KIRKLAND v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
24
OPINION. Signed by Judge Katharine S. Hayden on 08/30/2018. (sms)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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DAVID KIRKLAND,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
Civil Action No. 16-7831 (KSH)
OPINION
HAYDEN, District Judge:
Petitioner David Kirkland, confined at FPC Schuylkill in Minersville, Pennsylvania, has
filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging
on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel the judgment and sentence imposed by this Court
in United States v. Kirkland, No. 06-cr-0911 (“Crim. Dkt.”), ECF No. 189 (D.N.J. entered Oct. 5,
2009), after a jury convicted him of transporting stolen goods across state lines. For the reasons
stated below, the Court denies the motion.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As summarized succinctly by the Third Circuit on direct appeal:
While in prison for a string of burglaries, Kirkland and Terrance Lawton conspired
to commit future burglaries. Once released from prison, Kirkland and Lawton
carried out their jointly devised scheme. Along with additional coconspirators, they
burglarized affluent homes in New Jersey and transported the stolen goods to New
York City for purchase by a fence. Lawton was the government’s key witness at
trial.
United States v. Kirkland, 612 F. App’x 133, 135 (3d Cir. 2015).
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Kirkland went to trial twice. The first time was in June 2008, on a multi-count, multidefendant indictment that resulted in pleas after a few days by his two co-defendants. Kirkland,
who was charged in the indictment with one count of conspiracy and three substantive counts, also
entered a guilty plea to one substantive count of transporting stolen goods across state lines,
exposing him to a sentence of 120 months. See Plea Agreement, Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 70. Not
long after that, Kirkland’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, citing disruptive and threatening
behavior on Kirkland’s part. Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 81. Kirkland was appointed new counsel, who
moved to vacate Kirkland’s plea due to the lack of a factual basis for the substantive count of
burglary that Kirkland pleaded guilty to.1 Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 90. The Court granted the motion
after holding a hearing. Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 92.
At that point, Kirkland was presented with a plea offer – which mirrored the original plea
agreement – whereby he would agree to plead guilty to one substantive count by a date certain.
He was advised of the penalties he faced if he was convicted after a trial on the indictment. See
Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 99. Kirkland turned down the plea offer. Thereafter, the government filed a
four-count superseding indictment, charging Kirkland with conspiracy to transport stolen goods
across state lines, and three substantive counts of transportation of stolen goods across state lines.
Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 111. A second jury was empaneled, trial took place, and the jury acquitted
Kirkland on one of the substantive counts, but found him guilty on the others. See Jury Verdict,
1
In the indictment, the conspiracy count against all the co-defendants listed numerous overt acts
relating to a spate of residential burglaries, and a variety of substantive counts describing specific
burglaries. Kirkland was named in three substantive counts and pleaded to one of them. The
defense argument on the motion to withdraw plea was that factual basis questions posed to
Kirkland described conduct that, on counsel’s close scrutiny, did not apply to what happened
during the particular burglary that Kirkland admitted to. The Court agreed and entered an order
vacating Kirkland’s plea. Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 92.
2
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Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 151. The Court imposed a 216-month custodial sentence. Crim. Dkt., ECF
No. 189.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A prisoner in federal custody may move the sentencing court “to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence” upon three grounds: (1) “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States”; (2) “that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence”; or (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” 28
U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A criminal defendant bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to § 2255 relief. See
United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182, 189 (3d Cir. 2005). Moreover, because a § 2255 motion to
vacate is a collateral attack on a sentence, a criminal defendant “must clear a significantly higher
hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982), cited
in United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2014). In considering a motion to vacate
sentence, “the court must accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless they are clearly
frivolous on the basis of the existing record.” United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Kirkland raises eight claims in the motion, all ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Claims I and II, however, essentially raise the same claim. The seven distinct claims Kirkland
raises are: (1) trial counsel erroneously advised him that his maximum sentencing exposure was
120 months, which affected his plea decisions; (2) trial counsel failed to object to a jury instruction
regarding the definition of “market value”; (3) trial counsel failed to object to a jury instruction
that changed the alleged start date of the conspiracy; (4) trial counsel failed to raise a statute of
3
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limitations defense prior to trial; (5) trial counsel failed to object to the method used to calculate
restitution; (6) trial counsel failed to object to improper comments by the government during
summation; and (7) appellate counsel failed to raise meritorious arguments on direct appeal.
A. Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The sixth amendment guarantees the accused the “right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Under the familiar standard, this means the
right to the effective assistance of counsel, and counsel can deprive a defendant of that right by
failing to render adequate legal assistance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686
(1984). A claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction
has two components, both of which must be satisfied. First, the defendant must “show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” To meet this prong,
a “convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions
of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at
687-90. The court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified errors
fell “below an objective standard of reasonableness[.]” Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1083
(2014) (per curiam). Second, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice due to the alleged
ineffective assistance. However, “a defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more
likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. To establish
prejudice, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial
would have been different absent the deficient act or omission.” Hinton, 134 S.Ct. at 1083.
B. Sentencing Exposure
In claims I and II, Kirkland asserts he was erroneously advised by trial counsel that his
maximum sentencing exposure would be only 120 months, which materially affected his plea
4
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decisions. It is unclear from his allegations which trial counsel these claims are made against. To
the extent the claims are made against his first attorney who represented him when he entered a
guilty plea, that attorney was not ineffective—Kirkland’s maximum sentencing exposure for the
count to which he pled guilty was indeed 120 months, see Plea Agreement 2, so the advice
Kirkland received was not erroneous. To the extent Kirkland asserts he withdrew his plea due to
error in the advice provided by the attorney with whom he went to trial after the Court found
irretrievable breakdown in his relationship with his plea attorney, Kirkland suffered no prejudice
because the original plea offer was still available.
The only plausible claim under the facts of this case is that alleged erroneous advice by his
second attorney led Kirkland to reject the reinstated plea offer and go to trial instead. However,
the factual allegations are insufficient to establish this claim. If the second attorney had advised
Kirkland that the maximum sentencing exposure under the plea offer was 120 months, that advice
was correct—after all, it was the same plea offer that Kirkland originally accepted under the first
attorney’s advice. Instead, Kirkland cryptically alleges that “[i]f trial counsel properly advised the
Petitioner, he would have entered into an ‘open plea’ and received a sentence substantially below
that which he is presently serving 216 months.” ECF No. 1-1 at 6. This allegation makes little
sense, because the record shows that the government steadfastly refused to make any other plea
offer,2 so the only “open plea” Kirkland could have made was to plead guilty to all counts in the
original four-count indictment, not the one count offered as part of the plea agreement. See Crim.
Dkt., ECF No. 99 (“The defendant was advised that the United States will neither negotiate nor
modify the [original] plea agreement.”). An open plea to the original indictment would have
2
The order entered after Kirkland’s plea was vacated reflected that Kirkland was advised of the
potential penalties if he was convicted of all counts in the indictment.
5
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subjected Kirkland to three substantive crimes as opposed to the two he was eventually found
guilty of, putting him in a worse scenario than the 216 months he is currently serving.3 See Lafler
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012) (“[A] defendant must show that but for the ineffective
advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that . . . the [] terms would have been less severe
than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.”).
Kirkland also appears to allege that the 120-month advice was given as his maximum
sentencing exposure after a trial and conviction. This belies the record. Indeed, because the
superseding indictment was not filed until after the plea offer had been withdrawn, his attorney
could not have been certain what charges the government would eventually bring against Kirkland
in a new trial, let alone what the maximum sentencing exposure would be under the new
indictment. Moreover, irrespective of the subsequent superseding indictment, Kirkland himself
was well aware that he was likely to be charged on more than one count in the new trial, as the
initial four-count indictment was still pending after he withdrew his guilty plea.
Instead, the record suggests that Kirkland may have been hoping the government would
accept a guilty plea on just one count, as the original plea offer provided, with the difference that
there would be no sentencing stipulations. As indicated, the government refused. The fact his
second attorney was unable to procure a plea agreement that satisfied Kirkland is not a valid basis
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)
(“[A]n [ineffective assistance of counsel] analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination,
without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable,
is defective.”); Kim v. United States, No. 05-3407, 2006 WL 981173, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2006)
3
Kirkland was sentenced to 108 months for each of the two substantive counts, to be served
consecutively, resulting in the 216-month sentence. The sentence for the conspiracy conviction, a
60-month sentence, was made concurrent to the substantive counts. Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 189.
6
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(“[T]hat [he] now appears unhappy with the result does nothing to change the fact that there is not
the slightest indication that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel.”). As such, claims
I and II are denied.
C. “Market Value”
In claim III, Kirkland alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
jury instruction given at trial regarding the definition of “market value.” The underlying issue,
however, has already been litigated on direct appeal, with the Third Circuit finding that record
evidence supported the jury verdict regarding the required market value of the stolen goods. See
Kirkland, 612 F. App’x at 135-36. “It is well settled that a petitioner generally may not relitigate
issues that were decided adversely to him on direct appeal by means of a Section 2255 petition.”
Sonneberg v. United States, No. 01-2067, 2003 WL 1798982 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2003) (citing United
States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993)). Indeed, if the jury’s findings on market
value were supported by evidence despite the alleged improper jury instruction, it is unclear what
a change in jury instruction would have accomplished—evidence would still have led to the same
result. To the extent Kirkland challenges the substantive standard used at trial to define market
value, the Third Circuit obviously found it to be proper. Thus, he suffered no prejudice from the
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, because the outcome of the trial would not have been
different. Therefore, claim III is denied.
D. Start Date of the Conspiracy
In claim IV, Kirkland alleges that trial counsel failed to object to a jury instruction
regarding the start date of the conspiracy. Specifically, he alleges while the indictment stated that
the conspiracy started in 1999, the instruction at issue stated that it started in 1996.
7
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It is not clear what jury instruction Kirkland refers to, because none of his factual
allegations points to a jury instruction that made use of the 1996 date. Instead, he appears to argue
that the prosecution impermissibly made references to the 1996 date. In response, the government
states, and Kirkland does not dispute, that the 1996 date related to evidence submitted at trial—
which the Court allowed after an evidentiary hearing, see Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 216—about
conversations Kirkland and Lawton had while in prison, before the conspiracy, regarding their past
burglaries and how they could do them better in the future. This is probative evidence of the
conspiracy, and Kirkland has not shown the government used it to prove that the conspiracy
actually began in 1996. Indeed, none of the overt acts alleged in the superseding indictment
happened before 1999.
Furthermore, Kirkland has not established prejudice by showing that had counsel made the
alleged objection, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Given the overwhelming
evidence against him, it is exceedingly unlikely that the jury would have acquitted him of the
conspiracy charge, even if it was made explicitly clear to the jury that the 1996 date was not the
start date of the conspiracy. Accordingly, claim IV is denied.4
E. Statute of Limitations
In claim V, Kirkland alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a statute of
limitations defense at trial. Essentially, he claims that because the two substantive crimes for
which he was found guilty occurred on December 9, 2001, and February 9, 2002, and the
4
To the extent Kirkland asserts that counsel failed to object to the superseding indictment, which
included more criminal conduct than the original indictment, the addition of more charges is
usually the very purpose of a superseding indictment—a consequence of rejecting the plea deal.
See United States v. Sanders, 208 F. App’x 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] prosecutor does not
violate due process when he threatens serious charges to induce a guilty plea[.]”).
8
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superseding indictment he was tried on was filed on January 27, 2009, the applicable statute of
limitations prohibited the government from indicting him for those crimes.5
Kirkland’s claim is meritless. “When ‘the government has filed a superseding indictment,
the day on which the original indictment was filed controls for statute of limitation purposes,
provided that . . . the superseding indictment does not materially broaden or substantially amend
the charges[.]’” United States v. Johnson, 682 F. App’x 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Oliva, 46 F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir. 1995)). Here, the operative statute of limitations is
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), which is five years. The substantive counts in the superseding
indictment were identical to the corresponding counts asserted in the original indictment, which
was filed on November 9, 2006. Therefore, the filing date of the original indictment controls, and
the two substantive crimes occurred within five years of the filing date of the original indictment.
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a statute of limitations defense prior to trial because
the defense was unavailable to Kirkland. Thus, claim V is denied.
F. Restitution
In claim VI, Kirkland alleges that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the method
of calculation for restitution. To the extent this claim challenges the restitution order itself,
“[r]estitution orders and fines . . . are not sufficient restraints on the liberty of a criminal offender
to constitute ‘custody.’” Kolasinac v. United States, No. 13-1397, 2016 WL 1382145, at *4
(D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2016) (citing Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2003), United States
5
Kirkland makes the same argument with regard to the conspiracy count, but the indictment stated
that the conspiracy lasted until 2006. The statute of limitations for a conspiracy crime runs from
the last act performed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d
150, 153 (3d Cir. 2009). Insofar as the indictment alleged overt acts as late as November 14, 2006,
Crim. Dkt., ECF No. 111 at 5, the conspiracy charge was clearly within the statute of limitations
even considering the filing date of the superseding indictment.
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v. Ross, 801 F.3d 374, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2015)). “[B]ecause [habeas relief] is available only to those
seeking release from custody, [it] is not available to those . . . seeking to challenge fines or
restitution orders.” Id.6
To the extent Kirkland claims that the amount of restitution affected the calculation of his
sentence, he asserts that “the government seeks to by-pass the grand jury by adding 58 homes
identified by the [PSR],” ECF No. 1-1 at 16, and that counsel was ineffective for not challenging
this error. However, as with the “market value” claim, the Third Circuit already ruled on this issue,
holding that “this claim is meritless because the court did not impose a mandatory minimum.”
Kirkland, 612 F. App’x at 139 n.12 (citing United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 335-36 (3d
Cir. 2014)).7 It also found that “the court did not abuse its discretion by applying an enhancement
for amount of loss and number of victims.” Id. at 139. Kirkland further asserts that much of the
loss amount was attributed to individuals who had not been shown to be “victims” under the
Mandatory Restitution Act of 1996, but he does not explain why the act, which deals exclusively
with restitution, had any relevance to the calculation of loss amount under the Sentencing
Guidelines. As with the “market value” claim, because the loss amount found by the Court has
already been upheld, Kirkland fails to establish the prejudice necessary for his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. As such, claim VI is denied.
6
Kirkland’s claim certainly appears to be challenging the restitution order itself, as it is purportedly
based on the Mandatory Restitution Act of 1996, which strictly deals with restitution orders only.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. Nevertheless, out of the abundance of caution, the Court construes the
claim as also raising a challenge to the loss amount calculation as it related to the imposed sentence.
7
Freeman held that “[w]hile the Supreme Court made clear that any fact that increases a
defendant’s statutory minimum sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, this
rule does not foreclose a district court’s ability to engage in some judicial factfinding.” 763 F.3d
at 335.
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G. Improper Comments by Prosecution
In claim VII, Kirkland alleges that counsel was ineffective by failing to object to comments
made by the prosecutors that amounted to witness vouching. In particular, he highlights two
comments made by two separate prosecutors, first during the government’s summation and later
the rebuttal:
“Now, you may not like Terence Lawton or Corey Emanuel, but the fact they are
not likeable does not [mean] tha[t] they lied here on the stand.”
“Ladies and gentleman, common sense tells you what Terrence Lawton told you is
what actually happened. If he was eager to please and eager to give the
investigators and the prosecutors what they wanted to hear, he would have told you
that. But he didn’t. And I submit to you that he was being truthful when he testified
about what he did. I submit to you most likely [], he obviously made a mistake.
Because it would make no sense for him to be lying about that. Especially when
he knows that something so easy and verifiable, he knows David Kirkland. He
visited David Kirkland at the half-way house.”8
ECF No. 15 at 45-46.9
In order for a prosecutorial misconduct claim to warrant federal habeas relief, the
prosecutor’s comments must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 (1986) (citing
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)).
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such
8
Although Kirkland appears to suggest the second statement was a contiguous statement from the
rebuttal, the Court has reviewed the transcript, and it is instead a conglomeration of statements
made by the prosecutor during rebuttal, which explains its apparent fragmentation.
9
Kirkland also alleges that the government used false testimony at trial. That issue was decided
by the Third Circuit on direct appeal, where it found that “Kirkland must show, among other things,
that the false statement went uncorrected and that there is a reasonable likelihood it could have
affected the verdict. He cannot show either. In both cases, the government corrected the
misstatement at trial. Moreover, the other evidence of Kirkland's guilt was overwhelming.
Accordingly, Kirkland cannot establish a due process violation based on these misstatements.”
Kirkland, 612 F. App’x at 138 (internal citation omitted).
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comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of
the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather
than its own view of the evidence.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985). However, when a prosecutor’s statement
“contained no suggestion that he was relying on information outside the evidence presented at
trial,” and “when viewed in context . . . cannot be read as implying that the prosecutor had access
to evidence outside the record,” then the prosecutor has not improperly vouched for a witness. Id.
at 19.
To state a claim of improper vouching, Kirkland must establish that “(1) the prosecutor
must assure the jury that testimony of a government witness is credible; (2) this assurance must be
based on either the prosecutor’s personal knowledge or other information not contained in the
record.” United States v. Brown, 54 F. App’x 342, 345 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)). Nothing in the comments he points to suggests that the
prosecutors relied on information and evidence that was outside of the record. It was known to
the jury that Lawton was Kirkland’s co-conspirator. It was known to the jury that Lawton
cooperated with the government by testifying against Kirkland in order to receive a plea deal. The
prosecutors’ comments were made in anticipation that the jury may have disliked Lawton and
questioned Lawton’s credibility. Those were not comments made by relying on information or
evidence outside of the record. While Kirkland is correct that the prosecutors did not know
whether any juror actually disliked Lawton or did not believe him, their comments were
nevertheless reasonable because the facts and circumstances supported such an inference, and they
were entitled to address those potential jury concerns. Kirkland was certainly free to rebut those
comments during his summation, but counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to those
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comments. They were reasonable comments supported by the record evidence. See United States
v. Felix, 314 F. App’x 430, 432 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he prosecutor used an appropriate argument
to suggest that [the witness] was telling the truth. It was also proper for the government to argue
that a cooperating witness’s plea agreement provides an incentive for truthful testimony, so long
as the cooperating witness has so testified or the record otherwise supports the argument.” (internal
citation omitted)). That Kirkland disagreed with them did not render them improper. Claim VII
is denied.
H. Appellate Counsel
In claim VIII, Kirkland argues that appellate counsel was ineffective because she failed to
raise two arguments regarding (1) the definition of “market value”; and (2) a Brady violation. The
Court has already rejected Kirkland’s “market value” claim, see supra, and also rejected his Brady
claim in a previous memorandum order as meritless. See ECF No. 20 at 2-3. Appellate counsel
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims. See Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.
3d 760, 776 (6th Cir. 2013); Barney v. D’Ilio, No. 15-0057, 2018 WL 2018054, at * 23 (D.N.J.
May 1, 2018). Accordingly, claim VIII is denied.10
I. Certificate of Appealability
An appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
unless a certificate of appealability issues upon a finding that “the applicant has made a substantial
10
Kirkland also raises other arguments regarding appellate counsel’s alleged deficiencies in his
brief, filed almost eight months after the initial § 2255 motion. See ECF No. 15. These arguments
were not raised in the pleading, and therefore the Court is not obligated to “to accept assertions in
a brief without support in the pleadings. After all, a brief is not a pleading.” Chavarriaga v. N.J.
Dept’ of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 232 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). To the extent they were
attempts at raising new claims, Kirkland is time-barred from doing so. See Mayle v. Felix, 545
U.S. 644, 648 (2005); Hodges v. United States, 554 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Mayle
forecloses the relation back of a new, untimely claim when it is ‘supported by facts that differ in
both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.’” (quoting Mayle, 545 U.S at 650)).
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showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies
this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003).
Here, Kirkland has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right, and the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1);
3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Kirkland’s motion is DENIED and the Court denies a
certificate of appealability.
s/ Katharine S. Hayden
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.
Dated: August 30, 2018
14
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