THOMAS v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 11/30/16. (DD, ) N/M
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
THURMAN THOMAS,
Civil Action No. 16-1436 (SDW)
Petitioner,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.
IT APPEARING THAT:
1. On or about March 14, 2016, Petitioner, Thurman Thomas, filed his original petition
for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to raise claims related to his ongoing state court criminal
proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1).
2. On April 8, 2016, this Court entered an order and opinion dismissing that petition and
denying Petitioner a certificate of appealability because Petitioner had neither exhausted his
claims in state court nor presented extraordinary circumstances and thus was attempting to
improperly pre-litigate his constitutional claims in this court via habeas before first presenting
them to the state courts. (ECF Nos. 5-6).
3. On June 15, 2016, Petitioner filed an amended habeas petition, this time purportedly
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 16). Petitioner’s amended petition raised
nearly identical claims to those raised in his original petition, and it remained clear that Petitioner
had not yet been convicted, had not exhausted his claims in state court, and had not presented
extraordinary circumstances.
4. On June 20, 2016, this Court therefore entered another Order and Opinion, again
construing Petitioner to be raising his claims pursuant to § 2241 rather than § 2254 because
Petitioner remained a pre-trial detainee, and once again dismissing the petition as Petitioner was
attempting to prematurely litigate his claims in this Court rather than first presenting them to all
three levels of the state courts without having presented any extraordinary circumstances which
would warrant hearing his claims absent exhaustion. (ECF Nos. 17-18). This Court also denied
Petitioner a certificate of appealability as to his amended petition. (Id.).
5. On September 30, 2016, Petitioner filed with this Court a letter in which he requested
that the Court “re-open” his previously dismissed habeas petitions. (ECF No. 22). Petitioner
thereafter filed a second amended habeas petition on or about October 6, 2016. (ECF No. 23).
6. On October 11, 2016, this Court entered a memorandum opinion and order once again
screening and dismissing Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as Petitioner had not set
forth extraordinary circumstances warranting the hearing of his claims absent exhaustion, and
had not exhausted his claims before all three levels of the state courts. (ECF Nos. 25-26).
7. Following that order and memorandum opinion, Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on or about October 25, 2016. (ECF No. 31). In his motion for reconsideration,
Petitioner once again attempts to re-raise the same claims this Court has now dismissed several
times – claims that he is suffering ineffective assistance of counsel in his ongoing state court
prosecution, and that he is being denied Brady materials in that same case. (Id.). Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration does not present any truly new arguments, but simply reiterates and
expands upon those which this Court has already dismissed as premature absent exhaustion on
three occasions. (Id.).
8. Petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his habeas petition
as premature absent exhaustion. Regardless of whether this Court construes Petitioner’s motion
as arising under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) or Federal Rule 59(e), the same standard would apply to
this motion. Motions for reconsideration should only be granted sparingly. Delanoy v. Twp. Of
Ocean, No. 13-1555, 2015 WL 2235103, at *2 (D.N.J. May 12, 2015) (as to Local Civil Rule
7.1(i)); see also Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (as to Rule 59(e)). An order
may be altered or amended only where the moving party establishes one of the following grounds:
“(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not
available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact to
prevent manifest injustice.” Delanoy, 2015 WL 2235106 at *2 (quoting Max’s Seafood Café v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Blystone, 664 F.3d at 415 (applying same
standard to 59(e) motions). In this context, manifest injustice “generally . . . means that the Court
overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter that was presented to it,” or that a “direct,
obvious, and observable” error occurred. See Brown v. Zickefoose, Civil Action No. 11-3330,
2011 WL 5007829, at *2, n. 3 (D.N.J. 2011). Reconsideration motions may not be used to
relitigate old matters or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to
entry of judgment, and courts should only grant such a motion where its prior decision “overlooked
a factual or legal issue that may alter the disposition of the matter.” Delanoy, 2015 WL 2235106
at *2.
9. As the Court has repeatedly explained to Petitioner,
Section 2241 “authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus to any pretrial detainee who ‘is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,’” including
state pre-trial detainees. Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App’x 3, 4 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 n. 5 (3d
Cir. 1975)). “Nevertheless, that jurisdiction must be exercised
sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance ‘pre-trial
habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of
state criminal processes.’” Id. (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46).
Section 2241 may therefore not be used “to litigate constitutional
defenses prematurely in federal court.” Id. (quoting Moore, 515
F.2d at 445). The Third Circuit in Moore therefore held that
although federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear the habeas
challenges of state pre-trial detainees, “that jurisdiction without
exhaustion should not be exercised at the pre-trial stage unless
extraordinary circumstances are present.” 515 F.2d at 443. Thus,
where no exceptional circumstances are present and a petitioner
seeks to litigate the merits of a constitutional defense to a criminal
charge, “the district court should exercise its ‘pre-trial’ habeas
jurisdiction only if [the] petitioner makes a special showing of the
need for such adjudication and has exhausted state remedies” by
presenting his claim to the highest state court. Id.
Here, Petitioner is seeking to litigate his alleged
constitutional claims, including Brady claims, ineffective assistance
claims, speedy trial claims, and claims regarding a witness’s
identification, in this Court before raising them before the state
courts. Thus, it is clear that Petitioner is asking this Court to
prematurely review his constitutional defenses before exhausting
them by presenting them to all levels of the state court system.
Petitioner, however, has not presented any “exceptional”
circumstances which would warrant this Court hearing his claims
prior to exhaustion in so much as he offers little other than his
allegations that he is being “railroaded” by the police and
prosecutors to support his request for relief. Such claims are not
sufficient to establish the sort of “extraordinary circumstances”
required for review without exhaustion. See Moore, 515 F.2d at
446-47 (standard claims of constitutional violations, such as speedy
trial claims, do not make out extraordinary circumstances). As
Petitioner has not exhausted his claims, as his petition presents no
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant this Court hearing
his claims without exhaustion, and as Petitioner in essence seeks to
prematurely litigate his constitutional claims in this Court without
first raising them in the state courts, this Court must dismiss the
petition without prejudice at this time. Duran, 383 F. Appx at 4;
Moore, 515 F.2d at 443-46.
(ECF No. 5 at 3-5; ECF No. 17 at 4-5).
10. Here, as with all of his previous petitions, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
fails to set forth any extraordinary circumstances which would warrant the hearing of his claims
absent exhaustion, instead Petitioner once again seeks to prematurely litigate his constitutional
claims in this Court before first presenting them to the state courts. Likewise, nothing in
Petitioner’s current motion suggests that he has exhausted his claims. As such, Petitioner has
presented no new or overlooked evidence, and it is clear that this Court has neither overlooked
any relevant facts or applicable legal principles in dismissing Petitioner’s habeas petition. As
Petitioner has also failed to show any change in the law since this Court’s prior decisions, and as
he has not shown that a manifest injustice would result from the dismissal of his habeas petition
until such time as he has exhausted his claims, he has failed to present any valid basis for
reconsideration of this Court’s prior order and memorandum opinion dismissing his habeas
petition until such time as he has exhausted his claims in all three levels of the state courts.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration must therefore be denied. Blystone, 664 F.3d at 415;
Delanoy, 2015 WL 2235106 at *2; see also Duran, 383 F. Appx at 4; Moore, 515 F.2d at 44346.
11. In conclusion, Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 31) must be
DENIED. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: November 30, 2016
s/ Susan D. Wigenton
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton,
United States District Judge
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