JACKSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, that the Court will VACATE its prior order (ECF No. 3) to be replaced with this Memorandum and Oder, and it is further Ordered that the motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence is hereby Dismissed at screening for the reasons stated this Memorandum and Order. It is further Ordered that a certificate of appealability is DENIED, etc. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 10/4/2018. (JB, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil Action No. 17-4707(SRC)

STEVEN JACKSON,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

This matter having been opened to the Court by Petitioner’s filing of a Motion to Vacate,
Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255.

The Court has reviewed the

available record and screened the Motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. For the reasons
explained herein, the Court has determined that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and will
therefore dismiss the Motion at screening.
The Court notes that this matter was incorrectly docketed a motion for relief pursuant to
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.

,

135 $.Ct. 2551, 192 LEd.2d 5691 (2015). Upon

further review, the Court finds that Petitioner is moving for relief pursuant to Math is v. United
States, 579 U.S.

,

136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), which held that a state crime

does not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) predicate offense when its
elements are broader than the elements of a listed generic offense.’

The Court will therefore vacate its prior Order to be replaced with the instant Memorandum and
Order.
1

from the outset, it appears that this is Petitioner’s second habeas petition. His first
Motion for relief was denied by this Court on September 9, 2011 (Civ. No. 11-3392, ECF Nos. 7,
8), and the Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability on December 27, 2011. (ECF No.
11.) Before a second or successive

§ 2255 motion may be filed in the district court, the applicant

must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to
consider the motion. 28 U.S.C.

§S 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255.

Authorization may be granted only if

the motion contains “(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable.” See In re Olabode, 325 F.3d 166, 169 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§

2255). Petitioner has not moved before the Third Circuit for permission to file a second or

successive petition; thus, to the extent the instant motion would be deemed second or successive,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it.2
To the extent the motion is not second or successive, it fails on the merits.3 Petitioner
contends in his Petition that he was incorrectly sentenced as a career offender under the

2

It is not clear from the record whether Petitioner received the notice required by United States
v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir.1999) prior to the Court’s ruling on his 2011 motion to vacate.
See also Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003)
(requiring such notice before recharacterizing a pro se filing as a § 2255 motion). Where such
notice is not given, the motion does not count as a first § 2255 motion for second or successive
purposes. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 383, 124 S.Ct. 786; Norwoodv. United States, 472 F. App’x
113, 117 (3dCir. 2012).
Because the claim fails on the merits, the Court need not determine whether the petition is
timely under 2255(f)(3). However, all circuit courts to have considered this issue or the issue in
the context of a second or successive petition have determined that Mathis is not new. See
Boatwright v. Warden Fairton FCI, No. 17-3534, 2018 WL 3640305, at *2 (3d Cir. July 31,
201 $)(collecting cases and declining to decide whether Mathis announces a new right under §
2255(f)(3)). The Court agrees with those courts that have found that Mathis is not new.
2

Guidelines for two prior drug offenses that do not qualify as “aggravated felonies” under Mathis
and the Third Circuit’s decision in Chang-Cruz v. Attorney Gen. United States ofAm., 659 F.
App’x 114 (3d Cir. 2016).
Petitioner is incorrect. According to his Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”),
Petitioner has two prior controlled substance convictions in New Jersey for possession with
intent to distribute CDS: Possession of CDS (heroin) with intent to distribute on December 10,
2003; and Possession of CDS (cocaine) with intent to distribute on September 7, 2004.
Petitioner was over 1$ at the time of both offenses, and these convictions arise under N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5.
At the time of Petitioner’s conviction, the Guidelines defined a predicate drug offense as
“the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual

§ 4B1.2(b) (emphasis supplied).

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 makes it unlawful for any person

knowingly or purposely “to manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his
control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or
controlled substance analog[.1” (Emphasis added.) Because the federal and state definitions
match, the state CDS crimes at issue qualify as predicate offenses under the categorical
approach, and the Court need not resort to the modified categorical approach, which was the
issue in Mathis. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (“To determine whether a prior conviction
[qualifies as a predicate offense], courts apply what is known as the categorical approach: They
focus solely on whether the elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements
[of the predicate offense], while ignoring the particular facts of the case.”).

3

Nor does Chang-Cruz provide a basis for relief. There, the Third Circuit held that
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, of which alien had previously been convicted, swept more broadly than the
generic federal offense because the New Jersey offense could be committed by means either of
distribution or dispensing of controlled substance, and thus did not qualify as “aggravated
felony.” Under the immigration code, an aggravated felony is determined by reference to the
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C.
N.J.S.A. 2C:35—7 sweeps more broadly than

§

$02. The Court in Chang-Cruz determined that

$60, which criminalizes distribution but not

§

dispensing, and thus could not form the basis for an aggravated felony in the immigration
context. See Chang-Cruz, 659 F. App’x at 118. As explained above, the relevant comparison
here is between N.J.S.A. 2C:35—7 and

§ 4B1.2(b).

90, 92 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that “unlike

§

See United States v. Jackson, 711 F. App’x

860, the Career Offender Guideline does cover

‘dispensing’ in its disjunctive list of elements” and finding that the petitioner’s “reliance on
Chang—Cruz is misplaced”) (emphasis added). Therefore, Chang-Cruz does not provide
Petitioner a basis for relief.
For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the Motion at screening. Petitioner has not
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right; as such, no certificate of
appealability will issue pursuant to 2$ U.S.C.

§

2253(c)(1)(B). See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1); 3d

Cir. LA.R. 22.2.
IT IS, THEREFORE, on this

day of

C7FD béII4, 201$,

ORDERED that the Court will VACATE its prior Order (ECF No. 3) to be replaced
with this Memorandum and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence is hereby
DISMISSED at screening for the reasons stated this Memorandum and Order; it is further

4

ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum and Order upon Petitioner

at the address on file, and shall CLOSE this case accordingly.

SIcI(EY’ICëSLER
United States District Judge

S