MURTADA v. U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION et al

Filing 4

LETTER OPINION. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 10/27/2016. (JB, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG
POST OFFICE AND
COURTHOUSE
2 FEDERAL SQUARE, RooM

CHAMBERS OF
JOHN MICHAEL VAZQUEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

417
NJ 07102
973-297-4851

NEWARK,

October 27, 2016

LETTER OPINION
Re:

Murtada v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., et at,
Civil Action No. 16-04639

Dear Litigant:
The Court is in receipt of your complaint and application to proceed without prepayment
of fees or costs in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See D.E. 1.
Under § 1915, this Court may excuse a litigant from prepayment of fees when the litigant
“establish[es] that he is unable to pay the costs of his suit.” Walker i’. People Express Airlines,
Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). At the outset, Plaintiff sufficiently establishes his inability
to pay, and the Court grants his application to proceed infonna pauperis without prepayment of
fees and costs.’
However, when allowing a plaintiff to proceed in farina pauperis, the Court must review
the complaint and dismiss the action if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “A complaint is frivolous if it ‘lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact.” Ohpor i’. Sedgwick CMS, No. 12-6521, 2013 WL 1145041, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar.
18, 2013) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). And when considering
dismissal under § l915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the
Court must apply the same standard of review as that for dismissing a complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012).

The Court notes that Plaintiff did not sign the section of the informapauperis application
affirming the truth of the statements included therein. The Court will assume that Plaintiffs
failure to sign was a mere oversight and that his financial information is twthftflly and accurately
stated. Since the Court is dismissing this matter without prejudice, if Plaintiff opts to file an
amended complaint, he must also include a signed application.

In addition, “[a] federal court is bound to consider its own jurisdiction preliminary to
consideration of the merits.” Kaplan v. Garrison, No. 15-1915, 2015 WL 2159827, at *2 (D.N.J.
May 6, 2015) (quoting Trent Real/v Assocs. v. First Fed. Sai’. & Loan Ass’n of Phila., 657 F.2d
29,36 (3d Cir.1981)). If subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Court must dismiss the action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction in a civil case if either a federal question
is presented or if the parties are completely diverse and the attendant monetary threshold is
satisfied. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006).
Because Plaintiff is proeeedingpro se, the Court construes the pleadings liberally and holds
them to a less stringent standard than those filed by attorneys. Haines i. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). “The Court need not, however, credit apro se plaintiffs ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions.” D’Agostino v. CECOA’[RDEC, No. 10-4558, 2010 WL 3719623, at *1 (D.N.J.
Sept. 10, 2010) (citingMorse v. LouerMerjo,, Sc/i. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997)).
According to Plaintiff’s complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, on May 28, 2015, the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) rejected Plaintiff’s “request for
reinstatement of [his commercial motor vehicle] operating authority registration.” D.E. 1-3. On
April 11, 2016, pursuant to an administrative appeal, the FMCSA overturned its decision and
reinstated Plaintiffs operating authority. D.E. 1-5. The entirety of the facts alleged in Plaintiffs
complaint are as follows:
Plaintiff the owner of Public Transportation Authority US Dot #
59 1725, Mc # 301706 since 1996 until the events Rise. FMCSA
Revoked my Authority Due to Insurance Liability cancellation on
7/7/14 the FMCSA sent a letter to plaintiff directing the motor
carrier to reinstate the Authority once the Insurance Liability in
place. the plaintiff bought Insurance Liability From night Brook
Insurance Company in 10/22/2014 and timely Filed the
reinstatement form and the fees in Amount of S80.00 paid to the
FMCSA timely Exh. (P-I). but the FMCSA made Factual Error by
wrongfully rejected my Petition to reinstate my Authority on
5/28/20 15 Exh. (P-2). then the Plaintiff timely filed an appeal with
u.s. Department of Transportation on 6/5/2015 Exh. (P-3). The
Department of Transportation on 04/12/2016 Granted my Appeal
and ordered the FMCSA Agency to reinstate my Authority #
591725. Exh. (P-4). During this Period of time the Plaintiff
sustained damage and Expenses and loss of Contracts and loss of
business more that $300,000.00 + Interest + costs.2
[D.E. I at 3.]
Plaintiff attached five exhibits to his complaint which collectively demonstrate that the
FMCSA decision to revoke his commercial motor vehicle operating authority was overturned
2

The Court quotes Plaintiffs language as it appears in the complaint, including grammar,
punctuation, and capitalization.
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pursuant to an administrative appeal and his operating authority was reinstated. Id. at Exs. 1-5.
Plaintiff seeks relief
for the damage sustained from the defendant negligence and wrong
doing For the Plaintiff Loss of income, Loss of contracts, Loss of
Business and all expenses. Just Insurance Liability During this
Period the Plaintiff Paid S90.000 dollars as follows:
I. Insurance Premium to Night brook Ins. Co. and Topa Insurance
Company Exh. (P-5) $90,000.00
2. Loss of Contracts $190,000.00
3. Loss of Income will be calculated with Cost & Interests.3
[Id. at 4.]
Here, the complaint fails to assert a cognizable claim against Defendants, the Department
of Transportation and the FMCSA. Even when viewing the complaint liberally, the Court is unable
to ascertain an identifiable claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants are agencies of the federal government who may not be sued absent a waiver
of sovereign immunity. See F.D.LC. i Meyer. 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver,
sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”); United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite forjurisdiction.”). Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity for tort claims
“caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission” of federal employees “under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(I); see also Meyer,
510 U.S. at 477-78.
It appears that Plaintiff is claiming damages sustained as a result of the FMCSA’s initial
decision to revoke his commercial vehicle operating authority. In essence, it appears that Plaintiff
is proceeding on a theory that because the FMCSA’s initial decision was “negligent” and
“wrongiffi” (as evidenced by the fact it was overturned on appeal), he should be able to recover
damages flowing therefrom. However, Plaintiff has cited no legal authority, and the Court has
found none, that supports a cognizable cause of action under such facts. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
not stated a cognizable legal claim.
When dismissing a case brought by a pro se plaintiff, a court must decide whether the
dismissal will be with or without prejudice. Gravson v. Mavview State Hasp., 293 F.3d 103, 110II (3d Cir. 2002). If the complaint is dismissed without prejudice, a plaintiff may amend the
complaint. Id. The district court should deny leave to amend only if(l) the moving party’s delay
in seeking amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to the non-moving party or
Again, the Court quotes Plaintiffs claim for relief as it appears in the complaint.
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(2) the amendment would be futile. Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1984). Here,
the Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice and will permit Plaintiff to refile his
complaint with greater particularity describing the nature and basis ofjudsdiction for his claims.
Plaintiff must indicate a cLaim or cause of action that is legally recognized. The Court notes that
Plaintiffs complaint has already been dismissed once without prejudice under a different docket
number. See Munada v. US. Dept of Transp., 16-3057 at D.E. 2 (D.N.J. June 17, 2016). If
Plaintiff intends to refile, he must do so within forty-five days of this order.
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff has included his credit card information on the public
docket. See D.E. 1, attachment 2. In the interest of protecting Plaintiffs confidential information.
the Court will order that docket entry’ I, attachment 2 be sealed. If Plaintiff wishes to refile his
complaint and maintain a complete record, lie should refile docket entry 1, attachment 2 with all
confidential information redacted.
In conclusion, Plaintiffs application to proceed in Jörma pauperis is granted and the
complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally,
docket entry I, attachment 2 shall be sealed. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

John Michael

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