SMITH v. JOHNSON et al
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Cox Arleo on 11/10/2021. (sm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAMA SMITH,
Civil Action No. 16-3701 (MCA)
Petitioner,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
STEVEN JOHNSON, et al.,
Respondents.
This matter has been opened to the Court following supplemental briefing regarding
Grounds Seven and Nine of Petitioner’s Petition, which assert ineffective assistance of counsel
claims pursuant to Lajier v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (“LaJier Claim”). The Court
previously denied the Petition in part and deferred decision on Grounds Seven and Nine and on
issuance of a certificate of appealability (“COA”). For the reasons explained below, the Court
finds that the Lafier Claim, as asserted in Grounds Seven and Nine, is procedurally defaulted,
and Petitioner has not established cause or actual prejudice sufficient to overcome the default.
Moreover, even if Grounds Seven and Nine were not procedurally defaulted, the Court finds that
the Appellate Division’s alternate merits resolution of the Lqfler Claim does not unreasonably
apply federal law. For these reasons, the Court denies Grounds Seven and Nine and also denies
a COA.
In Grounds Seven and Nine of his Petition, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining stages because counsel failed to advise
Petitioner accurately regarding the maximum parole disqualifier he faced as a result of rejecting
the state’s plea offer and proceeding to trial, where he ultimately received a significantly higher
sentence. Petitioner argues that the state courts unreasonably applied the constitutional standards
1
for effective assistance of counsel laid out in Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lajier v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
Petitioner’s judgment of conviction “JOC”) is dated November 4,2012. (ECF No. 10-3.)
Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the Appellate Division affirmed his convictions and
mandatory consecutive term imposed on Count ten, but remanded for resentencing in light of
State v Natale (II), 878 A.2d 724 QJ.J. 2005), and for the trial judge to explain his reasons for
imposing a consecutive sentence on Count twelve. State v. Smith, 2007 WL 3005342, at *10
(N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 17, 2007).
Petitioner filed a petition for certification, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the
petition for certification in part, “limited solely to reviewing defendant’s claim that, to convict
under N.J.S.A. 2C:39—3(d), the State must prove a defendant’s knowledge of possession of the
weapon and knowledge of the weapon’s defacement.” State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 330 (2009)
(citing State v. Smith, 193 N.J. 584 (2008)). On January 27, 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed
defendant’s conviction. Id. at 339.
In the meantime, pursuant to the Appellate Division’s remand, Petitioner was
resentenced on October 3, 2008, and the judge re-imposed the sentence from the previous
judgment of conviction. (ECF No. 10-37.) Petitioner appealed the resentencing, and on April 2,
2009, while the appeal was pending, the New Jersey State Parole Board sent a letter to the
presiding judge of Passaic County requesting clarification of Petitioner’s sentence, noting that it
appeared that the sentence imposed was thirty years with a 10-year parole ineligibility term. (See
ECF No. 17, at 141 .) On May 14, 2010, the trial judge conducted a hearing and determined that
the original judgment of conviction contained clerical errors, and that he had imposed a total
aggregate sentence of 40 years with a 20-year parole ineligibility term. (ECF No. 10-38, Exhibit
2
38.) The trial judge amended the JOC to reflect the sentence he actually imposed. (ECF No. 17,
PA 53-55, Amended JOC dated May 14, 2010.)
An amended notice of appeal was filed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the sentence
in a per curiam opinion on July 28, 2011. (ECF No. 17, PA 56-69.) The New Jersey Supreme
Court denied certification on January 19, 2012. (ECF No. 17, PA 70.)
In the meantime, Petitioner raised the Lafler Claim in his PCR, which was filed on or
about March 12, 2010. more than five years after his original JOC. In a certification dated June
21, 2013, Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney failed to accurately inform him of the maximum period of parole ineligibility he faced if
he proceeded to trial and was convicted of all of the charges. Defendant certified that had he
known he could receive twenty years of parole ineligibility, rather than the thirteen years
discussed during the Rule 3:9—I proceeding and in paragraph numbered five of the pretrial
memorandum, he would have accepted the State’s plea offer instead of going to trial. (See ECF
No. 17, PA 76-78.)
The PCR court rejected this claim as procedurally’ barred under Rule 3:22-12 because it
was filed approximately four months beyond the 5-year deadline for bringing a PCR petition.
The PCR court also addressed the merits of the La//er Claim and determined that Petitioner
failed to meet the second prong of Strickland, because Petitioner was aware that he faced a “far
greater sentence if convicted after trial” and because Petitioner maintained his innocence during
trial and at sentencing and would not be able to provide a factual basis had he accepted the plea
deal. (See ECF No. 10-3c. PCR Hearing Tr. 34-5 to 34-21; 30-11 to 33-6.).
On appeal of the denial of PCR, the Appellate Division addressed the Lqfler Claim as
follows:
3
We first address defendant’s contention that the PCR court erred in
rejecting the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing
to accurately inform him regarding the maximum period of parole
ineligibility he faced if convicted of the charges after trial.
Defendant asserted that if he had been accurately informed of the
maximum period of parole ineligibility, he would have accepted
the State’s plea offer and not proceeded to trial.
We are convinced the PCR court properly rejected defendant’s
argument and denied the petition. Where it is claimed that trial
counsel’s mistaken advice regarding potential sentencing exposure
caused a defendant to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial, the
defendant establishes prejudice under the second prong of the
Strickland standard by demonstrating that he would have accepted
the plea offer if he had been aware of his sentencing exposure, that
his guilty plea would have been accepted by the court, and that the
conviction and sentence he would have received under the plea
offer would have been less severe than those resulting from the
trial. Lajier v. Cooper, —U.S.
132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385, 182
L. Ed.2d 398, 407 (2012).
,
As the PCR court correctly found here, even assuming trial counsel
had accurately advised defendant he could receive a twenty-year
period of parole ineligibility, the court could not have accepted the
proposed plea agreement because defendant could not have
provided a factual basis supporting convictions for the offenses to
which he was required to plea under the agreement. Defendant
maintained his innocence throughout the matter and testified under
oath at trial that he did not possess CDS or the handgun, did not
point a handgun at the officers, did not resist arrest, and did not
engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction.
The [New Jersey] Supreme Court has stated:
If a trial court cannot accept a guilty plea that is known to be false,
then it would be strange indeed for a PCR court to vacate ajury
verdict following a fair trial on the ground that defendant would
have taken an advantageous plea offer with a limited sentence
exposure if only he had been given the opportunity to lie under
oath. A court cannot give its imprimatur to perjury or in any way
suggest that the requirement of a truthful factual basis at a plea
colloquy is an empty formality.
[Taccetta, supra, 200 N.J. at 197.]
Our court rules require that there be a factual basis supporting a
plea of guilty and that, to accept a guilty plea, “a judge must be
‘satisfied from the lips of the defendant that he committed the acts
which constitute the crime.” Id. at 196 (quoting State v. Slater,
198 N.J. 145, 155 (2009)).
4
“Even if a defendant wished to plead guilty to a crime he or she did
not commit, he or she may not do so. No court may accept such a
plea.” Taccetta, supra, 200 N.J. at 196 (quoting State v. Smullen,
118 N.J. 408, 415 (1990)). Defendant here could not have entered
a plea of guilty to any of the charges pursuant to the State’s plea
offer, “for the simple reason that a defendant does not have the
right to commit peijury in giving a factual basis for a crime he
insists he did not commit.” Id at 194. He denied under oath at trial
committing all of the offenses charged in the indictment. Even
assuming defendant satisfied “the first prong of the
Strickland/Fritz standard—that his counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for giving him mistaken advice about the sentencing
consequences of proceeding to trial—-defendant [did not] satisi
the second prong of that standard, which require[ed] a showing of
prejudice” because the court could not have accepted defendant’s
guilty plea. Id. at 194—95.
We are convinced the PCR court correctly found that defendant did
not demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland
standard and, as a result, did not establish a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was therefore not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Marshall, supra, 148 N.J. at 158.
We also reject defendant’s argument that the court erred in finding
that the PCR petition was time barred under Rule 3:22—12. Rule
3:22—12(a) requires a defendant to file a petition for PCR within
five years of the entry of the judgment or sentence unless the
defendant shows that the delay “beyond said time was due to
defendant’s excusable neglect and that there is a reasonable
probability that if the defendant’s factual assertions [are] found to
be true enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental
injustice.” “The [j time limitation[ ] shall not be relaxed, except as
provided” in Rule 3:22—12. R. 3:22—12(c); see R. 1:3-4(c)
(“Neither the parties nor the court may [1 enlarge the time
specified by R. 3:22—12”).
...
Defendant’s judgment of conviction was entered on November 12,
2004, and his PCR petition was required to have been filed by
November 12, 2009. Defendant filed his petition on March 17,
2010, four months beyond the deadline contained in Rule 3:22—12.
Defendant acknowledges that the five-year time bar commenced
upon the entry of his judgment of conviction and was neither tolled
nor stayed by the prior appellate proceedings. See, e.g., Stale v,
Dugan. 289 N.J. Super. 15, 19 (App. Div.). certif. denied, 145 N.J.
373 (1996). He contends, however, that his failure to timely file the
petition should be excused under Rule 3:22—12(a)(1) because he
appeared pro se and the attorneys who represented him on his
S
various direct appeal proceedings did not advise him of the
deadline for filing a PCR petition. We disagree.
Defendant’s pro se status does not provide a basis to permit his late
filing of his PCR petition. Any claimed “[ijgnorance of the law and
rules of court does not qualify as excusable neglect.” State v.
Merola, 365 N.J. Super. 203, 218 (Law Div. 2002) (citing State v.
Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000)), aff’d oh., 365 N.J. Super. 82,
84 (App.Div.2003), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 312 (2004).
We do not consider defendant’s contention that the purported
failure of his direct appeal counsel to advise him of the filing
deadline constitutes excusable neglect under Rule 3:22—12. We
cannot consider defendant’s argument because it is founded upon
facts which are not supported by an affidavit or certification. See
State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014) (“[T]he Court Rules []
require that factual assertions in a petition for post-conviction
relief be made by affidavit or certification in order to secure an
evidentiary hearing.”); R. 3:22—10(c).
Moreover, we decline to consider the argument because it was not
raised below and does not involve jurisdictional or public interest
concerns. Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226—27 (2014); see also
Nieder v. Royal Inc/em. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (“[Ojur
appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not
properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a
presentation is available ‘unless the questions so raised on appeal
go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great
public interest.’ “(quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58
N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div.1959), cerqf denied, 31 N.J. 554
(1960))).
Even assuming defendant made a showing of excusable neglect
under Rule 3:22—12(a)(1), he failed to demonstrate that
enforcement of the time bar would result in a ifindamental
injustice. Defendant could not demonstrate a fundamental injustice
because, as noted, he failed to establish a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard.
State v. Smith, 2016 WL 698565, at *57 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Feb. 23, 2016).’ The Supreme
Court of New Jersey denied the petition for certification. State v. Smith, 225 N.J. 340 (N.J.
2016).
Respondents argue that the Appellate Division also rejected Petitioner’s claim that his attorney
misinformed him about his maximum parole disqualifier. See ECF No. 8, Respondent’s Answer
at 45.) The Court disagrees, as the Appellate Division determined that the “PCR court correctly
6
At issue is whether Plaintiffs Lafier Claim, as asserted in Grounds Seven and Nine, is
procedurally defaulted. In its prior decision, the Court ordered the panics to provide
supplemental briefing on procedural default. See ECF No. 20. The parties have submitted their
supplemental briefs, ECF Nos. 2 1-22, and the matter is ready for disposition.
Procedural default occurs when a claim has not been fairly presented to the state courts
(i.e.. is unexhausted) and there are no additional state remedies available to pursue, see Wenger
v Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223—24 (3d Cir. 2001); or, as in this case, when an issue is properly
asserted in the state system but not addressed on the merits because of an independent and
adequate state procedural rule. See MeCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999).
“Ordinarily, violation of firmly established and regularly followed state rules
...
will be adequate
to foreclose review of a federal claim. There are, however, exceptional cases in which exorbitant
application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of
a federal question.” Lee v Kemna. 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In this case, the Appellate Division first rejected Petitioner’s Lcifler Claim on the merits
and subsequently found that Petitioner’s Lafler Claim was barred by N.J. Ct. R. 3:22-12, because
found that defendant did not demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland
standard” and did not address whether counsel was deficient. See id. at 6. Indeed, the Appellate
Division further stated:
Because defendant failed to establish prejudice under the second
prong of the Strickland standard, it was umwcessary for the PCR
court to resolve the issue of whether defendant’s response in
paragraph numbered six on the pretrial memorandum provided
adequate notice that he faced a twenty-year period of parole
eligibility if convicted of all of the charges at trial.
Id. at *5, n. 3.
7
it was filed four months beyond the 5 year limitation period for filing petitions for posteonviction
relief
In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), the Supreme Court considered the application of
the adequate and independent state ground doctrine to claims on habeas review and held that a
procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on.
.
.
habeas review unless the
last state court rendering a judgment in the case “clearly and expressly” states that its judgment
rests on a state procedural bar.” Id. at 263. In Harris, the Supreme Court established a “plain
statement” rule that there would be no procedural default, for purposes of federal habeas review,
unless “the last state court rendering judgment in the case ‘clearly and expressly’ states that its
judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”2 489 U.S. at 263. The Court in Harris expressly noted,
however, that state courts may both rely on state procedural bars and reach federal substantive
questions in denying habeas relief:
Moreover, a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a
federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the
adequate and independent state ground doctrine requires the
federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient basis for
the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on
federal law. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 [56
S.Ct. 183, 80 L.Ed. 158] (1935). Thus, by applying this doctrine to
habeas cases,
reconsideration of the federal issue on federal
habeas [is curtailed] as long as the state court explicitly invokes a
state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for decision. In this
way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing
its interests in finality, federalism, and comity.
.
.
.
2
Harris’plain statement rule was subsequently narrowed by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 735 (1991), which clarified that the first step is to determine whether the decision of the last
state court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims “fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law.” Only then, if there is such a reliance on
federal law, do we look at whether the state court clearly and expressly based its ruling on a state
procedural ground. Id; see also Johnson v. Finchak, 392 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, it
appears the Appellate Division’s decision is at least interwoven with federal law, as the
Appellate Division applied the Strickland/Lafler standards to Plaintiffs Lajier claim.
8
Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n. 10; see also Cabrera v. Barbo, 175 F.3d 307,314 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that the fact that Appellate Division also addressed the lack of merit in the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim “does not undermine our conclusion that the state courts rejected
Cabrera’s claim on an independent and adequate state basis, as the comment at most was an
alternative holding”). In Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 320 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit
explained that the Harris footnote “suggests that where a holding provides sufficient basis for the
state court’s judgment, it should be upheld by the federal court”, and that “[t]he Supreme Court’s
language [in the Harris footnote] does not limit the federal court’s consideration based upon
whether such state court articulation form the primary basis for its decision, or an alternate and
sufficient basis for the decision.” Id.
Petitioner argues that the Lajier Claim is not procedurally defaulted because the
Appellate Division addressed the merits of the La,fler Claim at length and did not clearly state
that its decision also rested on a state procedural bar.3 The Court disagrees. Pursuant to Harris.
it does not matter that the Appellate Division first addressed the Lczfler Claim on the merits or
that the Appellate Division addressed the merits at length because the court also clearly held that
the claims were barred by Rule 3:22—12. Specifically, the Court stated: “We also reject
defendant’s argument that the court erred in finding that the PCR petition was time barred under
Rule 3:22—12.” State
i’.
Smith, 2016 WL 698565, at *7 Petitioner makes no argument that Rule
3:22-12 is not a regularly followed rule; indeed, the Third Circuit has expressly found Rule 3:2212 to be an independent and adequate ground for procedural default. See Johnson v. Pinehak,
The Petitioner also notes that none of the other habeas claims were procedurally barred, but
Grounds Seven, Eight, and Nine were the only claims Petitioner raised in his PCR, and the Court
rejected Ground Eight because it is not cognizable in federal habeas review. The remaining
claims were raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal.
9
392 F.3d 551, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (“From the unambiguous language of Rule 3:22—12 and from
the many prior cases that have consistently applied the time bar, it is clear that this procedural
rule was an independent and adequate state ground establishing procedural default.”). As such,
the Court finds that Grounds Seven and Nine are procedurally defaulted.
A federal habeas court may entertain a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can
show “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal
law.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Alternatively, a petitioner may
overcome procedural default by demonstrating that failing to allow his claims to proceed would
result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice. Schiup
&
Delo, 513 U.S. 298. 320-22 (1995).
Lastly, if a petitioner has committed a procedural default and has not shown either cause and
prejudice or a miscarriage ofjustice. the proper disposition is to dismiss the procedurally
defaulted claim with prejudice. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Here, Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse the
procedural default. Petitioner’s direct appeal was still pending when the five-year period to file
his PCR expired, and Petitioner previously asserted that his attorneys on direct appeal failed to
advise him of the filing deadline. Although cause for procedural default may be established
where counsel of record abandons his or her client without warning, see Maples v. Thomas, 565
U.S. 266, 289 (2012), an attorney’s oversight or error with respect to filing deadlines do not
provide sufficient cause for procedural default.4 See Coleman. 501 U.S., at 753. Because
Pe1itioner has not provided sufficient cause for the procedural default, the Court need not reach
whether he can establish prejudice. Petitioner also argues that failure to hear his claim amounts
Because Petitioner’s attorneys represented him on his direct appeal and not in his petition for
postconviction relief, it is not clear they had any duty to advise him about the five-year deadline.
10
to a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice. A fundamental miscarriage ofjustice requires a showing
of actual innocence. See Schlup v. Delo. 513 U.S. at 327—28. Petitioner is unable to meet the
actual innocence standard. As such, Ground Seven and Nine are subject to dismissal on the basis
of procedural default.
Moreover, even if the Lafler Claim were not procedurally defaulted, Petitioner fails to
show that the Appellate Division relied on an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts in resolving his Lafler Claim.5
Defendants have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.
Hi//v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Petitioner is required to establish that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and caused him prejudice. Strickland i’. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). The nub of the prejudice inquiry is whether the attorney’s deficient performance
leaves the defendant worse off. In the plea-bargaining context, the defendant must first establish
a reasonable probability that the plea agreement would have been consunmiated. Missouri
i’.
Frye, 566 U.S. 134. 147 (2012). This requires a reasonable probability that: (1) “the defendant
would have accepted the plea,” (2) “the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of
intervening circumstances,” and (3) “the court would have accepted its terms.” Lafler, 566 U.S.
at 164. The defendant nuist then “show a reasonable probability that the end result of the
criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a
sentence of less prison time.” As explained in United States
Day, 969 F.2d 39,43 (3d Cir.
The Third Circuit has held that AEDPA deference, rather than de novo review, applies when a
state court decides a claim on procedural grounds and, alternatively, on the merits. See Rolan.
680 F.3d at 319 (addressing claim using AEDPA deference after determining that procedural
default did not apply). As such, the Court applies AEDPA deference in reviewing Petitioner’s
Lajier Claim.
11
1992), “[kjnowledge of the comparative exposure between standing trial and accepting a plea
offer will often be crucial to the decision whether to plead guilty.” Day, 969 F.2d at 43.
Many courts, including the Third Circuit, have questioned whether a petitioner who
maintains his innocence can make the required showing under Lajier. See, e.g., United States v.
Tarnai, 782 F. App’x. 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[Petitioner] has not established the government
would have allowed him to take the plea while insisting on his innocence.”); J-Iurnphress v
United States, 398 F.3d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that defendant’s assertion of innocence
undermined his contention that he would have accepted a plea deal); Sanders v. (hi i/ed States,
341 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A defendant who maintains his innocence at all the stages of
his criminal prosecution and shows no indication that he would be unwilling to admit his guilt
undermines his later
§
2255 claim that he would have pleaded guilty if only he had received
better advice from his lawyer.”); United States v Stevens, 149 F.3d 747. 748 (8th Cir.1998)
(concluding that defendant could not establish prejudice when his post-trial assertions of
innocence demonstrated that he would not have entered a guilty plea).
Although the Third Circuit has not issued a precedential decision addressing this issue, in
Davis v. Administrator New Jersey State Prison, 795 F. App’x. 100. 102—03 (3d Cir. 2019), the
circuit court affinned the denial of habeas relief in a similar Laf er claim:
The [New Jersey] Appellate Division held that [petitionerl could
not meet Strickland’s prejudice prong because he consistently
maintained his innocence, including “denying his guilt and
indicating his whereabouts away from the crime scene on the night
of the shooting” during his testimony at trial. App. I 34a.
As the Taccetta court explained, “[tihe notion that a defendant can
enter a plea of guilty, while maintaining his innocence, is foreign
to our state jurisprudence” and “[c]ourt-sanctioned perjury is not a
permissible basis for the entry of a plea in [New Jersey].” 975 A.2d
at 935.
Applying Taccetta, the Appellate Division concluded that
[petitioner] could not have accepted a favorable plea deal as a
12
matter of New Jersey law. We cannot “reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. A’icGuire, 502
U.s. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475. 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Rather. “[un
conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding
whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United Stales.” Id. Here, we can find no such violation.
[Petitioner] asserts no federal right to plead guilty in this
circumstance. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.s. 25,38 nil,
91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (“states may bar their courts
from accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their
innocence.”).
Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the Appellate Division to
conclude that [petitioner] failed to show any prejudice from the
alleged failure of counsel to provide him with an accurate
explanation of his sentence exposure. [Petitioner] had maintained
and continues to maintain
his innocence and is thereby
prohibited under New Jersey law from pleading guilty. See
Taccetta, 975 A.2d at 935. There can be no prejudice if counsel’s
deficient performance merely deprived [petitioner] of the
opportunity to do something that would have been legally
prohibited. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.s. 157, 175, 106 S.Ct. 988,
89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (explaining that a defendant who is
“persuaded or compelled to desist from perjury has no valid
claim that confidence in the result of his trial has been diminished”
and thus cannot claim prejudice).
—
...
id,, see also Taccetta v. Administrator New Jersey State Frison, 601 F. App’. 165, 168 (3d Cir.
2015) (applying the same reasoning).
Following the Third Circuit’s decisions in Davis and Taccelta, this Court also finds that
the Appellate Division did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it
determined that Petitioner failed to establish Strickland prejudice in light of Taccetta ‘s
prohibition against pleading guilty while maintaining one’s innocence. Indeed, the Appellate
Division relied on state law, which this Court may not review. As such, to the extent Grounds
Seven and Nine are not procedurally defaulted, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief
on these claims.
Having denied relief on Petitioner’s remaining habeas claims, the Court will also deny a
COA as to all claims in the Petition. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
13
§ 2253(c), a petitioner may not
appeal from a final order in a habeas proceeding unless he has “made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” Similarly, “[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition
on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim[sj, a COA
should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
Didiano v. Balicki, Civil ActionNo. 09—2315 (FLW), 2010 WL 1752191, at *64 (Apr. 29,
2010) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Here, Petitioner has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. As such, the Court will also deny a
COA. An appropriate Order follows.
kte
2f)L1
Madeline Cox Arleo, District Judge
United States District Judge
14
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