Shapiro v. Suga et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 7/21/2015. (nr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROBERT ELIAS GEORGE SHAPIRO,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 16-4068 (ES) (MAH)
v.
OPINION
KATHERINE SUGA et al.,
Defendants.
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court by way of pro se Plaintiff Robert Elias George
Shapiro’s filing, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, of a
Complaint along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
and the subsequent transfer of the matter to the District of New Jersey. (See D.E. Nos. 1, 2, 3). In
the transfer order, Chief Judge Colleen McMahon of the Southern District of New York directed
that “the transferee court” determine whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis. (D.E. No. 3 at 3).1 Having considered Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately established that his financial condition
renders payment of the $400.00 filing fee a hardship.
However, after a court determines that a plaintiff is qualified to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must then “screen” the complaint to determine whether it
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Additionally, subsequent to the transfer and the case being assigned to the Undersigned, Plaintiff submitted a letter
in which, among other things, Plaintiff again requests permission to proceed without payment of fees. (D.E. No. 12).
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Having thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, (D.E. No. 2, Complaint (“Compl.”)),
the Court dismisses the Complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In particular, the Complaint asserts the following factual
allegations:
“Staff at [Seton Hall] University tried to injure [Plaintiff] or cause bodily
and legal harm”;
“Faculty at Seton Hall University requested for treatments or conditions
improperly and or [sic] attempted to advise him to seek behavioral treatment for
them causing harm to him”;
“The Doctor or University personnel then tried to sabotage his Diploma”;
“Seton Hall ignored safety provisions and directed Karen Van Norman and
Katherine Evans to prescribe treatment to him”;
“After requesting for treatment all three individuals caused complications
while, during, and after completing the requested treatment and documentation
grievance procedure”;
“Two faculty at Columbia University indirectly exposed him to torture, and
other federal issues after the Seton Hall Faculty caused the harm”;
“Seton Hall University information utilized [sic] HHC Insurance
information and shut-off my scheduled hours by electronic device causing proxy
and logistics errors through DSP logistics platforms[] and corporate (CODE)-NJCS
or EHRPD and by E-MAIL Proxy or Protocol from Karen Van Norman and the
office of Dr. Katherine Evans”;
“Afterward the Hospital attempted to deem him incompetent and unable to
remain employed and a student.”
(Compl. at 3, III.C.). Furthermore, Plaintiff states that he suffered the following injuries:
“Neck pain and or sprain, Rib sprain, Bruised Rib & Stolen Bicycle, Broken
Nose, - went to Emergency room on two seperate [sic] visits – no treatment
required[, t]old to be patient and let neck, nose and rib heal”;
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“Denied Diploma – Bachelor’s Degree, the Faculty requested him to seek a
lawyer and to seek 6 months of behavioral treatment as a penalty”;
“Issued citation & or was deemed by another external agency as a
*suspended driver* for an issue he did not cause or complicate. The supervisor
Frank Patrone scolded him to correct the debts he caused.”
(Id. at 3, IV.).
Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint is comprised of generalized allegations against “Staff,”
“Faculty,” and “The Doctor or University personnel” that fail to specify which particular
Defendants are liable for which particular causes of action, and why. And, those generalized
allegations—such as “Staff at [Seton Hall] University tried to injure [Plaintiff] or cause bodily and
legal harm” and “Faculty at Seton Hall University requested for treatments or conditions
improperly and or [sic] attempted to advise him to seek behavioral treatment for them causing
harm to him”, (id. at 3, III.C.)—are devoid of substantive factual content, failing to meet the
Supreme Court’s requirement of more than “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s],”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Even where particular Defendants are named, Plaintiff does not state recognized causes of
action. For example, Plaintiff states that “Seton Hall ignored safety provisions and directed Karen
Van Norman and Katherine Evans to prescribe treatment to him” and that “After requesting for
treatment all three individuals caused complications while, during, and after completing the
requested treatment and documentation grievance procedure.” (Compl. at 3, III.C.). Leaving aside
that Plaintiff does not specify what “safety provisions” were allegedly “ignored” or what
“complications” were “caused,” the Court cannot—and Defendants should not be expected to—
decipher the basis in law of purported causes of action for “ignoring safety provisions,”
“direct[ing]” certain persons “to prescribe treatment,” or “caus[ing] complications while, during,
and after completing the requested treatment.”
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Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to adhere to Rule 8’s
pleading requirements.
The shortcomings discussed above do not, however, foreclose the
possibility that Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable claim by filing an amended complaint.
Therefore, considering Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court dismisses the Complaint without
prejudice, with leave to file an amended complaint.
In the event Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint and re-plead his claims, the Court
advises that a properly pleaded complaint must contain, under each count, a cause of action against
a clearly identified defendant or defendants and the specific factual allegations that would permit
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the identified defendant or defendants are liable for
that cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see, e.g., Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent.
Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[The plaintiff]’s complaint is a perfect
example of ‘shotgun’ pleading in that it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact
are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”).
An appropriate Order follows.
s/Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
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