 2006). Rather, each parent is
seeking to assert his or her rights against the other, with the State court in the
role of arbiter. See Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710, 721 (N.J. 2003). In
such a case a preponderance standard is a virtual necessity. Given the strong
presumption that a fit parent shall retain custody, the “best interests of the
child” standard is the traditional standard, and certainly is a permissible one.
See generally Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) (“The best
interests of the child,’ a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is
a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two
parents will be accorded custody.”); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104
S. Ct. 1879 (1984) (“The goal of granting custody based on the best interest of
7
the child is indisputably a substantial government interest for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause.”).
Rashduni has not made the slightest legal or factual showing that the
court’s application of the best interests of the child standard denied him due
process or equal protection of the laws, or was erroneous in any way. As for
future deprivations of parental rights, plaintiff can demonstrate neither a
2
likelihood of future harm nor standing to assert rights of others. The
injunctive claims, too, are dismissed.
IlL
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the defendant to dismiss the
complaint is GRANTED. The dismissal is with prejudice, because the complaint
fails to meet jurisdictional requirements and seeks relief against a defendant
who is immune. The plaintiff’s motion to vacate all orders of Judge Meichionne
is DENIED because the complaint fails to state a claim.
Dated: July 26, 20i.6
Newark, New Jersey
L.
)
HON. KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge
The lack of any showing on the merits is sufficient to require dismissal. I note also,
the
however, that the complaint also lacks a showing of irreparable harm. To the extent
unwarranted. Any error is correctable by the
proceedings are ongoing, interference would be
te
trial judge himself, or by the appellate process. To put it another way, there is an adequa
are somewhat ambiguous as to the status of the proceedings
remedy at law. Both sides’ papers
lent of an attempt
when the complaint was filed. The State asserts that this action is the equiva
man
to appeal an adverse state court judgment, and hence is barred by the Rooker-Feid
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., Inc., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct.
doctrine. See, e.g.,
man
1517 (2005); O’Callaghan v. Harvey, 233 F. App’x 181 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying Rooker-Feld
proceeded to
in context of child custody matter). If it were clear that the state custody case had
for lack of
judgment when this federal action was filed, I would agree, and dismiss the case
ded that the state court
jurisdiction. In response to an inquiry from chambers, counsel respon
judgment is currently final and has not been appealed. (ECF no. 12)
2
8
7
EXHIBIT A
9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CLAUDE RASHDUNI,
Civ. No. 16-240 (KM)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
V.
P. DENTE (COP 1), THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
JOHN DOE1 (COP 3), JOHN DOE2 (COP4)
GRZEGORZ KINAL (COP 2), PETER J.
MELCHIONNE, LAURA MEZA, BARBARA
COWEN, MARINE MANVELYAN, COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, MUNICIPAL COURT
OF BERGEN COUNTY,
Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
Claude Rashduni brings this “counterclaim” pro se alleging “trespass,
and trespass on the case,” but also states that the actions of defendants were
“unconstitutional.” I will interpret this as a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§
1983 (“Section 1983”).’ It names Defendant Hon. Peter J. Meichionne, J.S.C.,
the judge presiding over Mr. Rashduni’s child custody proceedings, as well as
court personnel, Sheriff’s Officers, the Municipal Court of Bergen County,
Rashduni’s ex-wife, and her lawyer. This case is a companion to Rashduni v.
Meichionne, No. 15-8907, in which I am also filing an opinion today.
Defendants have moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim. For the reasons expressed herein, the motions are granted.
The amended complaint in this action (ECF no. 8) is entitled “Amended Counterclaim
for Trespass and Trespass on the Case.” I have treated it as a complaint and deemed Mr.
Rashduni to be plaintiff.
1
BACKGROUND
I.
For some time, proceedings have been proceeding in the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Bergen County, concerning the divorce of Mr. Rashduni and his
ex-wife, Marine Manvelyan, and custody of their child, K.R. Judge Meichionne,
the last judge to preside, has seemingly awarded custody to Manvelyan and
ordered Rashduni to pay child support.
The amended complaint is quite difficult to follow. The allegations may be
summarized as follows.
At a April 2, 2015, court appearance, defendants forced Rashduni
to accept that sole custody of the child would be given to Manvelyan, with
“unfounded proof and uncivilized barbaric process.” The attached transcript
1.
excerpts demonstrate that the court had not yet made its determination. The
judge did state that the proofs were pointing toward sole custody, and warned
Rashduni that he could be jailed if he did not stop interrupting. (ECF no. 8 at
2—4, 16—21)
2.
The court dismissed a counterclaim despite no counterclaim’s
having been filed. (ECF no. 8 at 4—5)
In December 2013 Manvelyan obtained a passport for the child
without Rashduni’s consent or knowledge. (ECF no. 8 at 5—7) This, believes
Rashduni, was a step in a plan to kidnap the child. The passport was
3.
mentioned repeatedly at a December 2013 hearing.
Manvelyan has given false information about the child’s enrollment
4.
in the New Jersey Family Care Plan, which would be inappropriate given
Manvelyan’s income level. Defendant Cowen, her lawyer, has allegedly known
about or aided the misrepresentation. (ECF no. 8 at 7—8)
Manvelyan sought to dissolve the marriage five months after
5.
receiving her green card. She filed three bogus criminal charges against
Rashduni, which were dismissed.
Attached to the complaint is an order of the state court, dated
December 14, 2015. The order dismissed Rashduni’s answer, counterclaim,
and order to show cause, and stated that the matter would proceed by default
6.
2
on January 11, 2016. (ECF nol. 8 at 24) Also attached is a notice of proposed
final judgment granting Manvelyan sole custody without visitation rights,
restraining Rashduni from approaching Manvelyan or the child, returning
passports and permitting Manvelyan to remove the child from the jurisdiction,
awarding child support of $589 per week, and awarding attorney’s fees and
other relief. The outcome of the January 11, 2016 hearing is not stated.
The complaint alleges that this is a plan to kidnap the child while
imprisoning Rashduni. It alleges that “it is unconstitutional to take a child
from one person and transfer[j it to another person.” (ECF no. 8 at 10)
Also alleged is that the judge wrongfully ordered the scanning of the
deeds of two houses owned by Rashduni’s mother. (ECF no. 8 at 11)
As relief, the complaint demands “Dismiss all Criminal charges in the
Bergen County Municipal Court with a mandate from the federal court.” (ECF
no. 8 at 13) No supporting facts are stated. This seems to refer to a disorderly
persons charge of contempt brought against Rashduni based on his disruptive
behavior in court. (ECF no. 1-1)
The complaint demands that the child’s passport be held by the State
Department.
The complaint also seeks damages based on loss of reputation in the
amount of “$15 million plus $50,000 multiplied by the number of days in
constructive and actual imprisonment.” (ECF no. 8 at 13)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) may be raised at any time. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,
67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437-38 (D.N.J. 1999). Rule 12(b)(1) challenges are either
facial or factual attacks. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE
§ 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2007). The defendant may facially challenge
subject matter jurisdiction by arguing that the complaint, on its face, does not
allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Iwanowa, 67
F. Supp. 2d at 438. Under this standard, a court assumes that the allegations
3
in the complaint are true, and may dismiss the complaint only if it appears to a
certainty that the plaintiff will not be able to assert a colorable claim of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. The jurisdictional arguments made here are based on
the allegations of the complaint. Accordingly, the Court will take the allegations
of the complaint as true. See Gould Elecs., Inc. v. US., 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d
Cir. 2000).
2. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole
or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated.
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion
to dismiss, a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.s.
490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140
F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (“reasonable inferences” principle not undermined by
later Supreme Court Twombly case, infra).
FED. R. Civ. p. 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed
factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual
allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a
speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also
Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has
“facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[tjhe plausibility standard is not akin to a
4
‘probability requirement’
...
it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (2009).
Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro
Se,
the complaint is “to be
liberally construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, it must meet some minimal
standard. “While a litigant’s pro se status requires a court to construe the
allegations in the complaint liberally, a litigant is not absolved from complying
with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he
proceeds pro Se.” Thakar v. Tart, 372 Fed. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted).
II.
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C.
A.
§ 1983.
Claims against Judge Melchionne, Mezza, and the Court
Judge Melchionne, Laura Mezza, and the Superior Court, all named as
defendants, have filed a motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated in my
opinion filed in a related case today, the claims against Judge Melchionne are
barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, his non-amenability to
suit as a “person” under
§ 1983, and absolute judicial immunity. Rashduni v.
Meichionne, Civ. No. 15-8907. (A copy is attached for ease of reference.)
The Superior Court itself, as well as Laura Mezza, as Court Services
Supervisor, are likewise shielded from suit as entities and officers of the State,
5
for the reasons expressed in the Meichionne opinion. See Robinson v. New
Jersey Mercer County Vicinage-Family Div., 514 Fed. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir.
2013) (New Jersey county court was “clearly a part of the state of New Jersey,”
so “both the court itself and its employees in their official capacities were
unconsenting state entities entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment”) (citing Benn v. First Judicial Dist. Of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d
Cir. 2005)).
2
Mezza, like the judge, is entitled to assert judicial immunity as to claims
against her in her personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25—27,
112 S. Ct. 358, 362—63 (1991) It is not clear precisely what Mezza is alleged to
have done to injure the plaintiff. What is clear is that Mezza carried out tasks
integral to the judicial function, and is therefore entitled to absolute quasijudicial immunity. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760,
772 (3d Cir. 2000) (Deputy Court Administrator entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity); Dongon v. Banar, 363 Fed. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2010) (judicial
employees).
Finally, to the extent Rashduni seeks to upset a final judgment of the
state court, this court lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., Inc., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125
S. Ct. 1517 (2005); O’Callaghan v. Harvey, 233 F. App’x 181 (3d Cir. 2007)
(applying Rooker-Feidman in context of child custody matter). Rashduni’s
complaint states that the Family Court’s judgment is final, and he clearly is
seeking in this action to overturn the result. The Deputy Attorney General
representing defendants confirms the allegation of the complaint that the
judgment is final, and adds that it has not been appealed. (Case no. 15-8907,
ECF no. 12) For this reason as well, the court lacks jurisdiction.
Claims against Manvelyan’s lawyer, Ms. Cowen, seem to have the opposite problem;
because Cowen did not act for the State, she is not an appropriate defendant for a § 1983
claim. See Steward v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 669, 669-70 (3d Cir. 1972)(private attorney was not a
state actor under Section 1983); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (198 1)(even court
appointed defense attorneys do not act under the color of state law for purposes of Section
1983).
2
6
B.
Claims against Bergen County Sheriff, Dente, Kinal, Bergen
County Municipal Court
The complaint names as defendants the Bergen County Sheriff, Sheriff’s
Officers Qrzegorz Kinal and Pellegrino Dente, and the Central Municipal Court
of Bergen County. The complaint itself says little or nothing about these
defendants. The allegations appear to relate to a municipal court complaint,
attached to the original complaint in this action as Ex. A (ECF no. 1-1). The
municipal court complaint relates that, on October 19, 2015, Rashduni
refused to be quiet after being asked several times by Judge Meichionne and
the Sheriff’s Officers to stop interrupting and causing a disturbance. He is
charged with two disorderly persons offenses, one of them a petty offense. See
N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:29-1A and 2C:33-2A(1).
The complaint in this action demands that all criminal proceedings
against Rashduni in the municipal court be dismissed. That this Court cannot
do under the doctrine of Younger abstention. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971). The doctrine requires pending or ongoing state judicial proceedings;
the proceedings must implicate important state interests; and the proceedings
must afford an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional issues. See
Middlesex Cty. Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982); Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003). Where Younger
abstention is appropriate, the proper remedy is outright dismissal of the federal
action. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
3
Ongoing state criminal proceedings, like these, present the
quintessential case for Younger abstention. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed that principle:
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified in Sprint that Younger
applies “only in three ‘exceptional’ classes of cases: (1) state
criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings, and (3)
civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions.”
The implication of the complaint, which seeks to enjoin the criminal proceedings, is that
those proceedings are ongoing. There is no indication of a disposition in the record before me.
7
Chambers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 15-6976 (JBS/JS), 2016 WL
3533998, at *4 (D.N.J. June 28, 2016) (quoting Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n
of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2014) (discussing Sprint
Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs,
—
U.S.
—,
134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013)).
Criminal prosecutions implicate important state interests. They obviously
afford a defendant the opportunity to assert constitutional defenses at trial and
on appeal. To the extent that Rashduni seeks to have this court order dismissal
of state criminal proceedings, then, I abstain under Younger and dismiss his
claims.
Finally, the complaint simply fails to state a claim against these
defendants. The Sheriff’s Office and its Officers acted as courtroom security
personnel. It is inferable that they arrested Rashduni and filed the complaint
for contempt. Nothing about the facts alleged in the complaint or the transcript
indicates any unconstitutional basis for the arrest or charges. For this reason,
too, the claims against these defendants must be dismissed.
4
The Bergen County Municipal Court is simply the court in which the
charges were filed. Again, no unconstitutional conduct is specified. And the
Court would partake of absolute judicial immunity at any rate. See supra.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the defendant to dismiss the
complaint is GRANTED. The dismissal is with prejudice, because the complaint
fails to meet jurisdictional requirements and seeks relief against defendants
who are immune.
Dated: July 26, 2016
Newark, New Jersey
HON. KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge
To view it from another standpoint, because the complaint alleges no constitutional
violation, the officers’ qualified immunity is not overcome. See Hope v. Peizer, 536 U.s. 730,
739, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Saucierv. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001);
McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2005). I do not reach the issue of whether the
courtroom officers would enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Ingram v. Twp. of Deptford,
858 F. Supp. 2d 386, 393 (D.N..J. 2012)
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?