MELEIKA v. BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 92

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 5/7/2020. (ld, )

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
STEVEN MELEIKA,
Plaintiff,
v.
BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CITY OF BAYONNE, STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, HUDSON COUNTY
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, HUDSON
COUNTY COURTHOUSE, and
HUDSON COUNTY, NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 17–1958 (KM) (MAH)
OPINION

Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
Detectives from the Bayonne Police Department arrested Steven Meleika
and charged him with possession of marijuana. The police never submitted the
evidence for lab testing, and the charges were later dismissed.
Based on that dismissal, Meleika sued, pro se, among others, the
Bayonne Police Department and the City of Bayonne. 1 Now before the Court

This is one of several distinct but somewhat interrelated pro se actions filed in
this district by Steven Meleika:
1

17-cv-1958 Meleika v. Bayonne Police Department
17-cv-1959 Meleika v. Jersey City Police Department
17-cv-1960 Meleika v. Hudson County Correctional Center
17-cv-5759 Meleika v. Jersey City Medical Center
19-cv-20916 Meleika v. State Of New Jersey (transferred from E.D. Pa.)
Overlapping parties and similar docket numbers have resulted in some confusion. The
City of Bayonne or the Bayonne Police Department are listed as defendants in three of
Mr. Meleika’s complaints: this action, 17-cv-5759, and 19-cv-20916. As noted in a
prior opinion, the plaintiff has from time to time filed papers under the wrong docket
number, a situation the clerk’s office has attempted to correct. (See Opinion, 17-cv1958 DE 25; 17-cv-5759 DE 13).

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are the competing motions for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
56, of defendants the Bayonne Police Department and the City of Bayonne (DE
75) 2 and plaintiff Meleika (DE 83 & DE 90). 3 For the following reasons, the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DE 75) is GRANTED; Meleika’s
motions for summary judgment (DE 83 & DE 90) are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Few if any facts are in dispute. On April 23, 2015, Detectives Steven
Rhodes and Daniel Kaiser of the Bayonne Police Department were on
surveillance patrol and noticed Meleika smoking marijuana in a parked car in
front of a housing complex. They arrested him and, during a routine search,
discovered more marijuana:
On 04-23-201[5], Detective Kaiser and [Detective Rhodes] were on
an unrelated surveillance in the area of 30 East 26th Street[,] the
Centerville Gardens Bayonne Housing Complex. While [they] were
on [their] unrelated surveillance Detective Kaiser and [Detective
Rhodes] detected an odor of burnt marijuana coming from the east
end of the parking lot of 30 East 26th Street. [They] observed a
male, later identified as Steven Meleika[,] sitting inside of a parked
black Nissan[,] . . . and he was smoking marijuana. [They]
approached Meleika with [their] badges displayed and verbally
identified [them]selves as police officers. [Detective Rhodes]
recovered a partially smoked marijuana blunt from Meleika.
Detective Kaiser placed Meleika under arrest. [During a] search
incidental to arrest, Detective Kaiser recovered a Marlboro cigarette
box containing marijuana in a vacuum[-]sealed plastic bag from
Meleika’s right front pants pocket. [Two other police officers]
transported Meleika to headquarters for processing without
incident. The vehicle was parked and secured at the scene. The
marijuana was marked for identification and submitted into
evidence. Detective Kaiser issued Meleika a summons (C-16083)

2

“DE __” refers to the docket entries in this case.

Also before the Court is what Meleika describes as a “motion for recusal” but
what is, in substance, an untimely notice of appeal. (DE 91). The motion is
administratively terminated.
3

2

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39:4-49.1 for drugs in a motor vehicle. [Detective Rhodes] signed a
complaint against Meleika for the above listed charge.
(DE 76 Ex. A).
Meleika’s account is substantially identical. He testified that on April 23,
2015, he was smoking a blunt (marijuana cigar) in his mother’s car at the
Centerville Gardens Bayonne Housing Complex. (DE 76 Ex. E at 26:12–23).
Detectives Rhodes and Kaiser arrived in the parking lot, smelled that he was
smoking marijuana, and blocked his car with their own. (DE 76 Ex. E at
28:22–23 & 34:2–22). The detectives approached Meleika’s car, displayed their
City of Bayonne Police Department badges, and identified themselves as police
officers. (DE 76 Ex. E at 29:1–9). Detective Kaiser asked Meleika to lower his
window and step out of the car, and he placed Meleika under arrest. (DE 76
Ex. E at 31:7–11). Detective Kaiser then searched Meleika and found a
cigarette pack containing a vacuum-sealed plastic bag of marijuana in
Meleika’s pants pocket. (DE 76 Ex. E at 36:3–6).
Meleika was transported to police headquarters, where he was processed
but never placed in a cell. (DE 76 Ex. E at 37:15–17 & 39:6–7). The officers
charged Meleika with possession of marijuana under fifty grams. (DE 39:1314). Meleika was released, with a summons, around 12:45 a.m. on April 24,
2015. (DE 76 Ex. E at 39:13–20). Meleika did not seek medical treatment for
any physical or emotional injuries arising from his arrest. (DE 76 Ex. At 41:8–
42: 13).
The Bayonne Police Department never sent to the testing lab the
marijuana recovered from Meleika, and on September 20, 2016, the charges
against him were dismissed. (DE 76 Ex. E. at 40:9–20 & Ex. F).
B. Procedural History
Based on the dismissal of the charges against him, Meleika filed this
lawsuit on March 22, 2017, alleging “Violation of civil rights, False arrest, False
imprisonment, Malic[ious] prosecution, 14 Amendment, 4 Amendment, and

3

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Punitive damages.” 4 (DE 1 & DE 76 Ex. E at 50:6–10). In support of these
claims, Meleika relies only on the September 27, 2016 letter from the Bayonne
Municipal Court that advised him that the charges against him had been
dismissed. (DE 76 Ex. E at 40:9–20 & Ex. F).
Meleika’s first complaint purported to sue the Bayonne Police
Department, the City of Bayonne, and the State of New Jersey. (DE 1). In light
of Defendants’ motion, on October 5, 2017, I entered an opinion and order (DE
25 & DE 26) dismissing on Eleventh Amendment/sovereign immunity grounds
the claims against the State; dismissing the claims against the Bayonne Police
Department because it is not an independent entity to be sued; and dismissing,
without prejudice and for failure to state a cause of action, the claims against
the City of Bayonne. (DE 25). On November 7, 2017, Meleika filed a first
amended complaint (DE 27), and the parties exchanged discovery, which
included interrogatories and deposition testimony.
On August 27, 2019, despite the absence of a final, appealable order,
Meleika filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
(DE 73). The Third Circuit has docketed the appeal as 19-3011. (DE 74). What
the “notice” consists of, however, is a demand that judgment be entered in
Meleika’s favor based on the statute of limitations (Meleika is the plaintiff), and
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial “[i]n all criminal prosecutions”
(this is a civil case). 5 There is no final, appealable decision disposing of all
The Court and Defendants have interpreted these claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act and as claims against the City of Bayonne
on a municipal-liability theory.
4

Considered as a notice of appeal, this filing would likely be treated as frivolous,
and therefore insufficient to divest this Court of jurisdiction:
5

There are few circumstances in which a district court may continue to
exercise authority over a case after the filing of a notice of appeal, an
“event of jurisdictional significance [that] confers jurisdiction on the
court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over . . . the
case.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58–59
(1982). A district court may proceed if the appeal is patently frivolous, if
the notice of appeal relates to a non-appealable order or judgment, or if

4

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issues as to all parties and no indication that an interlocutory appeal would be
appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. I will therefore deal with the outstanding
motions filed by Meleika and Defendants.
On September 13, 2019, the Bayonne Police Department 6 and the City of
Bayonne moved for summary judgment. (DE 75). On October 16, 2019, Meleika
filed his own motion for summary judgment. (DE 83).
While these motions were pending, Meleika, on March 25, 2020, filed a
second motion for summary judgment. (DE 90). On the same day, he filed what
he called a motion to recuse, but what might be characterized as a (second)
notice of appeal. 7 (DE 91).

the appeal is taken in bad faith and would result in unwarranted delay.
See United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1980) (patently
frivolous); Mondrow v. Fountain House, 867 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1989) (nonappealable order or judgment); Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847
F.2d 90 (3d Cir.1988) (bad faith).
United States v. McIntyre, No. 04-cr-50, 2006 WL 1330202 at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 15,
2006).
If my prediction is incorrect, however, this decision may be treated as an
“indicative ruling” and the Court of Appeals may, within its discretion, order a limited
remand under Rule 62.1:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1 provides that when a motion is made
for relief that the district court lacks authority to grant due to a pending
appeal, the court may “(1) defer considering the motion; (2) deny the
motion; or (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of
appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial
issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1.
MZM Constr. Co., Inc. v. N.J. Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Benefit Funds, No. 18-16328,
2019 WL 3812889 at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2019).
The Bayonne Police Department has already been dismissed as a defendant,
because, as a department of the City government, it is not an independent entity that
can be sued. (DE 25 at 4). See pages 14–15 and note 10, infra.
6

7

The “motion to recuse” reads:
The plaintiff apparently has a summary judgment against all the
defendants for violating his Sixth amendment right to a speedy trial in
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. For good cause shown, the plaintiff

5

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DISCUSSION
This case is one in which the “district courts have original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” The complaint has been interpreted to assert
claims under the federal Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2. The federal claims are sufficient to
provide an “original jurisdiction” toehold for the state claims under the
supplemental jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 563 (2005).
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment
should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and
inferences in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cty. of
Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). “[W]ith respect to an
issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden
on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to
the district court—that there is an of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case.” Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the non-moving
party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt
requests the court grant his motion to recuse the case to the U.S. Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.
(DE 91). This notice, too, would likely be treated as frivolous. See note 5, supra.

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as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that
creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth the types of evidence on which
a nonmoving party must rely to support its assertion that genuine issues of
material fact exist). “[U]nsupported allegations . . . and pleadings are
insufficient to repel summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorp., 912
F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gleason v. Nw. Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d
130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of
material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its
favor at trial.”). If the nonmoving party has failed “to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, . . . there can be ‘no
genuine issue of material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (3d Cir.
1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23).
Meleika appears pro se. He has not filed papers in response that conform
with the federal or local rules. The court may consider “grant[ing] summary
judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts
considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it . . . .” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e). A failure to dispute a party’s statement of material facts, however,
“is not alone a sufficient basis for the entry of a summary judgment.” See
Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that even where a local rule deeming unopposed motions to
be conceded, the court was still required to analyze the movant’s summary
judgment motion under the standard prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see
also Muskett v. Certegy Check Servs., Inc., No. 08-3975, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67320, 2010 WL 2710555 (D.N.J. July 6, 2010) (“In order to grant Defendant’s
unopposed motion for summary judgment, where, as here, ‘the moving party

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does not have the burden of proof on the relevant issues, . . . the [Court] must
determine that the deficiencies in [Plaintiff’s] evidence designated in or in
connection with the motion entitle the [Defendants] to judgment as a matter of
law.’” (quoting Anchorage Assocs., 922 F.2d at 175)).
I am nevertheless mindful of the plaintiff’s pro se status. Where, for
example, “the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the court has an obligation to
construe the complaint liberally.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.
2009) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–521, (1972); Gibbs v. Roman,
116 F.3d 83, 86 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997)). Meleika has made any number of filings in
which he has stated his legal and factual positions. I have reviewed and
considered them as his opposition to summary judgment and have construed
Meleika’s pleadings and filings in the liberal spirit of Haines.
B. Civil Rights Violations
Each count of the complaint seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Thus, a
claim under § 1983 requires first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state
law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”) is modeled on § 1983 and is
construed in parallel with it. See, e.g., Ingram v. Twp. of Deptford, 911 F. Supp.
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2d 289, 298 (D.N.J. 2012); Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417,
443 (D.N.J. 2011). Like Section 1983, the NJCRA grants a cause of action
against “a person acting under color of law.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2.
Probable Cause
A threshold issue for Meleika’s claims is the question whether the police
possessed probable cause authorizing the arrest of Meleika and seizure of his
marijuana without a warrant. Meleika alleges that the detectives lacked
probable cause and this contention forms the basis of his false-arrest, falseimprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and
seizures.” 8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A seizure is usually reasonable when it is
carried out with a warrant based on probable cause. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 356–357 (1967). Warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable, see id., but are permitted under certain circumstances. One
such exception to the warrant requirement is a brief “pat-down” search
incident to an investigative, reasonable-suspicion Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 27 (1968); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Another
exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause.
When a police officer is effecting a lawful arrest, the Fourth Amendment
permits the officer to perform a warrantless incidental search of the detainee’s
person:
Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a
contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons
or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). This right to search and seize without a
search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate
control, Carroll v. United States, []267 U.S.[ 132,] 158 [(1925)], and,
to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the
place where he is arrested, Agnello v. United States, []269 U.S.[ 20,]
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979).
8

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30 [(1925)]; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61–62 (1950).
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); see also Watley v. Felsman,
No. 16 -2059, 2018 WL 1532953 at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018) (citing more
recent authorities).
There was surely probable cause to arrest for a marijuana-possession
offense. “Probable cause exists whenever reasonably trustworthy information or
circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed
by the person being arrested.” United States v. Laville, 480 F.3d 187, 194 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S. Ct. 329
(1959)). “It is well settled that the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and
particularized, may establish not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable
cause.” United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he odor of
marijuana alone can provide probable cause to believe that marijuana is
present in a particular place.”); United States v. Winters, 221 F.3d 1039, 1042
(8th Cir. 2000)).
Here, the evidence adduced from Defendants and from Meleika reveals
that the detectives smelled the odor of burning marijuana when they pulled
into the parking lot. As they approached Meleika’s car, they saw him smoking a
blunt. These facts, then, demonstrate more than just the “smell of marijuana
alone.” The officers smelled burning marijuana, and then actually saw Meleika
smoking a blunt, confirming the source as well as the identity of the substance
being smoked. These “articulable and particularized” facts unquestionably
constituted probable cause to arrest Meleika for a drug offense. See Ramos,
443 F.3d at 308.
The officers were thus entitled to search Meleika’s person incident to that
lawful arrest. They did so and found more marijuana in Meleika’s pocket. That
search incident to arrest did not violate Meleika’s Fourth Amendment rights.

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A recent case from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, Watley v. Felsman, confirms those well-settled principles.
Watley, like Meleika here, sued the police based on, inter alia, their search of
his pockets in connection with an allegedly invalid arrest for traffic offenses. As
I have done here, that court found on summary judgment that the arrest was
supported by probable cause, and then considered the validity of the search of
defendant’s person:
Since the arrest in this case was valid, the search of Watley’s
pockets by Trooper Nilon was lawful as a search incident to a valid
arrest. “An officer may conduct a search incident to arrest without
obtaining a warrant.” See United States v. Elmore, Cr. No. 1100361-02, 2012 WL 2905195, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 16, 2012)(citing
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)); see also Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979)(“Under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, an arresting officer may, without a
warrant, search a person validly arrested.”)(citation omitted). “[T]he
constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend
on whether there is any indication that the person arrested
possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest,
standing alone, authorizes a search.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S.
435, 449 (2013) (quoting DeFillipo, 443 U.S. at 35).
Watley v. Felsman, No. 16- 2059, 2018 WL 1532953 at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29,
2018).
Under these facts, the Fourth Amendment did not require the detectives
to obtain a warrant to search Meleika. What the officers saw and smelled
constituted probable cause for an arrest, and the seizure of marijuana from
Meleika’s pockets was a valid search incident to arrest. 9
Meleika argues that, merely by looking at him, the officers conducted an
unreasonable search:
9

Seeing, looking in somebody’s direction is considered a search I would
argue under the Fourth [A]mendment. Just looking in somebody’s
window, in somebody -- well, it’s not in a house, it would be a stronger
case looking in somebody’s house window. It’s a violation of their Fourth
[A]mendment right, it’s a search. Just, to see, look inside somebody’s
window. It so happened to happen in a car with a motor vehicle.

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False Arrest and False Imprisonment
“To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made
without probable cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d
Cir. 2012) (citing Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir.
1995); Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1988)).
Closely related is the tort of false imprisonment, which may cover the
arrestee’s subsequent detention. It, too, depends on a lack of probable cause:
“[W]here an individual was arrested without probable cause, he ‘has a claim
under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that
arrest.’” Simpson v. Owner of Dollar Tree Store, No. 09-6162, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88027, 2010 WL 3364200 at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2010) (quoting
Groman, 47 F.3d at 636 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 F.2d
1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1988))).
Because the detectives had probable to cause to seize Meleika and his
marijuana, see supra, there is no genuine issue of material fact that he was
neither falsely arrested nor falsely imprisoned. The claims are DISMISSED.
Malicious Prosecution
Under § 1983, a claim of malicious prosecutions requires a plaintiff to
show that “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in [the plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the
It could be because when he goes and talks to you and searches, looks in
your car, and he’s going to -- the search starts, he sees. It could be
because he’s asking you for driver’s license and it’s in the seat next to
you. It’s a search and seizure, Fourth [A]mendment and I would say my
case, my argument would be starting with just seeing is a search.
(DE 76 Ex. E at 49:12–50:3). Officers might violate the Fourth Amendment if they
violate an expectation of privacy (e.g., trespass on the curtilage of a home) in order to
arrive at their vantage point. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987).
Merely looking at a person or object on a public street, however, does not constitute an
unlawful search. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (seizure of
contraband in plain view); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (observation
of contraband lying on car’s front seat).

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proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of
a legal proceeding.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 , 295–97 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citing Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (adopting elements of the
common law tort for purposes of § 1983).
The evidence in the record reveals the absence of two factors: probable
cause and malicious intent.
For the reasons discussed supra, Detectives Rhodes and Kaiser had
probable cause to seize Meleika and the marijuana. It is true that the charges
were later dismissed, based on the lack of any laboratory analysis of the
substance. That circumstance does not retroactively undermine the officers’
possession of probable cause. Probable cause is assessed from the point of view
of the officers at the time of the arrest; “The validity of the arrest is not
dependent on whether the suspect actually committed any crime, and ‘the
mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense for which he is
arrested is irrelevant.’” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979)). The presence of facts
sufficient to establish probable cause, even standing alone, would doom any
malicious prosecution claim.
Evidence of malice, too, is lacking. “Actual malice in the context of
malicious prosecution is defined as either ill will in the sense of spite, lack of
belief by the actor himself in the propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an
extraneous improper purpose.” Robinson v. Jordan, 804 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210
n.8 (D.N.J. 2011) (quoting Morales v. Busbee, 972 F. Supp. 254, 261 (D.N.J.
1997) (citations omitted)).
The record here contains no facts suggesting that the detectives acted
with actual malice or with any purpose other than to bring Meleika to justice.
The detectives were patrolling the area and conducting unrelated surveillance

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when they noticed Meleika smoking marijuana and arrested him for that
violation. Meleika was promptly processed after his arrest, and he was released
mere hours after the detectives arrested him. Meleika believes that by looking
in his direction, the officers acted unreasonably. That is incorrect, and there is
no evidence that either detective acted maliciously in the encounter. The later
dismissal of the charges against him—for evidentiary reasons—does not post
hoc render malicious his prosecution for possession of marijuana. There is no
genuine issue of fact that the detectives had probable cause to seize Meleika’s
marijuana and that they acted solely with the intent to bring Meleika to justice.
The malicious-prosecution claim is accordingly DISMISSED.
Municipal Liability
Meleika sues the City of Bayonne. 10 For constitutional torts, whether
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the analogous provisions of the NJCRA, there is no
respondeat superior liability. Municipal liability for the acts of employees must
be premised on the doctrine of Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,
1358–61 (2011); Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d
Cir. 2013). 11 A local government unit is liable only to the extent that its own
The Bayonne Police Department has already been dismissed as a defendant
because it is a department of a city government, not an independent entity that can
sue and be sued. (DE 25 at 4 (citing, inter alia, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-118
(municipal police department is “an executive and enforcement function of municipal
government”); Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App’x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004);
Mitchell v. City of Jersey City, No. 15-6907, 2016 WL 1381379 at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Apr. 7,
2016)).
10

The vehicle for a claim of violation of the State constitution would be the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2. The NJCRA, like Section
1983, does not impose vicarious or respondeat superior liability. See Perez v. New
Jersey, No. 14-4610, 2015 WL 4394229 at *8 (D.N.J. July 15, 2015) (“[B]ecause
respondeat superior liability is not permitted under § 1983, and because New Jersey
courts interpret the NJCRA as analogous to § 1983, the Court holds that respondeat
superior liability is not permitted for claims under the New Jersey Constitution and the
NJCRA.”) (quoting Ingram v. Twp. of Deptford, 911 F. Supp. 2d 289, 298 (D.N.J.
2012)); Estate of Dasaro v. County of Monmouth, No. 14-7773, 2015 WL 5771606 at *5
n.3 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2015) (same); Hudgon v. LaFleur, No. 07-3626, 2010 WL 2950004
11

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policies or practices led to a deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 694; see
also City of Canton Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); Bielevicz v.
Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.1990). Thus, a municipality may be liable
under § 1983 where the constitutional injury is alleged to have been caused by
either a municipal “policy” or “custom.” See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Policy is made when a “‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to
establish [local] policy with respect to the action’ issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
1480 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481
(1986)). “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is
so well-settled and permanent as to virtually constitute law.” Bielevicz v.
Dubinion, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480);
accord Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
Nor is it sufficient to allege the mere existence of such a policy or
custom. Monell liability may only be premised on facts establishing “an
affirmative link between the [public entity]’s policy and the particular
constitutional violation alleged.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
809 (1985).
Meleika has not produced any evidence to substantiate a municipalliability theory. There is no evidence that the City of Bayonne or the police
department had a policy or custom that encouraged arrests or imprisonments
without probable cause. Likewise, there is no evidence that the City or the
police department furthered a custom or policy of malicious prosecution.
Finally, the record does not demonstrate a policy or custom of failure to train
or supervise police officers or that such a failure caused a false arrest, false
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. In any event, without an underlying

at *7 n.6 (D.N.J. July 22, 2010)(“the Court sees no reason not to interpret the NJCRA
consistent with Monell as precluding municipal liability absent an official pattern or
practice.”).

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constitutional violation, Meleika cannot, as a matter of law, establish a claim of
municipal liability for such a violation. See Panarello v. City of Vineland, 160 F.
Supp. 3d 734, 763 (D.N.J. 2016).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(DE 75) is GRANTED; Meleika’s motions for summary judgment (DE 83 & DE
90) are DENIED; and Meleika’s motion for “recusal” to the Third Circuit (DE 91)
is administratively terminated.
A separate order will issue.
Dated: May 7, 2020
/s/ Kevin McNulty
___________________________________
Hon. Kevin McNulty
United States District Judge

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