PIERRE v. M & T BANK et al

Filing 20

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 4/10/2017. (JB, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT Of NEW JERSEY

MELCHIOR PIERRE,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-8639 (JLL)

Plaintiff,

0PINI0N

V.

M&TBANK,etal.,
Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge

The remaining defendant in this action, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
(hereinafter, “MERS”), moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter,
“Rule”) 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims that are asserted against it in
this action (hereinafter, “the Federal Action”) by the pro se plaintiff, Melchior Pierre.
(See dkt. 16; dkt. 16-1; dkt. 16-2; dkt. 17 through dkt. 17-5; dkt. 18 through dkt. 18-5.)’
Pierre has not filed opposition to MERS’s motion.
This Court has previously granted the motion filed by the other original defendant
in this action, M & T Bank (hereinafter, “the Bank”), to dismiss the claims that were
asserted against it. (See dkt. 14

—

dkt. 15 (an Opinion and an Order entered on March 6,

2017).)

This Court will refer to documents by the docket entry numbers and the page

numbers imposed by the Electronic Case Filing System.

This Court resolves MERS’s motion to dismiss upon a review of the papers and
without oral argument. See L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, this Court
grants MERS’s motion.
BACKGROUND

When Pierre defaulted on the payments related to the mortgage on his property
(hereinafter, “the Mortgaged Property”), a foreclosure action was brought against him in
New Jersey state court (hereinafter, “the State Foreclosure Action”) in May 2010 by:
(1) the Bank, which was the lender; and (2) MERS, which was the servicing agent for
the mortgage.

No. F-28198-10 (N.J. Superior Court, Morris County). (See dkt. 14 at

1—2; dkt. 17-1 at 42—46.)
Pierre filed an answer, and he was represented by counsel in the State Foreclosure
Action. (See dkt. 14 at 2; dkt. 17-1 at 53—59; dkt. 17-3 at 2—11.) In May 2014, a final
judgment of foreclosure was entered in the State Foreclosure Action against Pierre
(hereinafter, “the State Judgment”). (See dkt. 14 at 2; dkt. 17-4 at 1—2.) The Mortgaged
Property has since been sold in a sheriffs sale. (Sç dkt. 14 at 2; dkt. 16-1 at 3; dkt. 17 at
3; dkt. 18 at 3.)
Pierre instituted the Federal Action against the Bank and MERS in November
2016. (See dkt. 1.) In the Federal Action, Pierre alleges that the State Judgment resulted
from conduct on the part of MERS in the State Foreclosure Action that was violative of
the Constitution, misrepresentative, negligent, and fraudulent. (See dkt. 1.) Pierre further
alleges that MERS “ha{s] no legal right, title, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of this action.” (Dkt. 1 at 4—5.)

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ANALYSIS
I.

Standards

This Court is guided by the following standards in resolving MERS’s motion to
dismiss.
A.

Rule 12(b)(1)

It is not necessary for this Court to restate the standard for resolving a motion to
dismiss that is made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l), because that standard has been already
enunciated. See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (setting forth the
standard; citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977),
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), and Constitution Party of Pa. v.
Aichele, 757 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2014)).
B.

Rule 12(b)(6)

It is also not necessary for this Court to restate the standard for resolving a motion
to dismiss that is made pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6), because that standard has been already
enunciated. See Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 764—65 (3d Cir.
2013) (setting forth the standard; citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209—12 (3d Cir. 2009) (setting forth
the standard; citing Twombly and Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
C.

Unopposed Motions To Dismiss

Pierre has not opposed MERS’s motion to dismiss. However, this Court is
required to address a motion to dismiss on the merits even if it is unopposed. Sçç Jones

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v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 381 Fed.Appx. 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2010);
Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991).
B.

Liberal Construction Of Pro Se Pleadings

This Court, in addressing MERS’s motion to dismiss: (1) construed PielTe’s claims
liberally; and (2) accepted all of Pierre’s factual allegations as being true, construed the
claims in the light most favorable to Pierre, and considered whether Pierre may be
entitled to relief in federal court under any reasonable reading of those claims. See
Kissell v. Dep’t of Corrs., 634 Fed.Appx. 876, 878—79 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Igbal,

Twombly, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)).
II.

Pierre’s Constitutional Claims

Violations of federal constitutional rights are actionable under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983.

The gravarnen of Pierre’s Section 1983 claims that are asserted against MERS is a
dispute between Pierre and a private entity, and thus those claims raise no proper federal
causes of action and have no call upon a federal forum. Pierre cannot maintain claims
under Section 1983 that essentially seek relief based on the private conduct of a private
actor, i.e., MERS, no matter how allegedly wrongful. See Dophin v. Bank of Am. Mortg.

Co., 641 Fed.Appx. 131, 133 (3d Cir. 2016); St. Croix v. Etenad, 183 Fed.Appx. 230, 231
(3d Cir. 2006).
Therefore, the part of MERS’s motion to dismiss Pierre’s claims for Constitutional
violations is granted.

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III.

The Rooker-feidman Doctrine

Pierre’s remaining claims that are asserted against MERS for misrepresentation,
negligent conduct, and fraudulent conduct are barred by the Rooker-Feidman doctrine,

because he is seeking to avoid the State Judgment issued in the State Foreclosure Action
by bringing the Federal Action. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
482(1983); Rookery. Fid. Tmst Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414—16 (1923). The Rooker
Feldman doctrine bars this Court from adjudicating Pierre’s claims, because: (1) Pierre is
a state court loser complaining of injuries caused by the State Judgment; (2) the State
Judgment was rendered in May 2014, which was before the Federal Action was
commenced in November 2016; and (3) Pierre invites a review and a rejection of the
State Judgment. $ç Bierley v. Abate, 661 Fed.Appx. 208, 209 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming
the district court’s dismissal of claims on Rooker-Feidman grounds).
The proper way for Pierre to proceed would be to seek review and relief through
the state appellate process, and then seek certiorari directly to the United States Supreme
Court, because this Court is prohibited from providing relief that would effectively
reverse the decisions, directly or indirectly invalidate the detenninations, prevent the
enforcement of the State Judgment, or void the rulings issued by the state court in the
State Foreclosure Action. See Francis v. TD Bank, N.A., 597 Fed.Appx. 58, 60—61 (3d
Cir. 2014) (affinning a district court’s dismissal of the claims that were brought in
connection with a state foreclosure action as being barred by the Rooker-Feldrnan
doctrine, because plaintiff sought redress from a state court judgment); Jacques v. Chase
Bank USA, N.A., No. 16-13 18, 2016 WL 5075940, at *1 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2016) (doing

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the same); Moncriefv. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 Fed.Appx. 149, 152—53 (3d
Cir. 200$) (affirming a district court judgment that dismissed the claims attacking the
merits of a separate state court foreclosure action, inter alia, as being barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
Therefore, the part of MERS’s motion to dismiss Pierre’s remaining claims is
granted. This Court notes that Pierre’s claims for Constitutional violations would be
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well.
IV.

Alternative Grounds for Dismissal

The determinations set forth above “preclude[] the necessity to address [any]
alternative grounds for dismissal,” but this Court will exercise the discretion to discuss
alternative grounds “for the sake of completeness.” Global Naps, Inc. v. Bell AtlanticNew Jersey, Inc., 287 F.Supp.2d 532, 545 n.20 (D.N.J. 2003) (addressing the defendant’s
alternative grounds for dismissal, even though dismissal was to be granted based upon the
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
A.

Res Judicata

Pierre is raising claims concerning MERS ‘5 alleged conduct that occurred before
the State Judgment was entered. Because those claims either have been raised or should
have been raised in the State Foreclosure Action, those claims are barred by the doctrine
ofresjudicata. See Jacques, 2016 WL 5075940, at *1.
Res judicata applies, because (1) the State Judgment and any related state court
orders are valid, final, and on the merits, (2) the parties in the State Foreclosure Action

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and the Federal Action are either the same or in privity with each other, and (3) the
claims in the Federal Action arise from the same transactions and occurrences underlying
the State Foreclosure Action. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984).
Therefore, this Court could also grant MERS’s motion to dismiss pursuant to res
judicata.
B.

Entire Controversy Doctrine

Pierre’s claims that are asserted against MERS are also barred by the entire
controversy doctrine, because he could have raised any allegations concerning MERS ‘5
conduct that was constitutionally violative, misrepresentative, fraudulent, or negligent in
the State Foreclosure Action. See Lui v. Comm’n On Adult Entm’t Establishnients, 369
F.3d 319, 326 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the state courts are “every bit as competent to
deal with.

.

.

claims

.

.

.

as are federal courts, and this, of course, includes the ability to

address claims under both the State constitution and the Federal constitution”).
The entire controversy doctrine, “which does not require commonality of issues,
precludes a party from later bringing claims that could have been joined in the earlier
action,” particularly when those claims “arise from related facts or the same transaction
or series of transactions.” Zahi v. Warhaftig, 655 Fed.Appx. 66, 76 (3d Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Opdycke v. Stout, 233 Fed.Appx.
125, 129 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (setting forth the broad reach of the entire controversy
doctrine). As a result, Pierre is precluded from bringing his claims in the Federal Action
against MERS.

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_________

Therefore, this Court could also grant MERS’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the
entire controversy doctrine.
C.

Lack of Authority

This Court is also without authority in general to review and adjudicate issues that

have arisen in the state court in the State Foreclosure Action. See Francis, 597 Fed.Appx.
at 61 (affirming the dismissal of a borrower’s claims alleging misconduct by a bank in
bringing a separate state foreclosure action, and citing Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970), and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 654 F.2d
268 (3d Cir. 1981)).

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, this Court: (1) grants the motion to dismiss filed
by the defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems; and (2) dismisses Pierre’s
claims that are asserted against the defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems.
The Court will enter an appropriate order and judgment.

JOWL. LINAR1

U$Ved States District Judge
Dated: April

,2017

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