FERRERAS et al v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

Filing 120

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 03/05/2018. (ek)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DANIEL FERRERAS, et a!.,
Plaintiffs,

:
:

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-2427 (JLL)
OPINION

V.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.

LINARES, Chief District Judge

This is a putative class action brought by the named employee plaintiffs against the
defendant employer, American Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter, “American”). Pending before the
Court is the motion by the named plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter, “Rule”) 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) to certify three subclasses compromised of
current and former hourly-paid and non-exempt hourly American employees who worked at
Newark Liberty International Airport at any time from April 29, 2014 through the present,
who were allegedly denied compensation for work performed: (1) before and after their
scheduled shifts while on the clock; (2) during their unpaid meal periods; and (3) before
clocking in for their scheduled shifts, and after clocking out for their scheduled shifts. (ECF
Nos. 104 through 104-2 1, and 110.) American opposes the motion to certify. (ECF Nos.

105 through 105-17.)

Also pending before the Court is American’s cross-motion pursuant to Rule 56 for
summary judgment in its favor as to the claims asserted by the named plaintiff Edwin
Gonzalez alone. (ECf Nos. 108 through 1 08-9, 116 through 116-2, and 117.) The plaintiffs
oppose American’s cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 114 through 114-15.)
The Court will resolve the motion to certify and the cross-motion for summary
judgment upon a review of the papers and without oral argument. See L. Civ. R. 78.1(b).
For the following reasons, the Court: (1) grants the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification;
and (2) denies American’s cross-motion for suiurnary judgment without prejudice.’

BACKGROUND
American has a timekeeping system that records the hours that its employees work
and links those hours to their pay. The system automatically pays the employees for their
scheduled shifts if they are clocked in, and accounts for a thirty-minute meal break for fulltime shifts. The system also has pre-programmed “grace periods,” where an employee may
clock into the system before a shift starts, and may stay after the shift ends before clocking
out. (ECF No. 105 at 10.)

The Court previously granted summary judgment in American’s favor as to the
plaintiffs’ claims concerning: (1) American’s alleged failure to pay overtime wages to its
employees for the hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a given week as a result of voluntary
shift trades with other employees (hereinafter, “the Shift Trade Claim”); (2) liquidated
damages; (3) injunctive relief; and (4) punitive damages. (ECF Nos. 71 & 72.) The Court
also previously denied the plaintiffs’ motion for permission to file an immediate appeal from
the Court’s determination concerning the Shift Trade Claim. (ECf No. $1.)

The plaintiffs allege that American, as a matter of company policy, regularly violates
the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (hereinafter, “the NJWHU’) by denying them
compensation for work performed: (1) before and after their scheduled shifts, even if they
clock in early or clock out late to finish their work; (2) during their unpaid meal periods; and
(3) before clocking in for their shifts, and after clocking out for their shifts. (Id.)2 The
named plaintiffs are all employed by American at Newark Liberty International Airport as
hourly-paid: (1) fleet Service Clerks, who load bags and freight into airplanes, unload the
same off of airplanes, operate towlines to pull aircraft into and out of hangars, and assist
with water and lavatory services; or (2) Aircraft Maintenance Technicians, who perform
repairs and service updates on aircraft systems. (ECF No. 24.)
The named plaintiffs are as follows:
•

Daniel felTeras, who works as a full-time Fleet Service Clerk, was hired in

December 2008, and is paid $20 an hour;
•

Edwin Gonzalez, who works as a part-time fleet Service Clerk, was hired on

January 12, 2015, and is paid $11.69 an hour;
•

Doug Billitz, who works as a full-time Aircraft Maintenance Technician, was

hired in July 1989, and is paid $38 an hour;
•

Scott Ellentuck, who works as a full-time Aircraft Maintenance Technician,

was hired in October 1991, and is paid $38 an hour;

In contrast to the NJWHL, the Fair Labor Standards Act completely exempts airlines
from being required to pay overtime wages to their employees, even if those employees work in
excess of 40 hours under any circumstance. See 29 U.S.C. § 2l3(b)(3).
2

3

•

Denis Lippens, who works as a full-time Aircraft Maintenance Technician,

was hired in Augtist 1985, and is paid $40 an hour;
•

Rueben Ramirez. who works as a full-time Aircraft Maintenance Technician,

was hired in June 1997, and is paid $38 an hour;
•

Masoud Zabihialarn, who works as a full-time Aircraft Maintenance

Technician, was hired in July 1991, and is paid $41 an hour;
•

Christopher Faust, who works as a full-time Aircraft Maintenance Technician,

was hired in October 1988, and is paid $38 an hour; and
•

Ramon Coca, who works as a full-time Aircraft Maintenance Technician, was

hired in May 1989, and is paid $38 an hour.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
A motion for class certification may be granted if the prerequisites of Rule 23 have
been met, i.e.: (1) the four requirements under Rule 23(a) of nurnerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy; and (2) the pleading requirements under Rule 23(b)(l), Rule
23(b)(2), or Rule 23(b)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 23 certification also involves an
ascertainability inquiry, wherein it must be shown that: (1) the class is “defined with
reference to objective criteria”; and (2) there is “a reliable and administratively feasible
mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”
Byrde. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015). If there is any doubt as to whether

4

any of the Rule 23 requirements have been met, then certification should be denied,
regardless of the area of substantive law. See 1-fydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 321.
To satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)

under which the plaintiffs seek to proceed here

—

there

must be a finding “that the questions of law or fact common to the class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added); see also Rvdrogen Peroxide, 552 f.3d at 310
(discussing the concepts of predominance and superiority). “Ifproofofthe essential
elements of the cause of action requires individual treatment, then class certification is
unsuitable.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
As a result, in addition to the four requirements of Rule 23(a), common issues of fact and
law must predominate, and a class action must be superior.
On a motion for class certification, “Plaintiffs are not required to conclusively
demonstrate the merit of their claims in order to obtain certification as a class.” In re
Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig., 257 F.R.D. 46, 55 (D.N.J. 2009). Instead, “they

must show that the elements of those claims are capable of proof at trial through evidence
that is

common to

the class rather than individual to its members.” Id. (quotation marks and

citation omitted).

5

CLASS ACTION ANALYSIS

I.

Numerosity
Rule 23(a) requires a finding that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable.” fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l). This requirement promotes judicial
economy by eliminating the need to separately adjudicate many actions that are similar in
nature. See Marcus v. BMW ofI’L Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012).
Furtherniore, this requirement enhances access to judicial relief, particularly when
individual claims would not be economical to litigate individually, and prevents putative
class representatives and counsel from depriving members of a small class from
adjudicating their claims individually. Id. at 594—95. As a general rule, a potential class
with at least forty members may meet the numerosity requirement. See Id. at 595.
American does not contest the numerosity requirement in this action. (See generally
ECF No. 105 at 1—36.) In any event, the plaintiffs have identified approximately 200 class
members so far, and have identified at least 40 members of each subclass. (See ECf No.
104-1 at 8—9, 25.) Thus, the plaintiffs have satisfied the numerosity requirement.

II.

Typicality
Rule 23(a) requires a finding that the claims or defenses of the named plaintiffs are

“typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). This requirement
“is designed to align the interests of the class and the class representatives so that the latter
will work to benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their own goals.” In re Prudential

6

Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig.
typicality element, rather than

Agent Actions,

requiring

14$ F.3d 283, 311 (3d Cir. 1998). The

that the putative class members have claims that are

identical to each other, functions to ensure that the putative class members will be
adequately represented. In re Warfarin Sodium AntitrttstLitig., 391 F.3d 516, 53 1—32 (3d
Cir. 2004). Typicality may lie when the claims of the class representatives and of the class
members arise from the same alleged course of conduct on the part of a defendant. See
Baby Neat, for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994).
American does not contest the typicality requirement in this action. (See generally
ECF No. 105 at 1—36.) In any event, each member of the proposed subclasses were subject
to the same overall timekeeping system. (ECF No. 104-1 at 9—10.) All putative members of
Subclass 1 were allegedly not paid for work done while clocked in if they worked before
and after their scheduled shift times. All putative members of Subclass 2 were allegedly
subject to American’s systematic policy of failing to pay employees for work performed
during meal periods. All putative members of Subclass 3 were allegedly subject to
American’s uniform policy of not paying employees for work performed before clocking in
and after clocking out. Thus, the claims all rely upon the singular issue of whether
American is violating the NJWHL by failing to pay its employees for time worked beyond
their scheduled hours. (See ECF No. 104-1 at 33.) furthermore, all putative class members
will be subject to the same defense to be presented by American,

i.e.,

that American has a

procedure in place whereby employees may request on certain forms to be compensated for
any additional hours that they work, and that American does not deny compensation for the

7

additional time worked as a matter of company policy. Thus, the plaintiffs have satisfied
the typicality requirement.

III.

Commonality and predominance

The Court may jointly apply the commonality requirement set forth in Rule 23(a)(2)
and the predominance requirement set forth in Rule 23(b)(3). As set forth by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals:
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality element requires that the proposed class
members share at least one question of fact or law in common with each other.
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance element in turn requires that common issues
[T]he
predominate over issues affecting only individual class members.
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, which is far more demanding,
incorporates the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement. Accordingly, we
analyze the two factors together, with particular focus on the predominance
requirement.
.

.

.

See Warfrzrin Sodium, 391 F.3d at 527—28 (citations omitted).
In addressing the predominance requirement, the Court must determine whether the
questions of law or fact that are common to the members of the putative class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action would be
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
See In re Cmty. Bank ofP.L Va., 418 F.3d 277, 308 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, “[t]he
predominance inquiry tests whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.” Id. at 308—09.
The plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality and predominance requirements here

8

by setting forth allegations and initial evidence that hourly-paid American employees at
Newark Liberty International Airport are not being compensated for all hours worked due to
the manner in which American operates its timekeeping system. The issue that
predominates over all of the Subclasses is whether American is violating the NJWHL by
imposing a schedule-based compensation system that in theory permits a supervisor to
authorize compensation for work performed outside of a scheduled shift, but in practice
discourages employees from seeking such authorization when they actually work additional
hours, and thereby deprives American’s employees of the extra compensation that they have
earned. (See ECF No. 104-5 at 3 5—39, 42—43, 46 (an American manager testifying in a
deposition that American’s timekeeping system only pays employees for time within the
confines of scheduled shifts).) Indeed, the named plaintiffs Billitz, Ellenaick, Lippens,
Ramirez, Zabihialam, Coca, and Faust testified in their respective depositions that many
employees simply gave up requesting to be compensated for the extra time that they worked
after numerous requests had been denied by those in management. (See ECF No. 1 04-1 1 at
61—62, 123—24; ECF No. 104-12 at 170, 174—83; ECF No. 104-13 at 43—55, 170—74; ECF
No. 104-14 at 57—66, 71—72, 175—83; ECF No. 104-15 at 38—46, 143—45; ECF No. 104-16
at42—44, 108—15, 176—85; ECF No. 104-17at70—73, 141—43.)
Furthermore, the named plaintiffs Ferreras, Gonzalez, Billitz, Ellentuck, Lippens,
Ramirez, Zabihialam, Coca, and Faust testified in their respective depositions that: (1) all
employees were required on a regular basis by managers to arrive early and stay late to
finish their work due to a shortage of labor, to attend meetings, and to complete training

9

requirements; (2) American’s timekeeping system defaulted to pay employees based only on
the scheduled hours; and (3) the amount of time for which employees performed work
beyond their normal schedules and during meal periods ranges from one to four hours of
uncompensated time each week. (See ECF No. 104-9 at 34—36; 42—43, 50—52, 175—79;
192—94; ECF No. 104-10 at 34—37, 43—49, 87—88; 128—29, 133—34; ECF No. 104-11 at 35—
38, 44—49, 61—66, 128—33; 136—37; ECF No. 104-12 at 112—13; 158—59, 166—86; ECF No.
104-13 at 43—55, 6 1—62, 68—73, 84, 99—100, 170—74, 181; ECF No. 104-14 at 57—66, 70—
72, 75—82, 172—79, 182—87; ECF No. 104-15 at 38—46, 50—57, 60—62; 143—45; ECF No.
104-16 at 42—44, 52—53, 109—16; 174—85, 190—91; ECF No. 104-17 at 66—73, 79, 141—43,
167—68, 172—73, 178—20; see also ECF No. 104-18 at 1 (a chart reflecting the hours worked
by Ferreras from April 29, 2014 through May 18, 2014, and that he was only paid according
to his scheduled shift time); ECF No. 104-19 at 1 (chart reflecting the hours worked by
Lippens from May 28, 2014 through June 26, 2014, and that he was only paid according to
his scheduled shift time). This evidence is sufficient for certification of this action as a class
action at this juncture. See Gait v. Eaglevilte Hosp., 238 F. Supp. 3d 733, 737—38 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (conditionally certifying a class action where the three plaintiffs declared that the
defendant employer deprived different types of employees of their compensation for work
performed during their scheduled meal breaks, and that the employer’s argument that

employees were encouraged to take their meal breaks did not provide a basis to deny
certification and was more appropriate for decertification or summary judgment); cf
Armstrong v. Weichert Realtors, No. 05-3 120, 2006 WL 1455781, at *12 (D.N.J. May 19,

10

2006) (denying a motion to certify a class action on behalf of all loan officers employed by
the defendant, as the plaintiff failed to put forth a basis for his generalized allegation that all
loan officers were required to work unpaid hours, and that he showed at best that only he
was compelled by the defendant to work unpaid hours).
American argues that the plaintiffs’ claims cannot be resolved on a class-wide basis
because employees would clock in early or clock out late for personal reasons, and spend
this time engaged in personal activities, such as socializing, drinking coffee, watching
television, or reading. (ECF No. 105 at 7.) Furthermore, American argues that the putative
class members worked different shifts that entailed different responsibilities. (Id. at 23.)
However, whether American’s hourly-paid employees engage in personal activities, rather
than work-related activities, during the time periods raised by the plaintiffs is to be
addressed during discovery, and does not merit a denial of class certification at this juncture,
particularly since the named plaintiffs Gonzalez, Billitz, and Zabihialarn testified in their
depositions that no personal matters were attended to while employees were clocked in.
(ECF No. 104-10 at 128—29, 133—34; ECF No. 104-11 at 37—38; ECF No. 104-15 at 143.)
furthermore, even if there is a certain amount of individual variation of the job
functions among the putative class members, the fact remains that the named plaintiffs
allege that American had a company-wide policy in place at one location, i.e., Newark
Liberty International Airport, to avoid paying its employees for all of the time that they
worked. The fact that there will be individualized variations among the members of the
putative class as to their reasons for working through meal breaks, for clocking in early or

11

clocking out late, or for working off the clock, should not defeat the certification of this
action as a class action. See Tyson foods, Inc. v. Bottaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 104 1—48
(2016); (affinning the district court’s certification of a class action, even though the
employees at issue held different jobs at the same facility run by the defendant employer,
because the issue of whether all employees, who were subject to the same timekeeping
systems, were being unlawfully deprived of compensation for the time they spent putting on
the different kinds of required protective work gear predominated); see also Clark v. Bally ‘s
ParkPlace, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 188, 196—98 (D.N.J., 2014) (granting a motion to certify a
class action on behalf of employees at a casino operated by the defendant employer, all of
whom were allegedly required to attend mandatory training and information sessions run by
management before their schedules shifts without being paid for their time in attendance,
even though the defendant argued that all employees were not required to attend such
meetings); c/Rogers v. Ocean Cable Gp. Inc., No. 10-4 198, 2011 WL 6887154, at *4
(D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2011) (denying class certification in an action concerning the compensation
paid to the technicians employed by the defendant cable television company for hours
worked beyond their scheduled shifts, as the autonomous nature of the technicians’ work at
different locations each day was not conducive to a showing of predominance); Moeck v.
Gray Supply Coip., No. 03-1950, 2006 WL 42368, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006) (denying a
motion to certify a class action concerning installers of gas lines, as different policies

concerning compensation for work that was perfonned by these employees beyond their
scheduled shifts were in place at different locations that were run by the defendant

12

employer). Furthermore, the fact that the damages will vary among the putative class
members, i.e., different amounts of wages allegedly owed based on different reasons for the
alleged underpayment, does not merit a denial of class certification. See Clark, 29$ F.R.D.
at 200 (holding that even though the amount of compensation owed to the class members,
who were employees of the defendant’s casino, may differ, the class was allegedly
“impacted uniformly” by the defendant’s failure to pay for the time spent in training and
information sessions before shifts were scheduled to begin).
American directs the Court’s attention to Angeles e. USA1nvays, Inc., No. 12-5860,
2017 WL 587658 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017), wherein a district court in the Northern District
of California found that a class action brought on behalf ofemployees of the defendant
airline for uncompensated work could not proceed, due to the individual variations among
employees. (See ECF No. 105 at $ (arguing that the holding in Angeles “denied class
treatment”).) However, that case is distinguishable from the instant action. First, that
opinion granted a motion to decertij5 a class action. See Id. at *4• In other words, the
Angeles court initially saw fit to certify an action that concerned claims that were similar to
the claims raised in the instant action as a class action (see Order Granting Certification,
Angeles v. US Airways, Inc., N.D. Cal. No. 12-5860, ECF No. 75 (Apr. 4, 2014)), and later
chose to undo that certification only after the parties had conducted discovery. Unlike the
action at issue in the Angeles opinion, the instant action is still in its preliminary stages.
Second, the instant case concerns one duty station, i.e., Newark Liberty International
Airport, whereas the Angeles matter concerned the airline’s alleged failure to properly

13

compensate its employees at all of the airports that it served in the entire state of California.
See Angeles, 2017 WL 58765$, at *23 (addressing variations in employee conduct at
airports located in Ontario, San Jose, San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles). That a
district court would find the commonality and predominance elements to be defeated in that
situation is not surprising. See, e.g., Wa/-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359—60 (2011)
(reversing the certification of a class action concerning the defendant employer’s alleged
failure to compensate and promote women employees across the entire United States,
because the putative class members held a multitude ofjobs and were subject to a variety of
regional policies, and because the defendant’s local managers had varying levels of
discretion in paying and promoting their employees). ft is far easier to find that the
predominance element has been met in the instant case, as only one duty station is being
examined.

IV.

Adequacy of representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties [must] fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Under this element, the Court
must determine: (1) whether counsel is qualified to represent the class; and (2) whether there
are conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and the putative class members who
they seek to represent. See Waifarin Sodium, 391 F.3d at 532.
The aforementioned requirements have been met in this action. First, the Court notes
that the plaintiffs’ attorneys are more than adequate representatives for the purposes of
serving as class counsel. This is clear based on the personal and law firrri resumes

14

submitted in support of the motion for certification. (See ECF No. 104-3 at 1; ECF No. 1044 at 1-3.) Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ attorneys have demonstrated their diligent and
competent representation throughout this action as it has proceeded so far. Additionally, the
named plaintiffs are appropriate class representatives, as they have no interests that would
be antagonistic to the interests of the putative class members, and they have expressed their
willingness to represent the putative class members. (See ECF No. 104-1 at 35-36.)
American argues that some of the named plaintiffs occasionally acted as crew chiefs,
and that they had the ability to approve compensation for employees for hours worked
outside of the scheduled shifts when acting in that capacity, and thus they cannot adequately
represent the interests of the putative class members. (See ECF No. 105 at 25.) However,
those named plaintiffs allege that they were discouraged by American’s management from
approving such overtime requests when functioning as crew chiefs, and that they were still
subject to American’s alleged underpayment scheme when acting as crew chiefs because
they were paid by the hour. (ECF No. 110 at 9.) Therefore, based on all of the foregoing,
the Court finds that the adequacy requirement of Rule 23 is satisfied.

V.

Superiority
To be certified as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the putative class action

must be “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Thus, the Court must “balance, in terms of fairness
and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternative methods of
adjudication.” Prudential Ins. Co.. 148 F.3d at 316. In doing so, the Court must consider:

15

(A) the class members’ interest in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a
class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 315 n.56 (reiterating the
same).
The Court concludes that permitting this action to proceed as a class action would be
superior to other available avenues of adjudication. First, the putative class members would
have little interest in maintaining individual control over their claims, as the recoverable
amounts will be unlikely to exceed 10% of the wages of those employees for a given
workweek. (ECF No. 104-1 at 42.) For that same reason, it would be unlikely that the
individual putative class members would have the resources to litigate on their own, partly
because the cost of doing the same would be far more than the amount of recovery for each
putative class member. Second, there is no argument made here that there are similar civil
actions that have already been brought by American employees working at Newark Liberty
International Airport. Third, the Court finds that it would be best if the claims of the
putative class members were addressed in the same proceeding in the same court, in order to
provide consistent adjudication of these claims and to provide straightforward guidelines for
American to follow in the future if the plaintiffs and class members ultimately succeed here.
Fourth, the Court foresees no difficulty in managing this class action, as American’s records
should reveal the names of putative class members and the hours that they were clocked in
for work.

16

American argues that the named plaintiffs and all of the putative class members are
represented by unions, and that they have access to grievance procedures that would be
superior to litigation. (See ECf No. 105 at 33.) The Court disagrees with that argument, in
that conducting 200 separate grievance procedures, i.e., one per putative class member, does
not seem to be a superior alternative to one streamlined class action. furthermore, the Court
notes that American provides no support in case law or otherwise for this argument. Thus,
the Court finds that a class action is a superior method of adjudicating the controversy here.

VI.

Ascertainability

The Court finds that the class has been defined with reference to objective criteria, as
detailed above. For example, the subclasses will include hourly-paid employees who
allegedly were not compensated for all of the time that they actually worked for American at
Newark Liberty International Airport. In addition, the Court has no doubt that American’s
payroll records will be a reliable source to be used in determining whether putative class
members fall within the definitions of the three subclasses, as the time period at issue is
limited to the period between 2014 and the present. Notably, it is uncontested that
American’s timekeeping records reflect when employees clock in and clock out each day,
and thus it should be a straightforward task to determine the number of hours that
employees actually worked and the unpaid compensation they may be owed as a result.
Thus, the Court concludes that the ascertainability element for certification of a class action
has been met here.

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

Legal standard

It is not necessary for the Court to restate the standard for resolving a motion for
summary judgment that is made pursuant to Rule 56, because that standard has been already
enunciated. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (providing for an award of summary judgment if there
is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as matter of
law); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247—48 (1986) (setting forth the
summary judgment standard); United States ex rel. Kosenke v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d

88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009) (setting forth the summary judgment standard).

II.

Argument

American argues that it is entitled to sunmiary judgment as to the claims asserted by
the named plaintiff Edwin Gonzalez, as Gonzalez testified in his deposition that he was
aware of the procedure for getting paid when working beyond his scheduled shifts, that he
had submitted requests for overtime, and that he was indeed paid when he made such
requests unless he forgot to make such requests. (See generatl,v ECF No. 108-1.)
furthermore, American argues that Gonzalez was paid over $32,000 in wages for time
worked outside of his regular shift schedule from January 2015 through November 2017.
(Id. at 15.)

In contrast, Gonzalez argues that all of the examples that American submits
concerning the extra payments that he received were for hours that were preapproved by
those in management before he worked them, that American failed to pay him for hours

18

worked outside of his normal schedule that were not preapproved, and that he was
discouraged from requesting to be paid for extra hours that he worked that were not
preapproved. (ECF No. 114 at 6.) In fact, Gonzalez asserts he was never told about the
proper procedure for requesting payment for hours worked outside of his normal shifts that
were not preapproved. (Id. at 7-8; ECF No. 114-6 at 2.) Gonzalez also asserts that those in
management were well-aware that he did work after clocking in, but before his regular shift
was scheduled to begin, and that those in management did not tell him that he should
request additional compensation. (ECF No. 114 at 8; ECF No. 114-6 at 3.) Further,
Gonzalez asserts that he was indeed performing work if he was on the clock, and that he
regularly worked through the unpaid meal periods without being compensated for that work.
(ECF No. 114 at 17.)
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gonzalez at this preliminary
juncture, the Court finds the cross-motion for summary judgment to be premature, as
Gonzalez’s assertions concerning American’s alleged failure to fairly compensate him is
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact in response to American’s arguments. Therefore,
American’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. However, the Court denies that
cross-motion without prejudice to American to move again for summary judgment when
appropriate, i.e., at the conclusion of discovery in this action.

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_____

CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs’ motion to certify this action as a class action is granted. American’s
cross-motion for suimary judgment as to Gonzalez’s claims is denied without prejudice.
An appropriate order will be entered separately.

ChieJJudge, United States District Court
Dated:

,2018

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