OJO v. SESSIONS et al
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 6/26/2017. (ld, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
OLUKAYODE DAVID OJO,
Civil Action No. 17-1875 (JLL)
JEFF SESSIONS, et al.,
IT APPEARING THAT:
1. On or about March 21, 2017, Petitioner Olukayode David Ojo filed in this court a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, purportedly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (ECF No.
1). Petitioner also filed with that petition an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Document
2 attached to ECF No. 1).
2. On March 27, 2017, this Court entered an order denying Petitioner’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 3). In that order, this Court also terminated this matter and
infonned Petitioner that, to the extent he wished to challenge his conviction in the Eastern District
of New York, he should refile this matter as a motion to vacate sentence in that court. (Id.).
3. Petitioner thereafler paid the applicable filing fee and submitted an application to reopen
this matter. (ECF No. 4).
4. Following his request to reopen, this Court dismissed Petitioner’s claim seeking to
challenge his restitution order for lack ofjurisdiction, but permitted Petitioner’s claim challenging
the calculation of his sentence to proceed, and the Court directed Respondents to file an answer to
that claim within forty-five days on May 31, 2017. (See ECF No. 5).
5. On June 12, 2017, Respotents submitted a letter to the Court in which they informed
the Court that Petitioner’s term of supervised release concluded on March 13, 2017, and that he is
no longer subject to supervised release,
is he otherwise still in custody. (ECF No. 8). In
support of that contention, Respondents submitted to the Court a certification from Petitioner’s
Probation Officer in which the Officer avers that Petitioner has concluded his term of supervised
release, and that Petitioner was informed of the end of his supervised release term by letter on
March 30, 2017. (Document 1 attached to ECF No. 8). A copy of that letter was also provided.
(Document 2 attached to ECF No. 8). Based on the termination of Petitioner’s supervised release
terni, Respondents request that this matter be dismissed as moot. (ECF No. 8).
6. In his sole remaining claim, Petitioner asserts that the Bureau of Prisons miscalculated
his release date, and that his term of supervised release had therefore run longer than it otherwise
should have. (See ECF No. I at 7). Based on this claim, Petitionei- asserted that this Court should
enter an order terminating his supervised release term. (Id. at 8).
7. Federal courts “may adjudicate ‘only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Buczek
v. Welinger, 513 F. App’x 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bzti*ey v. Mctrberrv, 556 F.3d 142,
147 (3d Cir. 2009). A controversy will remain live only while the party seeking relief retains a
“personal stake in the outcome.” Id. Where that personal stake ceases, which in a habeas corpus
action will occur when a petitioner has received the only relief requested for his claim, a case will
become moot and must be dismissed as such. Id.
8. In the only claim Petitioner has before this Court, Petitioner sought only to challenge
his ongoing period of supervised release, and through that claim he sought only the termination of
his supervised release tenm As Petitioner’s supervised release term has now expired, Petitioner
has already received the only relief available to him, and Petitioner’s personal stake in the outcome
of this claim has ended. Petitioner’s habeas petition therefore no longer presents a live case or
controversy and must be dismissed as such. Id.
9. In conclusion, this matter will be dismissed without prejudice as moot. An appropriate
States District Judge
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