CALAN v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY et al

Filing 19

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 3/27/17. (cm, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JORGE CALAN,

:

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-9008 (JLL)

:

OPINION

V.

CITY OF JERSEY CITY, et a!.,
Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge

BACKGROUND
The pro se plaintiff. Jorge Calan, brought this action in state court on September
29, 2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 (hereinafter, ‘Section 1983”) and the New Jersey

Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2 (hereinafter, ‘the NJCRA”) against the following
defendants: (1) the City of Jersey City; (2) City of Jersey City police detective Alexander
Rivera; and (3) the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter, the HCPO”). The
Court notes that the plaintiff has not named an individual prosecutor, and has named only
the HCPO itself.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his rights under the federal
constitution and the New Jersey constitution by: (1) securing an indictment in 2010 for a
murder charge against him based upon fabricated evidence, and then maliciously

prosecuting him in New Jersey state court on that charge, for which he was ultimately
acquitted on October 2, 2014; and (2) holding him in jail for four years while he awaited
trial. (See dkt. 1 through dkt. 1-3.)’
The defendants removed this action from state court pursuant to the Court’s
original federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, 1441. The City of Jersey City and

Rivera now move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, “Rule”)
12(b)(6) to dismiss the plaintiffs claims that are asserted against them. (See dkt. 15

through dkt. 15-13; dkt. 1$; dkt. 18-1; dkt. 18-2.) The HCPO separately moves pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the plaintiffs claims that are asserted against it. (See dkt. 14
through dkt. 14-5.) The plaintiff has not filed any response to these two pending motions
to dismiss.2
The Court resolves the two motions to dismiss upon a review of the papers and
without oral argument. See L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). For the following reasons, the Court grants
both motions.

The Court will refer to documents by the docket entry numbers and the
page numbers imposed by the Electronic Case Filing System.
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The defendants had previously filed motions to dismiss the complaint.

6; dkt, 9.) The previous motions were administratively terminated without
prej udice, because the Court was concerned that the defendants had served the pro se

(Sc dkt.

plaintiff at the incorrect address. (See dkt. 12.) However, the defendants have now
demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction that the two current motions to dismiss have
been properly served upon the plaintiff. (See dkt. 14-5; dkt. 15-1; dkt. 1$; dkt. 1$-i;
dkt. 18-2.)

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standards
The Court is guided by the following standards in resolving the two pending

motions to dismiss.
A.

Rule 12(b)(6)

It is not necessary for the Court to restate the standard for resolving a motion made
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), because that standard has been already enunciated. See
Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc., 714 f.3d 761, 764—65 (3d Cir. 2013) (setting forth
the standard citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209—12 (3d Cir. 2009) (setting forth the standard;

citing

Twombly and Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
B.

Unopposed Motions To Dismiss

The plaintiff has not opposed the two motions to dismiss that are pending at bar.
However, the Court must still address both of those motions to dismiss on the merits even
if they are unopposed. See Jones v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 381
Fed.Appx. 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2010); Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29,30 (3d
Cir. 1991).
C.

Liberal Construction Of Pro Se Pleadings

The Court. in addressing the two instant motions: (1) construed the prose
plaintiffs cLaims liberally; and (2) accepted all of the plaintiffs factual allegations as
true, construed the claims in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and considered

whether the plaintiff may be entitled to relief in federal court under any reasonable
reading of those claims. See Kissell v. Dep’t of Corrs., 634 Fed.Appx. $76, 87$—79 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing Iqbal, Twombly, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. $9 (2007), and Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 200$)).
D.

Section 1983 and the NJCRA

‘Section 19$3 creates a species of tort liability for the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill.,
No. 14-9496, 2017 WL 1050976, at *3 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2017) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The NJCRA does the same for the federal constitution, as well as for the New
Jersey constitution. See N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) (stating that “[a]ny person who has been
deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or
whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has
been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or
coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and
for injunctive or other appropriate relief’). As a result, ‘[t]he NJCRA is interpreted as
analogous to

§

1983,” Szernple v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 493 Fed.Appx. 238,

241 (3d Cir. 2012), and a court will analyze

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.

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NJCRA claims through the lens of

1983.” Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F.Supp.2d 417, 444 (D.N.J. 2011); see Estate

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of Martin v. U.S. Marshals Serv. Agents, 649 Fed.Appx. 239, 245 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016)
(holding that “it appears undisputed that Plaintiffs’ claims under the New Jersey
Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act trigger the same legal elements and
principles as

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.

.

[the] federal causes of action [under Section 1983]”). Thus, the Court’s

analysis of the plaintiffs Section 1983 claims also applies to the plaintiffs NJCRA
claims in this case.
II.

The HCPO

Section 1983 and the NJCRA both enable a plaintiff to bring a civil action only
against a “person” who causes a deprivation of federal and state constitutional rights
under the color of state law. It is well-settled law that the prosecutor’s office of a New
Jersey county, such as the HCPO in this instance, is not a “person” subject to liability
under Section 1983 or the NJCRA, particularly when that office is fulfilling its law
enforcement and investigative roles. See Mikhaeil v. Santos, 646 Fed.Appx. 158, 161
(3d Cir. 2016) (dismissing the claims brought against the HCPO), cert. denied, 2017 WL
737872 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2017); see Estate of Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office,
769 F.3d 850, 854—55 (3d Cir. 2014); Wilson v. Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office,
No. 15-6035, 2016 WL 1090211, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2016).
It is also well-settled law that the Eleventh Amendment bars a plaintiff from
bringing claims under Section 1983 and the NJCRA against the prosecutor’s office of a
New Jersey county, such as the HCPO in this instance, when the conduct at issue
concerns law enforcement and investigative functions on behalf of the state, because

those kinds of claims are, in effect, brought against the State of New Jersey itself See
Woodyard v. County of Essex, 514 Fed.Appx. 177, 182 (3d Cir. 2013); Hyatt v. County
of Passaic, 340 Fed.Appx. 833, 837—38 (3d Cir. 2009); Lopez-Siguenza v. Roddv,
No. 13-2005, 2014 WL 1298300, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014); End! v. New Jersey,
5 f.Supp.3d 689, 697 (D.N.J. 2014); see also Henry v. Jersey City Police Dept, No. 1454$0, 2016 WL 1586875, at *5_7 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2016) (dismissing the claims brought
against the HCPO).
The State of New Jersey has not consented to subject the HCPO to liability for
claims brought under Section 1983 or the NJCRA, and the immunity afforded to the
HCPO against Section 1983 claims and NJCRA claims has not been abrogated.
Therefore, the Court grants the motion by the HCPO for the aforementioned reasons, and
dismisses all of the plaintiffs claims that are asserted against it.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs Section 1983 claims and NJCRA claims brought
against the HCPO, wherein the plaintiff asserts that the HCPO fabricated evidence and
then engaged in a malicious prosecution against him, are dismissible because of the fact
that the plaintiff was indicted by the Grand Jury. The issuance of the indictment
demonstrates that there was probable cause for the HCPO to proceed with the criminal
prosecution against the plaintiff See Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269
f.3d 243, 251 (3d Cir. 2001); Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 362—
63 (3d Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs allegations against the HCPO that are contained in the
complaint offer nothing to counter this showing. See Wimbush v. Snyder, No. 13-4654,
2015 WL 4911850, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2015) (in response to the defendant’s

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argument that an indictment by the Grand Jury demonstrated that there was probable
cause to bring a criminal prosecution, the court held that the plaintiff “has nowhere

alleged, let alone pointed to facts in the record, that that the indictment was procured by
fraud, perjury, or any other corrupt means”). Thus, the Court finds that the motion by the

HCPO could be granted on this ground as well.
III.

City of Jersey City and Rivera

The plaintiff’s claims against the City of Jersey City and Rivera must also be

dismissed based upon the alternative ground for dismissal of the claims asserted against
the HCPO: the claims alleging violations of Section 1983 and the NJCRA based upon
allegations of fabricated evidence and malicious prosecution are dismissible due to the
fact that the plaintiff was indicted.

Trabal, 269 f.3d at 251; Camiolo, 334 f.3d at

362—63; see also Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2016) (dismissing
arrestee’s claims that were brought against a police detective, and holding that an
indictment

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.

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constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute”).

Furthermore, the plaintiffs allegations against the City of Jersey City and Rivera that are
contained in the complaint offer nothing to counter this showing. See Mozelle v. City of
Pleasantville. No. 12-1700, 2012 WL 2945721. at *2 (D.N.J. July 2,2012) (dismissing a

malicious prosecution claim brought under Section 1983 and the NJCRA against a
municipality and police officers, because the plaintiff merely “allege[d] that the
indictment was based on lies,” and offered no other allegations to counter the fact that he

was indicted). Therefore, the Court grants the motion by the City of Jersey City and

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Rivera for the aforementioned reasons, and dismisses all of the plaintiffs claims that are
asserted against them.
The Court notes that Rivera also moved for dismissal based upon qualified
immunity. However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ‘caution{ed]

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that it is

generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it
is necessary to develop the factcial record in the vast majority of cases.” Newland v.
Reehorst, 32$ Fed.Appx. 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, the Court finds that a
determination of qualified immunity insofar as it concerns Rivera would be inappropriate
at this juncture.
IV.

All Defendants
The Court also notes in the alternative that the complaint is deficient, because the

plaintiff fails to specifically allege the conduct in which each defendant engaged that
violated his rights under the federal constitution and the New Jersey constitution.
furthermore, the Court notes that the complaint contains at least one inaccuracy: the
plaintiff alleges that he “was wrongfully convicted,” when in actuality he was acquitted
of the criminal charge against him. (See dkt. 1 at 9.)
As a result, the plaintiff has failed to properly put each defendant on notice as to
the allegations against each of them. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Boseman v. Upper
Providence Twp.. No. 16-1338, 2017 WL 758480, at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 2017)
(dismissing Section 1983 claims that were based upon a plaintiffs allegations of
fabricated evidence in a criminal case, because the plaintiff failed to provide specific

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factual allegations to demonstrate a meaningfu1 connection” between the alleged injury
and the use of fabricated evidence). Thus, in the alternative, the Court finds that the
entire complaint is dismissible on this ground as well.

CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court: (1) grants the motion by the
defendants City of Jersey City and Rivera to dismiss the plaintiffs claims that are
asserted against them; (2) grants the motion by the defendant Hudson County
Prosecutor’s Office to dismiss the plaintiffs claims that are asserted against it; and (3)
dismisses all of the plaintiffs claims without prejudice.
The Court will enter an appropriate order and judgment.

U States District Judge

Dated: March

2017

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