NIBLACK v. MIGLIO et al

Filing 43

OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 02/28/2017. (ek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil Action No. 16-747 (MCA)

STANLEY L. NIBLACK,
Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.
SCO ANNA MIGLIO, Ct al.,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter has been opened to the Court by a “motion to partially dismiss [Pjlaintiff’s

1
Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” The Moving Defendants contend that the

§

1983 claims against Defendants Gary Lanigan, John Powell, and Kenya Collins are subject to
dismissal because these Defendants were not personally involved in the alleged wrongs that form
the basis of Plaintiff’s

§

1983 claims. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the

motion to dismiss the claims brought pursuant tO 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 as to Defendants Lanigan,

Powell, and Collins. The dismissal is without prejudice, and Plaintiff may file an Amended

‘The Moving Defendants are identified as SCO Anna Miglio, DHO Christy Ralph, Sergeant
James McDonnell, Lieutenant James Hunsicker, Sergeant Jonathon Hinson, Alexander Solanik,
John Powell, Kenya Collins, and Gary Lanigan. However, they seek to dismiss the § 1983
claims against Lanigan, Powell, and Collins only.
1

Complaint within 30 days to the extent he can cure the deficiencies in his claims as to these
Defendants.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

II.

The Court recites only the facts necessary to the instant motion to dismiss. Plaintiff
alleges in his Complaint that on April 3, 2014, Defendant SCO Anna Miglio, a corrections
officer at Bayside State Prison (ECF No. 1, Compi. at ¶ 9), read Plaintiff’s legal mail and/or
documents during a search of his cell and subsequently instituted false disciplinary charges
against him when he complained and sought to speak to a sergeant about her conduct. (Id.

¶J at

22-3 7.) The charges were for .256 “disobeying an order” and *.306 “conduct which disrupts the
orderly running of the facility. (See id. at ¶ 64.) On April 4, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred from
Bayside State Prison to Southern State Correctional facility pre-hearing detention. (Id at

¶ 37.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants who conducted his disciplinary hearing in April 2014
did not afford him due process in the proceeding and engaged in a variety of misconduct. (Id. at

¶J 3 8-63.)

Plaintiff also alleges that he made unspecified complaints about his disciplinary

hearing to “NJDOC administrative officials,” but these complaints went unanswered. (Id. at ¶
51.)
Plaintiff allegedly sought to take a polygraph test pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1OA:3-7.1 in order
to bolster his credibility in the disciplinary proceeding, but his request was refused by
Administrator Willie Bonds, who did not provide a statement of reasons for the denial. (Id. at ¶
59.) Plaintiff apparently appealed this determination to Defendant Alexander Solanik, an
Assistant Superintendent at Bayside State Prison, but Defendant Solanik allegedly denied his
appeal without applying the proper standard and without written explanation. (Id. at 60.)

2

Plaintiff then sought to pay for his own polygraph, and sent a request to Commissioner Lanigan
and Administrator John Powell, but they did not respond. (Id. at 61.)
In the section of his Complaint entitled “Claims for Relief,” Plaintiff alleges that
“Defendant’s [sic] Gary M. Lanigan and John Powell violated [P]laintiff s due process [rights]
when they would not allow [P]laintiff’s family to pay for [a] polygraph examination in bolstering
2
his credibility against false disciplinary infractions lodged against him by SCO A. Miglio.” (Id.
at

¶

113.) He further alleges in the same paragraph that Defendants Powell, along with

Defendant Charles Ray Hughes, “further violated [P]laintiffs due process [rights] in not
answering [Plaintiff’s] grievances when he sought to resolve this matter with complaints to them.
(Id)
Plaintiff was subsequently found guilty on both charges and received 60 days loss of
commutation time, 10 days of detention time, and 90 days of administrative segregation on the
.256 infraction, and received 90 days lost commutation time, 10 days detention, and 90 days
3
administrative segregation on the *.306 infraction. (Id. at ¶ 64.) Plaintiff appealed, and the case
was remanded for a new hearing by the Appellate Division on April 20, 2015. (Id at ¶J 66-67.)
After the hearing, Plaintiff was found not guilty on the *.3o6 charge and guilty on the .256
charge. (Id. at ¶ 71.) Plaintiff appealed, and on June 18, 2015, Mrs. Nardelli, an Assistant
Superintendent of Bayside State Prison, “rescinded the decision,” finding that the evidence failed
to demonstrate that a violation had occurred. (Id. at ¶ 73.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Bond violated his due process rights by denying his request
for a polygraph examination and failing to investigate the disciplinary infractions prior to issuing
thedenial. (Id atJ 110-111.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant DHO Christy Ralph did not provide a statement of reasons as to
the evidence relied upon, the disciplinary action taken, or the basis for her findings. (Id. at ¶ 63.)

2

3

Plaintiff alleges that due to the false disciplinary charges he was denied parole and lost
work and minimum credits that have not been restored despite his filing of grievances. (Id. at ¶J
68, 74-77.)
Plaintiff, who spent approximately six months in administrative segregation (“Ad-seg”)
on the disciplinary charges, also alleges that Defendants Ralph, Powell, Bonds, Hughes, Nelson,
Collins, and Lanigan “held or had the [Pilaintiff placed in in Ad-seg under horrendous
conditions.” (RI at ¶ 116.) Plaintiff described these conditions in Ad-seg as follows:
Where the conditions were horrendous, laundry not washed, rooms
leaking water, Rooms flooding out with puddles in rooms, rusted
beds, mold and mildew sheets to sleep on, no sick call program,
medical slips went unanswered, placed in rooms with other
prisoners who had serious psychological conditions, no reading
materials, toilets backing up reeking of feces and urine (raw
sewage), not given supplies or cleaning apparatus for the rooms,
sheets not exchanged or washed.
(Id. at ¶ 116.) It appears from his Complaint that Plaintiff was confined at an Ad-seg unit at
Northern State Prison. (See id. at ¶ 64.) Plaintiff further states in his Complaint that these
conditions are not experienced by other prisoners in the general population, i.e., those who are
not confined in Ad-seg. (Id. at ¶ 64.)
Plaintiff seeks damages against all Defendants in their individual capacities (id. at ¶ 126),
4
as well as declaratory relief from the NJDOC. (RI at ¶ 125.) The Defendants seeking dismissal
are supervisory officials who are sued in their individual capacities. Defendant Lanigan is
identified in the Complaint as the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections
(“NJDOC”) during the relevant time period. (ECF No. 1-1, Compl. at

¶ 21.)

Defendant Powell

is identified as an Administrator at Bayside State Prison during the relevant time period. (Id. at ¶

The Court does not construe the Complaint to seek declaratory relief under § 1983 from
Defendants Lanigan, Powell, or Collins, and therefore addresses only the individual capacity
claims against these Defendants.
4

17.) Defendant Collins is identified as an Assistant Administrator/Superintendent at Northern
State Prison during the relevant time period. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW

III.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a claim “for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2(b)(6). On a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the moving party “bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)); United Van Lines,
LLC v. Lohr Printing, Inc., No. CIV. 11—4761, 2012 WL 1072248, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012).
In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2(b)(6), courts first separate
the factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as true. See
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210—11 (3d Cir. 2009). All reasonable inferences
must be made in the plaintiffs favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314
(3d Cir. 2010). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). This standard requires the plaintiff to show “more than a sheer possibility that a

5

defendant has acted unlawfully,” but does not create what amounts to a “probability
requirement.” Asheroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, Courts are required to liberally construe pleadings
drafted by pro se parties. See Tucker v. Hewlett Packard, Inc., No. 14-4699 (RBKIKMW), 2015
WL 6560645, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
Such pleadings are “held to less strict standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id.
Nevertheless, pro se litigants must still allege facts, which if taken as true, will suggest the
required elements of any claim that is asserted. Id. (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). To do so, [a plaintiff] must plead enough facts, accepted as true,
to plausibly suggest entitlement to relief.” Gibney v. Fitzgibbon, 547 F. App’x 111, 113 (3d Cir.
2013) (citing Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)). Liberal construction also does
not require the Court to credit apro se plaintiffs “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Id.
(citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). That is, “[ejven a
pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the
plaintiff caimot be construed as supplying facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.
Id. (citing Milhouse v. Carison, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)).
IV.

ANALYSIS
Here, the Moving Defendants have sought dismissal of certain claims against Defendants

Lanigan, Powell, and Collins. From the outset, the Court notes that it is not clear which claims
the Moving Defendants seek to dismiss. Plaintiff originally filed this action in state court, and
not only alleges violations of 42 U.S.C.

§

1983, but also violations of the New Jersey

Constitution, the NJCRA, and the New Jersey Administrative Code. (See ECF No. 1-1, at ¶J 12.) Although Moving Defendants seeks dismissal of “all claims” against Lanigan, Powell, and

6

Collins, their arguments focus only on the

§

1983 claims and do not address whether Plaintiff

states claims for relief against these Defendants under the NJCRA or other state law. Because
5
Moving Defendants have the initial burden to show that no claim has been presented, the Court
declines to address whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged any state law claims in the absence
of appropriate briefing. The Court will therefore limit its analysis to whether Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged any federal claims under

§

1983 against Defendants Lanigan, Powell, and

Collins, and Moving Defendants are free to file a second motion to dismiss to address any
remaining state law claims.
Defendants contend generally that Defendants Lanigan, Powell, and Collins are entitled
to dismissal of the

§

1983 claims against them because they are premised solely on a theory of

respondeat superior, which is not a basis for liability under

§

1983. (ECF No. 13, Moving Br. at

4-5.) Moving Defendants further contend in a summary fashion that although N.J.A.C. 1OA:37.1 permits an inmate to request a polygraph examination, the administrative code does not
confer a federal constitutional right to a polygraph examination. (Id. at 5.) Finally, Moving
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs allegations that Lanigan, Powell, and Collins “held or had him
placed in [Administrative Segregation] under horrendous conditions” is an “unsubstantiated
allegation” amounting to a legal conclusion. (Id. at 6.)
The Court first addresses Plaintiffs claim that Defendants Lanigan and Powell ignored
his letter request to have his family pay for a polygraph examination in connection with his
disciplinary proceeding. Plaintiff allegedly requested to take a polygraph test, which is permitted

For instance, Moving Defendants do not address whether New Jersey would recognize a limited
due process right where the failure to provide a polygraph examination resulted in fundamental
unfairness in the disciplinary hearing, or whether there is a private right of action for violations
of the New Jersey administrative code.
7

under N.J.A.C. 1OA:3-7.1, but was refused by Defendant Administrator Willie Bonds, who did
not provide a statement of reasons for the denial. (Id at ¶ 59.) Plaintiff apparently appealed this
determination to Defendant Alexander Solanik, an Assistant Superintendent, but Defendant
Solanik allegedly denied his appeal without applying the proper standard and without written
explanation. (id at 60.) Plaintiff then sought to pay for his own polygraph, and allegedly sent a
letter request to Commissioner Lanigan and Administrator John Powell, but they did not
respond. (Id. at 61.) Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that “Defendant’s [sic] Gary M. Lanigan
and John Powell violated [P]laintiff’s due process [rights] when they would not allow
[P]laintiff’s family to pay for [a] polygraph examination in bolstering his credibility against false
6
disciplinary infractions lodged against him by SCO A. Miglio.” (Id at ¶ 113.) In the same
paragraph, he alleges that Defendants Powell, along with Defendant Charles Ray Hughes,
“further violated [P]laintiff’s due process [right] in not answering [Plaintiff’s] grievances when
he sought to resolve this matter with complaints to them. (Id.)
“In general, to prevail on [a procedural due process] claim, a plaintiff must show the
deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest that occurred without due process of law.”
Iwanicki v. Pa. Dep’t ofCorr., 582 F. App’x 75:80 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008)). A prisoner possesses a liberty interest in protecting his
good-time credits from arbitrary abrogation. See Woffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974);
Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013) (A prisoner has a liberty interest in good time
credits). In Wolffv. McDonnell, supra, the Court held that due process requires procedural
protections before a prison inmate can be deprived of a protected liberty interest in good time

also alleges that Defendant Bond violated his due process rights by denying his request
for a polygraph examination and failing to investigate the disciplinary infractions prior to issuing
thedenial. (IdatJ110-111.)
6

8

credits; thus, “[w]here a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits,
an inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement
by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.”
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Woiff 418 U.S. at 563—67). In addition,
the disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” in the record. See id. at 455.
The Court agrees with Defendants to the extent that they contend that the Due Process
Clause itself does not provide a federal right to take a lie detector test in a disciplinary hearing.
See, e.g., Williams v. Werlinger, 451 Fed. Appx. 127 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (No due
process violation in habeas context when federal prisoner was denied the opportunity to take a lie
detector test for a disciplinary hearing; such a right is not protected under due process.);
Patterson v. Gilmore, 974 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1992) (inmate has no constitutional right to a
polygraph test); Wigal v. Wilson, 865 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1988) (no right to polygraph or forensic
tests; see also Johnson v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 298 N.J. Super. 79, 688 A.2d 1123
(App. Div. 1997) (inmate found guilty of disciplinary infraction was not entitled to take
polygraph test merely because he requested one).
The New Jersey Administrative Code provides that an inmate may request a polygraph in
connection with a disciplinary proceeding:
1OA:3—7.l Use of polygraph examinations with inmates
(a) A polygraph examination may be requested by the
Administrator or designee:
1. When there are issues of credibility regarding serious incidents
or allegations which may result in a disciplinary charge; or
2. As part of a reinvestigation of a disciplinary charge, when the
Administrator or designee is presented with new evidence or finds
serious issues of credibility.

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(b) The polygraph shall not be used in place of a thorough
investigation, but shall be used to assist an investigation when
appropriate.
(c) Agreement by the inmate to take a polygraph examination shall
not be a pre-condition for ordering a reinvestigation. An inmate’s
request for a polygraph examination shall not be sufficient cause
for granting the request.
N.J. Admin. Code

§

1 OA:3-7. 1. In construing this regulation, the New Jersey Appellate Division

has stated that “{t]he right to a polygraph is a limited right provided by N.J.A.C. 1 OA:3-7. 1(a).”
Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005). As noted by the Moving
Defendants, “[am inmate’s request for a polygraph examination shall not be sufficient cause for
granting the request.” N.J.A.C. 1OA:3—7.1(c); Johnson, 298 N.J. Super. at 83. N.J.A.C. 1OA:3—
7.1 “is designed to prevent the routine administration of polygraphs, and a polygraph is clearly
not required on every occasion that an inmate denies a disciplinary charge against him.”
Ramirez, supra, 382 N.J. Super. at 23—24. A request should be granted only “when there is a
serious question of credibility and the denial of the examination would compromise the
fundamental fairness of the disciplinary process.” Id. at 20.
Here, the Court need not (and does not) decide whether the denial of a polygraph
examination in the context of a disciplinary proceeding could ever violate a New Jersey’s
prisoner’s due process rights under federal or state law, and thus state a claim for relief under

§

1983 or the NJCRA. Plaintiffs single allegation that Defendants Lanigan and Powell, who are
remote supervisory officials not otherwise alleged to have been decision makers in his
disciplinary proceedings, ignored Plaintiff letter request to have his family pay for a polygraph
test, in effect “refusing” the request, is insufficient to suggest the type of personal involvement
required to state a claim for relief under

§

1983. As a general matter, claims that prison officials

failed to take corrective action still require personal participation. “A defendant in a civil rights
action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
10

1 195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). It is also well-established that prisoners do not
have a constitutional right to an effective grievance process. “[B]ecause a prisoner has no free
standing constitutional right to an effective grievance process [citation omitted], a prisoner
cannot maintain a constitutional claim.. based upon [the prisoner’s] perception that [the
.

recipient of the grievances] ignored and/or failed to properly investigate his grievances.” Woods
v. First Corr. Med Inc., 446 F. App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Mercado v. Ellis, No.
11—6756, 2012 WL 1636164, at *3 (D.N.J. May 9, 2012) (“It appears that Plaintiffs only claims
against the named defendants are based on their failure to investigate or respond to Plaintiffs
letters and grievances. These claims fail to rise •to the level of a constitutional deprivation
sufficient to state a claim under

§

1983. Indeed, an allegation of a failure to investigate, without

another recognizable constitutional right, is not sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Drisco v. Williams, No. CIV. 2:13-1144 KM,
2015 WL 5097790, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2015) (explaining same and collecting cases).
Although Plaintiff cites Cardona v. Warden-MDC Facility, No. CIV. 12-7161 RBK AMD, 2013
WL 6446999, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2013), for the proposition that a supervisor may be liable
under

§

1983 where he or she has notice of and fails to remedy a continuing violation of a

prisoner’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff has not set forth facts suggesting that Defendants
Lanigan or Powell were on notice of and failed to remedy any continuing violation of his
constitutional rights. The Court will therefore dismiss without prejudice the

§

1983 claims

against Defendants Lanigan and Powell based on their failure to respond to Plaintiffs letter
requesting to have his family pay for a polygraph examination.
The Court will also dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s

§

1983 claims against

Defendants Lanigan, Powell, and Collins premised on their alleged placement of Plaintiff in

11

administrative segregation under “horrendous conditions.” Plaintiff, who spent approximately
six months in administrative segregation (“Ad-seg”) on the allegedly false charges, alleges that
Defendants Lanigan, Powell, and Collins, along with Defendants Ralph, Bonds, Hughes, and
Nelson, “held or had the [P]laintiff placed in in Ad-seg under horrendous conditions.” (Id. at ¶
116.) Plaintiff appears to allege that he was held in an Ad-seg unit at Northern State Prison (id.
at ¶ 64), and described the Ad-seg conditions as follows:

(Id at ¶

Where the conditions were horrendous, laundry not washed, rooms
leaking water, Rooms flooding out with puddles in rooms, rusted
beds, mold and mildew sheets to sleep on, no sick call program,
medical slips went unanswered, placed in rooms with other
prisoners who had serious psychological conditions, no reading
materials, toilets backing up reeking of feces and urine (raw
sewage), not given supplies or cleaning apparatus for the rooms,
sheets not exchanged or washed.
116.) Plaintiff further states in his Complaint that these conditions are not experienced

by other prisoners in the general population, i.e., those who are not confined in Ad-seg. (Id. at ¶
64.)
Plaintiff appears to frame his placement in Ad-seg as a due process violation. In this
regard, the Court notes that prisoners typically have a protected liberty interest only in “freedom
from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship

...

in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Conner,-515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). As such, placement
in “administrative segregation only implicates a protectable liberty interest [sufficient to trigger
due process protections] if it dramatically departs, in length of time or otherwise, from basic
prison conditions.” Crawford v. Lappin, 446 F. App’x 413, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Mitchell v.
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 532 (3d Cir.2003)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“[P]lacernent in administrative confinement will generally not create a liberty interest.”)). “In
determining whether a protected liberty interest exists, the court must consider: (1) the duration

12

of the disciplinary confinement; and (2) whether the conditions of confinement were
significantly more restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates in solitary confinement.”
Huertas v. Secy Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 533 F. App’x 64, 66 (3d Cir.2013) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at
486).
Most cases considered by the Third Circuit deal with the length of time spent in
segregation. The Third Circuit has held that administrative segregation in the S.C.I. Graterford
Restricted Housing Unit for periods as long as fifteen months does not create an atypical and
significant hardship and, thus, does not deprive an inmate of a liberty interest. See GrfJln v.
Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir.1997); see also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d
Cir.2002) (seven months in disciplinary confinement did not implicate a liberty interest); Torres
v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 15 1—52 (3d Cir.2002) (disciplinary detention for fifteen days and
administrative segregation for 120 days did not implicate a protected liberty interest); Jenkins v.
Hayman, No. CIVA 09-4989 (FEW), 2010 WE 1838399, at *10 (D.N.J. May 6, 2010) (same); cf
Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that eight years in administrative
custody is atypical and implicates a protected liberty interest); Allah v. Bartkowski, 574 F. App’x
135, 139 (3d Cir. 2014) (vacating dismissal of due process claim where inmate held in
administrative segregation for six years).
Even assuming that Plaintiff could state a due process violation based on his placement in
Ad-seg, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that
Defendants Lanigan, Powell or Collins were personally involved in this alleged wrong.
It appears, however, that Plaintiff also attempts to allege that the conditions of his
confinement in Ad-seg violated the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment imposes upon
prison officials a duty to provide “humane conditions of confinement.” Betts v. New Castle

13

Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994)). “For the conditions of confinement to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation, they must deny the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”’ “Id. (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). Unsanitary conditions can be cruel and unusual. Young v. Quinlan,
960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996,
Pub.L. No. 104—134, 110 Stat. 1321, as recognized inNyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65,71 n. 7 (3d
Cir. 2000). To establish deliberate indifference a prison official must both know of and
disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or safety. Thus, “[t]o assert an Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective (‘Was the
deprivation sufficiently serious?’) and subjective (‘Did the officials act with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind?’) test.” Allah, 574 F. App’x at 138 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991)).
Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the conditions of his confinement in Ad-seg violated
the Eighth Amendment; however, he does not provide sufficient facts in his Complaint to
suggest that Defendants Lanigan, Powell, or Collins were on notice of any of the Ad-seg
conditions he describes in his Complaint, and failed to remedy the situation. Plaintiff may be
able to cure this defect in his Complaint, particularly with respect to Defendant Collins, who is
alleged to be an Assistant Administrator/Superintendent at Northern State Prison. For these
reasons, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendment

§ 1983 claims against Defendants Lanigan, Powell, and Collins premised on their

alleged placement of Plaintiff in Ad-seg under horrendous conditions, and will grant him leave to
re-plead the knowledge element of this claim with respect to these three Defendants.
V.

CONCLUSION

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For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss the
1983 claims against Defendants Lanigan, Powell, and Collins. The dismissal is without
prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint within 30 days to the extent he
can cure the deficiencies in the

§

1983 claims against these Defendants. An appropriate Order

follows.

Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.D.J.
Dated: Februar2’2017

15

§