RHULEN v. LG CHEM AMERICA, INC., et al.

Filing 70

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 5/15/18. (cm, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT Of NEW JERSEY

Civil Action No.: 16-6924 (JLL)

ANTHONY SCOTT RHULEN,

OPINION

Plaintiff,
V.

LG CHEM AMERICA, INC. et at.,
Defendants.

LINARES, Chief District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant LG Chem Ltd.’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 59). Plaintiff has submitted Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (ECf No. 67), which
Defendant has replied to. (ECF No. 68). The Court decides this matter without oral argument
pursuant to federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies
the Motion to Dismiss.
I.

BACKGROUND1

The detailed facts underlying this action are not relevant to the disposition of the current
application before the Court. As such, the Court sets forth only the relevant facts necessary to
dispose of Defendant’s pending Motion to Dismiss.

‘This background is derived from Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 50 (“FAC”)), which the Court must
accept as true at this stage of the proceedings. See Aiston v. Countiywide fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 758 (3d Cir.
2009).

Plaintiff, a citizen of the State of California, brings this action to recover damages under
New Jersey’s Products Liability Act (“NJPLA”). (FAC

¶

1, 36-72). Defendant is a domestic

and/or foreign corporation with a principle place of business in the State of New Jersey. (FAC

¶I

6-7). This action revolves around an allegedly exploding cell phone battery that caused Plaintiff
to sustain personal injuries while he was boarding a flight in Denver, Colorado. (FAC

¶

17-34).

Subsequently, Plaintiff brought this two count action asserting the following claims: 1) Violation
of the NJPLA; and 2) for punitive damages. (Compi.

¶J 3 6-77).

Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs FAC, arguing that Defendant cannot be held
liable for violation of the NJPLA because it has no connection to the State of New Jersey. (ECF
No. 59-1 (“Def. Mov. Br.”) at 9-12).

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s Motion asserting that

Defendant has substantial corporate activity in New Jersey, such that it is subject to the general
jurisdiction in this district. (ECF No. 67 (“P1.
II.

Opp. Br.”) at 5-10).

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Att. Coip. v. Twoniblv, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id.
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twomblv and Iqbal in the Third Circuit,

the court must take three steps: first, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim; second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; finally, where there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then deternine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement for relief. See Connetlv v. Lane Constr. Coip., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d
Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only
the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Maer v.
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).
B. General Jurisdiction
“[G]eneraljurisdiction exists when a defendant has maintained systematic and continuous
contacts with the forum state.’ This is a fact-specific inquiry, and the ‘nonresident’s contacts to
the forum must be continuous and substantial’ to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.”
Aipaio e. Dupre, 527 F. App’x 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). In recent years,
the United States Supreme Court has offered guidance on the level of “continuous and substantial”
contacts that might justify the exercise of general or “all purpose” jurisdiction.
In Goodyear Dun lop Tires Operations

v. Brown

the Court addressed a situation in which

the foreign subsidiaries of an American corporation challenged a North Carolina court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over them.

564 U.S. 915 (2011). A unanimous Court discussed the

parameters of general jurisdiction, writing that “[for an individual, the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Id. at 924. The Court reiterated
the principal that “[a] corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state’

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‘is not

enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.”
Id. at 927 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). The Court further noted

that neither regular purchases of goods from a state nor the sales of goods to a state were sufficient,
in themselves, to subject an entity to general jurisdiction on claims unrelated to the sales/purchases.
Id. at 927-28 (citing Heticopteros Nacionales Dc Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984)).

As the Defendant subsidiaries in Goodyear had only “attenuated” contacts with the state (i.e., their
products were sold into the state via intermedianes)- and were in no sense at home in North
Carolina,” the Court found that the subsidiaries were not subject to general jurisdiction in North
Carolina’s courts. Id. at 929.
The Supreme Court confirmed the narrow applicability of the general jurisdiction doctrine
inDaimle,-AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). InDaimler, the Court rejected a formulation of

the doctrine that would “approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a
corporation ‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business,”
characterizing that broad definition as “unacceptably grasping.” Id. at 119 (internal citation
omitted).

The Court observed that “the inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign

corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is
whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render it essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. at 138-39 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at
919). The Court also clarified that “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not ‘focus solely on the
magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.’ General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal
of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that

may bolster
The Goodyear Court also specified that while the ‘[fllow of a manufacturer’s products into a forum
ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdiction do not
an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction
warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has gc’nera/ jurisdiction over a defendant.” Id. at 927
(emphases in original).

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operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise ‘at home’
would be synonymous with ‘doing business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in
the United States.” Id. at 139 n. 20. The Court ultimately found that there was “no basis to subject
Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly
render it at home there.” Id. at 118-19.

C. Specific Jurisdiction

“Specific jurisdiction is established when a non-resident defendant has ‘purposefully
directed’ his activities at a resident of the forum and the injury arises from or is related to those
activities.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Burger King
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). In other words, specific jurisdiction exists ‘here the
“cause of action arises out of [t]he defendant’s forum-related activities, such that the defendant
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum.” Abe/v.

Kirbctran,

267 F. App’x

106, 108 (3d Cir. 200$) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Three elements must be met to establish specific jurisdiction. HS Real Co., LLC et al. v.
Sher, 526 F. App’x 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2013). First, the defendant must have purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum. Id. Second, “plaintiffs’ claims
must arise out of or relate to at least one of the contacts with the forum.” Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. 0 ‘Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 f.3d 312, 317 (3d
Cir. 2007).
Because the existence of specific jurisdiction depends on a link between the defendant’s
activity and the resulting hanri, a specific jurisdiction analysis is necessarily claim specific.
Remick v. Manfredv, 23$ F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Such a determination is claim specific

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because a conclusion that the District Court has personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants
as to a particular claim asserted by [plaintiff] does not necessarily mean that it has personal
jurisdiction over that same defendant as to [plaintiff]’s other claims.”).

III.

ANALYSIS

Preliminarily, the Court finds that there is no basis for specific jurisdiction in this matter.
This is because the alleged injury sustained by Plaintiff did not occur within the State of New
Jersey. As such, Defendant cannot be subjected to specific personal jurisdiction in this District.
Gen. Elec. Co., 270 F.3d at 150. However, Plaintiffs FAC contains sufficient allegations that, if
true, would subject Defendant to general personal jurisdiction in this District.

F or example,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has a principle place of business in the State of New Jersey. (FAC

¶J 6-7).

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant “placed the battery into the stream of commerce and

derived substantial revenue from sale and distribution of its batteries in the State of New Jersey.”
(FAC

¶ 26).

These allegations, if true, could subject Defendant to general personal jurisdiction in

this District, as Defendant could be found to be “at home” in New Jersey.
Being subject to general jurisdiction in New Jersey would also mean that Defendant would
be subject to the NJPLA. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (stating that a court may hear any and all
claims against a corporation when it is subject to that court’s general jurisdiction) (quotations
omitted). Unfortunately, Plaintiffs FAC contains sufficient allegations such that the Court gleans
the possibility of general jurisdiction, but does not contain sufficient allegations for it to firmly
conclude that general jurisdiction is present.

Accordingly, the Court finds that it would be

beneficial for the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery in order to ascertain whether
Defendant is “at home” in New Jersey. Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion to

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Dismiss, without prejudice, and with leave to reffle same afier the conclusion of jurisdictional
discovery, and afier receiving permission from the Magistrate Judge.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied, without
prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: May)2Ol$
JOWL. LINARES
Cf Judge, United States District Court

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