RAMOS v. DAYE et al
Filing
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OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 2/8/16. (sr, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RAMONCITO RAMOS,
Civil Action No. 16-0050 (JLL)
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
LT. DAYE, et al,
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge:
Currently before this Court is the complaint of Plaintiff, Ramoncito Ramos. (ECF No. 1).
As this Court has granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must
dismiss Plaintiffs claims if they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek
damages from a defendant who is immune. For the reasons set forth below, this Court will
permit Plaintiffs retaliation and denial of treatment claims to proceed against Defendants Daye
and Robertson, will dismiss those two claims without prejudice against the remaining
Defendants, and will dismiss Plaintiffs remaining§ 1983 claims for failure to state a claim for
which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Ramoncito Ramos, is currently civilly committed to the Special Treatment Unit
in A venel under New Jersey's Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act. Plaintiff alleges that, on
December 25, 2015, he was called to the desk of a corrections officer named Q. Robertson.
(ECF No. 1 at 5). According to Plaintiff, Robertson began "cursing [and] yelling at [him] [in
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regards to Petitioner's] getting a kitchen position" that Robertson wanted to go to one of"her
'favorites.'" (Id.). Plaintiff"responded and walked away" after which he was told that he was
fired. (Id.). Robertson and another officer named Stevens then seized Plaintiffs kitchen
uniform. (Id.). Plaintiff also asserts that, on December 31, 2015, a New Jersey D.H.S. staff
member, Mrs. Prunte, "informed [him] that because of the corrections officer['s] written report[,
Plaintiffs] job [was] being suspended." (Id. at 6).
Plaintiff further asserts that, after the December 25 incident, Robertson "degraded" his
character in front of the other officers, and as a result, both Robertson and the other officers
have, including Lt. Daye, harassed Plaintiff. (Id.at 5-9). Plaintiff also asserts that Robertson and
company attempted to have Plaintiff placed on MAP disciplinary status and thereby deprive him
of group therapy and other forms of treatment. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff next asserts that, because of
his fear of harassment and further disciplinary action, he remains in his cell more often than not,
and thus also misses treatment for that reason. (Id. at 9-10). Plaintiff further alleges that he has
been told ifhe continues to file complaints and disciplinary dispute forms, he will be placed on
MAP status for causing problems. (Id. at 10). In relation to this, Plaintiff states that he has filed
numerous complaints with supervisors in the STU over the last three months complaining about
his treatment by Robertson and other officers including corrections officer Washington, Sergeant
Davis, and Lt. Daye. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff in tum states that the officials who operate the facility
are in tum responsible for the alleged violations of his rights because he has made them aware of
his treatment by officers and have not done anything about his complaints. (Id. at 6-10).
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II. DISCUSSION
A. LegalStandard
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 132166 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding informa pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or
seeks damages from a state employee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) Plaintiff has been granted informapauperis status.
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers
'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim 1, the complaint must allege
"sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while prose
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"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230, 232
(3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x
159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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pleadings are liberally construed, ''prose litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff attempts to raise claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation ofhis
constitutional rights. "To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate
a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States that was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law." Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806
(3d Cir. 2000); see also Woodyard v. Cnty. ofEssex, 514 F. App'x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013)
(section 1983 provides "private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal law
committed by state [actors]"). "The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to 'identify
the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated' and to determine 'whether
the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all."' Nicini, 212 F.3d at 806
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5 (1998)). Here, Petitioner
attempts to assert constitutional claims arising out of his alleged harassment by officers, a claim
regarding his loss of his job at the STU, a claim for retaliation against him because of his
complaints, and a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim for the denial of his medical
treatment as a result of being locked in his cell or being placed on MAP status.
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1. Plaintiff's harassment and job loss claims are not cognizable under § 1983
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Robertson and her cohorts have harassed and insulted him on
multiple occasions. Verbal harassment or profanity alone[, however,] no matter how
inappropriate, unprofessional, or reprehensible it might seem, does not constitute the violation of
any federally protected right and therefore is not actionable under"§ 1983. Durant v. Horn,
Civil Action No. 07-93, 2007 WL 1575186, at *2 (D.N.J. May 30, 2007); see also See
Richardson v. Sherrer, 344 F. App'x 755, 757 (3d Cir. 2009) (verbal harassment alone not
actionable). Thus, to the extent that Petitioner alleges that he has been insulted, had his character
questioned, or been subject to verbal harassment by Robertson and others, he fails to state a
claim for relief under§ 1983. As such, his § 1983 harassment claim shall be dismissed against
all Defendants. 2
Plaintiff's claim that he lost his job because of the actions of Robertson likewise fails to
state a claim under § 1983. Confined persons "do not have a liberty or property interest in their
job assignments that would give rise to Due Process Clause protection." Watson v. Sec'y
Pennsylvania Dep 't of Corr., 567 F. App'x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014); see also James v. Quinlan, 866
F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989) (prisoners have "no entitlement to a specific job, or even to any
job"); Ellis v. Rodriguez, No. 04-6118, 2005 WL 1475595, at *8 (D.N.J. June 22, 2005)
(applying rule to non-convicted detainee). As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under§ 1983
in so much as he asserts that he was deprived of his job in the STU kitchen by Robertson and
company. Watson, 567 F. App'x at 78; Ellis, 2005 WL 1475595 at *8. Plaintiff's job loss claim
shall therefore also be dismissed against all defendants.
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Nothing in Plaintiff's complaint suggests a desire to bring a state law claim of any sort against
the officers, and this Court does not construe the complaint as raising any state law claims.
Thus, the propriety of similar state law claims is not before this Court at present.
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2. Petitioner's remaining claims must be dismissed against the supervisory Defendants
While this Court shall permit Plaintiff's denial of treatment and retaliation claims to
proceed at this time against Defendants Daye and Robertson as Plaintiff has pled that they were
directly involved in the retaliation and denial of Plaintiff's treatment, his remaining claims must
be dismissed as to the remaining supervisory Defendants (Knox, Adams, Prunte, Corniel, and
Slaughter) as Plaintiff has failed to plead facts connecting these Defendants to the alleged
constitutional violations. "A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in
the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.
Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08, see also Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676-77 (Government officials "may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior," civil rights plaintiffs must
plead that each defendant "through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
constitution"); Tenon v. Dreibelbis, 606 F. App'x 681, 688 (3d Cir. 2015) (vicarious liability
unavailable under§ 1983, each defendant must have "personal involvement, including
participation, or actual knowledge and acquiescence, to be liable"). To establish supervisory
liability, a plaintiff must normally show "liability based on an establishment of policies, practices
or customs that directly caused the constitutional violation [or] personal liability based on the
supervisor participating in the violation of [the p]laintiffs rights, directing others to violate [the
p ]laintiff' s rights, or having knowledge of and acquiescing to a subordinate' s conduct." Doe v.
New Jersey Dep't of Corr., Civil Action No. 14-5284, 2015 WL 3448233, at *9 (D.N.J. May 29,
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2015) (quoting Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316-20 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on
other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015)).
Here, Petitioner essentially asserts that the supervisory Defendants should be liable either
because they failed to oversee their subordinates or because Plaintiff has filed grievances
regarding the conduct in question, and has received no beneficial action as a result. The first
type of claim is essentially a vicarious liability claim, which is unavailable under § 1983. As to
the second, Petitioner asserts that after he submitted grievance forms, the DHS officials at the
STU told him they had no supervisory authority over the corrections officers, who are employed
by the New Jersey Department of Corrections. As such, Plaintiff has failed to plead that the
Supervisory Officials knew of and acquiesced in the actions of the officers in so much as
Plaintiff was informed that these officials did not have supervisory authority over those officers.
Indeed, Plaintiff pleads few, if any, facts regarding the specific supervisory Defendants, and at
best pleads no more than a conclusory allegation of supervisory liability, which is insufficient to
state a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Plaintiff has not pled a plausible claim for
relief against them as supervisors, and Plaintiff has not otherwise pled any facts indicating that
they would be liable for the alleged constitutional infractions about which Plaintiff complains,
this Court will dismiss Defendants Knox, Adams, Prunte, Corniel, and Slaughter from this action
without prejudice at this time.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court will dismiss Plaintiffs harassment and job loss
claims for failure to state a claim under§ 1983; dismiss without prejudice Defendants Knox,
Adams, Prunte, Corniel, and Slaughter; and shall permit Plaintiffs retaliation and denial of
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treatment claims to proceed at this time against Defendants Daye and Robertson. An appropriate
order follows.
Ho . Jose L. Linares,
U ited States District Judge
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