GOULD v. O'NEAL et al

Filing 92

OPINION & ORDER denying 88 Plaintiff's Motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andre M. Espinosa on 5/12/2021. (bt, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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Plaintiff, :
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v.
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DETECTIVE ROBERT O’NEAL, et al.,
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Defendants. :
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JONATHAN GOULD,

Civil Action No. 17-100-JMV-AME
OPINION & ORDER

ESPINOSA, Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Jonathan Gould (“Plaintiff”) brings this motion for leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rules 15(a)(2) and 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. [D.E. 88] No opposition has been filed. Nevertheless, because the Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to meet the applicable standard for amending the complaint, the motion will
be denied.

I.

BACKGROUND
In brief, this civil rights action stems from Plaintiff’s February 2015 arrest and detention

and criminal charges brought against him for allegedly committing credit card theft against his
elderly mother, then a resident of West Orange, New Jersey. Plaintiff had claimed he was
authorized to use the credit card and pleaded not guilty. Ultimately the criminal charges against
him were not only discontinued but expunged by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex
County.

On January 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action for false arrest and malicious prosecution,
in violation of his constitutional rights. The Complaint named three individuals who were
employed by the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office and who were alleged by Plaintiff to be liable
for their involvement in the underlying events. In relevant part, the Complaint asserted a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest against Defendant Robert Grady (“Grady”), then an
assistant prosecutor in the Financial Crimes Unit. On Defendants’ motion, brought pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the claim against Grady was dismissed on
February 8, 2018, by the Honorable John M. Vazquez. In an Opinion of that same date, the Court
found, based on the allegations set forth in the Complaint, that absolute prosecutorial immunity
barred the claim against Grady. The Court, however, permitted Plaintiff an opportunity to replead his entire Complaint, including the false arrest claim against Grady. Following the filing of
the First Amended Complaint, Defendant Grady again moved to dismiss. On July 17, 2018, the
Court once again dismissed, with prejudice, the false arrest claim against Grady, finding it barred
by prosecutorial immunity.
Shortly before the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint as to Defendant Grady
with prejudice, the Magistrate Judge previously assigned to this case held an initial scheduling
conference. The Scheduling Order entered on June 15, 2018, directed that all motions to amend
pleadings be filed by October 12, 2018, and set a discovery end date of December 31, 2018.
Discovery was thereafter extended numerous times at the parties’ request and was ultimately
extended to July 17, 2020. According to the docket, by that date all document discovery and
party depositions had concluded. The parties also jointly requested an additional 45 days to

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complete non-party depositions, which had been delayed due to the pandemic. It does not appear
that any extension of the deadline to amend pleadings was sought until December 2020, when
Plaintiff indicated his wish to file the instant motion.

II.

DISCUSSION
In the motion for leave to amend presently before the Court, Plaintiff seeks to reinstate

the false arrest claim against Grady, arguing that information obtained in discovery has provided
Plaintiff with “ample basis to allege that Mr. Grady advised the detective Defendants as to the
existence of probable cause.” (Pl. Br. at 2.) He maintains that the proposed Second Amended
Complaint sets forth facts demonstrating that Grady was involved in the investigation, activity
which Plaintiff argues falls outside the protection of prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiff concedes
that this motion to amend has been filed long after the deadline set by the Court’s scheduling
order. Accordingly, he acknowledges that his motion is therefore subject not only to Rule 15(a),
but also to the more stringent standard of Rule 16(b)(4). Plaintiff contends that he meets that
standard because he was diligent in pursuing discovery and vigorously opposed both motions to
dismiss the claims against Grady. According to the brief filed in support of this motion, “[t]he
only reason Plaintiff is seeking to amend to add Mr. Grady into the action at this juncture is
because the Court previously determined to dismiss him from the action, not through any choice
made by Plaintiff.” (Pl. Br. at 9.)
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend a pleading]
when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, when a party brings a motion to
amend the complaint after the court-ordered deadline, he or she must first demonstrate that there
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is “good cause” to modify the Court’s scheduling order and that he or she has acted with
reasonable diligence despite the failure to comply with the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)
(“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”); see also
Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 84 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Rule
16(b)(4) focuses on the moving party’s burden to show due diligence.”). If a plaintiff
demonstrates good cause, the court then proceeds to apply the standard applicable to motions to
amend, pursuant to Rule 15(a). While Rule 15(a)(2) plainly states that leave must be freely
given, it is equally well-established that, in the court’s discretion, leave to amend may be denied
for various equitable reasons such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and/or] futility of
amendment . . ..” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Arthur v. Maersk, Inc.,
434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Foman).
This Court finds that Plaintiff has not made the requisite demonstration to obtain leave to
file the Second Amended Complaint. The instant motion was filed on December 28, 2020,
almost four years, to the day, after this action was initiated. The Court allowed Plaintiff to
proceed with this motion, even though the deadline for amending pleadings had expired two
years prior to the motion and even though the very protracted discovery period had already
concluded. Though he filed the motion with permission, Plaintiff must nevertheless satisfy the
threshold requirement of good cause before he may amend his pleading. He has not done so.
Plaintiff argues that, in discovery, he obtained evidence that assistant prosecutor Grady
participated in the criminal investigation leading to Plaintiff’s arrest, pointing specifically to the
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deposition testimony given by Grady and by Defendant Robert O’Neal, one of the detectives
investigating Plaintiff. The Court has reviewed the proposed Second Amended Complaint, as
well as the deposition transcripts submitted in support of this motion. Contrary to Plaintiff’s
assertions, Grady in fact denied having any involvement in the investigation. Plaintiff, moreover,
fails to demonstrate that he was diligent in his attempt to uncover facts that would justify his
attempt to reinstate a claim that was evaluated and found deficient, twice, on dispositive motion
practice early in the litigation. In short, the Court finds no good cause for what essentially
amounts to a very belated motion for reconsideration of the Court’s July 18, 2018 Order. 1
This Court must stress that, in the July 18, 2018 Order, Judge Vazquez dismissed the
false arrest claim against Defendant Grady with prejudice. As the parties are aware, a dismissal
with prejudice carries the same finality as if the claim were to have proceeded to judgment on the
merits. Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Dismissal with prejudice
constitutes an adjudication of the merits as fully and completely as if the order had been entered
after trial.”) (citing Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Svc. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 327 (1955)). Thus, even if
Plaintiff had satisfied Rule 16’s good cause standard, the motion must be denied as prejudicial to
Grady. The Third Circuit has “‘consistently recognized . . . that prejudice to the non-moving
party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.’” Arthur, 434 F.3d at 204 (quoting

The District of New Jersey’s Local Civil Rule 7.1 provides that a motion for reconsideration
may be brought within 14 days after entry of the order on the original motion and requires the
moving party to identify the matter or controlling decisions that he or she believes were
overlooked by the Court. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i); see also Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (setting forth grounds for reconsideration).
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Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993)). Here, allowing Plaintiff to reinstate a
claim that had been dismissed with prejudice would upend Defendant Grady’s reliance on the
Court’s July 18, 2018 Order of dismissal and force him to defend against a false arrest claim
terminated early in the case, hampered by the passage of time and his lack of preparation. 2 This
inequitable result provides a compelling reason to deny the instant motion for leave to amend.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint is not warranted under Rules 15(a)(2) and 16(b)(4) of the Federal Rules Civil
Procedure. Accordingly,
IT IS on this 12th day of May 2021,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint [D.E.
88] is hereby DENIED.
/s/ André M. Espinosa
ANDRÉ M. ESPINOSA
United States Magistrate Judge

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Indeed, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion does not address the viability of the claim if it
were to be reinstated almost three years after dismissal, under the applicable two-year limitations
period for Section 1983 claims. The futility of an amendment, which examines whether the
complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, is yet another grounds
for denying a motion to amend. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434
(3d Cir. 1997).
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