THOMAS v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Filing 17

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 6/20/16. (DD, ) N/M

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

THURMAN THOMAS,
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 16-1436 (SDW)

OPINION

WIGENTON, District Judge:
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Thurman Thomas’s amended petition for a writ of
habeas corpus challenging his pre-trial detention. (ECF No. 16). As Petitioner has paid the five
dollar filing fee applicable to habeas petitions, this court is required, pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, applicable to § 2241 through Rule 1(b), to screen the petition
and determine whether it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief.” For the reasons set forth below, this Court will dismiss the
amended petition and deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he
attempted to challenge certain aspects of his ongoing criminal prosecution. (ECF No. 1). On
April 8, 2016, this Court screened that petition pursuant to Rule 4 and dismissed the petition
because Petitioner had shown neither extraordinary circumstances warranting review of his
constitutional claims prior to their exhaustion in the state courts nor that he had exhausted the

claims he seeks to make by raising them on the merits before all levels of the New Jersey Courts.
(ECF Nos. 5-6). In the opinion dismissing Petitioner’s first petition, this Court summarized
Petitioner’s claims as follows:
Petitioner, Thurman Thomas, is a state pre-trial detainee currently
detained in the Hudson County jail during the pendency of his
criminal charges. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Petitioner has apparently
been incarcerated pending trial for approximately two years on
charges including “[Seco]nd degree Robbery, Kidnapping and
criminal restraint” arising out of an incident wherein Petitioner
allegedly forced a woman to withdraw money from several ATMs.
(ECF No. 1 at 5-8; ECF No. 3 at 2). On or about March 14, 2016,
Petitioner filed in this Court a document which he termed a “Writ of
Habeas Corpus under Summary Judgment” in which he asks this
Court to intervene in his state court criminal matter based on his
allegations that various police officers and prosecutors committed
Brady violations by failing to procure video tapes of the alleged
robbery, that his counsel has been constitutionally ineffective, that
he has been held at length without a hearing (essentially a speedy
trial claim), and that the victim’s identification of him is unreliable
because she is racially biased. (ECF No. 1 at 1-25). The Clerk of
the Court docketed that motion as a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Docket Sheet).
Because Petitioner seeks to challenge his pre-trial detention and
seeks to have the charges against him dismissed, he instead appears
to be attempting to bring his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
and this Court therefore construes his petition as a § 2241 petition.
(ECF No. 5 at 1-2).
On June 15, 2016, Petitioner filed what he contends is an “amended” petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. (ECF No. 16). Although Petitioner again contends that he seeks relief under §
2254, he remains a pre-trial detainee who is seeking to prematurely raise his constitutional claims
in this Court before first raising them in the state courts, and this Court thus again construes his
petition as one brought under § 2241. (Id.). Although Petitioner has added more factual detail,
the basic substance of his claims remains similar to that raised in his original petition – he continues

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to attempt to assert Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims which have yet to be
properly presented to all levels of the New Jersey courts. (Id.). As to exhaustion, in his amended
petition, Petitioner adds the following information:
I have mailed complaints and documents to [the New Jersey
Appellate Division’s] clerk’s office and received answers stating
that you are unable to help me d[ue] to pending litigation. Others
said I must be sentence[d], or appeal through certain motion being
denied. I have been told to write the Appellate Section [of the
Public Defender’s Office], only to be told that they can not represent
me while in pre trial [detention] and refer me to [the county Public
Defender’s Office]. I have wrote [to the] Attorney General’s
[Office]. I have wrote [to the] Ethics Committee and filed
Grievances[.]
(Document 1 attached to ECF No. 16 at 1).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody”
and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). Pursuant to Rule 4
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, applicable to Section 2241 petitions through Rule
1(b), this Court is required to preliminarily review a petitioner’s habeas petition and determine
whether it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief.” Pursuant to this rule, a district court is “authorized to dismiss summarily any

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habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849,
856 (1994).

B. Analysis
Petitioner is a pre-trial detainee seeking to challenge his ongoing criminal proceedings
and continued pre-trial detention based on alleged constitutional violations, including alleged
Brady violations and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. As this Court has previously
explained to Petitioner:
Section 2241 “authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus to any pretrial detainee who ‘is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,’” including
state pre-trial detainees. Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App’x 3, 4 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 n. 5 (3d
Cir. 1975)). “Nevertheless, that jurisdiction must be exercised
sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance ‘pre-trial
habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of
state criminal processes.’” Id. (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 44546). Section 2241 may therefore not be used “to litigate
constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.” Id. (quoting
Moore, 515 F.2d at 445). The Third Circuit in Moore therefore
held that although federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear the
habeas challenges of state pre-trial detainees, “that jurisdiction
without exhaustion should not be exercised at the pre-trial stage
unless extraordinary circumstances are present.” 515 F.2d at 443.
Thus, where no exceptional circumstances are present and a
petitioner seeks to litigate the merits of a constitutional defense to a
criminal charge, “the district court should exercise its ‘pre-trial’
habeas jurisdiction only if [the] petitioner makes a special showing
of the need for such adjudication and has exhausted state remedies”
by presenting his claim to the highest state court. Id.
Here, Petitioner is seeking to litigate his alleged
constitutional claims, including Brady claims, ineffective assistance
claims, speedy trial claims, and claims regarding a witness’s
identification, in this Court before raising them before the state
courts. Thus, it is clear that Petitioner is asking this Court to
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prematurely review his constitutional defenses before exhausting
them by presenting them to all levels of the state court system.
Petitioner, however, has not presented any “exceptional”
circumstances which would warrant this Court hearing his claims
prior to exhaustion in so much as he offers little other than his
allegations that he is being “railroaded” by the police and
prosecutors to support his request for relief. Such claims are not
sufficient to establish the sort of “extraordinary circumstances”
required for review without exhaustion. See Moore, 515 F.2d at
446-47 (standard claims of constitutional violations, such as speedy
trial claims, do not make out extraordinary circumstances). As
Petitioner has not exhausted his claims, as his petition presents no
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant this Court hearing
his claims without exhaustion, and as Petitioner in essence seeks to
prematurely litigate his constitutional claims in this Court without
first raising them in the state courts, this Court must dismiss the
petition without prejudice at this time. Duran, 383 F. Appx at 4;
Moore, 515 F.2d at 443-46.
(ECF No. 5 at 3-5).
Petitioner’s amended petition fairs no better than his previous attempt. Petitioner’s
statements in his Petition clearly establish that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims in so
much as the Appellate Division has directly told him that he must either appeal through an
interlocutory appeal of one of the trial court’s orders or appeal from a judgment of conviction to
have his claims reviewed by the higher state courts. (Document 1 attached to ECF No. 16 at 1).
Thus, Petitioner clearly has not exhausted his claims, his letters and grievances not withstanding.
Petitioner has likewise continued to fail to present any extraordinary circumstances which would
warrant this Court hearing his claims without exhaustion as Petitioner’s continued assertions that
he is being “railroaded” or being ill served by counsel are insufficient to establish entitlement to
pre-exhaustion habeas review. Moore, 515 F.2d at 446-47. Petitioner continues to attempt to
assert his constitutional defenses in this Court before first raising them on the merits in the state

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courts, which he is not permitted to do under the circumstances presented. Id.; see also Duran,
383 F. Appx at 4. This Court must therefore once again dismiss Petitioner’s habeas petition.

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Although appeals from petitions brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by federal
prisoners do not require a certificate of appealability, see, e.g., Day v. Nash, 191 F. App’x 137,
139 (3d Cir. 2006), because Petitioner is a state pre-trial detainee, he is required to obtain a
certificate of appealability to the extent that he wishes to challenge this Court’s dismissal of his
amended petition as his habeas petition challenges his detention which “arises out of process
issued by a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see also Magano v. New Jersey, No. 08758, 2008 WL 2345584, at *4 n. 3 (D.N.J. June 3, 2008). In a habeas proceeding, a certificate
of appealability may only be issued “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). “When
the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's
underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because
jurists of reason could not disagree with this Court’s decision to dismiss Petitioner’s petition for

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failure to exhaust or show exceptional circumstances, Petitioner’s petition is inadequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further at this time, and this Court will deny Petitioner a
certificate of appealability.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus
(ECF No. 16) will be dismissed and Petitioner will be denied a certificate of appealability. An
appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 20, 2016

_s/ Susan D. Wigenton____
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton,
United States District Judge

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