DOE v. CARE ONE, LLC et al
Filing
24
LETTER OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 9/27/2021. (sm)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHAMBERS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT ST.
NEWARK, NJ 07101
973-645-5903
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
September 27, 2021
Steven L. Penaro, Esq.
Alston & Bird LLP
90 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10016
Counsel for Defendants Care One, LLC, Care One Mgmt., LLC & Healthbridge Mgmt., LLC
Inayat Ali Hemani, Esq.
Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP
1350 Avenue of the Americas, 31st Floor
New York, NY 10019
Counsel for Relator John Doe
Rachel Geman, Esq.
Leif Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
New York, NY 10013
Counsel for Relator John Doe
LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Re:
John Doe v. Care One, LLC et al.
Civil Action No. 17-3451 (SDW) (LDW)
Counsel:
Before this Court is Defendants Care One, LLC, Care One Management, LLC and
Healthbridge Management, LLC’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Identify Relator John
Doe. This Court having considered the parties’ submissions, and having reached its decision
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, and for the reasons
discussed below, GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
DISCUSSION
A.
The general rule in federal litigation is that “proceedings should be public” and,
consequently, “Rule 10(a) requires parties to a lawsuit to identify themselves in their respective
pleadings.” Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011). It is only in “exceptional
circumstances” that courts permit a party to remain anonymous. Id., see also Doe v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[t]he use of fictitious names is
disfavored”). To proceed anonymously, a party must show “both (1) fear of severe harm, and (2)
that the fear of severe harm is reasonable.” Megless, 654 F.3d at 408; see also U.S. ex rel. Luciano
v. Pollack Health & Wellness, Inc., Civ. No 13-6815, 2015 WL 2168655, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 30,
2015). If a litigant “sufficiently alleges that he or she has a reasonable fear of severe harm from
litigating without a pseudonym, ... district courts should balance a plaintiff's interest and fear
against the public's strong interest in an open litigation process.” Megless, 654 F.3d at 408.
The expectation that parties identify themselves applies even after a matter has been
terminated. For example, where a party seeks to maintain their anonymity by sealing the judicial
record after a case has been voluntarily dismissed, that party “bears the burden of showing that the
material is the kind of information that courts will protect and that disclosure will work a clearly
defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure.” In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194
(3d Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Janssen Therapeutics, 795 F. App’x 142, 146 (3d Cir.
2019); U.S. ex rel. Eberhard v. Angiodynamics, Inc., Civ. No. 11-556, 2013 WL 2155327, at *2
(E.D. Tenn. May 17, 2013) (denying relator’s motion to seal upon the voluntary dismissal of qui
tam action where relator feared economic retaliation or career damage if his name was made
public, finding the mere possibility “of some form of economic harm is inadequate to depart from
the rule favoring public access”).
B.
This Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural history of this
matter and recites only those facts necessary for the resolution of the instant motion. John Doe
(“Relator”) is the owner and/or operator of long-term care facilities in New Jersey and a direct
competitor of Defendants. (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 11-24.) On May 11, 2017, Relator filed a qui tam Complaint
on behalf of the United States of America against Defendants alleging that they submitted false
claims and statements to the United States in violation of federal and state law and the case was
sealed. (D.E. 1-3.) The United States later declined to intervene and its application to unseal the
matter was granted. (D.E. 4-7.) Relator then voluntarily dismissed the case with prejudice. (D.E.
15, 16.) Defendants now move to identify Relator, arguing that there is no basis for him to remain
anonymous and that “Defendants must know who Relator is for the dismissal with prejudice to be
given effect.” (D.E. 19-1 at 1.) This Court agrees.
Here, Relator speculates that he “could” be subject to “significant harm . . . as someone
who owns and operates nursing homes in the same region as Defendants” because his “capacity to
hire employees and contract with other health-care entities in the area would likely suffer if his
identity were public.” (D.E. 21 at 7-8.) This broad assertion of possible economic loss, without
more, is insufficient to show severe harm or serious injury. See, e.g., Megless, 654 F.3d at 408
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(noting that embarrassment or economic harm do not constitute severe harm); Purcell v. Gilead
Sciences, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 3d 569, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (determining that “possible ‘negative
impact’ on Relator’s continued livelihood . . . d[id] not outweigh the strong presumption of access
to judicial materials”); Eberhard, 2013 WL 2155327 at * 3 (noting that “the mere possibility, or
even plausibility, of some form of economic harm is inadequate to depart from the rule favoring
public access”). The type of harm Relator raises is not dissimilar from what any business owner
may face when suing a competitor and is not of the type that would justify Relator’s continued
anonymity. See Megless, 654 F.3d at 408 (noting that anonymity has been permitted in cases
“involving ‘abortion, birth control, transsexuality, mental illness, welfare rights of illegitimate
children, AIDS, and homosexuality;”) (internal citation omitted); Eberhard, 2013 WL 2155327 at
*3 (noting that “concerns involving national security, trade secrets or personal safety” are of the
type that would constitute severe or serious harm). As such, Relator has failed to provide this
Court with facts that justify allowing his identity to remain secret.
In addition, as Defendants note, dismissal with prejudice has no effect unless Defendants
know Relator’s identity. Without knowing who Relator is, Defendants would be unable to assert
a res judicata defense against a subsequent suit brought by Relator. See, e.g., Doe v. Indyke, Civ.
No. 20-484, 2021 WL 871382, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (permitting defendant to obtain
plaintiff’s identity where plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claim so that if plaintiff later sued
defendant, defendant could defend herself) 1; United States ex rel. Wenzel v. Pfizer, Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 2d 217, 222 (D. Mass. 2012). Although Relator is correct that Defendants could address
this problem through discovery in a later suit, the more expedient and efficient approach would be
to reveal Relator’s identity now and avoid unnecessary future litigation expenses.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion (D.E. 19) is GRANTED. An
appropriate order follows.
s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Orig:
cc:
Clerk
Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.
Parties
In Indyke, because the underlying claims arose out of a highly publicized case involving sexual assault, sexual
battery, and false imprisonment, plaintiff’s identity was provided only to the defendant, who was instructed not to
disclose it ‘for any purpose without prior approval of” the court. Indyke, 2021 WL 871382 at *1-2. Such privacy
concerns are not present here.
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