ADP, LLC v. LYNCH

Filing 142

OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 6/25/18. (gh, )

Case 2:16-cv-01053-WJM-MF Document 142 Filed 06/25/18 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 1990

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ADP, LLC,
Civ. No. 2:16-01053

Plaintiff,
v.
JORDAN LYNCH,
Defendant.

ADP, LLC,
Civ. No. 2:16-01111

Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN HALPIN,

OPINION

Defendant.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiff ADP, LLC brings this action against its former employees Jordan Lynch
and John Halpin (collectively “Defendants”), alleging violations of restrictive covenants
contained in their employment agreements. This matter comes before the Court on
Plaintiff’s application for attorneys’ fees in connection with the Court’s order issued on
April 17, 2018, holding Defendant Halpin in contempt for violating the Court’s preliminary
injunction that restrained him from soliciting Plaintiff’s clients. There was no oral
argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s application is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

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I.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts and will summarize below
only those facts relevant to the instant filing. On June 30, 2016, this Court entered a
preliminary injunction (the “Injunction”) against Defendants, enjoining them from
soliciting Plaintiff’s existing clients. The Injunction also restrained Defendants from
soliciting Plaintiff’s prospective clients, but only those prospective clients known to them
while they were employed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 31. On April 17, 2018, the Court found
Defendant Halpin guilty of civil contempt for violating the Injunction by soliciting
Plaintiff’s clients. ECF No. 133. The Court imposed a fine of $1,000.00 against Defendant
and further held him liable for the attorneys’ fees incurred through the litigation of
Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. Id. The Court further ordered Plaintiff’s counsel to file
an accounting of attorneys’ fees for services rendered in association with that motion. Id.
On May 1, 2018, Plaintiff’s counsel filed an application for attorneys’ fees. ECF
No. 135. Genova Burns LLC, serving as local counsel for Plaintiff, seeks fees and costs
totaling $1,437.33. See Certification of H. Freier (“Freier Cert.”) ¶ 17, ECF No. 135-1.
These fees arise out of time spent by Mr. Freier and his associate, Christopher Kurek, which
involved communications with client and co-counsel, and reviewing and revising the
briefing papers. See id., Exs. A, B. McDonald Hopkins, PLC, serving as Plaintiff’s
primary counsel, seeks fees totaling $13,338.50. See Certification of T. Lowe (“Lowe
Cert.”) ¶ 10, ECF No. 135-3. These fees arise out of time spent by Mr. Lowe, his firm
partner James Boutrous, his associate Jacob Radecki, and a fourth attorney James
Giszczak.1 See id., Exs. A. The attorney services rendered included drafting, reviewing
and revising the motion papers, reviewing deposition transcripts, communicating with the
client and co-counsel, and internal legal strategizing and discussion. Id.
Defendant objects to a portion of these fees, arguing that “there appears to be an
excessive number of attorneys involved and time spent in the preparation of this motion.”
See Letter from J. Schmidt (“Def.’s Opp’n”) 1, May 10, 2018, ECF No. 136. Defendant
claims that this straightforward motion for sanctions should not have required extensive
attention from six different attorneys; instead, the motion required only the work of one
associate and one partner. See id. at 4. Defendant does not object to the hourly rates
charged by any of the attorneys or the billing time and tasks of Mr. Freier. See id. at 1, 3.
Plaintiff responds, arguing that Defendant’s objections are impermissible because
the Court did not specifically authorize Defendant an opportunity to contest the attorneys’
fees in its order holding Defendant in contempt. See Letter from H. Freier 2, May 15, 2018,
ECF No. 137. Defendant dismisses this argument, claiming that any application for
attorneys’ fees is considered as a motion under the Local Rules for the District of New

1

Mr. Giszczak’s status is unclear because Mr. Lowe does not mention him in his attorney certification.

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Jersey, to which the opposing party has a right to contest. See Letter from J. Schmidt 1,
May 15, 2018, ECF No. 138.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[A]ttorneys seeking fees must document the hours for which payment is sought
with sufficient specificity to allow the District Court to determine whether the hours
claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.” See Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,
273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted). “Once these records
[are] submitted, the District Court [is] required to perform a positive and affirmative
function in the fee fixing process.” See id. (quotation and citation omitted). “A District
Court is obligated to review the time charged, decide whether hours set out were reasonably
expended for each of the particular purposes described and then exclude those that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See id. at 362 (quotation and citation
omitted). The District Court “retains a great deal of discretion in deciding what a
reasonable fee award is, so long as any reduction is based on objections actually raised by
the adverse party.” See Bell v. United Princeton Props., Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 721 (3d Cir.
1989). “In determining whether the fee request is excessive . . ., the [C]ourt will inevitably
be required to engage in a fair amount of ‘judgment calling’ based upon its experience with
the case and its general experience as to how much time a case requires.” See id.
III.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, Local Civil Rule 54.2 for the District of New Jersey
provides, in pertinent part, “In all actions in which a counsel fee is allowed by the Court
or permitted by statute, an attorney seeking compensation for services or reimbursement
of necessary expenses shall file within 30 days of the entry of judgment or order . . . a
motion for fees and expenses in accordance with L. Civ. R. 7.1.” See L. Civ. R. 54.2(a)
(emphasis added). Local Rule 7.1 governs motion practice in this Court and naturally
provides an adverse party an opportunity to oppose a movant’s motion. See L. Civ. R.
7.1(d). Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s objections are impermissible because the
Court did not expressly authorize them in its order is, therefore, meritless. All court filings
requesting attorney fees, regardless of label, are construed as motions under Local Rule 7.1
and subject to opposition.
As noted above, it is this Court’s duty to assess the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s fee
request considering the Court’s experience in this case and its general experience. The
Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s sanctions motion was straightforward and did
not require a great deal of complicated legal reasoning and analysis. The initial moving
brief totaled a little over seven pages and the reply brief totaled eight. The task of drafting
and revising should have fallen to one or two lawyers, not six.
After careful review of the attorney certifications, it appears that Mr. Radecki
performed the bulk of the initial drafting and was primarily overseen by Mr. Lowe. It
further appears that Mr. Boutros communicated with the client and subsequently
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strategized with Mr. Lowe. The Court finds that these tasks were reasonable in producing
Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and it grants the fees associated thereto.
In addition to the extensive time spent by Mr. Lowe revising, however, it also
appears that Mr. Boutros spent significant time doing the same. See Lowe Cert., Ex. A
(Boutros time entries dated Feb. 21-22 and Mar. 11-12, 2018). Further still, another
lawyer, Mr. Giszczak, also spent considerable time working on Plaintiff’s reply brief. See
id. (Giszczak time entries dated Mar. 1 & 7, 2018). It is entirely unclear from Mr. Lowe’s
certification what Mr. Giszczak’s role was and why his services were necessary. As stated
above, the sanctions motion was not complicated and certainly did not require the extensive
time and attention from three separate partners at McDonald Hopkins. 2 The Court,
therefore, strikes the fees associated to time spent by Mr. Boutros reviewing and revising
the moving papers and all of Mr. Giszczak’s fees. Accordingly, Defendant shall pay
McDonald Hopkins $10,842.50.
Defendant does not object to Mr. Freier’s fees and the Court grants them. Mr. Kurek
also spent approximately three hours reviewing and revising the sanctions motion. It is
reasonable for local counsel to spend some time reviewing the briefing papers that are to
be filed under his or her name. Accordingly, the Court also grants Mr. Kurek’s fees and
Defendant shall pay Genova Burns $1,437.33.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s application for attorneys’ fees is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. An appropriate order follows.

/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: June 25, 2018

2

The Court assumes that Mssrs. Boutros and Giszczak are members of McDonald Hopkins based on their billing
rates.

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