BOSWELL v. CABLE SERVICES COMPANY, INC., ET ALS
OPINION. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 06/28/2017. (ek)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NEWTON BOS WELL,
Civil Action No. 1 6-4498
CABLE SERVICES COMPANY, INC.,
KAREN FISCHER, JOSEPH CASCHERA,
PAULETTE HENSLER, JOHN DOES 1-10,
JANE DOES 1-10 (said names being fictitious
and unknown), ABC COMPANY 1-10 (said
names being fictitious and unknown),
John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on the above-captioned Defendants’ motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, to transfer due to improper venue, and to dismiss Plaintiffs claim
under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) for failure to state a claim. D.E. 4.
The Court reviewed all submissions made in support and opposition, and considered the motion
without oral argument pursuant to L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted. As a result, the Court does not reach
the motion to dismiss for improper venue or for failure to state a claim.
FACTS’ AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant Cable Services Company, Inc. (“Cable Services” or “Defendant”) is
incorporated in Pennsylvania and has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. D.E. 4-7
D.E. 4-4. Defendant Karen Fischer has always worked in Cable Services’
office in Williamsport, Pennsylvania and, at all relevant times, been a Pennsylvania resident. D.E.
9-1 (“Fischer Supp. Cert.”)
Defendants Joseph Caschera and Paulette Hensler no longer
work for Cable Services, but at all relevant times, worked out of Cable Services’ Williamsport,
Pennsylvania office and were Pennsylvania residents.2 Fischer Cert. ¶J 10, 12; Fischer Supp. Cert.
Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident. D.E. 5 at 5.
On December 7, 2009, Defendant Cable Services Company, Inc. (“Cable Services” or
“Defendant”) hired Plaintiff Newton Boswell to work as a “lineman.” Compl. at 2. Cable Services
is a full service provider of telecommunications that specializes in broadband infrastructure design
and installation in the United States. Fischer Cert.
Plaintiffs duties as a lineman consisted of
“installing lock boxes, frame poles strand and cables at job sites throughout the Pennsylvania and
New York area.” Id.
in Pennsylvania. Id. at
In 2010, Plaintiffs earnings were exclusively from jobs he performed
1$. In 2011, the majority of Plaintiffs job assignments were in New
York, but some were in Pennsylvania. Id.
19. Thus, although Plaintiff lived in New Jersey, his
work for Cable Services occurred in Pennsylvania and New York.
The facts of this matter derive from the Complaint and the affidavits submitted in support and
opposition to this motion. As this is a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court
looks to facts beyond those alleged in the Complaint. See DayhoffInc. v. N.J Heinz Co., $6 F.3d
1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996).
Defendants’ public record search indicates that Caschera and Hensler still reside in Pennsylvania.
Fischer Supp. Cert. ¶ 9, 12. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary.
On July 6, 2011, Plaintiff injured his right knee while working at a project in New York.
Compl. at 2. After two knee surgeries, Plaintiff returned to work on August 2, 2011 with modified
duties. Id. On August 17, 2011, Plaintiff suffered a “serious” hand injury at work causing him to
undergo two additional surgeries. Id.3 The hand injury also occurred in New York.
On March 27, 2012, Plaintiff was examined by “the insurance company’s”4 independent
medical examiner (“IME”). Id. at 3.
On April 9, Plaintiff received the IME report, which
concluded that Plaintiff was restricted to lifting no more than twenty pounds with his right hand.
Id. at 4. On April 18, 2012, Plaintiff informed Cable Service’s human resources manager that
Plaintiff had been released back to work with restricted lifting duties for his right hand. Id.; Fischer
Plaintiff alleges that Cable Services maintained a location in Sparta, New Jersey where he
could have been assigned the light duty position known as a “flagger.” Compi. at 9. In the
Complaint, Plaintiff does not state that he ever applied for the flagger position (or any other
position in Sparta) or that such a position was available. In a certification submitted in opposition
to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff claims that in March 2012, he asked Defendant Karen Fischer,
Cable Services’ human resources manager, for the flagger position in Sparta but that she denied
his request “because [he] had been laid off and not returned to [his] job [for] over one year.” D.E.
5-2 (“Boswell Cert.”)
¶ 4; D.E.
10-1 (“Boswell Supp. Cert.”)
Plaintiff also states that he was
denied the position because Cable Services “already had flaggers” and Plaintiff was not certified
as a flagger. Boswell Supp. Cert.
According to Defendants, “Cable Services never advertised
Plaintiff also refers to contracting Hepatitis B from a co-worker, Id. at 3, but the Complaint is
vague as to how this condition is relevant to Plaintiffs claims. The Complaint is not clear as to
whether this condition is supposed to be a basis for Plaintiffs claims.
It is not entirely clear from the Complaint who “the insurance company” is.
for, nor hired any candidates for a [flagger or other light duty position at [the Sparta] location.”
Fischer Supp. Cert.
¶ 17. During the relevant timeframe, Cable Services placed advertisements
for only three positions in Sparta, all of which were not “light duty” and required qualifications
that Plaintiff did not possess. Id.
¶] 19-20. Ultimately, Cable Services did not assign Plaintiff to
another position and their employer-employee relationship ended.5
Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging the following eight causes of action: (1) “Gross
negligence and/or negligence in the hiring, training, retaining, supervision, and retention of the
Defendant[s] Karen Fis[cJher, Joseph L. Caschera, [and] Paulette Hensler,” (2) “Conspiracy to
commit acts and violate Plaintiffs’ [sic] rights,” (3) “Fraudulent concealment/misrepresentation,”
(4) “Intentional and/or negligent breach of fiduciary duty,” (5) “Breach of statutory duty,” (6)
“Claim for violation of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, et seq., 42
USCA 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988[,J ADA, Title VII,” (7) “Request for punitive damages,” and
(8) “Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with
beneficial economic expectations.” Compl. at 13-25. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, to transfer due to improper venue, and to dismiss Plaintiffs claim
under the LAD for failure to state a claim.6 Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendants replied.
Plaintiff then filed a sur-reply.7
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The exact date that Plaintiff officially stopped working for Cable Services is not clear. See, e.g.,
Compl. at 18.
Defendants’ brief and supporting papers in support of their motion to dismiss (D.E. 4) will be
referred to as “Def. Br.” Plaintiffs submissions in opposition (D.E. 5) will be called “P1. Opp.”
Defendants’ reply papers (D.E. 9) will be referred to as “Def. Rep.” Plaintiffs sur-reply (D.E. 10)
will be known as “P1. Sur-Rep.”
Plaintiff filed the sur-reply without leave of the Court. However, the Court subsequently granted
Plaintiff leave to do so. D.E. 15.
A. Standard of Review
In a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “bears the burden of
demonstrating the facts that establish”jurisdiction. Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 f.3d 361,
368 (3d Cir. 2002). Initially, a court “take[s] the allegations of the complaint as true.” Dayhoff
Inc. v. Hi Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996). However, once a defendant raises a
jurisdictional defense, “a plaintiff bears the burden of proving by affidavits or other competent
evidence that jurisdiction is proper.” Id.; see also Time Share Vacation Chtb v. Ati. Resorts, Ltd.,
735 F.2d 61, 66 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984). Yet, in reviewing the evidence, a court must “accept all of the
plaintiffs allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Carteret Say.
Shttshan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Metcalfe v. Renaissance
Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is well established that in deciding a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court is required to accept the plaintiffs allegations as true,
and is to construe disputed factors in favor of the plaintiff’) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, the Court looks beyond the
pleadings to all relevant evidence and construes all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
“[A] federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state
in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of that state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499
F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Provident Nat ‘1 Bank v. cal. federal Say. & Loan Ass ‘n,
819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.1987)). In New Jersey, “courts may exercise jurisdiction over a non
resident defendant to the uttermost limits permitted by the United States Constitution.” Nicastro
v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 72 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev ‘d on
other grounds sub nom., I McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). “Accordingly,
in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, we ask whether, under the Due Process Clause,
the defendant has certain minimum contacts with [New Jersey] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 0 ‘Connor v. Sandy
Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Personal jurisdiction may be established by means of general jurisdiction or specific
jurisdiction over a defendant. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (noting that “opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe decision have
differentiated between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked
jurisdiction”). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is
the individual’s domicile[.]” DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). “With respect
to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm bases for
general jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A corporation’s principal place of
business is where the corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as
to render it essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Once general jurisdiction is established, a defendant can be sued in that jurisdiction on any matter.
This is why general jurisdiction is referred to as “all-purpose” jurisdiction.
Specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant “has purposefully directed his activities at
residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to
those activities.” Burger King Corp. e. Ritdzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction “requires some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” I McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, $80 (2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, due process requires that “maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting int’l Shoe C’o. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see
also O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 316 (discussing three-step process in determining personal
jurisdiction). Importantly, “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [must
be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). “[A] plaintiffs residence, by itself, is
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction” over a defendant. Choi v. Damttl Corp., No. 1 22440, 2014 WL 314669, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2014). Once specific jurisdiction is established, a
defendant can be sued in the jurisdiction only in the matter from which the jurisdiction arises. This
is why specific jurisdiction is referred to as “case-linked” jurisdiction.
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the Court has both general and specific personal
jurisdiction over Defendants. P1. Opp. at 5,8-10. As to the individual Defendants, Plaintiff makes
no showing that any are domiciled in New Jersey, so the Court does not have general jurisdiction
over them. As a result, the Court does not have general jurisdiction over the individual Defendants.
As to Cable Services, it is a Pennsylvania corporation whose principal place of business is
also in that state. Thus, pursuant to the Supreme Court of the United States’ analysis in Daimler,
it does not appear that the Court has general jurisdiction over Cable Services either. See Daimler
AG, 134 5. Ct. at 760. Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that the Court has general personal
jurisdiction over Defendants by virtue of Cable Services having registered to do business in New
Jersey. Unfortunately, Plaintiff provides no legal authority to support his argument. Through its
own research, the Court has determined that despite a split of authority in the District of New
Jersey, the mere fact that Cable Services is registered to do business in New Jersey and appointed
an agent to receive process does not mean that it is subject to general jurisdiction in New Jersey.
In Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., Chief Judge Simandle addressed the issue of whether
a corporation’s registration to do business and appointment of a registered agent for service of
process in New Jersey means that the corporation consented to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.
106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 467 (D.N.J. 2015). In relying on two Supreme Court cases from the first half
of the twentieth century, Chief Judge Simandle concluded that “a corporation’s appointment of an
agent for service of process constitutes, under certain circumstances, consent to the forum’s
personal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 30$ U.S. 165
(1939); Pa. fire Ins. Co. ofPhila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95 (1917)).
The court reasoned that “in appointing an agent, a foreign corporation ‘takes the risk of the
construction that will be put upon the [registrationj statute and the scope of the agency by the State
Court.” Id. at 468 (quoting Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S.
213, 216 (1921)).
Additionally, Chief Judge Simandle relied on a decision from the Third Circuit, Bane v.
Netlink, Inc., where the Court found that “by registering to do business in Pennsylvania, the
defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, th[u]s invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Otsuka Pharm., 106 F. 3d at 468
(quoting Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991)). Finally, the Otsuka Pharmacy
court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision inDaimler did not preclude jurisdiction through
a corporation’s consent by means of registration and appointment of an agent for service of
In Chief Judge Simandle’s view, Daimler concerned non-consensual general
jurisdiction over a corporation but did not “cast any doubt on the continued vitality of consent
based jurisdiction.” Id. Therefore, the court in Otsuka Pharmacy concluded that two of the
defendant corporations consented to jurisdiction in New Jersey by means of registering to do
business and appointing a registered agent. Id. at 470. See also Senjît Pharm. Co. v. Metrics, Inc.,
96 F. Supp. 3d 428, 438 (D.N.J. 2015) (noting that “acceptance of service by a defendant registered
to do business in the state establishes personal jurisdiction”); Sadler v. Halismith SYSCO food
Servs., No. 08-4423, 2009 WL 1096309, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2009) (“Because the Court finds
that [the defendant corporation] consented to being sued in the courts of New Jersey, the Court
need not engage in an analysis of [the defendant corporation’s] contacts with the state.”).
In another decision from this District, Judge Arleo reached the opposite conclusion. In
Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, the court found that a corporation did not consent to jurisdiction
in New Jersey merely by registering to do business here and appointing an agent for service of
process. 182 F. Supp. 3d 166, 179 (D.N.J. 2016). The court relied on two primary premises to
support its conclusion.
First, Judge Arleo distinguished the Third Circuit’s decision in Bane.
explained that in Bane, the Third Circuit was interpreting Pennsylvania’s registration statute,
which provided that by registering to do business in Pennsylvania and designating an agent for
service of process, a corporation consents to personal jurisdiction there. Id. at 173-75. Unlike the
Pennsylvania registration statute, the Display Works court reasoned, the New Jersey statute does
not expressly state that a corporation consents to jurisdiction when it registers to do business in
New Jersey. Id. at 174-75. Therefore, Judge Arleo concluded that “Bane compels the Court to
find that the New Jersey statutory scheme does not permit [general] jurisdiction by consent by
virtue of registration to do business here or actually doing business here.” Id. at 175.
Second, Judge Arleo found that the early to mid-twentieth century Supreme Court
decisions relied upon by the court in Otsuka Pharmaceutical “developed from an outmoded way
of thinking about jurisdiction” and were inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Daimler. Id. at 176-77. Judge Arleo reasoned that
the sweeping interpretation that a state court gave to a routine
registration statute and an accompanying power of attorney that
Pennsylvania fire credited as a general “consent” has yielded to the
doctrinal refinement reflected in Goodyear and Daimler and the
Court’s 21st century approach to general and specific jurisdiction in
light of expectations created by the continuing expansion of
interstate and global business.
Id. at 178 (quotingBrown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 f.3d 619, 639 (2d Cir. 2016)). Therefore,
Judge Arleo concluded that a corporation’s registration to do business and appointment of an agent
for service of process in New Jersey does not mean that the corporation consented to general
personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.
The Court finds Judge Arleo’s reasoning in Display Works persuasive. The Court agrees
that Bane is distinguishable due to the differences in the Pennsylvania and New Jersey corporation
registration statutes. Importantly, the New Jersey Statute does not contain any express language
to put a corporation on notice that by registering to do business in New Jersey, it is also consenting
to personal jurisdiction in the state. See N.J.S.A. 14A:1-1 et seq.; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 291 (“Due process requires that the defendant be given adequate notice of the suit and be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.” (internal citation omitted)). Moreover, the Court
finds that consent by registration is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler.
Daimler reiterated the principal from Goodyear that there is general jurisdiction over a corporation
in its place of incorporation and its principal place of business. Daimler, 134 5. Ct. at 760.
Daimler also cautioned that older decisions addressing general jurisdiction over a corporation
should be afforded limited weight. Id. at 761 n. 18 (stating that cases “decided in the era dominated
territorial thinking should not attract heavy reliance today” (citation omitted)). In
short, the Court cannot square the theory of consent to jurisdiction by mere registration and
appointment of an agent for service with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant Cable Service’s registration to do
business in New Jersey does not mean it consented to general jurisdiction in New Jersey.
Accordingly, the Court does not have general jurisdiction over any of the Defendants.
Plaintiff alternately contends that there is specific jurisdiction because his claims arise out
of Defendants’ failure to hire him for the flagger position in Sparta, New Jersey. P1.
Opp. at 5, 9-
10. As noted, in his Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege that he applied for a flagger job in Sparta
or that one was even available. Also, in his Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege that any of the
individual Defendants took any action in or directed at New Jersey. Even in his supplemental
certification, Plaintiff still fails to assert that such a position was even available. According to
Defendants, there was not a flagger position (or any other light duty position) available in Sparta
and Defendants never hired anyone to fill these unavailable positions. In short, Plaintiff offers no
“competent evidence” that a flagger position was even open in Sparta. Dayhoff 86 F.3d at 1302.
In the absence of such evidence, Plaintiffs causes of action do not arise out of any contact that
Defendants had with New Jersey.
In other words, Plaintiff cannot show specific personal
jurisdiction by arguing that Defendants failed to hire him for a flagger position in New Jersey when
he has presented no competent proof that the position was available or that it even existed.8
In his supplemental certification, Plaintiff notes that on June 23, 2016, he took a picture of a van
with cable wires at the Sparta location. P1. Sur-Rep. ¶ C(3). Plaintiff states that “[t]he cable wire
evidenced linemen jobs and wherever there are linemen jobs, there have to be at least 2 flaggers
on the job.” Id. According to Plaintiff, this picture shows that there are at least two flagger jobs
in Sparta, New Jersey. However, the fact that two flaggers may have possibly been working in
Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof in establishing specific personal jurisdiction
Plaintiff finally argues that Defendants have waived their ability to contest personal
jurisdiction because they made a “general appearance,” as opposed to a “special appearance.” P1.
Sur-Rep. at 2. Plaintiff cites to Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d
871 (3d Cir. 1944) to support his argument.1° P1. Sur-Rep. at 2. Orange Theater, however, stands
for the exact opposite proposition than that advanced by Plaintiff. In that case, the Third Circuit
It necessarily follows that Rule 12 has abolished for the federal
courts the age-old distinction between general and special
appearances. A defendant need no longer appear specially to attack
the court’s jurisdiction over him. He is no longer required at the
door of the federal courthouse to intone that ancient abracadabra of
the law, de bene esse, in order by its magic power to enable himself
to remain outside even while he steps within. He may now enter
openly in full confidence that he will not thereby be giving up any
keys to the courthouse door which he possessed before he came in.
This, of course, is not to say that such keys must not be used
promptly. If the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the person is not
raised by motion before answer or in the answer itself it is by the
express terms of paragraph (h) of Civil Procedure Rule 12 to be
treated as waived, not because of the defendant’s voluntary
appearance but because of his failure to assert the defense within the
time prescribed by the rules.
Sparta in 2016 more than four years afler Plaintiff claims he asked for a flagger position is
entirely irrelevant to this matter. The picture submitted by Plaintiff does not demonstrate that a
flagger position was available in Sparta at the time Plaintiff was seeking the job.
Plaintiff appears to imply that Defendants have the burden of demonstrating that there is no
personal jurisdiction. P1. Opp. at 10 (“[I]t is the Defendant that must present a compelling case
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdictions [sic] unreasonable.”).
The Third Circuit, however, has made clear that the burden to show personal jurisdiction is on the
Plaintiff. O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Once challenged,
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.”).
Plaintiff cites to a second case, which he identifies as “Long v. Newhouse, 570 Ohio St. 348,
49 NE 577.” The Court is unable to locate this case based on the citation provided.
Id. at 874. The abolition of the distinction between special and general appearances applies with
equal force today. See AliGood Entm ‘t, Inc. v. Gridiron Video, No. 09-2406, 2012 WL 395373,
at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2012). Here, Defendants appeared in this matter and filed a timely motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Defendants were not required to make a “special
appearance” to do so. Therefore, Defendants have not waived their right to contest personal
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is granted.” Plaintiff may file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies
identified herein within thirty days of this Opinion in accordance with Local Civil Rule 15.1.12
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: June 28, 2017
John Michael Vazquez, 11lJS.D.(..
Because the Court is dismissing this matter for lack of personal jurisdiction, it does not reach
Defendants’ arguments regarding dismissal for improper venue and for failure to state a claim
under the LAD. However, the Court notes two points.
First, if Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint in New Jersey, Plaintiff should carefully
review the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and legal authority governing venue.
Second, the Court emphasizes that Plaintiff must plausibly plead his causes of action. As it
currently stands, the Complaint is often confusing, not in chronological order, and difficult to
follow. For example, in Count Six, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the LAD, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. However, in the succeeding paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated
under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and New Jersey Constitution. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks a
“demand for production pursuant to R. 4:18-2,” which is a New Jersey Court Rule that is
inapplicable in federal court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must make plausible
allegations to support his claims for relief.
Effective May 10, 2017, Local Civil Rule 15.1 states, in part, that
a party who files an amended pleading in response to an Order
authorizing the filing of that pleading to cure a defect in its pleading
(1) a copy of the amended pleading, complete with a handwritten or
(2) a form of the amended pleading that shall indicate in what
respect(s) it differs from the pleading that it amends, by bracketing
or striking through materials to be deleted and underlining materials
to be added.
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