JUAN v. GREEN

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; replacing name of the petitioner to JUAN URENA; ordering that an Immigration Judge provide Mr. Urena with an individualized bond hearing within 14 days, respondent shall report the outcome within 7 days after it occurs; ordering the Clerk to serve this Memorandum and Order on Mr. Urena by regular U.S. Mail; and directing the Clerk to mark this case as closed. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 7/6/17. (jr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
URENA JUAN,
Petitioner,

Civ. No. 17-3953 (KM)

V.

CHARLES GREEN,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Respondent.
The petitioner. Juan Urena,’ is an immigration detainee currently lodged at the Essex
County Correctional Facility in Newark. New Jersey. A native and citizen of the Dominican
Republic, lie entered the United States in 2002. 1112013, Mr. Urena was convicted of robbery

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bodily injury of force. He was placed in immigration detention on August 24, 2016, and he
remains there.
On April 4, 2017, an Immigration Judge ordered Mr. Urena removed from the United
States. Mr. Urena appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). That
appeal remains pending before the BIA.
In May, 2017, Mr. Urena filed apro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§ 2241

in this Court. He requests that a bond hearing take place. On July 5, 2017, the

government filed its response to the habeas petition. (See Dkt. No. 4) In its response, the
government states that it does not object to this Court’s ordering that a bond hearing take place
before an Immigration Judge.
The Attorney General has the authority to detain aliens in removal proceedings before the
issuance of a final order of removal. This period of detention is known as the “pre-removal”
Petitioner’s name is actually Juan Urena; the clerk will be ordered to correct the caption to
replace Urena Juan with Juan Urena.

period. As Mr. Urena’s appeal remains pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, his
order of removal is not final. See 8 C.F.R.

§

1241.1(a) (order of removal by Immigration Judge

becomes final upon dismissal of appeal by the BIA). Detention of an alien in the pre-removal
period is governed by Section 1226 of Title 8 of the United States Code. Section 1226(a) permits
the Attorney General to detain or release an alien pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States. Except as provided in
subsection (c) of this section and pending such decision, the
Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General;
(B) conditional parole;
8 U.S.C.

§

1226(a). “Except as provided in subsection (c)” is included because, under Section

1226(c), certain criminal aliens are subject to mandatory pre-removal detention:
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense
covered in section 1 l82(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense
covered in section 1227(a)(2)(a)(ii), (A)Oii), (B), (C), or (D) of this
title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the
basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence to a term
of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
(D) is inadmissible under section 1 182(a)(3)(B) of this title or
deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is
release on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without
regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for
the same offense.
8 U.S.C.

§

1226(c)(l).

In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 201 1), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit established a framework for analyzing the permissibility of pre
removal detention:
[Title 8, United States Code, Section] 1226(c) contains an implicit
limitation on reasonableness: the statute authorizes only mandatory
detention that is reasonable in length. After that, § 1226(c) yields
to the constitutional requirement that there be a further,
individualized, inquiry into whether continued detention is
necessary to carry out the statutes purpose.... Should the length of
[an alien’s} detention become unreasonable, the Government must
justify its continued authority to detain him at a hearing at which it
bears the burden of proof.
656 F.3d at 235. Diop did not state a specific length of pre-removal-order detention beyond
which a petitioner would be entitled to a bond hearing. See Id. at 234; see also Carter

i

Aviles,

No. 13—3607, 2014 WL 348257. at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2014) (“[Tjhe Third Circuit has not set a
‘universal point’ when mandatory detention under

§

1226(c) is unreasonable.”) (citing Leslie v.

Attorney Gen,, 678 F.3d 265. 270—7 1 (3d Cir.2012)); Barcelona v.Napolitano, No. 12—7494,
2013 WL 6188478, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2013) (“The Court of Appeals in Diop declined to
adopt a rule that a hearing was required after a certain fixed amount of time in pre-removal
detention.”) (citation omitted). Instead, the Third Circuit noted that “[r]easonableness, by its very
nature, is a fact-dependent inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the circumstances of a
particular case.” Diop, 656 F.3d at 234. A reasonableness determination “must take into account
a given individual detainees need for more or less time, as well as the exigencies of a particular
case.” Id. 1-lowever, “the constitutional case for continued detention without inquiry into its
necessity becomes more and more suspect as detention continues past [certain] thresholds.”
Chavez—Alvarez

1’.

JVarck’n

York Cntj’. Priso,z 783 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Diop,

656 F.3d at 232, 234). Indeed, in Chavez—Alvarez, the Third Circuit noted with respect to the

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circumstances of that particular case that sometime after six months, and certainly within a year,
the burden to the petitione?s liberties would outweigh any justification to detain the petitioner
without a bond hearing. See Id. at 478. A petitioner’s bad faith, too, has at least the potential to
influence the determination of whether a bond hearing should be ordered. See Chavez-Alvarez,
783 F.3d at 476 (“Because we conclude that Chavez-Alvarez did not act in bad faith, we do not
need to decide here whether an alien’s delay tactics should preclude a bond hearing.”).
In the pre-removal context under Diop and Chavez-Alvarez. the proper relief is to order a
bond hearing before the Immigration Judge, not to order the petitioner released from immigration
detention. See Morrison v. Elwood, No. 12-4649, 2013 WL 323340, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2013)
(“This Court’s power to entertain habeas applications ensues from the narrowly-tailored mandate
2241, which

with respect to the claims raised by pre-removal order alien

of 28 U.S.C.

§

detainee’s

allows relief limited to a directive of a bond hearing.”) (citing Diop, 656 F.3d 221).

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In this case, Mr. Urena has been detained pursuant to

§

1226(c) for over ten months. The

government concedes at this point that it would be appropriate for this Court to order that a bond
hearing be held by an Immigration Judge in accord with Chavez-Alvarez. In light of the length of
time Mr. Urena has been in immigration detention, the lack of any evidence of bad faith on Mr.
Urena’s part, and the government’s consent, this Court will grant the habeas petition and direct
that an Immigration Judge conduct a bond hearing.
Accordingly, IT IS this 6th day of July, 2017,
ORDERED that the Clerk shall replace Urena Juan with Juan Urena as the name of the
petitioner in this action; and it is further
ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted; and it is further

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ORDERED that an Immigration Judge shall provide Mr. Urena with an individualized
bond hearing, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§

1226, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order;

and it is further
ORDERED that the respondent shall report the outcome of the bond proceeding to this
court within seven (7) days after it occurs; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum and Order on Mr. Urena by
regular U.S. mail; and it is further
ORDERED thai the Clerk shall mark this case as closed.

U

EVIN MCNULTY
United Slates District Judge

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