NORMAN et al v. N.J. STATE PAROLE BOARD et al
Filing
24
OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 5/29/2018. (ld, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HELEN E. NORMAN, et al.,
Civil Action No. 17-4413 (CCC)
Plaintiffs,
v.
OPINION
N.J. STATE PAROLE BOARD, et al.,
Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.
This matter has come before the Court on a civil rights Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiffs
HelenE. Norman and Joseph J. Norman pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1923. Presently before the Court
is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 16), seeking to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety
(“Motion”), for the reasons stated below, the Motion is granted in part, and denied in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are half-brother and half-sister who engaged in a consensual sexual relationship
in 2009 while Helen was fourteen, which resulted in Helen conceiving a son.1 Joseph was later
charged and convicted of a sex crime for this relationship, served a custodial sentence, and was
released in 2014. As a sex offender, Joseph was and is subject to Parole Supervision for Life
(“PSL”), which prohibits him from having contact with (1) the victim of his sex offense, in this
case Helen, and (2) any minor. After his release, Helen, now an adult, initiated contact with
‘After the filing of the initial complaint, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which is the subject
of the Motion. Unless otherwise noted, references to the “Complaint” refer to the amended
complaint.
Joseph. Due to his desire to be with Helen again, and be a father to his son, Joseph ignored his
parole conditions and began seeing Helen and his son on a regular basis. During this time, Helen
became pregnant again and the two had another son. Joseph’s parole officer eventually discovered
this situation in February of 2016 and arrested Joseph for violating his parole by contacting his
victim. The parole officer was informed by Helen that she wanted the no-victim contact condition
lifted.
The New Jersey Parole Board (the “Board”) found that Joseph had violated his conditions
of parole, but did not recommend revocation, in part because “it is much less clear what danger
his engaging in a relationship with a consenting adult poses to the community.” (ECF No. 9 at 5.)
The Board also took note of a report submitted in connection with the parole hearing, in which a
Dr. James Reynolds opined that Helen was in love with Joseph, wanted to be in a relationship with
him, and was not in any way coerced to feel that way. Dr. Reynolds also opined that Joseph’s
presence in Helen’s life would be a positive influence in both of their lives.
Instead of
incarceration, the Board therefore placed Joseph on the Electronic Monitoring Program (“EMP”)
for six months, in order to ensure that he did not have contact with Helen while her request to lift
the no-victim contact condition was under consideration. Helen then sent the Board another letter
stating that she wanted the no-victim contact and the no-minor contact conditions to both be lifted
so that Joseph would also be allowed to see his sons. Joseph made the same request to the Board.
However, Helen, desperate for financial assistance, started contacting Joseph again via
phone and text messages. Joseph continued to provide financial assistance to Helen and their sons,
as he has done since his release from prison. Joseph’s parole officer eventually discovered the text
messages, and again arrested Joseph for violation of his parole. The Board then once again placed
him in the EMP. Meanwhile, Helen and their sons’ financial situation continued to deteriorate.
2
The Board eventually agreed to hold the no-contact conditions in abeyance, but required Joseph to
see his sons only under Helen’s supervision and did not release him from the EMP.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs contend that Joseph’s parole officer, Defendant Officer Thawra
Naser, who allegedly has a personal disagreement with Plaintiffs’ relationship, forcefully coerced
Joseph to admit that he had brief contact with one of his sons outside of Helen’s presence, when
Helen was giving a bath to the other son in the bathroom. Joseph was arrested again for violating
his parole conditions, which proceeding is still ongoing. Plaintiffs also allege that Naser interfered
with their attempts to obtain an abeyance of the no-contact conditions by threatening both Joseph
and his attorney, and that the resultant delay caused them undue hardship. Plaintiffs further allege
that their filing of the instant suit resulted in additional charges being levied against Joseph in the
ongoing parole proceeding.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
II.
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need
only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the.
.
.
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Erickson v. Fardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted); see Connelly v. Lane
Constr. Corp., No. 14-3792, 2016 WL 106159, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 11,2016) (precedential). On a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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1 2(b)(6), a “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v.
United States, 404 F.3U 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept
its factual allegations as true, see James v. City of Witkes—Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012),
and to construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.s.
519, 520—21 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39,42 (3d Cir. 1992).
III.
DISCUSSION
The Complaint raises four claims: (1) that the no-contact conditions as applied to Joseph,
as well as his continued placement in the EMP, violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to
freedom of association; (2) that Naser’s interference with Plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain an abeyance
of the no-contact conditions, including threats to his attorney, violated their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and fourteenth Amendment due process rights; (3) that Naser’s coercion in regards
to the ongoing parole proceeding violated Joseph’s fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights; and (4) that the levy of additional charges against Joseph after the filing of the
initial complaint violated Plaintiffs’ first Amendment right to access to the courts.
Defendants, in turn, contend that: (1) the Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiffs’
claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (2) Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed
pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (3) Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed,
insofar as they seek monetary damages against the Board and other defendants in their official
capacity, because they are not “persons” amendable to suit under Wilt v. Much. Dep ‘t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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A. Abstention
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court established “a strong federal
policy against federal court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent
extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.
423, 431 (1982). “Younger abstention,” as the doctrine is colloquially known, “is premised on the
notion of comity, a principle of deference and ‘proper respect’ for state governmental functions in
our federal system.” Evans v. Ct. of Common Pleas, Del. Cnty., Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 1089 (1993). Federal courts are therefore directed to decline to
exercise jurisdiction when: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2)
the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an
adequate opportunity to raise federal claims [if any].” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.
1989).
Furthermore, it is “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not
act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has
an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.”
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. The “fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction within
narrow limits is.
.
.
important under our Constitution, in order to prevent erosion of the role of the
jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions where a single suit would be
adequate to protect the rights asserted.” Id. at 44. As such, in the interest of comity and federalism,
“federal courts must abstain in certain circumstances from exercising jurisdiction over a claim
where resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.” Miller v.
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010).
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“[I]n view of the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal
prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is ‘both great and immediate.”
Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having
to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be
considered “irreparable” in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat
to the plaintiffs federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by
his defense against a single criminal prosecution.
Id. “[A]bsent a showing of bad faith or an intent to harass, federal courts should decline requests
to enjoin state criminal prosecutions, ‘particularly
.
.
.
when the moving party has an adequate
remedy’ in state court.” Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm ‘n ofN.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 180 (3d
Cir. 2014) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43).
Here, the only claim that appears to implicate Joseph’s ongoing parole proceeding is Count
III, which relates to Joseph’s allegedly coerced confession. As such, it is a defense he can raise in
the ongoing parole proceeding and this Court accordingly abstains under Younger. In contrast, the
Court finds that neither Count II nor Count IV involve ongoing state proceedings and, therefore,
the Court declines to abstain as to either Count. Finally, Count I could arguably be construed as
involving an ongoing proceeding, insofar as it relates to Plaintiffs’ requests that the Board lift
Joseph’s no-contact conditions. Nonetheless, the Court cannot find that requests to the Board to
lift a condition of parole are “judicial in nature” for the purposes of Younger abstention. See
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (finding that a proceeding where “[t]here was no
right to compel the attendance of witnesses or to cross-examine.., no right to discovery.
.
.
and
no cognizable burden of proof’ is not judicial in nature). Moreover, based on the allegations in
the Complaint, the Court cannot find that the state “proceeding” affords Plaintiffs an adequate
opportunity to raise their freedom of association claim. For example, Joseph’s initial placement
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in the EMP was to ensure his continued adherence to the no-contact conditions while the Board
considered the requests to lift said conditions. Once the Board decided to hold the conditions in
abeyance, however, Joseph was not removed from the EMP, resulting in his placement in a
program that was designed to monitor his adherence to parole conditions that no longer exist.
These circumstances, coupled with allegations of Naser’s unreasonable supervision of Joseph,
even following the abeyance, lead this Court to conclude that the state proceeding does not afford
Plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to raise their federal claim. As such, the Motion seeking
abstention is granted as to Count III and is denied as to all other Counts.
B. Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
512 U.S. at 486-87. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, the Supreme Court further clarified its holding in
Heck, explaining that “a state prisoner’s
§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no
matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit
(state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action
would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” 544 U.S. 74, 81-82
(2005).
Here, Counts II and IV have no relation to the parole proceedings and therefore do not
implicate Heck. Count I implicates Heck to the extent that it involves monetary damages for any
unconstitutional imprisonment and conviction resulting from an alleged violation of Joseph’s First
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Amendment rights, through the imposition of the no-contact conditions during his first two parole
proceedings. Heck does not, however, bar damages arising from the prevention of Joseph and
Helen’s associating with each other, or damages that arise from interfering with Joseph’s ability
to be a father to his sons. Moreover, because the latest parole proceeding has not yet concluded,
Heck does no work to bar damages for any current imprisonment arising from Joseph’s latest
arrest; Heck only bars damages for alleged unconstitutional imprisonment if it would invalidate a
conviction. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.s. 384, 393-94 (2007) (holding that the Heck bar takes
effect only when a conviction has been obtained). Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims under Heck, because Counts II and IV do not implicate Heck, and only a portion
of the relief sought under Count I may be barred by Heck. To the extent Defendants seek to limit
the damages Plaintiffs can recover under Count I, they may file a motion at the appropriate stage
of the proceedings.
C. Official Capacity Damages Claims
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, “[tjhe Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. As such, the Eleventh Amendment
protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the type
of relief sought. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see P.R.
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (holding that the Ex
parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable to “the States or their
agencies, which retain their immunity against all suits in federal court”). Civil rights claims under
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42 U.S.C.
§
1983, moreover, do not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979).
The Supreme Court held that official capacity claims against state officials are essentially
claims against the state, not against a person. Will v. Mich. Dep ‘t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). Because a state cannot be sued in federal court under
§ 1983, there can be no official
capacity claims against state officials, except those under Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (190$),
which authorizes only injunctive relief. Metcalf 506 U.S. at 146. Since the Board is a state
agency,
and
Plaintiff cannot assert damages claims against the other defendants in their official
capacity, Defendants’ Motion is granted and all damages claims against Defendants in their official
capacity are dismissed.
Date:
M
r
Claire C. Cecchi, U.$.D.J.
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