GRAVES v. LANNIGAN et al
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 12/10/2018. (sm)
UNITED STATES DESTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No. 16-1822 (MCA)
DEION CRAVES,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v.
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
ARLEO. United States District Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Deion Graves, currently confined at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in
Avenel, New Jersey, has filed an Amended Complaint, alleging violations of his constitutional
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”). The Court
previously granted his IFP application and dismissed his original Complaint at screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. ECF >Jos. 2-3. The Court dismissed the Complaint against the State of New Jersey
with prejudice and dismissed the Complaint against Gary Lanigan and Jennifer Velez without
prejudice. Id. Plaintiff subsequently submitted an Amended Complaint naming Gary Lanigan
and Jennifer Velez in their individual supervisory capacities.’ See ECF No. 4 at 97, 11. For
the reasons explained below, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety for
Although the caption refers to the Defendants in their official capacities, the Amended
Complaint states that Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their individual capacities. Petitioner
1
failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted under
§
191 5(e)(2)(B). administratively
terminate this action, and provide Plaintiff with a final opportunity to amend to the extent he can
cure the deficiencies in his Amended Complaint.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
II.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is substantially similar to his original complaint. He has
sued two high-level supervisory state officials
--
Gary M. Lanigan, the Commissioner of the New
Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”) and Jennifer Velez, the Commissioner of the
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) --for alleged violations of his civil rights at the STU.
Plaintiff alleges he was targeted for assault and retaliation by unidentified subordinates of
Lanigan and/or Velez on August 21. 2012 while he was confined in the STU, and was
subsequently placed in Temporary Close Custody (“TCC”) for a two-year period. ECF No. 4,
Compl. at
J 2.
He further alleges Defendants and their subordinates conspired to assault him and
have hint placed TC.C in retaliation for a conflict that Plaintiff had with a correctional officer
while he was incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison.2 Id. Petitioner also alleges that his living
conditions while in TCC were “hazardous and unsanitary” and that he was “locked behind an 8’
x 12’ cage that was to remained [sic] locked at all times per DOC Supervisor.” Id. Plaintiff
alleges in the Amended Complaint that his confinement to the 8 x 12 caged cell for a two-year
period, from August21, 2012 until June 2,2014, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at
¶ 22
The Amended Complaint provides the following additional facts:
On June 4, 2014, an Administrative decision was made to move
the PLAINTIFF off of the West Unit where he was housed and
2
With respect to the assault, Plaintiff also alleges in the relief section that Defendants’
subordinates committed the assault with Defendants’ knowledge, direction, and consent. Id, at ¶
22A.
‘3
locked in the 8” x 12” caged in ccli, to the south unit 3” floor lock
up where other residents on (TCC) Temporary Closed Custody and
Cell (MAP) Modified Activities Program are housed, Department
of Corrections officials including officers from internal affairs
division with video cameras came to the west unit to this caged cell
where the PLAINTIFF was locked accompanied by (25) officers in
full riot gear and tear gas, only five officers plus the PLAINTIFF
could fit in the cell, after the proceeded to spray tear gas into the
cell for 8 to 10 minutes before going in, they then proceeded to go
in and extract the PLAINTIFF from the cell handcuffing him and
forcing him out of the room around the day room area and outside
across the court yard to the south unit 3rd floor lock up, the
PLAINTIFF is currently still on the south unit but is now in
general population.
Id. at2.
As he did in the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his confinement in TCC was the
result of policies and/or procedures and/or regulations established and/or maintained by
Defendants Lanigan and Velez. With Respect to Defendant Lanigan, Plaintiff states as follows:
Mr. Lanigan knew or should have known about an approved or
indeed promulgated and directed the various restrictive custodial
policies, practices, and procedures including training of DOC
personnel and security practices and uses of restraint concerning
the maimer and scope of the abusive treatment of the PLAINTIFF,
that created the punitive environment and excessively restrictive
conditions under which the PLAINTIFF is presently confined. Mr.
Lannigan [sicj knew or should have known about and approved or
failed to supervise subordinates operating under his authority and
take steps to prevent or correct each of these violations of the
PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights, as alleged more specifically
below.
Id. at
¶
7. Similarly, with respect to Defendant Velez, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
Ms. Velez was complicit in and along with the actions of
[Defendant LaiiganJ, Ms. Velez knew or should have known about
and approved or indeed herself promulgate and direct the various
policies, practices and procedures concerning the matter and scope
of the unconstitutional treatment of the PLAINTIFF that created
the punitive environment and excessive restrictive conditions
under which the PLAINTIFF is presently confined. Ms. Velez
knew or should have known about and approved or failed to take
steps to prevent or correct each of these violations of the
2
PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights as alleged more specifically
below.
Id. at
¶
11. With respect to both Defendants, Plaintiffs Complaint states that
Defendants, together have written, adopted, imposed, enforced,
maintained and are responsible for a number of written and
unwritten rules, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures that
makes the conditions of PLAINTIFF’s segregation behind a
special 8 x 12 cage at the Special Treatment Unit punitive and
excessively restrictive prison comparable environment, created,
implemented, and enforced by the Defendants.
Id.
at
21.
Like his original Complaint, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint describes the history of New
Jersey’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27,
Ct
seq, and alleges that
Sexually Violent Predators (“SVP5”) are entitled to treatment during their involuntary
confinement and, under the “Patient Bill of Rights,” are also entitled to be free of excessive
physical restraint and isolation during their confinement. Id. at
III.
¶
1 2-1 6.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the PLRA, district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a
person is proceeding
informapauperis. See 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs
district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. Id. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)’); Courteau v, United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
§
1915A(b)).
Here, Plaintiffs Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C.
§
l915(e)(2)(B).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). courts first separate the
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factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as true. See
Pow/er v UFMCShadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210—11 (3d Cir. 2009). All reasonable inferences
must be made in the plaintiffs favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.. 618 F.3d 300, 314
(3d Cir. 2010). The Complaint must also allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim
is facially plausible. Fowler v. UFMSShadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc.
ic
Detnpster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Courts are required to liberally construe pleadings drafted by pro se parties. Tucker v.
Hewlett Packard, Inc., No. 14-4699 (RBK!KMW), 2015 WL 6560645, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29,
2015) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Such pleadings
are
“held to less
strict standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id Nevertheless, pro se litigants
must still allege facts, which if taken as true, will suggest the required elements of any claim that
is asserted. Id. (citing Ma/a v Crown Ba).’ Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). To
do so, [a plaintiff] must plead enough facts, accepted as true, to plausibly suggest entitlement to
relief” Gibney v. Fitzgibbon, 547 F. App’x 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Bistrian v. Levi, 696
F.3d 352. 365 (3d Cir. 2012)). “Liberal construction does not, however, require the Court to
credit a pro se plaintiff’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.” Id. (citing Morse
Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). That is. “[e]ven apro se complaint may be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be
construed as supplying facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id. (citing
Mi/house v Car/son, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)).
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IV.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, Plaintiff has once again sued two high-level supervisory state officials
for violations of his federal and stale constitutional rights.3 The Court has screened the
Complaint for dismissal, and will dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety for failure to
state a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2).
From the outset, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiffs conspiracy claim
against both Defendants. Civil rights conspiracies brought under Section 1983 require a
“meeting of the minds,” and to survive screening or a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must provide
some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy, namely, agreement
and concerted action. See Startzell v City ofPhiladelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citing Adickes v. SN Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970). Here, Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient facts regarding the Defendants’ alleged participation in the alleged conspiracy to
assault him and have him placed in TCC. Nor does his Complaint provide sufficient facts to
suggest that the Defendants directly violated his constitutional rights or had knowledge of and
acquiesced in any violations. Instead, the Complaint states in a conclusory manner that both
Defendants “authoriz[edj”the use of force against him and that the subordinates of Defendant
Velez authorized his placement in TCC. Compl. at
‘
2. With respect to the vague allegation that
To the extent Plaintiffs NJCRA claims minor his § 1983 claims, those NJCRA claims are
addressed in tandem with his federal causes of action. See Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799
F.Supp.2d 417, 443—44 (D.N.J. 2011); see also Chapman v.New Jersey, Civ. No. 08—4130, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75720, at *7, 2009 \‘/L 2634888 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2009) (“Courts have
repeatedly construed the NJCRA in terms nearly identical to its federal counterpart
Arnstrong v Sherman, Civ. No. 09—716, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55616, at * 15, 2010 WL
2483911 (D.N.J. Jun. 4, 2010) (“[Tjhe New Jersey Civil Rights Act is a kind of analog to section
1983
); see generally Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 122 n. 12 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding
that New Jersey’s constitutional provisions concerning search and seizures are interpreted
analogously to the Fourth Amendment).
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the Defendants “authorized” the use of force against him, the Complaint lacks “sufficient factual
matter” to show that this claim is facially plausible. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. The latter
claim that Defendant Velez’ subordinates placed Plaintiff in TCC is premised on respondeat
superior and is not a basis for holding Defendant Velez liable under
§
1983. As such, the
conspiracy claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§
191 5(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff once again seeks to hold Defendants Lanigan and Velez liable in their personal
supervisory capacities for his conditions of confinement, and appears to contend that
Defendant’s policies caused him to be placed in TCC in an “8x12 caged cell” from
approximately August 21, 2012 until June 2,2014. In screening Plaintiffs original Complaint,
the Court explained that respondeat superior is not a basis for section 1983 liability. Indeed,
“[tjo establish liability under
*
1983, each individual defendant ‘must have personal involvement
in the alleged wrongdoing.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347. 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode
V
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). As such, “a plainliff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see also Innis v. Wilson, 334 F.
Appx 454, 457 (3d Cir. 2009) (indicating that section 1983 plaintiff could not maintain claim
against individual defendant unless said defendant was personally involved in actions causing the
claim); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (explaining that “[aj defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the
operation of respondeat superior”).
7
In Barkes v First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316-19 (3d Cir. 2014),
reversed on other grounds b Taylor v Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2043 (2015), the Third Circuit
outlined “two general ways” in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for deficient policies:
(1) where the supervisor established a policy, custom, or practice that caused the harm; or (2)
where the supervisor personally participated in the constitutional violation. The Third Circuit
explained these two general types of supervisory liability as follows:
[f]irst, liability may aftach if they, “with deliberate indifference to
the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” AM cx
reL J.MK. v Luzerne Cnti Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572. 586
(3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Stoneking v.
BradfordArea Sch. Dist. 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Second, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he
or she participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others
to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced” in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. fd.
(citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190—91 (3d Cir.
1995)). “Failure to” claims failure to train, failure to discipline,
or, as in the case here, failure to supervise are generally
considered a subcategory of policy or practice liability.
—
—
Id. The Third Circuit in Barkes reaffirmed its four-pan standard, established in Sample v.
Diecks, for determining whether an official may be held liable under
§
1983 for implementing
deficient policies. See Barkes at 317 (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Under Sample, to find that a supervisor acted with deliberate indifference as a policymaker,
the plaintiff must identify a supervisory policy or procedure that
the supervisor defendant failed to implement, and prove that: (1)
the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury
created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the
defendant-official was aware that the policy created an
unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk;
and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to
implement the supervisory procedure.
Barkes. 766 F.3d at 330.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged in a conclusory fashion that
8
Defendants, together have written, adopted, imposed, enforced,
maintained and are responsible for a number of written and
unwritten rules, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures that
makes the conditions of PLAINTIFF’s segregation behind a
special 8 x 12 cage at the Special Treatment Unit punitive and
excessively restrictive prison comparable environment, created,
implemented, and enforced by the Defendants.
(ECF No. 4, Compl, at
¶ 21.)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, like his original Complaint, relies
on formulaic language and does not provide sufficient facts describing the policy or procedure
that was in effect at the time of the alleged injury or how that policy or procedure caused his
constitutional injury. Nor has he provided facts to suggest that Defendants Lanigan andlor Velez
were deliberately indifferent to the risk presented by the policy that was in effect at the time of
his alleged injury. Because Plaintiff has not stated a civil rights claim based on deficient
policies, the Court will again dismiss these claims without prejudice as to Defendants Lanigan
and Velez.
Notably, the Amended Complaint also fails to state a conditions of confinement claim
based on Plaintiffs confinement in TCC. Plaintiffs conditions of confinement claims arise
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Youngberq v Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 32 1—22 (1982)
(“Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish.”). Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that civilly committed persons not be
subjected to conditions that amount to punishment, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979),6
within the bounds of professional discretion, Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 32 1—22. Specifically, in
Youngberg, the Supreme Court held that civilly committed persons do have constitutionally
protected interests, but that these rights must be balanced against the reasons put forth by the
State for restricting their liberties. Id. at 307. The Constitution is not concerned with de nilnimis
restrictions on patients’ liberties. Id. at 320. Moreover, “due process requires that the conditions
9
and duration of confinement [for civilly confined persons] bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which persons are committed.” Seling, 531 U.S. at 265; see also Barber v. Christie,
No. CIV.A. 10-1888 (SRC), 2010 WL 2723151, at 7—8 (D.N.J. July 7,2010) (same).
The gravamen of Plaintiffs conditions of confinement claim is that he was housed in
TCC for a period of two years and that his living quarters was an 8 x 12 cell that was locked.
See Complaint at
¶ 2.
Plaintiff also states without elaboration that his living conditions in TCC
were “hazardous and unsanitary”. Id. The Third Circuit has held that placement of a civilly
committed SVP in segregated confinement, such as TCC. does not violate due process unless the
deprivation of liberty is in some way extreme. See Deavers v. Santiago. 243 Fed. Appx. 719,
721 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), to segregated confinement
of civilly committed SVPs).
Here, Plaintiff states only that he was housed for a two-year period in ICC and was
housed in an 8x12 prison cell, which fails to state a claim for relief absent more facts to clarify
the overall conditions of Plaintiffs confinement in TCC. For instance, the Amended Complaint
fails to provide any facts about the time Plaintiff spent inside his cell and outside his locked cell
each day/week or other facts to suggest that his deprivation was extreme. Although Plaintiff
states that the conditions in TCC were unsanitary and hazardous, this bald allegation is
conclusory and is not entitled to the presumption of truth. If Plaintiff elects to submit a Second
Amended Complaint regarding the conditions of his confinement in ICC, he must provide
additional facts from which the Court could assess the overall conditions during the relevant twoyear period.
Finally, the Amended Complaint provides additional facts about Plaintiffs move from
West Unit to the South Unit on June 4. 2014. Plaintiff contends that 25 officers arrived at his
10
cell, and that one or more of the officers sprayed tear gas into the cell for 8-10 minutes,
handcuffed Plaintiff, and proceeded to move him to the South Unit. The Court does ilifi construe
Plaintiff to allege civil rights claims against the officers in their personal capacities because the
Amended Complaint does not describe these officers as Defendants and appears to seek relief
only from Defendants Lanigan and Velez.4 To the extent Plaintiff wishes to bring claims against
Defendants Lanigan and/or Velez for this incident, the claim is dismissed without prejudice, as
Plaintiff has failed to provide any facts suggesting that these Defendants had any personai
involvement in this alleged wrong. The allegation that an “administrative decision was made” to
move Plaintiff is insufficient to hold Defendants responsible under
§
1983.
For the reasons explained in this Memorandum Opinion, the Amended Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice in its entirety. The Court will provide Plaintiff with one final
opportunity to submit a Second Amended Complaint within 30 days to the extent he can cure the
deficiencies in his claims. An appropriate Order follows.
Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.D.J.
The Court does not reach the question of whether these new claims would be untimely if
Plaintiff were to bring them against the individual officers in a second amended complaint.
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