AZIZ v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 5/25/2018. (sm)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ABDUL AZIZ,
Civil Action No. 16-5872 (CCC)
Petitioner,
v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.
CECCHI, District Judge.

This matter has come before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C.

§

2241 by Petitioner Abdul Aziz. Respondent has filed an answer, (ECF No. 21), and

Petitioner has filed a reply, (ECF No. 23). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the
Petition.
Petitioner is a pretrial detainee who is in state custody during the pendency of his criminal
prosecution. The Petition primarily asserts that the bail set by the state court in his criminal
proceeding was excessive and, by implication, the Court also construed the Petition as raising a
Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, as prolonged pretrial detention is closely related to speedy
trial issues. Petitioner repeatedly alleges that the state refused “to provide any Bail hearings,
reductions, or Release on own Recognizance” in violation of his constitutional rights, (ECF No. I
at 2), but without any factual support to explain his claim. Petitioner asks the Court to order his
immediate release. (Id. at 3.)
With regard to the speedy trial claim, in the answer, Respondent argues that this claim must
be denied because Petitioner did not exhaust state-court remedies. In Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir.
Ci. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a pretrial detainee’s habeas
challenge based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right musts still be exhausted

in state court, even though his criminal proceeding has yet to conclude. Here, Respondent asserts
that Petitioner never once made a speedy trial demand in state court, let alone exhaust state-court
remedies for such a challenge. (ECF No. 21 at 10-11.) In his reply, Petitioner did not address this
claim, essentially conceding the failure to exhaust. Understandably, this claim was one construed
by the Court on its own accord in the interest ofjustice, but now having the benefit of the record
before it, the Court is satisfied that there is no cognizable speedy trial claim in the instant matter,
so any such claim is denied.
With regard to the excessive bail claim, the hallmark of such a claim is whether the state
court acted arbitrarily in setting bail. See US. ex ret, Savitz v. Gatlagher, 800 F. Supp. 228, 231
(E.D. Pa. 1992). In deciding whether the state court acted arbitrarily, the Court must be mindful
of the deference it must accord to the state court, and can reverse a bail decision “only if it is way
off the mark to conclude that a certain amount of bond is within the constitutional standard[.]” Id.
(citation omitted). This is consistent with the deference this Court must afford a state court
decision on a

§ 2254 habeas petition—habeas relief is only warranted when there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could agree with the state court’s decision. See Harrington v. Rich/er, 562 U.s.
86, 102 (2011).
Here, as summarized above, Petitioner provides no factual allegations to support his claim.
While he alleges in the Petition that his bail has never been reviewed, Respondent asserts that
Petitioner has received not one, but two bail hearings in state court—one on July 13, 2011, the
other on November 18, 2016. (ECF No. 21 at 8.) Petitioner disputes that he received a bail hearing
on July 31, 2011, but admits that he did receive the November 18,2016 hearing.’ (ECF No.23 at

As this is a habeas petition, the Court is only concerned with the validity of Petitioner’s current
confinement. To the extent there may have been any constitutional defects during the first hearing,
2

2.) Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that the bail set at the second hearing was still unconstitutional
because the hearing was not held on the trial court’s own volition, but instead in response to an
order by the appellate court, and the bail was excessive due to a misleading representation made
by the prosecution to the trial court. (Id.) The Court fails to see why, if the trial court held a bail
hearing on its own volition, or in response to an order from a higher court, it would have any
relevance to the constitutional question. Moreover, Petitioner does not explain (I) why the bail
amount was excessive,2 (2) what misleading representation was made to the trial court, (3) why
the representation was misleading, or (4) how the representation materially affected the bail
decision. Without adequate factual support, it is impossible for the Court to determine whether
the trial court acted so arbitrarily as to be unconstitutional. As such, Petitioner has not satisfied
his burden of establishing entitlement to relief and this claim is denied. In the interest ofjustice,
Petitioner is afforded one last chance to amend the Petition in order to perfect his excessive bail
claim; failure to state a plausible claim will result in the dismissal of this claim, and the Petition,
with prejudice.3
Date:
Claire C. Cecchi
United States District Judge

as long as Petitioner received a constitutionally adequate second hearing, his current confinement
would be lawful. See Craft v. Jones, 473 F. App’x 843, 845-46 (10th Cir. 2012).
2

The Court recognizes that the bail amount set by the trial court, one million dollars, is a large
sum. But without any explanation why this is excessive, this Court has no factual basis to question
the trial court’s decision, as Petitioner may have substantial assets to satisfy bail without undue
hardship.
The Court further notes that Petitioner may still need to exhaust state-court remedies with regard
to his challenge to the second bond decision. To the extent Petitioner’s challenge of the second
bond decision is based on the same set of facts and law as his first, then his claim would be deemed
exhausted. But if the second challenge differs in fact or law, then Petitioner must raise his claim
through all levels of the state court anew.
3