DYKEMAN v. L.L. BROWN et al
Filing
45
OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 10/8/2019. (dam, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WILLIAM DYKEMAN,
Civil Action No. 16-3274 (SDW)
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
L.L. BROWN, et al.,
Defendants.
WIGENTON, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed in this
matter by Defendants Bonds and Brown. (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff filed a response to that motion
in August 2019. (ECF No. 42). For the following reasons, the motion is granted and judgment
shall be entered in favor of Defendants Bonds and Brown.
I. BACKGROUND
On or about October 1, 2014, Plaintiff, William Dykeman, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in which he sought to challenge his state court convictions. (Docket No. 14-6111
at ECF No. 1). Following a series of procedural issues, Petitioner filed an amended habeas petition
on or about January 12, 2016. (Docket No. 14-6111 at ECF No. 14). Petitioner also filed a motion
requesting that the Court compel the prison in which he was then housed – South Woods State
Prison – to provide him with a considerable period of extra time per week in the prison’s law
library. (Docket No. 14-6111 at ECF No. 15).
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On January 15, 2016, this Court screened Petitioner’s amended habeas petition and entered
an order directing Petitioner to show cause why his habeas petition should not be dismissed for
lack of exhaustion. (Docket No. 14-6111 at ECF No. 16). As this Court recounted in that order,
On July 15, 2005, [Plaintiff] was convicted of numerous
crimes including three counts of sexual assault. [Plaintiff] appealed,
and the Appellate Division affirmed his conviction in March of
2009. See State v. Dykeman, 2009 WL 529220 (N.J. App. Div. Mar.
4, 2009). Although the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction
and rejected most of [Plaintiff]’s sentencing arguments, the
Appellate Division ordered the matter remanded for resentencing
pursuant to State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 495-96, 878 A.2d 724
(2005) (restructuring New Jersey’s entire sentencing scheme by
finding presumptive terms unconstitutional). Id. [Plaintiff]
petitioned for certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court, but
certification was denied. 199 N.J. 542 (2009). [Plaintiff] was
thereafter resentenced on July 24, 2009, and received the same
sentence as had been originally imposed. See State v. Dykeman,
2012 WL 371577 (Feb. 7, 2012). The Appellate Division affirmed
on February 7, 2012, see id., and the New Jersey Supreme Court
denied certification on December 13, 2012, 212 N.J. 462 (2012).
After his resentencing but before his second direct appeal
had concluded, [Plaintiff] filed a petition for post-conviction relief
in the New Jersey Superior Court – Law Division in August 2009.
According to the petition, the Law Division Judge denied
[Plaintiff]’s PCR application on or about August 25, 2014.
[Plaintiff] has apparently appealed that ruling to the New Jersey
Appellate Division, whose decision remains pending. [Plaintiff] has
thus not yet received a decision on his PCR claims from either the
New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division or the New Jersey
Supreme Court.
[Plaintiff] admits in his petition that many of his claims were
not raised on either of his direct appeals, but only in his PCR briefs.
As any claims presented on PCR have not yet been decided by the
Appellate Division or the New Jersey Supreme Court, those claims
have not yet been exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) states that a habeas petitions brought
by a state prisoner challenging his conviction or sentence “shall not
be granted unless it appears that” the petitioner has exhausted all of
his claims in the state courts, there is no state court process
applicable to the raised claims, or circumstances exist that render
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such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
Although [Plaintiff] has stated that he believes that his PCR process
has been in some ways insufficient, he has not clearly stated the
basis for this assertion other than to claim ineffective assistance of
PCR counsel and to suggest that he disagrees with the PCR court’s
disposition of his discovery motions.
Because many, although not all, of [Plaintiff’s] claims have
not been exhausted, his petition presents a mixed petition. As the
Third Circuit has explained, where a court is faced with a mixed
petition, the court has four options: “(1) dismiss the petition without
prejudice; (2) stay the proceedings and hold them in abeyance until
the claims are exhausted; (3) allow [Petitioner] to delete his
unexhausted claims; and (4) deny the petition if it found all of
[Petitioner’s] unexhausted claims to be meritless under § 2254(b)(2)
(allowing the denial of a petition on the merits ‘notwithstanding the
failure of the applicant to exhaust’). Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269,
274-78 [(2005).]” Mallory v. Bickell, 563 F. App’x 212, 215 (3d
Cir. 2014).
Pursuant to Rhines, a stay of a mixed petition should be
granted only in “limited circumstances.” 544 U.S. at 277. A district
court may only grant a stay where “the petitioner had good cause for
his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially
meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in
intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Id. at 278. The cases in
which stays are most appropriate are those where a dismissal of the
petition without prejudice would result in the petitioner’s inability
to timely file his habeas petition. See Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146,
152 (3d Cir. 2004) (“where an outright dismissal could jeopardize
the timeliness of a collateral attack” a stay is appropriate); Williams
v. Walsh, 411 F. App’x 459, 461 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[w]here the
timeliness of a habeas corpus petition is at issue . . . a District Court
has discretion to stay” the petition); Ragland v. Barnes, No. 147294, 2015 WL 1035428, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2015).
Here, [Plaintiff]’s direct appeal did not conclude until
December 2012 with the denial of certification on his appeal from
his resentencing. [Plaintiff] filed his PCR petition, which remains
pending in the Appellate Division, before that date. As the filing of
the PCR petition appears to have tolled the running of the AEDA
statute of limitations, [Plaintiff]’s one year limitation period has not
even started to run. See Figueroa v. Buechele, No. 15-1200, 2015
WL 1403829, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2015). Thus, [Plaintiff] would
be in no danger of losing his ability to timely file if this Court
dismissed his petition without prejudice. As such, a stay is
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inappropriate under these circumstances. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277;
Williams, 411 F. App’x at 461.
Based on the current filings, it is not clear that [Plaintiff’s]
claims can be denied on the merits regardless of exhaustion. As
such, this Court is faced with two options: dismiss the petition
without prejudice or allow [Plaintiff] to choose whether he wishes
to proceed solely on his unexhausted claims.
(Id. at 2-5, paragraph numbers and record citations omitted). Given this background, this Court
directed Plaintiff to file a response within thirty days showing why his petition should not be
dismissed for lack of exhaustion.
This Court also granted in part Plaintiff’s request for additional library time:
[Plaintiff] has filed a motion to compel legal access in which he
argues that he is being provided with inadequate access to the law
libraries at South Woods State Prison given his numerous civil suits.
Specifically, [Plaintiff] asserts that, on average, he is provided only
1-2 hours a week of library access, which he asserts is insufficient
for the number of cases he is pursuing. [Plaintiff] likewise asserts
that the loss or destruction of certain papers when he was moved to
South Woods has also increased the amount of time he requires as
he must essentially rebuild some legal papers he had previously
completed.
Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the Courts.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1996). Generally,
this right requires that prisoners be provided with some access to
law library facilities in prison. Id. That right, however, does not
extend so far as to provide a prison inmate with an unfettered right
of access to prison law libraries. Id. at 347-50. It is therefore not
the role of this Court to fashion rules and regulations governing how
a particular prison provides inmates with access to law libraries
sufficient to provide them with meaningful access to the courts. Id.
Nevertheless, it is within the authority of this Court to enter orders
requesting that prison institutions provide a prisoner litigant with the
maximum amount of library time which is consistent with the library
policies already put into place by the prison. See, e.g., Dubois v.
Abode, No. 04-1314, 2007 WL 1652256, at *1 (D.N.J. June 7,
2007).
Given the multiple cases [Plaintiff] has before this Court,
and the alleged difficulties he faces, and this Court’s entry of an
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order to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed as
unexhausted, this Court will grant [Plaintiff]’s motion for increased
library time only to the extent consistent with the policies of the
prison and the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
(Id. at 5-6, record citations and paragraph numbers omitted). This Court therefore entered an order
directed towards the Warden of South Woods State Prison, who at the time was Defendant Willie
Bonds, which “requested [that Defendant] make available to [Plaintiff] the resources of the
prison’s library to the maximum extent consistent with the policies of the prison and the New
Jersey Department of Corrections.” (Id. at 6).
Despite the passage of over two months following this order, Plaintiff did not file a
response to the order to show cause, instead merely filing letters reiterating his requests for more
library time. (Docket No. 14-6111 Docket Sheet). As Plaintiff had failed to file a response to the
Order to Show Cause, and as this Court determined that he would suffer no prejudice from the
dismissal of his habeas petition as his one year habeas limitations period had not yet begun to run,
this Court therefore dismissed his habeas petition without prejudice. (Docket No. 14-6111 at ECF
No. 22-23). As that dismissal was without prejudice, Plaintiff was free to file a new habeas petition
upon the completion of his state court proceedings. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his petition,
and the Third Circuit denied him a certificate of appealability. (Docket No. 14-6111 at ECF No.
30).
More than a year and a half after the dismissal of his petition and nearly four months after
the end of his appeal, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b) motion seeking to have the dismissal of his habeas
petition vacated. (Docket No. 14-611 at ECF No. 31). Although Plaintiff in that motion reiterated
his distaste for the amount of library time he had received and asserted that he should not have to
exhaust his claims to have at least some of his claims ruled upon, Plaintiff did not state an intent
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to only proceed on his exhausted claims and failed to show why he should be permitted to evade
the statutory exhaustion requirement, and this Court therefore denied his Rule 60(b) motion on
February 2, 2018. (Docket no. 14-6111 at ECF No. 32-33).
In June 2016, following the dismissal of his habeas petition, Plaintiff filed his initial
complaint in this matter, claiming that various officials at South Woods State Prison had denied
him access to the Courts and cost him a chance to pursue his habeas petition. (ECF No. 1). In
November 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which limited his claims only to a pair of
access to the court claims raised against Defendants L.L. Brown, a law librarian, and Willie Bonds.
(ECF No. 8). On January 11, 2018, that case was transferred to this Court as this Court had handled
Plaintiff’s underlying habeas petition.1 (ECF No. 10). On February 2, 2018, this Court permitted
that claim to proceed against Defendants Brown and Bonds. (ECF No. 11). On May 23, 2019,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in this matter, accompanied by a properly
formatted statement of material facts not in dispute. After being granted a significant extension,
Plaintiff failed to file a timely response, but did ultimately file a tardy response in August 2019.
(ECF No. 42).
At his deposition in this matter, Plaintiff admitted that other inmates at South Woods State
Prison did not receive any more library time than he did. (Document 5 attached to ECF No. 37 at
30). Prison records submitted alongside the summary judgment motion indicate that Plaintiff
received twelve hour long law library sessions in October 2015, ten hour long sessions in
November 2015, eight hour long sessions in December 2015, nine hour long sessions in January
2016, six hour long sessions in February 2016, and four hour long sessions in March 2016.
Because of the location of Plaintiff’s incarceration at the time he filed his complaint, this matter
had previously been assigned to Judge Hillman in this District’s Camden Vicinage.
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(Documents 6-10 attached to ECF No. 37). Plaintiff did not use these hours solely on his habeas
petition, however, because he had numerous other ongoing civil cases and his PCR petition before
various courts during the relevant period, and thus he prioritized some cases over others in his
library time based on his perception of their relevant need for filings. (Document 5 attached to
ECF No. 37 at 25, 34-35).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Rule 56, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment where the record
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of
“identifying those portions of the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is
material “if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim,” and is genuine if “a reasonable
jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Blunt v. Lower Merion School Dist., 767 F.3d
247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). In deciding a motion for summary judgment a district court must “view
the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion,” Id., but must not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing
of the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
[however,] there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party who must provide evidence sufficient to establish that a reasonable jury could find in the
non-moving party’s favor to warrant the denial of a summary judgment motion. Lawrence v. Nat’l
Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Serodio v. Rutgers, 27 F. Supp. 3d
546, 550 (D.N.J. 2014). “A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has
provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial. However, the party opposing
the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations, instead it must present actual
evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial.” Serodio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
B. Analysis
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s sole claim –
that they denied him access to the courts by not providing him considerably more library time. A
claim for denial of access to the courts arises both out of a prisoner’s First Amendment right to
petition the courts and his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process. Monroe v. Beard, 536
F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Schreane v. Holt, 482 F. App’x 674, 676 (3d Cir. 2012).
To establish such a claim, a Plaintiff must present facts which show that Defendants acted in such
a way that blocked his access to the courts and that he “suffered an ‘actual injury’ (i.e., that he lost
an opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous claim); and . . . has no other remedy, save the present civil
rights suit, that can possibly compensate the lost claim.” Schreane, 482 F. App’x at 676 (citing
Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205). The lost claim must either be a challenge to the plaintiff’s conviction
or sentence, or a civil rights claim challenging the conditions of confinement to which he is subject
as a prisoner. Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996).
Although a dismissal of a cognizable claim based on a technical default of which the plaintiff could
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not have been aware given the state of his prison’s law library can amount to actual injury where
the underlying claim has been lost, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-51, the dismissal without prejudice of
a claim that is in no danger of being time barred in the immediate future does not constitute a “lost”
cause of action because the plaintiff is free to bring his claim after complying with the necessary
procedural hurdles. See, e.g., Love v. City of New Brunswick, No. 16-2586, 2018 WL 429247, at
*11 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2018).
Plaintiff’s access of the court claim in this matter hinges on his assertion that Defendants
caused him to lose his opportunity to challenge his conviction and sentence via a habeas petition
because he had inadequate time in the law library with which to file a timely response to the order
to show cause in his habeas proceeding, resulting in the dismissal of his habeas petition without
prejudice. The fundamental flaw in Plaintiff’s claim is that he did not lose any claim – as this
Court thoroughly explained to Plaintiff in his habeas matter, Plaintiff could not proceed on his
claims because they had not yet been exhausted in state court,2 but he was free to file a new habeas
petition once he exhausted his claims, and such a petition would likely not be time barred as
Plaintiff’s one year habeas limitations period had not yet even begun to run. The dismissal of
2
Although this Court need not decide the issue in light of the deficiencies discussed in the body
of this opinion, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ actions caused the dismissal of his habeas
petition as unexhausted is at best dubious. Plaintiff’s habeas petition was dismissed because he
has not yet complied with the procedural requirements of the habeas statute – that he exhaust all
available state court remedies before pursuing habeas claims in federal court. Although Plaintiff
believes he should not be required to meet the statutory exhaustion requirements to present his
habeas claims, he has never presented to this Court in this matter or in his habeas proceeding any
viable basis for evading that requirement, which is mandatory save in those rare cases where state
remedies are unavailable or the plaintiff has been cut off from being able to complete exhaustion.
Based on the appeals and remands of Plaintiff’s PCR petition in state court, which is apparently
still ongoing, it is clear that process has been available to Plaintiff, that he is able to pursue it, and
Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the considerable amount of time the process has taken does not
therefore free him from the statutory exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). It is thus
doubtful at best that Plaintiff’s habeas petition would have not been dismissed had he had more
time to prepare a response to this Court’s order to show cause in his underlying habeas matter.
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Plaintiff’s habeas petition was entirely without prejudice, and in no way impedes or prevents him
from filing a new habeas petition in the event that his PCR proceedings, up to and including a final
decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court, do not end in his favor. Plaintiff clearly has an
alternative remedy available through which he can pursue his claims – the completion of his PCR
proceedings and an eventual habeas petition once he has properly exhausted his claims. Because
Plaintiff has not lost a cognizable habeas claim and has an available remedy to vindicate his claims
other than this current suit, his access to the courts claim fails as a matter of law. Lewis, 518 U.S.
at 350-54; Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205; Schreane, 482 F. App’x at 676. Defendants are thus entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, and judgment shall be entered in their favor.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, (ECF No. 37), and will enter judgment in favor of Defendants. An appropriate order
follows.
Dated: October 8, 2019
_s/ Susan D. Wigenton
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton
U.S.D.J.
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