PINCKNEY v. ESSEX PROBATION CHILD SUPPORT UNIT

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 5/22/18. (cm, )

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DAVID PINCKNEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ESSEX COUNTY FAMILY COURT
and JUDGE DONALD KESSLER,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 17-3794 (ES) (MAH)
MEMORANDUM

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
1.

Pro se Plaintiff David Pinckney alleges that Defendants New Jersey Superior

Court, Essex Vicinage, Family Division (“Family Court”) and the Hon. Donald H. Kessler, J.S.C.
(“Judge Kessler”) (together, “Defendants”) violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when Judge
Kessler entered orders in the Family Court changing Plaintiff’s child-custody status from jointcustody to non-custodial parent and requiring Plaintiff to pay “significant” child support. (See
D.E. No. 5, Am. Compl. at 3-4). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Family Court “lists [him]
as a custodial parent but enforces as a non-custodial parent and has confiscated a significant
amount of [his] property.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 2).
2.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See D.E. No. 31). They advance three primary
arguments. (See D.E. No. 31-3 (“Def. Br.”)). First, Defendants argue they are entitled to immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment, barring Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1). (See id. at 9-13).
Second, Defendants argue Judge Kessler is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, barring

Plaintiff’s claims against His Honor under Rule 12(b)(6). (See id. at 13-17). Third, Defendants
argue the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, barring
Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1). (See id. at 17-20). Plaintiff filed opposition generally
contending that his constitutional claims establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court
will address each argument below.
3.

The relevant legal standards are as follows. Rule 12(b)(1) governs jurisdictional

challenges to a complaint. A party bringing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) may assert either a
“facial or factual challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” See Gould Elecs., Inc. v.
United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). In a facial challenge, the moving party
“challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint,” and
courts “consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333,
346 (3d Cir. 2016). In a factual challenge, the moving party “attacks the factual allegations
underlying the complaint’s assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or
otherwise presenting competing facts.” Id. (cleaned up). A factual challenge allows courts to
“weigh and consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Id.
4.

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
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Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider
only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Finally, courts must liberally construe
pleadings filed by pro se litigants. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
5.

First, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The Amendment protects states as well as their agencies and departments
from suit in federal court.” Jones v. Justice of Peace Court # 3, 714 F. App’x 119, 120 (3d Cir.
2018) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). State officials
sued in their official capacity are also protected, as “a suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Further, the Supreme Court has held
that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”
Id. Plaintiff’s constitutional claims against Defendants are therefore barred.
6.

Second, to the extent Plaintiff intended to impose individual liability on Judge

Kessler, the Court finds that Judge Kessler is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. “[I]t is well
established that judges are immune from suit under § 1983 for actions arising from their judicial
acts.” Gromek v. Maenza, 614 F. App’x 42, 45 (3d Cir. 2015). “A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all
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jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are based only on Judge Kessler’s official acts in
connection with Plaintiff’s proceedings in Family Court. “As to those, [Judge Kessler] enjoys
absolute immunity.” See Dickerson v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 15-3747, 2016 WL 820989, at *4
(D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2016). Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Kessler are therefore barred.
7.

Third, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction in some
circumstances to review a state court adjudication.” Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III,
L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine’s scope
“is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Here, Plaintiff is
complaining about injuries stemming from “multiple” state court orders. (See Am. Compl. at 3).
And Plaintiff’s requested relief seeks district court review and rejection of those orders. (See id.
at 4). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims are barred.
8.

Finally, because Defendants are immune from suit, amendment of Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint would be futile.” See Reardon v. New Jersey, No. 13-5363, 2014 WL
2921030, at *3 & n.3 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) (finding amendment futile where plaintiff’s claims
were barred by sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum.
s/Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
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