TURANO et al v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 11/06/2017. (ek)

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JESSE TURANO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 16-2578 (ES) (JAD)
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
AND NEW JERSEY, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
March 31, 2017 Opinion and Order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (D.E. No. 23).
Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ motion (D.E. No. 25), and Plaintiffs replied (D.E. No. 26).1 Having
considered the parties’ submissions in support of and in opposition to the instant motion, the Court
decides the motion without oral argument. See L. Civ. R. 78.1. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs’
motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
I.

Background

On March 31, 2017, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants’ motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (D.E. No. 21 (“Opinion”); D.E No. 22 (“Order”) (together, the
“March 2017 decision”)). As the Court already set forth the factual background in its prior
Opinion, the Court incorporates those facts here. On April 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration with respect to the Court’s March 2017 decision. (D.E. No. 23-4 (“Motion”)).

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A reply is not permitted on a motion for reconsideration without permission from the Court. See L. Civ. R.
7.1(d)(3). Although the Court will consider Plaintiffs’ reply, it cautions counsel that the Court will disregard any
future filings that do not comport with this District’s Local Civil Rules.

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II.

Legal Standard

In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1 governs motions for reconsideration.
Morton v. Fauver, No. 97-5127, 2011 WL 2975532, at *1 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011) (citing Bowers
v. NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001)). Reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1 is
an extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 215
F. Supp. 2d 482, 507 (D.N.J. 2002). A motion for reconsideration may be based on one of three
separate grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously
available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest
injustice. Id. A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to raise new matters or arguments
that could have been raised before the original decision was made. See Bowers, 130 F. Supp. 2d
at 612-13. Nor is a motion for reconsideration an opportunity to ask the Court to rethink what it
has already thought through. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507. “Rather, the rule
permits a reconsideration only when ‘dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law’
were presented to the court but were overlooked.” Id. (quoting Resorts Int’l v. Greate Bay Hotel
& Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992)).
III.

Discussion

Plaintiffs make no claim that there was an intervening change in the controlling law or that
evidence that was not previously available has become available. (See generally Motion).
Plaintiffs instead ask the Court to reconsider its March 2017 decision dismissing without prejudice
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim on the grounds that the claim “was dismissed contrary to
established Supreme Court precedent and is clearly erroneous.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiffs’ Motion
appears to rest on the position that reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice. Generally, this means that the Court overlooked some dispositive

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factual or legal matter that was presented to it. See L. Civ. R. 7.1(i); see also Rose v. Alternative
Ins. Works, LLC, No. 06-1818, 2007 WL 2533894, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2007).
Plaintiffs, however, fail to show a need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest
injustice. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507. Indeed, the Court’s Opinion addresses
most of the “established Supreme Court precedent” on which Plaintiffs currently rely.2 And the
Court’s interpretation of Heffernan v. City of Paterson, which Plaintiffs argue is incorrect, appears
to be consistent with Plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation in their instant Motion.3 Similarly,
Plaintiffs’ view on establishing a defendant’s motive also appears to be consistent with the Court’s
March 2017 decision.4 Rather, Plaintiffs’ argument is based on their personal disagreement with
the Court’s application of established precedent to the facts alleged in the Complaint. But that is
not an appropriate basis for a motion for reconsideration, as such disagreement should be raised
through the appellate process. See Smart v. Aramark Inc., No. 14-3007, 2014 WL 4053961, at *6
(D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2015). Moreover, Plaintiffs already presented all of their substantive assertions

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(See, e.g., Opinion at 11-12, 15 (discussing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)); id. at 10, 15 (discussing
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016)); id. at 12, 14-15 (discussing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,
497 U.S. 62 (1990)); id. at 12-13 (discussing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980))).

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(Compare Opinion at 10 (“Generally, the First Amendment prohibits public employers from taking adverse
action against an employee because of an employee’s actual or perceived engagement in constitutionally protected
political activity.”) (citing Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419)), with Motion at 10 (“In Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the
Supreme Court a year ago found that First Amendment association claims can be premised on the perceptions of the
government employer, even if said perceptions were not accurate.”), id. at 2 (“Most recently, in Heffernan v. City of
Paterson, the Supreme Court held that the Plaintiff need not have engaged in protected activity to be protected by the
First Amendment, as long as the government’s employment decision is motivated by political patronage.”), and id. at
10 (“Further, and critically, Plaintiff need not even show that he actually was unassociated or associated with a certain
political figure in order to be protected, as long as [D]efendants perceived as such.”)).

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(Compare Motion at 2 (“Most recently, in Heffernan v. City of Paterson, the Supreme Court held that the
Plaintiff need not have engaged in protected activity to be protected by the First Amendment, as long as the
government’s employment decision is motivated by political patronage.”), id. at 11 (“In a word, it was the employer’s
motive, and in particular the facts as the employer reasonably understood them, that mattered.”) (citing Heffernan,
136 S. Ct. at 1418)), and id. at 1-2 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment prohibits
intentionally or even ‘incidentally’ creating a system where political patronage is used as a motivating factor in making
employment decisions.”), with Opinion at 11 (noting that “to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination based on
political patronage in violation of the First Amendment[,] a plaintiff must show that . . . this [constitutionally protected]
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the [public employer’s] employment decision.”) (citation omitted))).

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in the underlying motion.

Plaintiffs, therefore, have failed to proffer any change in law,

unconsidered evidence, or persuasive argument that the Court has committed a clear error of law
that requires correction. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion is denied.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
s/Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

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