TOUTEBON v. ST MARY'S VILLA

Filing 23

OPINION. Signed by Judge Katharine S. Hayden on 12/21/17. (cm, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARIE TOUTEBON
Civil No.: 17-cv-00852 (KSH) (CLW)
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
ST. MARY’S VILLA
Defendant.

Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.
Before the Court is defendant St. Mary’s Villa’s motion (D.E. 3) to dismiss plaintiff
Marie Toutebon’s complaint (D.E. 1, “Compl.”) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1), and alternatively for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Toutebon alleges that St. Mary’s Villa, her landlord, violated her
rights under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) by failing to translate Section 8 recertification forms
from English into Toutebon’s native language of Creole. The theory behind Toutebon’s lawsuit
is that St. Mary’s Villa’s inaction amounts to national origin discrimination under the FHA. For
its part, St. Mary’s Villa argues that Toutebon is effectively asking the Court to reverse a final
state-court judgment that previously terminated Toutebon’s subsidized tenancy, and that such an
exercise of federal jurisdiction is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the alternative,
St. Mary’s Villa argues that the Court should dismiss the complaint on res judicata grounds. For
the reasons below, the Court agrees that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the Court from
hearing the case.

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From 2007 to September 2015, Toutebon was a tenant in an apartment building owned
and operated by St. Mary’s Villa in Newark, New Jersey. Id. at ¶ 5. As a low-income tenant,
Toutebon qualified for the federal Section 8 rental subsidy, and she received the subsidy for the
majority of the time she lived at the apartment. Id. at ¶ 8. The Section 8 subsidy permitted
Toutebon to pay only a portion of her contractual rent under the lease. Id. In order to continue
to qualify for the subsidy, Toutebon was required under federal law to recertify her income to the
landlord at least once every year. Toutebon claims that she failed to submit her income
recertification in 2015 because the landlord failed to translate notices about the recertification
into her native language of Creole, causing her rent to increase beyond what she could afford,
and ultimately resulting in her eviction. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14.
Toutebon’s complaint consists of one count alleging a Fair Housing Act violation.
(Compl. at Count One, ¶¶ 1-3). Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to
“discriminate against any person in terms, conditions, or privileges . . . rental of a dwelling, or in
the provisions of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 3604. But Toutebon does not specifically allege that she was subjected to national
origin discrimination in her papers. Nor does she cite legal authority to support the argument
that a landlord’s failure to translate documents for a tenant with limited English proficiency is a
per se violation of the FHA. Notwithstanding, for purposes of examining this motion under Rule
12(b)(1), the Court will assume that Toutebon has succeeded in pleading a cognizable cause of
action.
St. Mary’s Villa’s Rooker-Feldman argument arises out of prior events that took place in
state court, and is supported by records from landlord-tenant proceedings between the parties,
which are attached to its motion papers. The prior proceedings include (1) a holdover eviction

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action filed by St. Mary’s Villa on July 1, 2015; (2) a post-judgment relief hearing held on
August 12, 2015; (3) a non-payment of rent eviction action that was heard on September 25,
2015; (4) a post-judgment relief hearing to set aside the judgment of possession, initially begun
on October 21, 2015; and (5) a second post-judgment relief hearing held on October 26, 2015.
The specific documents from these various proceedings are the consent judgment from the
August 12, 2015 post-judgment relief hearing (D.E. 3-7, Ex. A); the trial transcript from the
September 25, 2015 eviction proceeding (D.E. 3-5, Ex. A, D.E. 3-6); as well as the two
transcripts from the October 21, 2015 and October 26, 2015 post-judgment relief hearings (D.E.
3-7, Ex. B, D.E. 3-8, Ex. A).
A review of the proceedings establishes that on July, 7, 2015, the state court entered
default judgment against Toutebon in a holdover eviction case that St. Mary’s Villa filed because
her son Leon had been living with her in the apartment as an unauthorized guest in violation of
her lease. Toutebon sought post-judgment relief, and the court set an August 12, 2015 hearing
date for her application. That day, Toutebon signed a consent judgment that permitted her to
continue her tenancy on certain conditions.
The consent judgment (D.E. 3-7, Ex. A) reflects that a court-appointed Creole interpreter
translated the agreement. In paragraph 6, Toutebon acknowledged that the interpreter assisted
her in understanding the terms, one of which required that she fill out and return her annual
Section 8 recertification form before August 19, 2015 so that she remained eligible for her
federal rental subsidies. Id. at ¶ 3.
The next month, St. Mary’s Villa filed an eviction action against Toutebon for nonpayment of rent. A trial was held on September 25, 2015 before Superior Court Judge Ned M.
Rosenberg. The trial transcript reveals that Judge Rosenberg did not permit Toutebon’s son to

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speak on her behalf, and appointed an interpreter for her. The property manager for St. Mary’s
Villa testified that Toutebon had not recertified her current income as mandated by the recent
consent judgment, which disqualified her from receiving a federally-subsidized rental rate. The
testimony indicates that Toutebon had been sent three separate notices that she had to recertify in
order to receive her subsidy. Judge Rosenberg found that Toutebon had received the notices, and
further that she had duly recertified for the past seven years without incident. Based on his
findings, Judge Rosenberg entered judgment in favor of St. Mary’s Villa. (D.E. 3-6 at 6.)
Toutebon sought post-judgment relief from the eviction, and a hearing was scheduled for
October 21, 2015, again before Judge Rosenberg. The transcript (D.E. 3-7, Ex. B) indicates that
Leon Toutebon once again sought to argue for his mother, who was not there. After Leon failed
to support his claims that Toutebon had been regularly paying rent by producing proof of
payments, the court rescheduled the hearing so that Toutebon herself could testify.
On October 26, 2015, Toutebon appeared with a signed paper authorizing her son to
speak on her behalf. The transcript of the hearing (D.E. 3-8, Ex. B.) indicates that Leon
Toutebon produced a document purporting to be Toutebon’s current Section 8 recertification.
Upon Judge Rosenberg’s review of it, however, it turned out that the form that Leon brought was
actually from the previous year. The court denied relief, and the judgment of eviction stood.
For the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to preclude federal subject-matter jurisdiction, the
following must be established: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
complains before the federal court of injuries caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the judgment
was rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to
review and reject the state judgments. Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild
LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

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544 U.S. 280, 284, (2005)). The Third Circuit has counseled that “[t]he second and fourth
requirements are the key to determining whether a federal suit presents an independent, nonbarred claim.” Id.
In her complaint, Toutebon omits a crucial fact: she was evicted from her apartment
pursuant to a state-court judgment where the judge found that she had lost her subsidy because
she failed to submit the required Section 8 recertification. She is asking this Court to award her
money damages for a “loss of Section 8 benefits” and for “moving costs and storage costs.”
(Compl. at Count One, ¶ B.) Her complained-of injuries flow directly from the prior
adjudication. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the state proceedings and is satisfied that to be
successful, Toutebon’s federal lawsuit would undo the holdings in the tenancy proceedings that
were decided against her. She is, in short, alleging an injury based on an adverse state-court
decision, and not “an independent, non-barred claim.” Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this
Court does not have jurisdiction over Toutebon’s lawsuit, which seeks the review and rejection
of a state-court judgment, and the complaint must be dismissed.1
St. Mary’s Villa’s motion pursuant to 12(b)(1) is granted, and the clerk of the court is
directed to close this case. An accompanying order will be filed.
s/ Katharine S. Hayden___________
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.
Dated: December 21, 2017

The Court will not be addressing the merits of St. Mary’s Villa’s res judicata argument
because it is granting the motion under 12(b)(1).
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