Dunbar v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC et al
Filing
32
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 11/16/16. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 2:16-cv-4259 (WJM)
MAUREEN DUNBAR,
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC,
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., FEDERAL
HOME LOAN ORTGAGE
CORPORATION AS TRUSTEE
FREDDIE MAC ULTICLASS
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 3423, JOHN
DOES 1-100, et al.,
Defendants.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiff Maureen Dunbar filed this action after Defendant Nationstar
Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”) foreclosed on her property in New Jersey state court.
Nationstar and co-Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) now separately
move the Court under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars collateral attacks
on state court judgments.1 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motions
to dismiss with prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff mortgaged her home by loan agreement with BANA on February 14,
2008 in the amount of $117,479, as recorded in the Essex County Register’s Office.
See Declaration of Laurence P. Chirch in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
1
The Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), but there is
no need to address those arguments because no subject matter jurisdiction exists.
1
(“Chirch Decl.”), Ex. B.2 According to Defendants, Plaintiff defaulted on her
payments in October of 2009. Chirch Cert., Ex. C. ¶ 7. On February 21, 2014, BANA
assigned the mortgage to Nationstar. Declaration of Heather Elizabeth Saydah
(“Saydah Decl.”), Ex. C.
Nationstar initiated a foreclosure action on July 9, 2014 in the Superior Court
of New Jersey Essex County Chancery Division. Sayhad Decl., Ex. D. Default was
entered against Plaintiff on April 10, 2015, and a final judgment of foreclosure and
sale was entered on October 21, 2015. Chirch Cert., Exs. F, G.
On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed her action in the Southern District of New
York seeking a declaration that Defendants have no right to foreclose and seeking
damages for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander of title, civil
conspiracy, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ECF No. 1.
She also asserts that Defendants violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601, and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §
1602. In addition to challenging Nationstar’s foreclosure, Plaintiff challenges both
the validity of her loan agreement with BANA and BANA’s 2014 assignment of the
loan to Nationstar.
Because the property in question is located in New Jersey, Judge Jesse Furman
transferred the action to the District of New Jersey by Order dated July 6, 2016. ECF
No. 17. On August 3, 2016, Defendants BANA and Nationstar moved separately to
dismiss the Complaint, arguing that the action is an impermissible collateral attack
on a state court judgment. ECF Nos. 26, 27.3
Plaintiff has not responded to the Defendants’ motions. Instead, on August 11,
2016, Plaintiff requested that the Court dismiss her Complaint without prejudice.
She states that she has received a loan modification and that her house is no longer
in immediate danger of foreclosure. Defendants insist that the Complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the Complaint amounts to an improper collateral attack
on a state foreclosure proceeding, and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forecloses
subject matter jurisdiction. Because the Court agrees that the Rooker-Feldman
“[D]ocuments whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party
questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v.
Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Defendants also attack the substantive merits of the Complaint.
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2
doctrine dissolves subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, the Court need
not address Defendants’ other arguments.4
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes subject matter jurisdiction over
actions already litigated in state court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The doctrine applies to actions in which (1) a plaintiff in
federal court previously lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff seeks relief from injuries
caused by the state court judgment; (3) the state court judgment was issued before
the federal action filed; and (4) the plaintiff seeks federal review and rejection the
state judgment. Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615
F.3d 159, 166 (3d 2010) (“Great Western”).
Third Circuit courts have consistently applied Rooker-Feldman to bar federal
actions seeking to appeal or alter a state foreclosure proceeding. See, e.g., In re
Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009). A plaintiff in federal court need not have
responded to the foreclosure action in state court for Rooker-Feldman to apply, so
long as the party had a “‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the issue in the prior
proceeding.” See Valladares v. Gov't Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n as Tr. for the Ginnie Mae
Remic Trust 2007-002, 2016 WL 1243804, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2016) (citations
omitted). The jurisdictional bar extends to any claim “inextricably intertwined” with
the foreclosure judgment. See In re Madera, 586 F.3d at 232. Because foreclosure
requires the existence of a valid mortgage, claims that impugn the validity of a
mortgage and therefore “negate the foreclosure judgment” are barred under RookerFeldman, since those claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the foreclosure
action itself. See id.; Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA AS, 521 F. App'x 49, 51 (3d Cir.
2013); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 2005); Jacobowitz v. M & T Mortg.
Corp., 372 Fed.Appx. 225, 227-228 (3d Cir. 2010).
Rooker-Feldman prohibits the Court from exercising jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s statutory and common law claims challenging the validity of the loan
agreement and Defendants’ right to foreclose. Plaintiff lost in state court by way of
a judgment rendered before this federal action commenced. Plaintiff’s injury
resulted from a state court judgment, and Plaintiff now invites federal judicial
intervention to effectively “review and reject the state court judgment[].”
Valladares, 2016 WL 1243804, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2016). Although only
Defendant Nationstar was party to the state foreclosure proceeding, Rooker-Feldman
applies as well to Defendant BANA, because “the doctrine only requires identity of
4
Defendants also argue that dismissal is appropriate on grounds of res judicata and the New
Jersey Entire Controversy doctrine. It is unnecessary to address those arguments.
3
the party against whom the doctrine is being invoked.” Valladares, 2016 WL
1243804, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2016) (internal citations omitted). There is no
subject matter jurisdiction over claims that “are in essence an attack on the state
court judgment of foreclosure.” Valladares, 2016 WL 1243804, at *3.
Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arguably
survives Rooker-Feldman. The alleged injury may have occurred independently of
and prior to the foreclosure proceeding, in which case the harm could not have been
“caused by the state court judgment.” See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co.,
615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A useful guidepost is the timing of the injury,
that is, whether the injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the statecourt proceedings and thus could not have been ‘caused by’ those proceedings.”).
However, because Rooker-Feldman prevents the Court from exercising original
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s other claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. See Jacobowitz, 372 Fed. Appx. 225, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2010).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED and the
Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
November 16 2016
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