SAISI v. MURRAY et al

Filing 62

OPINION. etc. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 5/30/2019. (dam, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HEMMING WAY MUKORA SAISL

Civil Action No. 16-5064 (CCC) (JBC)
Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

CAROLYN MURRAY, et at.,
Defendants

CECCHI, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the complaint filed by Plaintiff Hemmingway
Mukora Saisi (“Plaintiff), asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for alleged violations of

Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Presently before the Court are two motions to dismiss by all
remaining Defendants (“Motions to Dismiss”), (ECF Nos. 57, 58), seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs
Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 49.) For the reasons stated below, the Motions
to Dismiss are granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this Opinion, the Court accepts all facts alleged in the SAC as true, and
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff raises claims against only four Defendants out of
the original sixteen: Carolyn Murray, Michael Marucci, Elizabeth Connolly, and Alfaro Ortiz.
Plaintiffs claims arise out of his confinement as a pretrial detainee between May 9, 2008, and
December 31, 2016, when he was incarcerated in Essex County Jail and Ann Klein Forensic
Center. (ECF No. 49 at 3—4.) While the SAC is not a model of clarity, Plaintiff appears to allege
claims related to his conditions of confinement and a claim of conspiracy. He explains that

Defendants Murray and Marucci “conspired with the other defendants by using psychologists to
diagnose [Plainitff] with mental diseases” and forced him to take debilitating psychotropic
medications. (Id. at 6.) He explains that he was attacked by other patients and restricted to his
cell for 23 hours a day. (Id. at 8.) He further states that he was subjected to excessive force, verbal
abuse by staff, sleep deprivation, and he was placed in a cell without water, a mattress, blanket or
a working toilet. (Id.) Plaintiff states that the Defendants had “a gainful arrangement” to shuffle
him between the two jails.

(Id. at 9.) While at Essex County Jail, Plaintiff states that he

experienced numerous harms: he was kept in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day, he was
beaten by inmates and guards, he was placed in cells with feces and no water, he was denied
medication, and denied other basic necessities. (Id. at 9—10.) Overall, Plaintiff argues that he was
intentionally found to be mentally ill, as punishment for his refusal to plead guilty, and that
Defendants Connolly and Ortiz should be liable under the theory of respondeat superior for being
in charge of the agencies that caused the harms. (Id. at 2, 11—13.) In addition, he argues that he
was discriminated against on the basis of his African origin and was subjected to excessive bail.
(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory relief. (Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in August of 2016. (ECF No. 1.) Upon motions by
Defendants, the Court dismissed all claims except those against Defendant Loretta E. Lynch. (ECF
No. 28). The Court allowed Plaintiff to amend the Complaint, and directed Plaintiff to provide
proof of service upon Lynch. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in September 2017,
(ECF No. 35), but did not provide proof of service upon Lynch. Defendants filed motions to
dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint, which the Court granted in May 201$. (ECF No. 4$.) The
Court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice, but cautioned that Plaintiff would be
given one final opportunity to amend, and that failure to raise a valid claim would result in a

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dismissal with prejudice. (Id. at 4.) On or about June 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed his SAC alleging
claims against four of the original sixteen defendants. (ECF No. 49.) In response, Defendants
filed their Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 57, 58), Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 59), and
Defendant Ortiz filed a Reply. (ECF No. 60.)
IL

LEGAL STANDARD

Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Erickson v. Fardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations
omitted). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice
of what the.

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.

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (citations omitted).
While a complaint. does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiffs obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment]
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.
.

.

.

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Belt Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); see Connetly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). On a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim brought pursuant to federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
“defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United
States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept
its factual allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012),
and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-2 1
(1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
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III.

DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Alfaro Ortiz
Defendant Alfaro Ortiz is the Director of the Essex County Jail. (ECF No. 57-1 at 7).

Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant Ortiz are (1) based on the doctrine of respondeat superior,
for his failure to properly train and supervise his employees and for being in “charge of agencies
that allowed this to happen,” (ECF No. 49 at 2, 13), and (2) based on an alleged conspiracy between
Defendant Ortiz and the other named Defendants to deliberately engage in the alleged conduct.
See (ECF No. 49 at 12-13).
a. Respondeat Superior Claims
In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Ortiz argues that he lacked personal involvement in
the alleged harms. (ECF No. 57-1 at 7—10.) The Court agrees that personal involvement in the
alleged harms has not been sufficiently alleged in the Complaint. “A defendant in a civil rights
action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable and cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.”
Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted); see also
Hodges v. Mankey, 651 F. App’x $1, $3 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Defendants in civil rights actions ‘must
have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs’; any liability cannot be based only on respondeat
superior.”) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, $45 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 198$)).
The Third Circuit has found that a supervisor can be liable for acts of subordinates where
“he or she participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the
person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” Santiago v.
Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A.M ex rel. IM.K. v. Luzerne Cnty.
Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)). “[W]here a supervisor with authority over

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a subordinate knows that the subordinate is violating someone’s rights but fails to act to stop the
subordinate from doing so, the factfinder may usually infer that the supervisor ‘acquiesced’ in.
the subordinate’s conduct.” Bennett v. Washington, 2015 WL 731227, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19,
2015) (citing Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 f.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir.1997), abrogated on
other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co v. White, 584 U.S. 53 (2006)). To sufficiently
allege knowledge and acquiescence, a Plaintiff must provide facts suggesting that the defendant
supervisor “had contemporaneous, personal knowledge of [the alleged violation(s)] and
acquiesced in it.” See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that a civil
rights complaint “is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible”).
The conclusory statements in the Complaint fail to meet the standards outlined above. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (explaining that a complaint must offer more than labels or conclusions
to state a claim for relief.) Plaintiff has provided no facts indicating that Defendant Ortiz had
knowledge of the alleged harms Plaintiff experienced while incarcerated, nor acquiesced in any
alleged misconduct. Plaintiff has also failed to provide facts establishing any pattern or practice
which caused the alleged harms. Without facts establishing any form of personal involvement by
Defendant Ortiz, the claim fails under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that in order to survive a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show
that the claim is facially plausible.”) (citation omitted).

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b. Conspiracy Claims
In addition, Plaintiffs broad conspiracy claim similarly fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.’ “In order to state a claim of conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a

plaintiff must make specific factual allegations of a combination, agreement, or understanding
among all or between any of the defendants to plot, plan, or conspire to carry out the alleged chain
of events in order to deprive plaintiff of a federally protected right.” Adams v. City ofAtl. City,
294 F. Supp. 3d 283, 299 (D.N.J. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff
states that the Defendants “conspired.

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by using psychologists to diagnose [Plaintiff] with mental

diseases” and moved him back and forth between Essex County Jail and Ann Klein Forensic
Facility. (ECF No. 49 at 6, 9.) Plaintiff simply has not pled facts sufficient to state a cognizable
claim for conspiracy. He has not alleged any specific facts showing that there was an agreement
between the parties, nor has he alleged how the actions of the Defendants were done to deprive
Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff states, in a purely conclusory manner, that the
Defendants “conspired” to harm him. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “allow[] the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
Accordingly, Defendant Ortiz’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. In addition, Plaintiffs conspiracy
claim against all of the Defendants is dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.
B. Defendants Carolyn Murray, Elizabeth Connolly, Michael Marucci
The remaining named defendants in this matter are Carolyn Murray, the state prosecutor
in Essex County in the underlying criminal matter, Elizabeth Connolly, Commissioner of the New

Defendant Ortiz argues that Plaintiffs conspiracy claim is untimely. The Court declines
to address the timeliness of Plaintiffs conspiracy claim, because there are insufficient facts and
dates in the SAC to ascertain when the alleged conspiracy took place.
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Jersey Department of Human Services, and Michael Marucci, the Deputy Public Defender who
represented Plaintiff in the underlying criminal matter. In their combined Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants Murray, Connolly, and Marucci argue that the SAC should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim because: 1) they lacked personal involvement in the alleged harms; 2) Plaintiff cannot
rest his claims on a theory of respondeat superior; 3) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine
ofresjudicata; 4) a number of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Supreme Court holding in Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, (1994); and 5) Plaintiffs false arrest claim is untimely. (ECF No. 583 at 12.) In addition, Defendant Murray argues that she is immune from liability under the doctrine
of prosecutorial immunity, and Defendant Marucci argues that he did not act under color of state
law as a public defender. (Id. at 23—25.) The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for relief and grants their combined Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff makes various allegations related to his conditions of confinement, without
identifying how these particular Defendants were involved in the alleged harms. As noted supra,
a defendant must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable in a

§ 1983 action.

See Baraka, 481 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). With respect to Defendant Connolly, Plaintiff
states only that she should be liable under a theory of respondeat superior for being in charge of
the agency that carried out the harms against him. (ECF No. 49 at 13.) Plaintiff has not provided
facts demonstrating that Defendant Connolly was aware of any of the alleged harms. Plaintiff has
not stated, for example, that he wrote to Defendant Connolly personally, or filed any grievances.
Plaintiff attaches various documents to his SAC and his Response to the Motions to Dismiss, but
these documents fail to cure the deficiencies in his SAC. The documents include letters he drafied
to the Kenyan embassy, a letter to the District Court and a document detailing the outcome of a
hearing on his involuntary medication administration. (See ECF Nos. 49-1, 59-1.) None of these

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documents indicate that Defendant Connolly was aware of Plaintiffs complaints.

Because

Plaintiff has not provided facts alleging knowledge and acquiescence on the part of Defendant
Connolly, the claims against her are dismissed.
The Court’s analysis applies equally to Defendants Murray and Marucci. Apart from
Plaintiffs conspiracy claim, which the Court dismissed above, Plaintiff has not alleged how the
Defendants were involved in any of the alleged harms related to his conditions of confinement.
To prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, an inmate must be able to allege, “(1) the prison
official deprived the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) the
prison official acted with deliberate indifference in doing so, thereby exposing the inmate to a
substantial risk of serious damage to her future health.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep ‘t ofCorr.,
806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994)).
Here, even if the Court could find that Plaintiff has met the first prong outlined above,
because he has not established that Defendants Murray and Marucci caused the purported harms,

this claim fails to state a claim for relief. Nor can the Court conceive of how Defendants Murray
and Marucci could have been personally involved in the conditions of Plaintiffs confinement. Per
Plaintiffs original complaint, Defendant Murray is an Essex County prosecutor, and Defendant
Marucci is a public defender. (See ECF No. 1 at 1.) While the Defendants may have been involved
in Plaintiffs criminal prosecution, Plaintiffprovides no facts establishing their involvement in any
of the harms outlined in the SAC.

Defendant Murray is additionally protected by absolute

prosecutorial immunity and Defendant Marucci did not act under color of state law. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-30 (prosecutors enjoy common law immunity in §1983 matters in
order to ensure they keep “the independence ofjudgment” required to perform their duties); Polk

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Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-325 (finding public defender’s immunity exists because their
responsibilities are “in no way dependent on state authority”).
furthermore, Plaintiff filed a complaint raising the same issues which underly this action
in Saisi v. Jersey City Police Dept., 1 5-cv-202 1 (SRC), which was before Judge Chesler in this
District. In that matter, Judge Chesler dismissed the Complaint for pleading deficiencies similar
to the ones noted in this Opinion. Lastly, Plaintiffs false arrest claims appear to be barred by the
two-year statute of limitations, assuming the dates provided by Plaintiff in the Complaint.
Overall, it appears that Plaintiff is asserting that he was forced to take medication against
his will, he was repeatedly moved between two jails, and suffered while awaiting his delayed trial.
While these are all unfortunate experiences, without facts establishing that these harms were
deliberately caused by the named Defendants, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (facial plausibility of a pleading requires “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” to show “that the pleader is entitled to relief’). Accordingly, the
Motion to Dismiss is granted on all claims alleged in the SAC.
C. Amendment
Plaintiff has already been provided three opportunities to sufficiently plead his claims. In
the Court’s May 29, 2018 Memorandum Opinion granting the Defendants’ second motions to
dismiss, the Court cautioned that Plaintiff would be given one final opportunity to amend his
pleading, and that failure to perfect his pleading would result in a dismissal of his claims with
prejudice. (ECF No. 48 at 3—4.) Because Plaintiff has reasserted claims that have previously been
dismissed, and he has failed, once again, to perfect his pleading, the dismissal of his claims is with
prejudice. See Velazquez v. Zickerfoose, No. 11-2459, 2014 WL 6611058, at

*

7 (D.N.J. Nov. 21,

2014) (dismissing with prejudice afier having afforded plaintiff three opportunities to perfect

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pleading); see also Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 f.3d 103, 112—13 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
that futility of amendment is a proper reason to deny leave to amend).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS both motions to dismiss filed by the

Defendants. In addition, Plaintiffs claims are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. An appropriate
order follows.

Date:

0,

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Claire C. Cecchi, U.S.D.J.

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