ONG et al v. SUPERIOR COURT OF HUDSON COUNTY et al
OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 01/08/2018. (ek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 16-06777 (KM)(JBC)
SUPERIOR COURT OF HUDSON
The plaintiffs, Johanna Ong and Dr. Beverley Ong, bring this action
against a number of State officials and entities. In an opinion and order filed on
June 5, 2017 (ECF nos. 36, 37), the Court granted the motion of defendants
Hudson County Sheriffs Office (the “Sheriff’), the Hudson County Correctional
Center (“HCCC”), and the Jersey City Medical Center (“JCMC”) to dismiss all
claims, on statute of limitations grounds. Familiarity with that opinion is
Now before the Court is a motion (ECF no. 51) to dismiss the Complaint’
for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), filed by four other defendants (the “Movants”). Those
Movants are the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County
(the “Superior Court”); the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office (the
“Prosecutor’s Office”); the State Department of Human Services (“NJDHS”); and
Trenton Psychiatric Hospital (“TPH”). For the reasons stated herein, the motion
will be granted.
There is a Complaint, with voluminous exhibits. (ECF no. 1) There is also an
“Amended Complaint,” with voluminous exhibits. (ECF no. 3)1 have reviewed all of the
allegations and exhibits. The “Complaint,” as used herein, encompasses both of these
filings. One additional defendant, the Jersey City Municipal Court, is named in the
Amended Complaint. It does not appear that the Municipal Court was ever served.
This litigation grew from a bitter dispute between plaintiffs, the Ongs,
and their neighbors, the Pasdars,2 that started in 2006. The particular focus of
the Ongs’ Complaint here is their treatment in connection with criminal
charges of harassment, criminal mischief, and assault on sheriffs officers in
2012. (ECF No. 3 at 3-8).
On May 29, 2012, the Ongs appeared before Judge Joseph Isabella,
J.S.C., for sentencing on charges of harassment and criminal mischief. (ECF
No. 3-1 at 30-82; ECF No. 3-1 at 4). The Ongs allege that after the sentencing,
they were “tortured” by sheriff’s officers on the “9th floor in the Superior Court
of Hudson County” and that Assistant Prosecutor Leonardo Rinaldi hid and
failed to turn over to defense counsel video of the torture. (ECF No. 3 at 4-5;
ECF No. 3-1 at 111).
On November 1, 2013, Johanna Ong appeared before Judge Frederick
Theemling, J.S.C., in connection with charges of aggravated assault against a
sheriffs officer arising from the May 29, 2012 incident at the courthouse. (ECF
No. 3-1 at 1-3). Judge Theemling ordered Johanna Ong to be examined by a
qualified psychiatrist to determine whether she was sane at the time of the
offense and whether she was fit to proceed. (ECF No. 3 at 4; ECF No. 3-1 at 13). Johanna Ong alleges that after this court appearance, Sheriffs Officers
“pushed” her and “dragged” her by her hair. (ECF No. 3 at 4-5).
Johanna Ong was transported to the Jersey City Medical Center
(“JCMC”) for a psychiatric evaluation that lasted six days. (ECF No. 3 at 5). She
was then transferred to Trenton Psychiatric Hospital for further evaluation for
a period of twenty days. (ECF No. S at 5). Ms. Ong alleges that she was
committed for a total of thirty-three days, which was in excess of the
authorization in Judge Theemling’s Order that she be committed for “a period
The name is sometimes rendered in the record as “Pastar.”
not exceeding thirty (30) days.” (ECF No. 3 at 4-7; ECF No. 3-1 at 1-3).
On October 10, 2014, Judge Martha Royster, J.S.C, dismissed the
charges against Johanna Ong stemming from the May 29, 2012 incident on the
basis that “defendant will not regain [her} fitness to proceed to trial.” (ECF No.
3 at 1, 7; ECF No. 3-1 at 254). Similar charges against Beverly Ong were
dismissed on motion of Assistant Prosecutor Rinaldi. (ECF No. 3-1 at 256-57).
On October 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a 245 page Complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (ECF No. 1). On October 17,
2016, Plaintiffs filed a 267 page Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 3). As stated in
my earlier opinion, the allegations do not tie particular causes of action to
The claims against the Superior Court and the NCPO would necessarily
arise from the actions of the Superior Court Judges and Assistant Prosecutor
Rinaldi during the prosecution of Plaintiffs on the charges of harassment,
stalking, etc., of their neighbors, and the ensuing charges of aggravated assault
on a sheriffs officer. (See ECF No. 3 at 3-10). The likely gravamen of these
claims would be a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under 42
1983, and perhaps the State-law tort of assault.
As against the NJDHS and TPH, the Ongs are alleging that their
commitment for psychiatric observation was unlawful, or unlawfully extended,
and that they were mistreated. In relation to certain codefendants, I determined
in my prior opinion that the “likely basis for such a claim would be a
deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or state-law
personal injury tort claim.” (ECF No. 36 at 5).
Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
FED. 1?. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) may be raised at any time. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Ca,
67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437-38 (D.N.J. 1999). Rule 12(b)(1) challenges are either
facial or factual attacks. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL
§ 12.30 (3d ed. 2007). The defendant may facially challenge
subject matter jurisdiction by arguing that the complaint, on its face, does not
allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Iwanowa, 67
F. Supp. 2d at 438. Under this standard, a court assumes that the allegations
in the complaint are true, and may dismiss the complaint only if it appears to a
certainty that the plaintiff will not be able to assert a colorable claim of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
The Movants’ argument that they are immune from suit based on the
Eleventh Amendment is postured as a facial challenge to the jurisdictional
basis of the Complaint. Accordingly, the Court will take the allegations of the
Complaint as true. See Gould Elecs,, Inc. v. U.S., 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole
or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated.
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion
to dismiss, a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth u. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. a Mirage Resorts Inc., 140
F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (“reasonable inferences” principle not undermined by
later Supreme Court Twombly case, infra).
Fed. R. Civ, p. 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed
factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiffs obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell ML Corp. a Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual
allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiffs right to relief above a
speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also
Umland u. PLANCO Fin. Scm., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has
“facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqba4 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Two rnbly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” fqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (2009).
The Complaint attaches a large volume of exhibits. The Court in
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is generally confined to the allegations of the
complaint. That rule, however, has exceptions:
“Although phrased in relatively strict terms, we have declined to
interpret this rule narrowly. In deciding motions under Rule
12(b)(6), courts may consider “document[s] integral to or explicitly
relied upon in the complaint,” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original), or
any “undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches
as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs claims are
based on the document,” PBGC a White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).”
In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 134 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2016). See also Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“However, an exception to the general rule is that a ‘document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint’ may be considered ‘without converting
the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.’”) (quoting In re
Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White
Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint is “to be liberally
construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient
facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala a Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). “While a litigant’s pro se status requires a
court to construe the allegations in the complaint liberally, a litigant is not
absolved from complying with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements
merely because s/he proceeds pro se.” Thakar a Tan, 372 F. App’Sc 325, 328
(3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment poses a threshold jurisdictional obstacle to
suit. The Eleventh Amendment incorporates a general principle of sovereign
immunity which bars citizens from bringing suits for damages against any
state in federal court. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. a Halderman, 465 U.s.
89, 100-101 (1984); Kelley v. Edison Twp., No. 03-4817, 2006 WL 1084217, at
*6 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2006) (citing Bennett v. City of ML City, 288 F. Supp. 2d
675, 679 (D.N.J. 2003)); see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 54 (1996); Edelman a Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662—63 (1974); Hans u.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). That bar applies unless Congress has abrogated
it, or the State has waived it, two exceptions that do not apply here. E.g., Pa
Fedn. of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. a Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).
The plaintiff here sues under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Ongs
point out that Congress may override a state’s sovereign immunity. Congress
did not do so, however, when it enacted Section 1983. Quem v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 342 (1979). Monetary claims for deprivations of civil rights under
Section 1983 are therefore subject to the Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity bar. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 58 (1989).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Closely related is the principle that State entities are not “persons” who may be
subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.
Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71.
State-law claims, too, are barred. Even where jurisdiction is otherwise
proper, the Eleventh Amendment denies a federal court jurisdiction to hear
claims that a state violated its own statutory or common law. See Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 121. See also College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 355 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1997) (noting that a claim of common law unfair competition “obviously
could not be asserted successfully [against instrumentality of the state] in light
of the Eleventh Amendment”), affd, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Doe v. Division of
Youth & Family Sen’s., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 4g2 (D.N.J. 2001)(claim of
common law negligence was barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
NJDHS: Agencies and departments of State government are immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
465 U.S. at 121. The Department of Human Services (“NJDHS”) is a
department of State government, and therefore is under the umbrella of the
State’s sovereign immunity:
The State Department of Human Services and the State
Department of Health are “principal department[s]” within the
State’s “Executive Branch.” N.J.S.A. 30:1—2 (establishing the
Department of Health); N.J.S.A. 26: 1A—2 (establishing the
Department of Human Services). As such, both Departments are
indisputably “arms of the state.” See Aerated Products Co. v. Dept
of Health of N.J., 159 F.2d 851, 853—54 (3d Cir.1947) (“[T]he
Department [of Health] is part of the executive branch of the New
Jersey Government.... Consequently, we agree
To the extent State constitutional law claims are asserted, they are subject to
the same Eleventh Amendment analysis. Szemple a Corr. Med. Sews., 493 F. App’x
238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012); Stroby v. Egg Harbor Th.’p., 754 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 n. 5
(D.N.J. 2010) (quoting Chapman v. State of New Jersey, No. 08-4130, 2009 WL
2634888, at *3 (Aug. 25, 2009)). And the NJCRA, like Section 1983, does not define a
“person” to include the state. Didiano v. Balicki, 488 F. App’x 634, 638 (3d Cit. 2012)
(explaining that “person” as defined in the New Jersey Code does not encompass the
state or its functional equivalents).
suit against the Department is protected by the Eleventh
Rouse v. New Jersey Dep’t of Health & Human Set-vs., No. CV 15-015 11 (JLL),
2015 WL5996324, at*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2015); see also Gattuso zc New Jersey
Dep’t of Human Serva, 881 F. Supp. 2d 639, 645—46 (D.N.J. 2012) (Simandle,
All claims against NJDHS must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
County Prosecutor’s Office: Counties and other local government
entities are not “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes. A
County Prosecutor’s office, however, occupies a hybrid status as both a State
and local entity.
In general, to determine whether a governmental entity is an arm of the
state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, a court must consider the three
“Fitchik factors”: (1) whether payment ofajudgment resulting from the suit
would come from the state treasury, (2) the status of the entity under state law,
and (3) the entity’s degree of autonomy. See Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en bane); see also Chisolm
v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Christy v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm’n., 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The Court is not writing on a clean slate, however. It is well settled that
when a County Prosecutor’s Office is performing its core functions of
investigating and prosecuting crime, it acts as an arm of the State. See,
Beightler v. Office of Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 342 F. App’x 829, 832 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505 (3d Cir.1996fl; In re Camden Police
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 18,
Cases, No. CIV. 10-4757 RBK/JS, 2011 WL 3651318, at
2011). See also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009). “On the
other hand, when county prosecutors are called upon to perform
administrative tasks unrelated to their strictly prosecutorial functions, such as
a decision whether to promote an investigator, the county prosecutor in effect
acts on behalf of the county that is the situs of his or her office.” Wright v.
State, 159 N.J. 422, 450, 778 A.2d 443, 461 (2001) (quoting Coleman, 87 F.3d
County Prosecutor’s Offices in New Jersey, including the Hudson County
Prosecutor’s Office, when performing their law enforcement functions, have
regularly been held to be acting as arms of the State for Eleventh Amendment
Based upon the above application of the Fitchik factors to the facts
of the case at bar, this Court finds that the HCPO is an “arm of the
state” entitled to sovereign immunity. Other courts in this district
have held the same. Woodyard u. County of Essex, 514 Fed.Appx.
177 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (applying the Fitchik factors in
finding that the Essex County Prosecutors Office is entitled to
sovereign immunity against claims that the office arrested and
detained plaintiff without probable cause); Beightler a Office of
Essex County Prosecutor, 342 Fed.Appx. 829, 2009 WL 2562717
(3d Cir.2009) (unpublished); In re Camden Police Cases, 2011 WL
3651318 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011) (Kugler, J.) (finding, upon
application of the Fitchik factors, that the Camden County
Prosecutor’s Office is immune from suit); Kandil a Yurkovic, 6—cv—
4701, 2007 WL 4547365, *4 (D.N.J.2007) (Greenaway, J.) (“[T}he
District of New Jersey has consistently held that New Jersey
county prosecutors’ offices are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suits arising out of the exercise of prosecutorial
powers.”); Paez c’. Lynch, 7—cv—5036, 2009 WL 5171858,
Dec. 23, 2009) (Cavanaugh, J.) (finding that the HCPO is an “arm
of the state,” for Eleventh Amendment purposes); Mikhaeil a
Santos, 10—cv—3876, 2011 WL 2429313, *4 (D.N.J. June 13, 2011)
(Martini, J.) (barring, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, all section
1983 claims brought against the State of New Jersey and its
agencies, including the HCPO).
Rouse v. New Jersey Dept of Health & Human Sen’s., No. CV 15-01511 (JLL),
2015 WL 5996324, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2015) (Linares, J.).
The Ongs’ claims against the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office do not
involve administrative functions, such as hiring and firing. Rather, they rest
squarely on that Office’s investigation and litigation of criminal charges against
them. Their claims against the Prosecutor’s Office are therefore barred by the
Superior Court: Here, too, it is not necessary to perform the Fitchik
analysis de novo. It is well settled that the Superior Court of New Jersey, and
its employees acting in their official capacities, partake of the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity to suit. See Robinson v. New Jersey Mercer County
Vicinage-Family Div., 514 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2013) (New Jersey county
court was “clearly a part of the state of New Jersey,” so “both the court itself
and its employees in their official capacities were unconsenting state entities
entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment”) (citing Benn v. First
Judicial Dist. Of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005)); Dongon v. Banar, 363
F. App5c 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson v. State of N.J., 869 F. Supp.
289, 296-98 (D.N.J. 1994)).
The Ongs’ claims here are directed at the actions of the judges of the
Superior Court, undertaken in their judicial capacities. Those claims are
jurisdictionally barred by the Eleventh Amendment.5
Hospital: Finally, I consider the Trenton State Psychiatric Hospital. TPH
“is a state hospital, created by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 30:1-7, operated by
the Department of Human Services and under the control of the Commissioner
of Human Services, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:1-12,” and has been held to be entitled
to sovereign immunity as well. Fladger v. Trenton Psychiatric E. 2 Treatment
*9fl (D.N.J. Jun. 27,
Team, No. 12-5982, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90434, at
2013). As to TPH, the case law is concededly not so deep or well-established as
it is for the Superior Court or the Prosecutor’s Office. Even assuming the Court
possesses jurisdiction, however, the Complaint must be dismissed, for the
reasons expressed in the following section.
Statute of Limitations
The Movants seek to dismiss the Ongs’ Complaint on statute of
limitations grounds. I analyze this claim in the alternative, to remove any doubt
I therefore do not reach other issues, such as judicial immunity.
as to the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds (chiefly, if at all, as to TPH).
Because the Complaint was filed outside of the applicable two-year limitations
period, it will be dismissed as against these Movants, as it was against their
codefendants in my earlier opinion. (ECF no. 36)
The statute of limitations is technically an affirmative defense which
must be pled in an answer. See Fed. I?, Civ. P. 8(c)(1). Nevertheless, a
complaint may be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, if “the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of
2017 WL 2112308 at *4 (3d
the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher,
Cir. May 16, 2017) (citing Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014));
see also Fried z,’. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590, 604 (3d Cir. 2017).
Federal claims under 42 U.S.C.
1983 borrow the relevant State’s
statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Patyrak v. Apgar, 511 F. App’x
193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Dique v. N.J State Police, 603 F.3d
181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) ( 1983
claims borrow the relevant state’s statute of limitations for personal injury
1983 claims and any state personal injury claim, then, are
governed by a two year statute of limitations. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 14-2.
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a dismissal is
permissible where the action’s untimeliness is clear, based on the complaint
and items properly considered on a motion to dismiss. Fried v. JP Morgan
Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590, 604 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Bethel v. Jendoco
Const. Coip., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978).
Relevant dates for statute of limitations purposes are pled in the
Complaint as follows: In 2009, the Ongs were indicted for various harassmentrelated charges in connection with their neighbors, the Pasdars. (ECF no. 1-7)
The sentencing date for those charges was May 29, 2012, and it was then that
an altercation with Sheriffs officers occurred. On November 1, 2013, Johanna
Ong was again in Court in connection with charges of aggravated assault
against a Sheriffs officer and resisting arrest (arising from the May 29, 2012
incident). (See ECF nos. 1-4, 1-6) Judge Theemling then ordered a psychiatric
examination of Johanna Ong. (ECF no. 1-3; ECF no. 3 at
An initial six-day
evaluation at JCMC was followed by 22-day stay at TPH. (ECF no. 1; ECF no. 3
at 4—5) The Movants state that Johanna Ong was released from TPH in
November 2013, but even by her own account she was released in December
2013 at the latest.
The Ongs’ Complaint in this action was originally filed on October 7,
2016. Any cause of action that accrued before October 7, 2014, is therefore
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The claims against the Movants,
particularly TPH, are ill-defined, but it appears that they necessarily accrued
by December 2013. No wrongful act is alleged to have occurred after that date.7
Accordingly, even if the Complaint survived an Eleventh Amendment
jurisdictional analysis, it would be time-barred as against these Movants.
For the foregoing reasons, the Movants’ motion (ECF no. 51) under Rule
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED as to defendants
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County (the “Superior
Court”); the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office (the “Prosecutor’s Office”); the
State Department of Human Services (“NJDHS”); and Trenton Psychiatric
Hospital (“TPH”). This dismissal, which is essentially jurisdictional, is without
Dated: January 8, 2018
United States District Judge
Eventually she was found unfit and the charges were ordered dropped. (ECP no.
Tolling or delayed accrual are not issues here. These wrongful actions and their
wrongful nature would have been immediately apparent to the plaintiffs.
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