G.S. v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
20
OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 10/24/2018. (rtm, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
G.S., on behalf of K.S., a minor child,
Civil Action No.: 16-8756 (CCC)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
CECCHI, District Judge.
Plaintiff G.S., on behalf of K.S., a minor child, seeks review of a final determination by
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Defendant”), which denied K.S.’s
application for supplemental social security income (“SSI”) payments under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (“SSA’?). This matter is decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure
7$•1
For the reasons set forth below, the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“AU”) decision is vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
Plaintiff is the parent of Claimant, an adolescent female who was born on March 20, 2001.
(Tr. 39). On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff, on behalf of Claimant, filed for SSI benefits. (R. 10).
Afier various requests for reconsideration, the application was denied and Plaintiff sought review
of the determination by the AU. (See generally ECF No. 1). A hearing was held on March 12,
1
The Court considers any arguments not presented by the parties to be waived. See Brenner v. Local 514, United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 927 f.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cfr. 1991) (“It is well established that failure to raise an issue
in the district court constitutes a waiver of the argument.”).
2
“R” refers to the Administrative Record, which uses continuous pagination and can be found at ECF No. 7.
1
2015, where Plaintiff and Claimant testified. (R. 10). On June 5, 2015, the AU issued an opinion
affirming the denial of 551 benefits. (R. 7-24). This appeal followed. (ECF No. 1).
Claimant suffers from the following disorders: 1) major depressive disorder; 2) posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); 3) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”); 4)
obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”); and 5) intermittent explosive disorder (“TED”). (R. 13).
Despite these impairments, the ALl concluded that Claimant did “not have any impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1(20 CFR 4 16.924, 4 16.925 and 416.926).”
(Id.). The AU also concluded that Claimant did “not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that functionally equals the severity of the listings (20 CfR 416.924(d) and
416.92[(]a).” (R. 15). As such, the AU concluded that Claimant “has not been disabled, as
defined in the {SSA], since January 23, 2013, the date the application was filed.” (R. 24).
II.
A.
LEGAL STANDARIS
Standard of Review
This Court has jurisdiction to review the AU’s decision under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) and
13$3(c)(3). The Court must affirm the decision if substantial evidence supported the it. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Markte v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 2003). Courts are not “permitted to re
weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations,” but must give deference to the
administrative findings. Chandler v. Comm ‘r Soc. Sec., 667 f.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011); see also
42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Nevertheless, the Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
whether the conclusions reached are rational” and supported by substantial evidence. Gober v.
Matthews, 574 f.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is more than
a mere scintilla, and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
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support a conclusion.” Chandler, 667 f.3d at 359 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971)).
If the factual record is adequately developed, substantial evidence “may be
‘something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.” Daniels v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1011587, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr.
15, 2009) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm ‘n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). In other words,
under this deferential standard of review, the Court may not set aside the AU’s decision merely
because it would have come to a different conclusion. Cruz v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 244 F. App’x
475, 479 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Hartranfl V. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Determining a Minor’s Disability
B.
The Social Security Administration examines three requirements in evaluating whether a
minor is disabled, namely:
(1) that the child is not working; (2) that the child had a “severe”
impairment or combination of impairments; and (3) that the impairment,
or combination of impairments, was of Listing-level severity, meaning the
impairment(s) met, medically equaled or functionally equaled the severity
of an impairment in the Listings.3
TC. ex rel. Z.C. v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 497 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§
416.924(a)).
With regard to the third requirement, to determine whether a child’s impairment(s) are
medically or functionally equal in severity to an impairment contained in the Listings, the
Commissioner assesses all functional limitations caused by the child’s impairment(s).
20 C.F.R.
See
§ 416.926a(a). In assessing the child’s functional limitations, the AU evaluates six
domains of functioning: (1) acquiring and using information, (2) attending and completing tasks,
20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
3
(3) interacting and relating with others, (4) moving about and manipulating objects, (5) caring for
oneself, and (6) health and physical well-being.
20 C.F.R.
§ 416.926a(b)(l)(i)-(vi) and
41 6.926a(b)(1).
If the child has an “extreme” limitation in one of the six domains or a “marked” limitation
in two of the six domains, the child’s impairment is functionally equivalent to a listed impairment.
20 C.F.R.
§ 416.926a(a). A limitation is “extreme” when the impairment “very seriously”
interferes with the child’s ability independently to initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R
§ 416.926a(e)(3)(i). A limitation is “marked” when the impairment “seriously” interferes with the
child’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.
20 C.F.R
§
416.926a(e)(2)(i). Also, a marked limitation is more than moderate, but less than extreme. Id.
In assessing functional equivalence, the ALl is not required to “use particular language or
adhere to a particular format.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004). Rather, the
AU must only “ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of
findings to permit meaningful review.” Id.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that the AU erred because she failed to “provide any explanation and[/or]
analysis
...
for her decision that
[] Claimant [did] not meet or medically equal listings 112.04 and
112.06.” The Court agrees. At Step One, the ALl found that Claimant had not engaged in any
substantial gainful activity. (R. 13). Next, at Step Two, the ALl determined that Claimant suffered
from the following severe impairments: 1) major depressive disorder; 2) PTSD; 3) ADHD; 4)
OCD; and 5) lED. (Id.). At Step Three, the AU found that Claimant’s impairment or combination
of impairments do not meet or functionally equal in severity an impairment in the Listings, but did
not support this conclusion with substantial evidence. Tr. 15-24.
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first, the AU explained that Listing 112.04 (mood disorders) “requires a disturbance of
mood
...,
accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome.” (R. 14). The AU went
on to note that a “disorder meets or medically equals the required severity when the evidence
demonstrates a medically documented persistence, either continuous or intermittent, of major
depressive syndrome.” (Id.). further, the AU correctly stated that “[t]he major depressive
syndrome must be characterized by at least five of the ten criteria listed under 1 12.04A1, and for
children [like Claimant], resulting in at least two of the appropriate age-group criteria in paragraph
B2 of 112.02.” (Id.). Unfortunately, the ALl’s analysis ends there as she summarily concludes
that “the record [did] not show the criteria listed above.” (Id.).
As the Third Circuit has explained, “there is a particularly acute needfor some explanation
by the AU she s/he has rejected relevant evidence or when there is conflicting probative evidence
in the record.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981) (emphasis added); see also
Grimm v. Benyhill, 201$ U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114268, at *10 (“Thus in order to facilitate review of
the decision under the substantial evidence standard, the AU’s decision must be accompanied by
‘a clear and satisfactory explanation of the basis on which it rests. “) (emphasis added). Here,
the ALl failed to provide any explanation to support her conclusion that Claimant’s disabilities
did not meet or medically equal Listing 112.04. Indeed, a review of the record and the hearing
transcript fails to reveal support, let alone by substantial evidence, for the conclusion that
Claimant’s disabilities did not meet or medically equal Listing 112.04.
(R. 13-14; Tr. 14).
Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that the AU’s conclusion was supported by substantial
evidence.
The same is true for the AU’s conclusion relating to Listing 112.06 (anxiety disorders).
(R. 14). Once again, the ALl explained what symptoms are necessary to qualify for this Listing
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and types of disorders. (Id.). The AU went on to note that “[t]he listing requires medically
documented findings of at least one of seven criteria under 1 12.06A and for children [like
Claimant], resulting in at least two of the appropriate age-group criteria in paragraph 32 of
112.02.” (Id.). Once more, AU concluded her analysis at this point and found that Claimant did
not meet or medically equal Listing 112.06. Just as with her analysis of Listing 112.04, the AU
did not provide any reasoning or citation to the record to support her conclusion that Claimant did
not meet Listing 112.06. As such, the Court cannot conclude that the ALl’s conclusion was
supported by substantial evidence. Hence, this matter must be remanded for further proceedings.
Because this matter is being remanded, the Court need not address Plaintiffs additional
arguments regarding the other purported errors the ALl made at the subsequent steps of the
analysis.
1V.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court remands this matter for further proceedings that
are consistent with the instructions contained herein. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Opinion.
DATED:-
-‘..
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
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