ROBERN, INC. v. GLASSCRAFTERS INC.

Filing 14

OPINION. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 7/22/2016. (JB, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ROBERN, INC..
Plaintiff
Civil Action No. 16-1815
V.

OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
GLASSCRAFTERS. INC.,

De/’izdatzt.

John Michael Vazgnez. U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Glasscrafiers Incorporated’s
(“Defendant” or “Glasscrafters”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Robem Incorporated’s (“Plaintiff’ or
Robem”) Complaint for failure to state a claim.’ This case concerns allegations that Glasscrafters
improperly infringed on Plaintiffs patent for mirrored medicine cabinets. The issue raised is
straightforward but has not yet been addressed in this District since December 2015 when Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 84 was abrogated.

Defendant argues that the plausibiLity pleading

requirement set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bell Atlantic Corporation v.
TILomblv, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and As/zero/i r. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). applies to Plaintiffs
Complaint for direct patent infringement. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees that the
Jqbal/Twonzblv standard applies and that Plaintiff has not met it in its Complaint. As a result, the

Defendant’s Brief in support of its Motion to Dismiss will be referred to hereinafter as “Def. Br.”
(D.E. 9), Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant’s brief will be referred to hereinafter as “P1. Opp.”
(D.E. 10), and Defendant’s Reply Brief in support of its Motion to Dismiss will be referred to
hereinafter as “Del Reply” (D.E. 11).

Court grants Defendant’s motion. However, the dismissal is without prejudice, and Plaintiff may
file an amended complaint within 30 days.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background2
Robem is a Pennsylvania corporation that engages in “residential storage solutions.
creating cabinets, vanities, mirrors. lighting and accessories for bathrooms, hallways. foyers, and
more.” Compl. 96, 1. Robem asserts that it is likely best known for its innovation in designing
mirrored bath cabinets. Id.

¶

7. It has a global customer base and “continually invests in the

engineering, design, and development of new residential storage solutions.” Id.

¶

10. Currently.

Robem owns “numerous patents worldwide on innovations in the residential storage solutions
industry.” Id.

¶

II.

One such patent is Patent No. 6,092.884 (“the ‘884 patent”), which is at issue in this matter.
Id.

¶

12. The ‘884 patent, entitled “Door for Cabinet and Method for Constructing Same,” was

issued to Robem by the United States Patent and Trademark Office on July 25, 2000. Id. 113.
The patent describes an “original and unique mirrored cabinet door.” Id.

¶

12. It contains fourteen

claims, comprised of two independent claims and twelve dependent claims. Id. Ex. A. Claim 1 is
independent and claims 2-8 are dependent on Claim 1; Claim 9 is independent and claims 10-14
are dependent on Claim 9. Id.

2

The factual background is taken from the Complaint (D.E. I) (“Compl.”). When reviewing a
motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Fowler i
UPMCshadvside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
7

Glasscraflers is a New Jersey corporation that presumably competes with Robern in the
cabinet industry. Id.

¶

2. With respect to patent ‘884, the critical paragraph in the Complaint

alleges that:
[n]otwithstanding Robern’s rights, Glasscrafters, without
permission or authorization, is manufacturing, offering for sale, and
selling certain cabinets, including cabinets marketed under the
GC1624, GC1630, GC1636, GC2030, GC2036, GC2430, and
GC2436 model numbers (and any other similarly configured
products (collectively, the ‘Inthnging Mirrored Cabinets’)), which
infringe at least one claim of the ‘884 patent.
Id.

¶

15. Plaintiff alleges direct infringement is a violation of 35 U.S.C.

§ 27 1(a).

Id.

¶J 20,

21.

B. Procedural Background
On March 31, 2016, Plaintiff filed its Complaint. Defendant filed the instant motion to
dismiss on April 20,2016, which Plaintiff has opposed. Defendant argues that the Complaint must
be dismissed because it does not meet the plausibility standard required by the Supreme Court in
fqbal and Tuvmbly. Plaintiff contends that the Complaint is properly pled,3 and in any event

Defendant will be receiving more detailed infonnation pursuant to the District of New Jersey’s
Local Patent Rules.

LI. DISCUSSION
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Pleading requirements are governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain

In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges that the proper pleading standard in this case is facial
plausibility pursuant to Iqbal and Twomblv. P1. Opp. at 4. Plaintiff also acknowledges that “the
recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil procedure abrogated Rule 84, which provided
the basis for pleading standards for direct patent infringement through Form 18.” Id. at 5. Yet,
Plaintiff incongruously argues that while Rule 84 and Form 18 have been abrogated, the pleading
standards required by Rule 1 8 have not changed.
3

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Originally, Rule 8(a) was interpreted liberally, requiring plaintiffs to merely provide defendants
with “fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conlev
Gibson. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). However, the Supreme Court in Twonzblv held that a civil
complaint must go beyond providing mere notice, and instead a plaintiff must allege enough facts
“to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 550 U.S. at 570 (referring to the standard
in Conlev as “an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard”). The Third Circuit
has since applied the Twomblv standard, Phillips

i’.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d

Cir. 2008), and the Supreme Court reiterated the applicability of the plausibility standard in Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662. Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement, it
does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawffilly.” Connellp v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
As a result, to withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. p. i 2(b)(6), a plaintiff must
allege “enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” J1Lomblv, 550 U.S. at
570. A court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. This assumption of truth applies
only to factual allegations, and a court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences,
unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.”

Baraka v.

McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir, 2007). The plausibility standard is met when “the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

4

A claim of patent infringement is governed by 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(a), which states, “whoever

without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention

.

.

.

during the term of

the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” Although the Iqbal/Twomblv standard applies to “all
civil actions,” its applicability to patent cases has been interpreted differently among federal courts.
This disparity was largely due to then Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provided guidance as to what constituted a sufficiently pled claim. Rule 84 stated that “[tihe Forms
in the Appendix
P. 84.

.

.

.

illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.” Fed. R. Civ.

Form 18 in the Appendix of Forms (the “Forms”), entitled “Complaint for Patent

Infringement,” provided an example for pleading a claim of direct patent infringement. However,
Rule 84 was abrogated in December2015. As a result, Form 18 was likewise abrogated.
Before Rule 84’s abrogation, courts took different views as to whether iqbal/Tivomblv
required a higher standard of pleading than Form 18 indicated. See Vaughan Co. v. Global Bio—
Fire/s Tech., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 1292. 2012 WL 5598501, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012) (“Courts
are divided as to whether allegations of direct patent infringement need only mirror those contained
in Form 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the more strict pleading requirements of
iqbal.”) (footnote omitted). Form 18 required a plaintiff to merely assert the following:
(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff
owns the patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing
the patent “by making, selling, and using [the device] embodying
the patent”; (4) a statement that the plaintitThas given the defendant
notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction and
damages.
K—Tee/i Te/econun., Inc. v. Ti,ne Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(quoting McZeal

i’.

Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

The Federal Circuit, in a series of cases, analyzed the pleading standard required by Form
18 in light of Iqba//Twombly.

These cases, noting the potential discrepancy between
5

Iqbal/Twomblv and Form 18, consistently found that “the Forms control.” K—Tech Telecornm.,
Inc., 714 F.3d at 1283; see also In re Bill ofLading Transmission & Processing St’s. Patent Litig.,
681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding any conflict between Twon,bly and its progeny and
the Form pleading requirements would be decided in favor of the Forms); ?vkZcal, 501 F.3d at
1360 (Dyk, J.. concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (acknowledging the deficiencies in Form
18 under Twomblv, but stating that “[courts are] required to find that a bare allegation of literal
infringement in accordance with Form [18] would be sufficient under Rule S to state a claim.”).
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court could not make changes to a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure so that Rule 84, and hence Form 18. was still valid. Sec In re Bill of Lading
Ti-ansuzission & Processing Si’s. Parent Litig.,681 F.3d at 1334 (“As the Supreme Court has noted,

[1

any changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be obtained by the process of

amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”) (internal quotations omitted);
McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1360 (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
In In re Bill ofLanding, the Federal Circuit made clear that the “Forms are controlling only
for causes of action for which there are sample pleadings.” 681 F.3d at 1336. There, the court
first found that a claim for direct infringement was properLy pled if consistent with Form 18. Id.
at 1334. However, if the allegation was one of indirect infringement, the Federal Circuit instead
looked to the Jqbal/Twomblv standard because there was no form addressing indirect infringement.
Id. at 1337-39.
In K-Tech, the Federal Circuit heard an appeal from a district court’s judgment dismissing
plaintiffs amended complaints for failing to meet the plausibility standard. 714 F.3d at 1280. In
reversing the district court, the K-Tech Court reiterated that if a conflict exists between
Iqbal/Twomblv and the Forms, “the Forms control,” Id. at 1283. The court observed that the

6

Forms “effectively immunize[] a claimant from attack regarding the sufficiency of the pleading.”
Id. However, the court further indicated that “Form 18 in no way relaxes the clear principal of
Rule 8.” ld. at 1284.

The K-Tech Court went on to analyze the complaint according to both

Form 18 and the plausibility standard, and determined that the complaint was sufficiently pled. Id.
at 1286-87. The Court found plausibility largely because of the plaintiffs inaccessibility to the
underlying infringing products.

Id. at 1286.

In K-Tech, plaintiff did not have access to the

underlying products of defendants, which allegedly infringed plaintiffs patents, since defendants
kept those products secret. Id. at 1285-87. As a result, plaintiff was forced to plead inthngement
through circumstantial evidence demonstrating that it was likely that defendants were infringing.
Id. The court in K-Tech found that plaintiffs lack of access to the actual product did not foreclose
plaintiffs case in light of the other, circumstantial allegations that were pled. Id. (“A defendant
cannot shield itself from a complaint for direct infringement by operating in such secrecy that the
filing of a complaint itself is impossible.”).5 Thus, the court found that plaintiff satisfied the
pleading standard of Form 18. Id. at 1287.
Unlike the Federal Circuit, “[o]ther courts, however, have held that because the
Twomblv/Iqbal pleading standard applies to all civil cases, a patent infringement complaint must
do more than simply assert the bare elements of a claim, and that a Form 18-style complaint will
not suffice, in the aftermath of Twonzblv and Iqbal.” Gradient Enters., Inc. v. Slwpe Techs. S.A.,
848 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (W.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Medsquire LLC

Spring Med. Svs. Inc.,No.

11-4504, 2011 WL 4101093, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (requiring Iqbal/Twomblv

Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to have set forth two distinct positions in K-Tech. First, the
court ruled that if a plaintiff followed Form 18, its pleading was essentially “immunize[d]” from
attack. Yet, the court also found that Form 18 was subject to the Iqbal/Twonibly holdings.

‘

Here, there is no allegation that Robem could not access the products at issue.
7

plausibility pleading in cases of direct patent infringement); Bender

i’.

tO Elecs. USA., Inc., No.

09-02114,2010 WL 889541, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11,2010) (same).
For example, in Macronix International Company, Limited

i’.

Spansion Incorporated, the

Eastern District of Virginia applied Fourth Circuit law in holding that the Iqbal/Titonthlv standard
applied to cases of direct patent infringement. 4 F. Supp. 3d 797, 802 (ED. Va. 2014). The
ManvnLv Court acknowledged that the Federal Circuit and the Fourth Circuit differed on their
views of how Jqbal and Twomblv affected the pleading standards. Id. at $01. The Macronix Court.
following Fourth Circuit law. explained that the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twomblv were
applying Rule 8(a), and “decisions by the Supreme Court that instruct how to apply the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are controlling.” Id. at 802. Thus. the Macronix Court concluded that
“[t]here is no logical reason to exempt patent complaints from the plausibility requirements that
apply to all other federal complaints.” Id. at 803—04.
The present matter is an issue of first impression in this District. It is apparent to this Court
that with the abrogation of Rule 84 and Form 18, there is no longer any credible conflict between
Supreme Court precedent and Form 1$. Both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have held
that the Iqbal/Twonthh’ pleading standard applies in all civil cases. See Jqbal. 556 U.S. at 684
(pleading standard applies in “all civil actions”); W Penn Allegheny Health Si’s.

i’.

UPMC, 627

F.3d 85,98 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Rule S’s pleading standard applies with the same level of rigor in all
civil actions”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Iqbal/Thivinbly standard controls.
Defendant points to two cases that have interpreted allegations of patent infringement
according to Iqbal and Twombly following the abrogation of Rule 84 and Form 18. Def. Br. at
11—12. The first case, Incorn Corporation

i’.

The Walt Disney Company, found that the abrogation

of Rule 84 meant that Form 18 “no longer provides a safe harbor for pleading direct infringement.”

8

No. 15-3011, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71319, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016). The InConz Court
nevertheless found that the plaintiff had stated a plausible claim, sufficient to withstand
Iqbal/Tnvmblv scrutiny, because it had “specifically identified] [d]efendants’ products and
alleg[ed] that they perform the same unique function as [p]laintiffs patented system.” Id. at *8.
The second case, Raindance Technologies, Incorporated i’. iox Genomics, Incorporated, held that
the “existing standards” for pleading patent infringement were “Iqbal and Twon,blv”. No. 15-152,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33875, at *7 (D. DeL. Mar. 4, 2016).

Applying this standard to the

plaintiffs complaint, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not plausibly pled infringement.
Id.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish these cases by arguing that they involve method claims and
“address technologies that are far more complicated than the doors on Glasscrafiers’ accused
cabinets.” P1. Opp. at 8. However, nowhere in either RainDance or InCom did the courts limit
their rulings to method claims. And while it is true that pleadings are fact-specific so that more
complicated material may require more detailed allegations, all pleadings must meet the
plausibility standard regardless of the level of complexity of the patent in question. See K-Tech,
714 F.3d at 1286 (“[A]dequacv of the facts pled depends on the breadth and complexity of both
the asserted patent and the accused product or system and on the nature of the defendant’s business
activities.”); cf IV Pen,z Alleghem’ Health Si’s.. 627 F.3d at 98 (holding that the “plausibility”
standard does not become a “probability” standard in complex cases).
Additionally, Plaintiff araues that the New Jersey Local Patent Rules require more detailed
disclosures, when compared with the pleading standard, after filing the Complaint. P1. Opp. at 9—
10. Therefore, Plaintiff notes that more specificity of the allegations in the complaint is not
required until “service of plaintiffs Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions

9

under the Local Patent Rules.” Id. at 8. In fact, Plaintiff attaches as Exhibit I to its opposition,
disclosures pursuant Local Patent Rules 3.1 and 3.2.

Id. Ex. 1.

Plaintiff states that these

disclosures “should eliminate any questions as to Robern’s infringement claim against
Glasscrafters, thereby mooting this motion.” Id. at 10.
New Jersey Local Civil Rules merely supplement, and cannot be inconsistent with, the
Federal Rules. See L. Civ. R. 1.1(a); L. Civ. R. 83.1. Thepleadingrequirementsoflqbal/Tnvmblv
pertain solely to pleadings. Thus, after-the-fact disclosures cannot be used to supplement the
pleadings and meet the Iqbal/Twomblv standard. (‘NA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n. 3 (3d
Cir. 2008) (finding that a district court may not look outside the pleadings when considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion). Ultimately, Plaintiff may be accurate as to the realistic outcome: Defendant will
presumably receive far more detailed information pursuant to the New Jersey Local Rules than
Plaintiff would have to plead. However, this does not remove Plaintiffs responsibility to comply
in the first instance with the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Setnerenko v. Cendant Coip.,
223 F.3d 165, 173 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[Plaintiff] is not free to add new factual allegations to
comply with Rule I 2(b)(6).”).
Having determined that the Iqbal/Tnvrnblv plausibility standard applies to complaints
alleging direct patent infringement, the Court next turns to whether Plaintiff has met the standard
here. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs Complaint is not plausibly pled.

Plaintiff does list

Defendant’s products which allegedly infringe, but this is not enough. Defendant correctly points
out that Plaintiff made no attempt to describe the alleged infringement and also failed to relate
factual assertions to the pertinent claims in the ‘884 patent. Def. Br. at I. Instead, the Complaint
merely states that Defendant’s products “infringe[d] at least one claim of the ‘884 patent.” Compl.

¶

15. Essentially, Plaintiff has echoed the statutory language and the requirements of the now-

10

abrogated Form 18. This is not sufficient to meet the pleading standard under Jqbal/Twomblv.
Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in K-Tech, Plaintiff here has fill access to the allegedly infringing
products. To be clear, the Court is not indicating that Plaintiff must plead the same level of detail
as it will disclose in its asserted claims and infringement contentions pursuant to the local rules.
Yet, Plaintiff must nevertheless meet the plausibility standard required by Iqbal and Twomblv.
Plaintiff further argues that a complaint for patent infringement is adequate under
Jqbal/Tuvnzbtv when the complaint “provides at least plausible facts that give Defendants notice
of the technology they allegedly used without authorization.” P1.
Inc.

i’.

Opp. at 6—7 (citing MvEChec/c

Zipnzarlc Inc., No. 14-2399, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32980, at *45 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17,

2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that nothing more is
required than “sufficient factual allegations such that a reasonable court could, assuming the
allegations were true, conclude that the defendant infringed.” Id. at 7 (citing WAG Acquisition,
LLC

1’.

Multi-Media, LLC, Nos.6 14-2340, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121028, at *22 (D.N.J. Sept.

10, 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Both cases cited by Plaintiff, MvECheck and WAG Acquisition, were decided before Form
18 was abrogated. Yet, both cases apply the plausibility standard of Iqbal/Twomblv. See WAG
Acquisition, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121028, at *21 (“WAG’s complaints meet the standard
of Twonzblv and Iqbal”); MvECheck, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32980 at *4 (finding plaintiffs
complaint “sufficient under the Twonibly/Iqbal pleading standard”). In MvECheck, the issue was
whether plaintiff adequately gave defendants “notice of the technology they allegedly used without
authorization.” 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32980 at *5 Here, there is no issue as to whether Plaintiff

6

The following cases are also consolidated in the above cited decision: 14-2345, 14-2674, 142832, 14-3456, 14-4531, 15-3581.

11

gave adequate notice of Defendant’s allegedly infringing products, so MvEChcck is inapposite.7
Moreover, W1G Acquisition supports the Court’s ruling because the plaintiff in that matter
included “detailed allegations of wiw Defendants infringe specific claims in each of the patents
asserted.”

W1G Acquisition, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121028, at *22.

In this case, Plaintiff

provides no such allegations.
Therefore, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to adequately state a claim sufficient to withstand the
pleading requirements of Iqbal/Twornbh’.

III.

CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiffs Complaint is subject to the Jqbal/Twomblv pleading

standards and that the Complaint is insufficiently pled. Thus, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has 30 days to file an amended complaint.
An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

Date; July 22, 2016

JO N MICHAEL 4ZQLEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In MvEcheck, the plaintiff licensed the technology at issue to the defendant. 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32980 at *lfl Since the defendant held the technology in violation of this license, it is
safe to assume that the product was, in fact, plaintiffs product.
12