TRAINER v. NOGAN et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 1/25/18. (DD, ) N/M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

Civil Action No.: 16-1576 (JLL)

:

STEVEN TRAINER,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner,
v.
PATRICK NOGAN, et al.,
Respondents.

IT APPEARING THAT:
1. On or about March 21, 2016, Petitioner, Steven Trainer, filed his petition for a writ of

habeas

corpus.

(ECF No. 1).

2. Following briefing, this Court entered an Order and Opinion dated October 19, 2017,
which determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition was not properly exhausted in the state courts,
and was subject to dismissal as a result. (ECF Nos. 17-18). This Court gave Petitioner forty-five
days, however, to request a stay if he so desired, and informed Petitioner that his petition would
be dismissed without prejudice in the event he did not request a stay. (ECF No. 18).
3. Approximately twenty-nine days later, Petitioner submitted to this Court a letter request
for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal as to the Court’s October 19, 2017
decision. (ECF No. 19). This Court granted that request by way of an Order issued on November

30, 2017, which gave Petitioner until December 18. 2017, to file a notice of appeal as to the Court’s
Order and Opinion finding Petitioner’s habeas petition unexhausted.
4. On December 4, 2017, Petitioner filed a second request for an extension of time within
which to file an appeal which had been mailed prior to the Court’s granting of Petitioner’s previous

extension motion. (ECF No. 21). Because that request was effectively identical to Petitioner’s
first extension request, and because this Court had already granted that request, this Court
terminated that motion. (See generally ECF Docket Sheet).
5. On December 8, 2017, however, Petitioner filed an additional letter requesting a stay,
and noting that the Court had given him an opportunity to request a stay of this matter pending
exhaustion through a post-conviction relief petition in the state courts within forty-five days of the
date of the Order and Opinion finding his petition unexhausted. (Id.). Although Petitioner requests
a stay in his letter, he does not argue or otherwise support his request for a stay pending exhaustion.
(Id.).
6. As this Court previously explained to Petitioner,
[a] district court may only grant a stay of an unexhausted or mixed
petition in “limited circumstances.” Rhines[ v. Weber], 544 U.S.
[269,] 277 [(2005)]. Specifically, the petitioner must have “good
cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims [must be]
potentially meritorious, and there [can be] no indication that the
petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at
27$. Even where these requirements are met, a stay will generally
only be warranted in those cases where a dismissal of the petition
without prejudice would result in the petitioner being unable to
timely file his habeas petition. See Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146,
152 (3d Cir. 2004) (“where an outright dismissal could jeopardize
the timeliness of a collateral attack” a stay is appropriate); Williams
v. Walsh, 411 F. App’x 459, 461 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[w]here the
timeliness of a habeas corpus petition is at issue. a District Court
has discretion to stay” the petition); Ragland, 2015 WL 103542$ at
.

.

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(ECF No. 17 at 10-1 1).
7. Even if this Court were to assume that Petitioner’s claims are potentially meritorious
and that Petitioner has not been dilatory, Petitioner has, both in his petition and in his letter,
provided the Court with no good cause for his failure to exhaust other than his own mistaken belief
that his claims were, in fact, exhausted when he attempted to raise them in the Appellate Division.
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As this Court has explained to Petitioner (see ECF No. 17 at 9-10), however, raising claims in an
appellate court “in a procedural context in which [their] merits [would] not be considered” does
not exhaust a petitioner’s claims as those claims were not fairly presented to the state courts.
Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350-51 (1989).

8. Thus, the oniy reason presented in the record for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims
in the state courts was his mistaken belief that he had exhausted or was not required to exhaust his
claims despite the fact that the Appellate Division refused to hear his ineffective assistance related
claims and informed him, both via the colloquy on appeal and in the Order affinuing his sentence,
that he could address those claims through “filing an application for post-conviction relief” (See
ECF No. 17 at 5-6, Document 4 attached to ECF No. 9). The Third Circuit has explicitly held,
however, that a Petitioner cannot show good cause for his failure to exhaust where the Appellate
Division told the petitioner “explicitly that the dismissal of his

.

.

.

claims [on appeal] was without

prejudice, and that he could pursue his constitutional claims in an application for post-conviction
relief.” Ellison v. Rogers, 484 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2007). Petitioner’s claims thus mirror those
in Eltison almost exactly

—

he attempted to pursue ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal,

was not permitted to do so, and was told he could raise those claims via a post-conviction relief
petition. Under those circumstances, a Petitioner who refuses that invitation and instead insists on
proceeding to file a federal habeas petition has neither exhausted his claims, nor shown good cause
for his failure to exhaust. Id. at 660-62. Because Petitioner has failed to show good cause for his
failure to exhaust, his request for a stay must be denied. Id.
9. Pursuant to 2$ U.S.C. §2253(c), a petitioner may not appeal from a final order in a
habeas proceeding where that petitioner’s detention arises out of his state court conviction unless

he has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “A petitioner satisfies

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this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude that the issties presented here
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El

i’.

Cockrett, 537 U.S. 322,

327 (2003). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue
when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural rctling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because jurists of reason could not disagree with this Court’s conclusion
that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted, and because jurists of reason could not dispute that
Petitioner has failed to show good cause entitling him to a stay pending exhaustion, jurists of
reason would not debate whether this Court was correct in finding his petition unexhausted and
concluding it must therefore be dismissed without prejudice. Petitioner is therefore once again
denied a certificate of appealability.
10. In conclusion, Petitioner’s request for a stay pending exhaustion is DENIED, Petitioner
is DENIED a certificate of appealability, and this matter shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as unexhausted. An appropriate order follows.

JOWL. LINARES
%Kief Judge, United States District Court

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