WOJAK v. BOROUGH OF GLEN RIDGE et al
Filing
68
OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 8/3/2018. (sm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOSEPH G. WOJAK,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 2:16-cv-1605-KM-JBC
BOROUGH OF GLEN RIDGE, GLEN
RIDGE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
TOWN OF BLOOMFIELD,
BLOOMFIELD BOARD OF
EDUCATION, JOHN DOES 1-10,
JANE DOES 1-10, and ABC
CORPORATIONS 1-10,
OPINION
Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
I write primarily for the parties and thus do not explain the entire factual
and procedural history. Plaintiff Joseph 0. Wojak sued Borough of Glen Ridge,
the Glen Ridge Board of Education (“Glen Ridge BCE”), the State of New Jersey,
the Township of Bloomfield, and the Bloomfield Board of Education
(“Bloomfield BOE”) when he discovered that his property’s school-district
classification had been changed from Glen Ridge to Bloomfield years before—
allegedly without his knowledge. He claimed that this constituted a regulatory
taking and a denial of due process. The regulatory taking claims and the claims
against the State of New Jersey were dismissed. Related claims by other
plaintiffs were also dismissed.
Now before the court are motions for reconsideration by the Borough of
Glen Ridge, the Glen Ridge BOE, the Township of Bloomfield, and the
Bloomfield BCE. (ECF Nos. 56, 57, 59, 60). For the reasons stated below, these
motions are denied.
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I.
LEGAL STANDARD
The standards governing a motion for reconsideration are well settled.
See generally D.N.J. Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary
remedy,” to be granted “sparingly.” NL Indus. Inc. a Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996). Generally, reconsideration is granted in
three scenarios: (1) when there has been an intervening change in the law;
(2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when necessary to correct a
clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. See North River Ins. Co. v.
CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995); Carmichael a
Everson, No. 3-cv-4787, 2004 WL 1587894, at *1 (D.N.J. May 21, 2004). Local
Rule 7.1(i) requires such a motion to specifically identify “the matter or
controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge
has overlooked.” Id.; see also Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat’l Guard, 684 F. Supp.
1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988). Evidence or arguments that were available at the
time of the original decision will not support a motion for reconsideration.
Damiano v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623, 636 (D.N.J. 1997); see
also North River Ins. Co., 52 F.3d at 1218; Bapu Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
No. 7-cv-5938, 2010 WL 5418972, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2010) (citing P.
Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J.
2001)).
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear
error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. They do not argue that there has
been an intervening change in the law or that new evidence has become
available. While the defendants make separate motions for reconsideration,
there is a significant overlap in the arguments and I thus address them
together. The defendants claim: (A) there is no legal or due-process
requirement to provide notice about school-assignment changes to individuals
who do not have school-aged children; and (NJ another party is liable.
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A. Requirement of Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard
The Glen Ridge BOE argues that there is no statutory or constitutional
requirement that defendants provide notice to Mr. Wojak in these
circumstances. It is true that Mr. Wojak has not identified a specific statute
that provides him with procedural rights. However, Mr. Wojak may have a due
process claim under two venerable Supreme Court precedents.
The Supreme Court cases of Londoner z.’. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1905),
and Ri-Metallic mv. Co. v. State Ed. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)
establish that legislative acts affecting a broad group of people do not trigger
individual due process rights such as notice and an opportunity to be heard.
However, adjudicative acts that affect an individual or a small group of people,
based on their unique circumstances, may necessitate additional procedural
safeguards to satisfy due process.
In Ri-Metallic, the State Board of Equalization and the Colorado Tax
Commission increased the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by 40
percent. 239 U.S. at 443-44. Plaintiff, a property owner in Denver, argued that
he was not given an opportunity to be heard and was thus denied due process
contrar to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 444. The Supreme Court
disagreed:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its
adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be
done in a town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General
statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or
property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without
giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the
only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. If the result in
this case had been reached, as it might have been by the state’s
doubling the rate of taxation, no one would suggest that the 14th
Amendment was violated unless every person affected had been
his voice against it before the body
allowed an
intrusted by the state Constitution with the power.
opportunity
to
raise
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Id. at 445.
The Court distinguished these circumstances from those in Londoner v.
Denver, where a local board had to determine “whether, in what amount, and
upon whom” a tax for paving a street should be levied. Londoner, 210 U.S. at
385. In these circumstances, the individuals had a right to additional
procedural safeguards. Id. at 386. “A relatively small number of persons was
concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing.” Bi-Metallic, 239
U.S. at 446 (discussing Londoner). In short, “[w] hen the action has a limited
focus (only a few people or properties are affected) and is based on grounds
that are individually assessed, it may be more adjudicative than legislative and
therefore subject to traditional procedural requirements of notice and hearing.”
Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Elbed Cty., 838 F.3d 1039, 1046
(10th Cir. 2016).
In this case, Mr. Wojak’s property classification was changed based on
his individual circumstances. He alleges that he was not provided with notice
and was not given an opportunity for a hearing. The change appears
sufficiently adjudicative that it may have necessitated additional procedural
safeguards, as the Supreme Court held in Londoner. Whether such safeguards
were required or were given remains to be seen. But for those reasons, the
prior decision denying dismissal of Mr. Wojak’s due process claim stands.
B. Responsibility of Other Defendant(s)
Individual defendants argue that another party was responsible for
providing any necessary procedural safeguards. The Borough of Glen Ridge, for
example, argues that the Glen Ridge BOE was responsible. Bloomfield BOE
and Bloomfield Township claim that the Glen Ridge defendants were
responsible.
Additional fact finding will be required to determine how the decision to
alter the school-assignment designation for Mr. Wojak’s property was made. It
appears unlikely that Glen Ridge (either the Borough or BOE) could unilaterally
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have reassigned properties and children to the Bloomfield schools. Of course, it
could turn out that some defendants (or even all defendants) are not liable. But
liability’ has been sufficiently alleged, and many of the pertinent facts are under
the control of the defendants. I decline to reconsider the prior opinion and
dismiss the Bloomfield defendants until discovery has been done to elucidate
the reassignment process.
The Borough of Glen Ridge alleges that one of Mr. Wojak’s exhibits (i.e.,
exhibit C) clearly shows that the Glen Ridge BOE was solely responsible for the
school-district shift. That document may constitute relevant evidence, but it is
not so clear as to surmount the motion-to-dismiss standard. Without
additional fact finding, I cannot determine which party is responsible and will
not prematurely dismiss a party from the case.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions for reconsideration are
denied. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.
Dated: August 3, 2018
K VIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge
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