ALVARDO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 15

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 06/19/2017. (ek)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSE A. ALVADO, a/va
JOSE A. ALVARDO,

:

Plaintiff,

.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-4459 (iLL)
0PIN1 0N

V.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,:
Defendant.

LINARES, Chief District Judge

Jose A. Alvarado seeks judicial review of a final decision (hereinafter, “the
Decision”) issued on behalf of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(hereinafter, “the Commissioner”) by an administrative law judge (hereinafter, “the
AU”). dated November 17, 2014, wherein the AU addressed his application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. (See ECF No. 1; R. at
12—27.) See also 42 U.S.C.

§

405(g); L.Civ.R. 9.1. TheALJ concluded that Alvarado

was not disabled during the relevant time period. Alvarado objects to the AU’s
conclusion.
The Court has carefully considered the administrative record, as well as the
submissions that have been made in support of and in opposition to the instant appeal,
and decides this matter on the briefs of the parties and without conducting oral argument.

(See ECF No. 5 (administrative record); ECF No. 11 (Alvarado’s brief); ECF No. 14
(Commissioner’s brief).) See L.Civ.R. 78.1(b); L.Civ.R. 9.1. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court remands this matter for further proceedings that are consistent with this
Opinion.
BACKGROUND
The Court writes for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of the case. The Court therefore specifically addresses in the discussion below
only those facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must affirm the Decision if the AU’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g): Reefer v.

Barnhart. 326 F.3d 376. 379 (3d

Cir. 2003); Sykes v. Apfel, 22$ F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court must be
deferential to the inferences drawn by the AU from the facts if those inferences. in turn,
are supported by substantial evidence. See Smith v. Califano, 637 f.2d 96$, 970 (3d Cir.
1981); see also Hartranfi v. ApfeL 181 F.3d 358. 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that a court
will not set the Commissioner’s decision aside if it is supported by substantial evidence.
even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently”). ‘SubstantiaI evidence
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,” and ‘[i]t is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere
scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart. 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Additionally, a disability must be established by objective medical

evidence. To this end, [a]n individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not
alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section.” 42 U.S.C.

§

423(d)(5)(A). Instead, a finding that one is disabled requires:
[M]edical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical
or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or
other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all evidence
required to be furnished under this paragraph

...

would lead to a

conclusion that the individual is under a disability.
Id. The factors to consider in determining how to weigh the evidence originating from
medical sources include: (1) the examining relationship; (2) the treatment relationship,
including the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment; (3) the supportability
of the opinion; (4) its consistency with the record as a whole; and (5) the specialization of
the individual giving the opinion. See 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1527(c).

The ‘substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review.” Jones, 364
f.3d at 503. The AU is required to “set forth the reasons for his decision,” and not
merely make conclusory and unexplained findings. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 220 f.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). But, if the AU’s decision is adequately
explained and supported, then the Court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
370 f.3d 357, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). It does

not matter

if this Court

“acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.” Monsour Med. Ctr. v.

Heckler, 806 f.2d 1185, 1190—91 (3d Cir. 1986)). The AU is also not requirejd]

...

to

use particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting [the] analysis,” but
the AU must ‘ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and explanation
of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
THE FIVE STEP PROCESS AND THE AU’S DECISION
I.

The Law

A claimant is eligible to collect benefits if among other things, he demonstrates
that he is disabled based on an ‘inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A).

A person is disabled only

if the physical or mental impairments are ‘of such severity that he is not only unable to
do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C.

§

423(d)(2)(A).

The five step sequential evaluation for determining whether a claimant is under a
disability, as set forth in 20 C.f.R.

§ 404.1520” is the following:

In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is
currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1520(a).

If a claimant is found to be engaged in substantial activity, the disability
claim will be denied. In step two, the Commissioner must determine
whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R.
404.1520(c). If the claimant fails to show that her impairments are
‘severe,” she is ineligible for disability benefits.

4

§

In step three, the Commissioner compares the medical evidence of the
clairnants impairment to a list of impairments presumed severe enough to
preclude any gainful work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If a claimant does
not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis proceeds
to steps four and five.
Step four requires the AL] to consider whether the claimant retains the
residual functional capacity [(hereinafter, “RFC”)] to perform her past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1520(d). The claimant bears the burden of

demonstrating an inability to return to her past relevant work.
If the claimant is unable to resume her former occupation, the evaluation
moves to the final step. At this stage, the burden of production shifts to the
Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant is capable of
performing other available work in order to deny a claim of disability. 20
C.f.R. § 404.1520(f). The AL] must show there are other jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can
perform. consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past
work experience, and residual functional capacity. The AL] must analyze
the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining
whether she is capable of performing work and is not disabled.
Burnett, 220 f.3d at 118—19 (case citations omitted). “The claimant bears the burden of
proof for steps one, two, and four of this test. The Commissioner bears the burden of
proof for the last step.” Sykes. 228 f.3d at 263. Neither party bears the burden of proof
at step three.

IL

id. at 263 n.2.

Analysis of Alvarado’s Severe Diabetes Impairment

At the second step of the sequential evaluation in this case, the AU concluded that
Alvarado had eight severe impairments, including diabetes. (See R. at 15.) However,

Alvarado argues that the AU failed to meaningfully consider his diabetes, either alone or
in conjunction with his other severe impairments, in assessing his ability to engage in
gainful employment during the relevant time period. (See ECF No. 11 at 23—24.) The
Court is compelled to agree with Alvarado’s arguments here.
The Decision sets forth the following assessment concerning Alvarado’s severe
diabetes impairment:
The claimant has also been diagnosed with diabetes mellitus. On May 27,
2012, he had an HbAlc of 10.0%. On February 8, 2013, he had an HbAlc
of 12.5%.

(R. at 20.) The AU provided nothing more in the Decision concerning Alvarado’s
diabetes, whether alone or in conjunction with the other severe impairments that the AL]
specifically found.
Having concluded that Alvarado’s diabetes was a severe impairment, more was
required of the AU’s analysis on this issue in the third step and in the subsequent
analysis. There is no way for the Court to meaningfully review the Decision on this issue
because the AL] gave no reasons for the conclusion that Alvarado’s severe diabetes
impairment, either alone or in combination with his other severe impairments, did not
merit an award of benefits. See Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 279 Fed.Appx. 149, 151
(3d Cir. 2008) (reversing a district court’s affirmance of an AU’s decision on this
ground, and directing that ‘[o]n remand, the AU shall fully develop the record and
explain his findings at step three, including an analysis of whether and why [the

6

claimants] diabetes

.

.

[and other severe impairments] in combination, are or are not

equivalent in severity to one of the listed impairments”); Miller v. Astrue, No. 11-7094.
2013 WL 3043460. at *8_9 (D.N.J. June 14, 2013) (holding that the AU erred in failing
to set forth an analysis of the claimant’s diabetes in conjunction with the claimant’s other
severe impairments, and as a result the district court cannot provide a

meaningful

judicial review of [the AU’s] findings”).
The Commissioner attempts to salvage the inadequate analysis set forth by the
AU concerning Alvarado’s severe diabetes impairment, by arguing the following:
Here, there was no evidence that Plaintiff’s diabetes, even if uncontrolled
at times, caused him to meet or equal the criteria of a listing for another
body system. There was no evidence that Plaintiff experienced any
complications of diabetes, such as chronic hyperglycemia, that affected
his cardiovascular system. In fact, Plaintiffs diabetes mellitus was often
diagnosed without complication.
(ECF No. 14 at 18 (citations and quotation marks omitted).)
The Commissioner also argues the following concerning Alvarado’s severe
diabetes impairment:
{T]he AU noted that Plaintiffs glucose level was high at times. but, as
stated above, there was no evidence that he had any complications, such
as hyperglycemia or episodes of dizziness, from diabetes mellitus
the extent, however, that Plaintiffs diabetes

.

.

.

[was] more limiting, the

AU’s inclusion in the RFC of no climbing of ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds, and no work around heights or machinery. reasonably took
th[isl other [impairment] into account.
(ECF No. 14 at 23 (citations omitted).)

7

o

However, the Commissioner’s arguments that are quoted above were not made by
the AU in the Decision, and the Court will not graft these arguments onto the assessment
set forth by the AL

$ç Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (holding that an AU must provide an

explanation of the findings in order to permit a meaningful review by a district

court):

see

alsoBuchananv.Astrue,No. 11-166, 2012 WU 6085151, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 6,2012)

(remanding a Social Security matter where the AU failed to explicitly address the
claimant’s acknowledged severe diabetes impairment, and rejecting the Commissioner’s
attempts to belatedly raise medical evidence that was omitted by the AU because that
sort of analysis was reserved for the AU to make in the first instance).
Consequently, because the AU failed to properly analyze Alvarado’s diabetes at
step three, this necessarily led to improper conclusions in the next steps of the analysis..
See Roseboro v. Astrue. No. 07-5204, 2008 WL 2224817. at *2 (D.N.J. May 27. 2008)
(remanding a Social Security matter where the AU found that the claimant suffered from
a severe diabetes impairment, but then the AU failed to address that impairment in the
subsequent steps). In view of the Third Circuit’s clear guidance that has been set forth in
Torres, the Court must remand this matter for a fuller assessment of Alvarado’s diabetes
on its own and in conjunction with the other severe impairments listed by the AUJ in the
subsequent steps.
Because the CoLirt has determined that a remand is appropriate based upon the
AU’s improper assessment of Alvarado’s diabetes, a new sequential evaluation is
necessary. Thus, the Court will not address Alvarado’s remaining substantive challenges.

8

because they should necessarily be addressed upon remand. See Lawrence v. Colvin, No.
15-2851,2016WL 1644622, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2016).’

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court rernands the matter for further proceedings
that are consistent with this Opinion. The Court will issue an appropriate Order.

ME L. LINARES
‘hief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: June

/97

,2017

The Court does note that contrary to an argument raised by Alvarado (see
ECf No. 11 at 17—19), the AU properly addressed Alvarado’s severe impairment of
obesity by (1) referring to Social Security Ruling 02-ip in the analysis, and (2)
considering the effect of his obesity individually and in combination with the other
impairments. (SeeR. at 17, 20.) See Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d
Cir. 2009) (setting forth the standard for an assessment of obesity by an AU); Cooper v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 26$ Fed.Appx. 152, 156 (3d Cir, 200$) (setting forth the same).
Nevertheless, the proper assessment of Alvarado’s obesity does not cure the deficiencies
found in the AU’s assessment ofAlvarado’s diabetes.

9