BARKLEY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 15

OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 03/22/2017. (ek)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TYRONE G. BARKLEY,

Civil Action No.: 2:16-cv-638 (CCC)

Plaintiff,
V.

OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

CECCHI, District Judge.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Tyrone G. Barkley’s (“Plaintiff’) appeal seeking review of a

final determination by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”)
denying his application for disability benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental social security income
(“S$I”) under

§ 2 16(i), 223(d), and

1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act (“$SA”). The issue

to be decided is whether the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial
evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALl”)
is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI in October 2011, alleging disability as of December 28,

2010. Tr.1 at 14. The applications were denied initially on May 29, 2012, and upon reconsideration
on December 12, 2012. Id. A hearing was held before AU Michal U. Lissek on December 18,
2013, and a supplemental hearing was held on May 7, 2014. Id. AU Lissek issued a decision on
July 22, 2014, finding Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined by the SSA. Id. at 22 (citing 20 C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(f), 416.920(f)). Plaintiff requested review of the decision and the Appeals Council

denied the request on December 2, 2015. Tr. at 1. On february 5, 2016, Plaintiff instituted this
action. ECF No. 1.
B.

Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on February 18, 1957. Tr. at 63. Plaintiff has a tenth-grade education,
completed his GED, Ed. at 52, and has work experience in construction and at a plumbing store.
Id. at 52-54. Plaintiff currently lives with his girlfriend, Ed. at 51-52, who helps him with personal
needs such as bathing, dressing, cooking, doing chores, and grocery shopping. Id. at 60-61.
Plaintiff testified that on a typical day he naps and watches television. Id.
Plaintiff sustained a gunshot wound to his left buttock in December 2010, which resulted
in a comminuted fracture of the left iliac wing (pelvis) and bullet holes in the small intestine which
required resection. Id. at 18-19. A follow-up report in June 2011 stated Plaintiff was well-healed
and “RT work.” Id. at 19. Since this incident, Plaintiff visited a hospital emergency room in
October 2012 for acute abdominal pain, which was determined to be nonspecific. Id. Plaintiff
alleges that due to the gunshot wound, he suffers from low back and left hip to knee pain. Id.
In April 2012, consultative examiner Dr. Justin Fernando determined Plaintiffi s gait and
station were normal, he was able to walk on his toes and heels and fully squat without difficulty,
he had full range of motion in the cervical and lumbosacral aspects of the spine and no restriction

1

“Tr.” refers to the certified record of the administrative proceedings. ECF No. 6.
2

in mobility in his hips, ankles and knees bilaterally. Id. Dr. Fernando also reported straight leg
raising was to sixty degrees bilaterally. Id.
In August 2012, independent physical examiner, Dr. Foye determined Plaintiff had full
range of motion of the lumbosacral spine and no spinal tenderness, despite complaints of pain. Id.
Dr. Foye found Plaintiff’s range of motion of the cervical spine was normal, there was no evidence
of muscle atrophy in the extremities, and muscle strength was mostly normal. Id. Despite these
findings, Dr. Foye concluded Plaintiff had a restrictive functioning capacity, stating Plaintiff could
only walk two hours a day, and could not carry more than ten pounds. Id. at 21.
In May 2012, Plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation with Dr. Steven Yalkowsky.
Id. at 477. Dr. Yalkowsky indicated Plaintiff was taking Xanax as of the date of the evaluation to
address mental health issues, a prescription which was written by his primary care physician. Id.
Dr. Yalkowsky concluded that while Plaintiff did have a previous diagnosis of anxiety disorder
for which he was taking medication, “it is believed Mr. Barkley is experiencing little in the way
of impact to his daily function that may be attributed to mental health issues.” Id. at 479.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g)

and 1383(c)(3). The Court is not “permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose [its]

own factual determinations,” but must give deference to the administrative findings. Chandler v.
Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 201 1); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g).

Nevertheless,

the Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational” and supported by substantial evidence. Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir.
197$) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, and is “such relevant

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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Chandler, 667
f.3d at 359 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). If the factual record is
adequately developed, substantial evidence “may be ‘something less than the weight of the
evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”
Daniels v. Astrue, No. 4:08-1676, 2009 WL 1011587, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2009) (quoting
Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm ‘n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). In other words, under this deferential
standard of review, the Court may not set aside the AU’s decision merely because it would have
come to a different conclusion. Cruz v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 244 F. App’x 475, 479 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Hartranft v. Apftl, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Determining Disability

B.

Pursuant to the SSA, in order to be eligible for benefits, a plaintiff must show he is disabled
by demonstrating an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”
42 U.S.C.

§

423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Taking into account the plaintiffs age, education,

and work experience, disability will be evaluated by the plaintiffs ability to engage in his previous
work or any other form of substantial gainful activity existing in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(2)(A),

13$2c(a)(3)(B). A person is disabled for these purposes only if his physical or

mental impairments are “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work, but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.

.

.

.“

42 U.S.C.

§

1382c(a)(3)(B).

Decisions regarding disability will be made individually and will be “based on evidence

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adduced at a hearing.” Sykes v. Apfel, 22$ F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983)). Congress has established the type of evidence necessary to
prove the existence of a disabling impairment by defining a physical or mental impairment as “an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(3),
C.

13$2(a)(3)(D).
Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Administration follows a five-step, sequential evaluation to determine
whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520, 416.920.

First, the AU must determine whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in gainful activity. Sykes,
228 F.3d at 262. Second, if he is not, the AU determines whether the Plaintiff has an impairment
that limits his ability to work. Id. Third, if he has such an impairment, the AU considers the
medical evidence to determine whether the impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (the “Listings”). If it is, this results in a presumption of disability. Id. If the
impairment is not in the Listings, the AU must determine how much residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) the applicant retains in spite of his impairment. Id. at 263. Fourth, the AU must consider
whether the plaintifrs RFC is enough to perform his past relevant work. Id. Fifth, if his RFC is
not enough, the AU must determine whether there is other work in the national economy the
plaintiff can perform. Id.
The evaluation continues through each step unless it is determined at any point the plaintiff
is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The plaintiff bears the burden

of proof at steps one, two, and four, upon which the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five.
Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263. Neither party bears the burden at step three. Id. at 263 n.2.

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IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Summary of the AU’s findings

At step one, the AU found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the SSA and
had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since the application date. Tr. at 16. At steps
two and three, the AU found Plaintiffs impairments of a gunshot wound with residual low back
and left hip pain and anxiety were “severe,” but not severe enough to meet, either individually or
in combination, any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R.

§

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at

16-18.
The AU concluded Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the
exertional demands of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1567(b) and 4 16.967(b), except

that due to anxiety, he is limited to semi-skilled work. Id. at 18. To make this conclusion, the AU
considered all of Plaintiffs symptoms and their consistency with the evidence.

Id. at 19.

Specifically, the AU considered Plaintiffs testimony of alleging back and hip pain, and stating
that Plaintiff was unable to care for his own personal needs. Id. The AU took into consideration
the treatment records of Dr. Fernando, Dr. Foye, Dr. Apigo, and Dr. Yalkowsky. Id. at 19-21. The
AU concluded that despite Plaintiffs complaints of debilitating pain, the treatment records appear
to be mostly benign. Id. at 20.
At step four, the AU found Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a
sales person in a plumbing supply company. Id. at 22.
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff makes the following arguments in support of his contention that the AU’s
decision should be remanded: (1) the AU failed to properly weigh medical opinion evidence, and
(2) the AU erred in relying upon the VE’s testimony. The Court will address each argument in

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turn.
1.

The AU’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion Evidence was Proper

Plaintiff argues the AU improperly substituted her own judgment for that of Dr. foye’s,
as Dr. Foye’s opinion “is the only credible opinion in the record.” See Plaintiffs Brief (“P1. Br.”),
ECF No. 10, at 20-26. “In evaluating medical reports, the AU is free to choose the medical
opinion of one doctor over that of another.” Diaz v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 f.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)). “When a conflict in the
evidence exists, the AU may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no reason or
for the wrong reason.

The AU must consider all the evidence and give some reason for

discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummet v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal
citation omitted). Under the substantial evidence standard of review, the issue is whether sufficient
evidence reasonably supports the AU’s analysis, not whether the evidence could support a
different finding. See Logan v. Colvin, No. 14-4571, 2015 WL 5722391, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
2015) (finding “[t]he role of the District Court in reviewing an AU’s denial of disability benefits
is not to reweigh the evidence presented, but instead to determine whether the AU made a decision
supported by substantial evidence”). Plaintiff here appears only to argue the AU should have
interpreted the medical evidence differently. P1. Br. at 21-24.
The Court finds the AU’s assessment was supported by substantial evidence. Here, the
AU explained that in light of Dr. Foye’s benign objective findings, the restrictive functional
assessment Dr. foye provided was entitled to little weight. Tr. at 21. The AU discussed Dr.
Foye’s objective findings in detail, stating:
Dr. Foye reported normal lumbosacral range of motion despite complaints of pain,
no tenderness to spine or sacroiliac joints. Cervical spine had normal range of
motion. There was no evidence of muscle atrophy and motor strength in the lower
extremities were normal. except for a slight weakness of toe extension in the left
leg.
Dr. foye reported positive straight leg raising on the left but he did not
.

.

.

.

.

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report the degree of limitation. There was no evidence of any frank neurological
deficits.
Tr. at 21. The AU went on to explain that despite these benign medical findings, Dr. Foye
concluded that Plaintiff was not able to stand or walk more than two hours in an eight-hour
workday, could not lift more than ten pounds, and could not climb, kneel, crouch, or crawl. Id.
Further, the AU noted Dr. Foye’s restrictive assessment was contradicted by the report of Dr.
Fernando, who found Plaintiff had full range of motion in the spine, ambulated normally without
a cane, and had no restriction of mobility in the lower extremities. Id.

It appears the AU

sufficiently considered Dr. Foye’s report and her decision to give the opinion little weight is
explained by the fact that Dr. Foye’s conclusion was not supported by the medical evidence and
was contradicted by Dr. Fernando’s report. Accordingly, the Court finds the AU’s evaluation of
the medical reports to be supported by substantial evidence.
2.

The AU Properly Relied upon the VE’s Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the VE improperly classified Plaintiffs past relevant work experience,
and therefore the AU erred in relying on this testimony. P1. Br. at 26. At step four, an AU must
determine ifa plaintiff has the capacity to perform past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(e).

To make this determination, “the AU often seeks advisory testimony from a vocational expert. In
addition, the AU will generally consult the Dictionary ofOccupational Titles (DOT), a publication
of the United States Department of Labor that contains descriptions of the requirements for
thousands ofjobs that exist in the national economy.

.

.

.“

Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 119

(3d Cir. 2002). “An individual retains the capacity to perform her past relevant work when she
can perform the functional demands and duties of the job as she actually performed it or as
generally required by employers in the national economy.” Malloy v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 306 F.
App’x 761, 765-66 (3d Cir. 2009).

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In this case, VE Patricia Sasona reviewed applicable portions of the record. Tr. at 42. The
VE identified two positions relevant to Plaintiffs past work experience. Id. The VE identified
these positions as “sales person, general hardware,” a semi-skilled occupation customarily
requiring light work, DOT # 279.357-050, and “stock clerk,” a semi-skilled occupation
customarily requiring heavy work, DOT # 299.367-014. Id. The AU found Plaintiff was capable
of performing past relevant work in “sales, general hardware, plumbing,” which requires light,
semi-skilled work. Id. at 22. Plaintiff argues that the VE misclassified Plaintiffs past work
experience as a sales person, and that the correct classification was “stock clerk,” a position to
which Plaintiff is incapable of returning. P1. Br. at 26-30.
While Plaintiff testified that he held only one position at All State Plumbing Supply,
matching the DOT occupational code for “stock clerk,” requiring heavy work, his Work History
Report makes clear that he had at least two positions, one of which matched the description
provided by VE Sasona for a sales person in general hardware. See Id. at 42, 247. Plaintiff alleges
the AU erred because “other than asking what years he worked at All State,” she “did not have
Mr. Barkley or Ms. Sosana clarify this classification.” P1. Br. at 27. However, it is Plaintiff who
“bears the burden” at step four “of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] past relevant work,”
Burnett v. Comm ‘r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Adorno v. Shalala, 40
F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994)), and despite the fact that Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the
hearing, Plaintiffs counsel did not attempt to examine the VE regarding this classification. Tr. at
45. Plaintiff further alleges that the AU’s decision “relies very heavily on a Work History Report
that is too incomplete for accurate decision making.” ECF No. 14 at 6.
The Court is cognizant of Plaintiffs burden at step four, and the risk of allowing Plaintiff
to rely on his failure to properly complete the Work History Report in his application. However,

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..

4

I

the Court finds the AU’s decision precludes meaningful review as to this issue. Plaintiffs
testimony implied he only had one position, consisting of heavy work. This testimony was not
reconciled by the AU either during the hearing or in the decision with the two positions in the
Work History Report. Tr. at 54. Moreover, the Work History Report for the position upon which
the VE appears to rely to classify Plaintiffs past work as a sales position, and to which AU cites
at step four to conclude Plaintiffs past work consisted of light work is internally inconsistent. The
Report stated that the heaviest weight lifted was twenty pounds, but that the weight that was
frequently lifted was twenty-five pounds. Tr. at 247.
In light of these issues, which are not addressed by the AU, the Court finds the AU’s
decision at step five precludes meaningful judicial review. See Social Security Ruling 82-62, 1982
SSR LEXIS 27 (providing that any case requiring consideration of past relevant work must contain
sufficient documentation and enough information on past work to permit a decision as to the
individual’s ability to return to such past work); Coleman Wynne v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93898, at *18 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2015). Upon remand, the “AU should fully develop the record
and make specific findings as to the physical and mental demands of [Plaintiffs] past relevant
work,” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 125-26 (citing $SR 82-62), and decide based upon a more complete
record which DOT occupational code most accurately describes Plaintiffs past relevant work.
V.

CONCLUSION
for the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms in part and vacates in part the ALl’s decision

and remands this case for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
appropriate order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: March 22, 2017

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
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An