NEGRON v. HOLGUIN et al

Filing 46

OPINION. Signed by Judge Katharine S. Hayden on 3/28/2018. (JB, )

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SACHA NEGRON,
Civil No. 2:16-03965 (KSH)
(CLW)

Plaintiff,
v.
MIGUEL HOLGUIN, et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss brought by
defendants New Jersey State Troopers Miguel Holguin and J.A. Burke, and
Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police Joseph Fuentes. (D.E. 32, Motion to
Dismiss; D.E. 1, Complaint, at ¶¶ 4-6.) Plaintiff Sacha Negron filed this lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 alleging various constitutional violations
arising from a search of her home and her subsequent arrest. (D.E. 1; Complaint.)
Negron sued–in addition to Holguin, Burke, and Fuentes–the City of Newark,
Newark police officer Garry McCarthy and various John Doe officers and
supervisors.1 (Id.) On September 29, 2017, the City of Newark and Newark police

Negron also names the United States of America and former Attorney General
Loretta Lynch in the caption. In addition to questionable service of process, there
are no allegations that include a federal actor beyond the assertion that unnamed
United States Marshals arrested her and brought her to a municipal police station
where she was prosecuted by state actors. The Court assumes on these bare facts
that Negron’s assertion that the arresting officers were from the federal sector was
made in error.
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officer Garry McCarthy successfully moved to dismiss on both procedural and
substantive grounds. (D.E. 40, Order.) The present motion by Holguin, Burke, and
Fuentes seeks to dismiss claims for unlawful search, seizure, and arrest, and
malicious prosecution. No opposing papers have been filed on behalf of Negron.
I.

Background
According to Negron’s complaint, Holguin and Burke “commenced a weapons

trafficking investigation in the City of Newark” in the fall of 2012. (D.E. 1,
Complaint, at ¶¶ 15-16.) A Confidential Informant reported Negron’s involvement
with weapons sales and trafficking. (Id.) Negron asserts the Confidential
Informant’s tip was “patently false” without providing reasons for the assertion
(Id.) In March or April of 2013, Negron claims “[d]efendants” searched her Newark,
New Jersey home without probable cause or a search warrant, and the search
yielded no illegal contraband. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 17.) Negron does not allege who among
the listed defendants conducted the search.
Negron claims she was arrested on April 9, 2013 by the United States
Marshals Service (see above footnote) and taken to Irvington, New Jersey, where
“[d]efendants conducted repeated un-counseled, un-Mirandized interrogations.”
(Id. at ¶ 18.) Neither Holguin, Burke, nor Fuentes is alleged to have arrested her.
She alleges that Holguin, who is a state trooper, “charged her” with unlawful
possession of a weapon and unlawful sale of a weapon. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Negron claims
she was held in Essex County Jail for nine days without a ten percent option to post
bail. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Some months later, in November 2013, she was indicted by an

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Essex County grand jury on charges of conspiracy to facilitate the unlawful sale of a
firearm, the unlawful sale of an assault fireman, unlawful possession of an assault
firearm, and the unlawful sale of large capacity ammunition. (Id. at ¶ 21) On June
30, 2014, all charges were dismissed. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Exactly two years later, she
filed this lawsuit.
Negron claims she was unlawfully searched, seized, arrested, falsely
imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at ¶ ¶ 23, 30-33.) Specifically, Count One alleges
federal constitutional violations (Id. at ¶ 29); Count Two alleges a Monell violation
(Id. at ¶ 36); Count Three alleges New Jersey Constitution and New Jersey Civil
Rights Act violations (Id. at ¶ 40); Count Four repeats nearly verbatim Count Three
(Id. at ¶ 45); Count Five alleges false imprisonment and false arrest (Id. at ¶ 53);
and Count Six alleges federal and state civil conspiracy (Id. at ¶ 62).
II.

Discussion
a. Standard of Review
Defendants bring this motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The
Supreme Court has instructed district courts to conduct a two-part analysis when
deciding motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678-79 (2009). First, a district court “must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true.” Id. at 678. A court is not obligated, however, “to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. “Second, only a complaint

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that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. Whether a
claim crosses the threshold of plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
679. Moreover, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Merely pleading a cause
of action will “not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79. Instead, “[a] complaint has to show such an
entitlement with its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir.
2009) (emphasis added).
b. Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that with the exception of malicious prosecution, Negron’s
causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. (D.E. 32-1, Motion to
Dismiss, at 6.) To succeed, they must demonstrate that “the time alleged in the
statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the
statute of limitations.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal
quotations omitted)). “Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the
personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action
accrued.” Williams v. Trenton Police Dept., 591 F. App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 2006)). In New
Jersey, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years. N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:14-2.

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For purposes of a statute of limitations analysis, accrual occurs, “when the
facts which support the claim reasonably should have become known to the
plaintiff.” Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 2001). The
Third Circuit has found that “a cause of action accrues at the time of the last event
necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury.”
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). For example, the Third Circuit has
held that a claim for unlawful arrest accrues on the day of the arrest. Williams, 591
F. App’x at 58; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007) (“The statute of
limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings,
begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.”)
Here, Negron alleges her house was searched in either March or April of
2013, and that she was arrested on April 9, 2013. (D.E. 1; Complaint at ¶ ¶ 17, 18.)
Under federal law, Negron’s claims for unlawful arrest, search, and seizure, and
false imprisonment began to accrue on the day of the search and arrest.2 That is,
because Negron knew on April 9, 2013 that her home had been searched and that
she had been arrested, she had the facts necessary that day to contest the
constitutional validity of that search and arrest. Under New Jersey’s two-year
statute of limitations, she had until April 9, 2015 before the statute ran to file her
lawsuit. She did not do so, however, until June 30, 2016. (See D.E. 1; Complaint.)

Her claim for unlawful search would accrue on the day of the search, but because
no specific date is alleged, for ease of reference, the Court will refer to April 9, 2013
as the operative date for accrual of these claims.
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That filing date strongly suggests that Negron mistakenly believed that the
two-year statute of limitations began to run on June 30, 2014—the date on which
the charges against her were dropped. While she failed to respond to defendants’
motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the complaint indicate she doubted the
legality of the police action from the start. Assuming this is so, the Court looks to
the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams. Williams, 591 F. App’x at 57.
Williams was arrested, searched, and charged with unlawful possession of a
gun on May 2, 2009 based on an anonymous tip from a confidential informant. Id. at
57. After the district court suppressed evidence against him on April 11, 2011, the
prosecution dropped the charges the same day. Id. He filed his § 1983 lawsuit on
October 28, 2011. Id.
Williams argued that the discovery rule—which would delay the date of
accrual—should apply because he could not have known the search was
unconstitutional until the judge ruled in his favor at the suppression hearing. Id. at
58. But the Third Circuit noted that Williams knew on the night of his arrest that
he might have grounds for a lawsuit; “Williams stated that very night that he knew
the identity [of the Confidential Informant], taunting the police officers that they
would never get a conviction.” Id. The equitable discovery rule was inapplicable in
Williams’ situation because “there was nothing new to discover.” Id.
Like Williams, Negron knew on the day of the search and arrest that she
might have grounds for a lawsuit. The dismissal of charges the following year was
not the occasion for Negron to “discover” that she could sue, “as there was nothing

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new to discover.” See id. The discovery rule is inapplicable here. There being no
basis to extend the limitations period, Negron’s claims for unlawful arrest, search,
and seizure, and false imprisonment were untimely filed and must be dismissed
with prejudice.
The issue of time-barred claims is “dispositive,” therefore the Court need not
address the underlying merits of her federal and state constitutional claims.
Williams, 591 F. App’x at 57.
c. Conspiracy
Negron alleges the defendants conspired to falsely arrest, imprison, and
maliciously prosecute her. (D.E. 1; Complaint, at ¶ 63.) A § 1985 conspiracy claim
“accrues when plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged conspiracy.”
Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2010). In Dique, the
Third Circuit found the underlying claim of selective enforcement to be time-barred,
therefore the derivative conspiracy claim was time barred as well. Id. See also
Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that
“Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to
§ 1985(3) claims” and dismissal of the conspiracy claim is proper when the
underlying § 1983 claims are time-barred). The Court dismisses the conspiracy
claim with prejudice.
d. Malicious Prosecution
Negron’s remaining § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution requires a finding
that “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding

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ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the
plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009). All six elements are required to win a
malicious prosecution claim; failure to establish one element is fatal to the claim.
Id.
In a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a grand jury indictment
“constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute,” but the
presumption “may be rebutted by evidence that the presentment was procured by
fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means.” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.
1989); see also King v. Deputy Atty. Gen. Del., 616 F. App’x 491, n.6 (3d Cir. 2015).
On November 22, 2013, an Essex County grand jury indicted Negron on four
counts of weapons possession and trafficking, constituting prima facie evidence of
probable cause to prosecute. (D.E. 1; Complaint, ¶ 21.) Negron fails to allege any
facts challenging the indictment. The only content in the complaint touching on
how the indictment was procured is Negron’s conclusory statement that her arrest
was the result of a confidential informant’s “patently false” tip. (D.E. 1; Complaint,
¶ 21.) The allegation of falsity is unsupported by any facts. This falls far short of
overcoming the presumption of probable cause. The insufficient complaint, coupled
with a failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, warrant dismissal with prejudice
of the malicious prosecution claim.

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III.

Conclusion

Negron makes blanket, conclusory statements of law that her house was
searched unlawfully (Id. at ¶ 17), that she was arrested unlawfully (Id. at ¶ 18), and
that she was maliciously prosecuted (Id. at ¶ 23). These “threadbare recitals” are
precisely what the Supreme Court warned against in Iqbal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Negron’s complaint consists of only such
accusations. The complaint is fatally deficient and is dismissed with prejudice.
The Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss. An appropriate order will
follow.

s/ Katharine S. Hayden
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.
Dated: March 28, 2018

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