PETROP-CIVIL v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
Filing
16
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 2/15/17. (sr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-9280 (JLL)
:
ROMAINE PETROP-CIVIL,
OPINION
V.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge
The plaintiff, Romaine Petrop-Civil, brought this action in New Jersey state court
to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination under the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination (hereinafter, “the NJLAD”) and New Jersey common law. (See
dkt. 1-2.)’ Petrop-Civil asserted her claims against the following defendants: (1) her
former employer, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereinafter, “the FRBNY”);
and (2) Karen Lynch, who is alleged to be “an Assistant Vice President andlor Manager
at [the FRBNY].” (Id.)
The defendants removed this action based upon the original jurisdiction afforded
to the federal district courts by 12 U.S.C.
§
632 over cases brought against the FRBNY
The Court will refer to documents by the docket entry numbers and the page
numbers imposed by the Electronic Case Filing System.
and its employees.
($ dkt. 1.) See 12 U.S.C. § 632 (stating that a matter in which a
Federal Reserve Bank, such as the FRBNY, is a party is deemed to arise under the laws
of the United States, and that the district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction over all such suits).
The defendants now move to dismiss all of Petrop-Civil’s claims pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, “Rule”) 12(b)(6). (See dkt. 5; dkt. 5-1; dkt.
6; dkt. 7; dkt. 7-1; dkt. 14.) Petrop-Civil opposes the motion. ($ç dkt. 9.)
The Court will resolve the motion upon a review of the papers and without oral
argument.
LCiv.R. 78.1(b). The Court presumes the familiarity of the parties with
the factual context and the procedural history of the action. For the following reasons,
the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.
BAC KGROUND
Petrop-Civil worked as a clerk for the FRBNY at a location in East Rutherford,
New Jersey, before her employment was terminated. (See dkt. 1-2 at 6.) She identifies
herself as “a 58 year old African-American woman of Haitian descent.”
(Rh) According
to Petrop-Civil, she was terminated by the FRBNY based upon her “ancestry, origin, age,
nationality and/or gender” in violation of the NJLAD and the related New Jersey
common law. (See generally dkt. 1-2.)
LEGAL STANDARD
It is not necessary for the Court to restate the standard for resolving a motion made
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of a plaintiffs claims, because that standard has
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been already enunciated. See Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 764—
65 (3d Cir. 2013) (setting forth the standard; citing Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.s.
544 (2007)); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209—12 (3d Cir. 2009) (setting
forth the standard; citing Twombly and Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
DISCUSSION
I.
The Defendants’ Arguments
The defendants argue in support of their motion to dismiss that Petrop-Civil’s New
Jersey state employment discrimination claims are preempted by Section 341 (Fifth) of
the Federal Reserve Act, which provides that the Federal Reserve Bank possesses the
power “{t]o appoint by its board of directors a president, vice presidents, and such
officers and employees as are not otherwise provided for in this [Act], to define their
duties, require bonds for them and fix the penalty thereof and to dismiss at pleasure such
officers or employees.” 12 U.S.C.
§
341 (Fifth).
The defendants specifically rely upon the holding in Fasano v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 457 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2006), which also concerned New Jersey
employment discrimination claims brought by a former employee at the FRBNY’s East
Rutherford, New Jersey location against the FRBNY and several of its employees. In
Fasano, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that employment discriminations claims
brought under New Jersey law are barred against the FRBNY and its employees, because
New Jersey law offers forms of relief that go beyond any of their federal counterparts,
3
such as Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and thus for a court to
permit New Jersey state claims to proceed would violate the preemption afforded under
Section 341 (Fifth). See 457 F.3d at 278.
II.
The Plaintiffs Arguments
Petrop-Civil argues in opposition that the Court should be persuaded by certain
case law holding that the employment discrimination laws of New York
the New York Human Rights Law
—
for example,
are not preempted by Section 341 (Fifth). (ç
generally dkt. 9 at 4—6 (citing opinions issued by the district courts within the Southern
District of New York and the Eastern District of New York).) In addition, Petrop-Civil
argues that the holding in Fasano is not controlling authority, and that the claims brought
under the NJLAD and the related New Jersey common law are indeed consistent with
their federal counterparts. (See dkt. 9 at 4—5 (arguing that “the laws of NJ and the
Federal laws are not in conflict and therefore, [the Federal Reserve Act] does not preempt
the application of the NJ antidiscrimination laws”).)
III.
Analysis
The defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. The Court declines to accept
Petrop-Civil’s invitation to follow the opinions of those district courts addressing the
employment discrimination laws of New York. The Court is bound by the previous
determination of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that NJLAD claims and any related
New Jersey common law claims that are brought against the FRBNY and its employees
are indeed preempted.
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The Third Circuit in Fasano concluded that Section 341 (Fifth) of the Federal
Reserve Act granted to all of the Federal Reserve Banks the “absolute, unlimited power
to dismiss an employee,” and that as a result that Act “preempts any state employment
law that goes beyond the remedies and protections provided by” federal law. Fasano, 457
F.3d at 288. Furthermore, the Third Circuit held that “[s]tate anti-discrimination laws
that do not minor their federal analogs cannot be validly applied to the [FRBNY] by
virtue of conflict preemption with Section 341 (Fifth) of the Federal Reserve Act.” j at
290.
The Third Circuit then specifically held that the FRBNY and FRBNY employees
could not be subjected to a civil action wherein a tenTiinated employee sought relief
under the NJLAD, because those types of claims provide for unlimited punitive damages,
provide for individual liability on the part of employees, and impose substantive and
procedural burdens well beyond those imposed by federal law, thereby frustrating the
purpose of Section 341 (Fifth). See id. at 283, 289. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded
that to permit New Jersey employment discrimination claims to proceed “would conflict
with Congress’s intent to provide Federal Reserve Banks with the broadest latitude
possible in carrying out their statutory duties” pursuant to Section 341 (Fifth). Id. at 288—
89.
To the extent that Petrop-Civil asserts claims that are linked to employment
discrimination under the New Jersey common law, the holding in Fasano makes it clear
that those claims are barred against the FRBNY and its employees as well, because those
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claims are subsumed by the NJLAD within the employment context. See id. 287—88
(stating that in view of the reach of Section 341 (fifth), “it would make little sense to
allow state tort claims [asserted within the employment context] to proceed”); see also
Mele v. fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 f.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (dismissing New
Jersey common law claims brought by a former FRBNY employee concerning
termination of employment that were asserted against the F RBNY); see also Gaines v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 13-3709, 2014 WL 1450113, at *5_9 (D.N.J. Apr. 14,
2014) (dismissing New Jersey common law claims arising from the plaintiffs
termination of employment, because they were subsumed by the NJLAD and were based
on the same operative facts underlying the NJLAD claims).
The Court’s discussion of Fasano demonstrates that the Third Circuit’s holding
therein is not ambiguous, and therefore renders Petrop-Civil’s arguments to be without
merit. See 457 F.3d at 288 (holding that “by no stretch of the imagination can.
[NJ]LAD be said to ‘parallel’ or ‘mirror’ [its] federal counterpart[]”).
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.
.
the
_____
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court grants the defendants’ motion to
dismiss all of Petrop-Civil’s claims. The Court will enter an appropriate order and
judgment.
JE L. EJNARES
‘hited States District Judge
Dated: February
,
2017
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