COLEMAN v. UNITED STATE OF AMERICA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM & OPINION for reasons explained herein, the Court dismisses this matter at screening and denies a certificate of appealability. an appropriate Order follows. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 9/27/2018. (JB, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No. 17-4817(SRC)
RICKY COLEMAN,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
§ 2255 pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
Petitioner moves for relief under 2$ U.S.C.
decision in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S.
,
136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016),
which held that a state crime does not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)
predicate offense when its elements are broader than the elements of a listed generic offense.
for the reasons explained below, the Court will dismiss the petition as untimely and without
merit.
Courts may afford relief under Section 2255 on a number of grounds including, “that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Id.
2255(a); see also 28 U.S.C.
§
§ 2255 Rule 1(a). The statute provides that, as a remedy for an
unlawfully-imposed sentence, “the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may
appear appropriate.” 2$ U.S.C.
§ 2255(b). The court accepts the truth of the defendant’s
allegations when reviewing a Section 2255 motion unless those allegations are “clearly frivolous
based on the existing record.” United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2005). A court
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is required to hold an evidentiary hearing when the motion “allege{s] any facts warranting
§
2255 relief that are not clearly resolved by the record.” United States v. Toltiver, $00 f.3d 13$,
141 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Booth, 432 F.3d at 546).
A criminal defendant bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to
§ 2255 relief.
See United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182, 189 (3d Cir. 2005). For its part, “the court must
accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous on the basis
of the existing record.” United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, “[i]t is the policy of the courts to give a
liberal construction to pro se habeas petitions.” Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir.
2010). “If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior
proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion and
direct the clerk to notify the moving party.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
This appears to be Petitioner’s first
§ 2255 motion. Petitioner, however, filed the instant
motion over a year after his conviction became final. The motion is thus untimely unless he can
prove that it falls within an exception to the general one-year limitation period for habeas
petitions. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f). Section 2255 contains an alternate commencement date for
the one-year statute of limitations running from “the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 225 5(f)(3).
In relevant part, Petitioner was designated as a career offender pursuant to Section 4B1 .1
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines because he had several prior felony convictions for
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controlled substance offenses.1 The court sentenced Petitioner to 151 months of imprisonment
on June 19, 2012. (See 07-CR-143, at No. 317.) Petitioner alleges that the claims raised in his
motion were “not made available until the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mathis v. United
States (citation omitted) and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Cruz v. Attorney
General United States ofAmerica, 659 Fed. Appx. 114 (3d Cir. 2016).” Based on the allegations
in his motion, the Court construes Petitioner to assert that Mathis announced a new right that
retroactively applies to his conviction, rendering his motion timely under 28 U.S.C.
Unlike new rules permitting successive
§ 2255(f)(3).
§ 2255 motions, new “rights” triggering §
2255(0(3) need not be constitutional. See United States v. Lloyd, 18$ f.3d 184, 187 n.$ (3d Cir.
1999) (holding an initial petition can be based on a new statutory right because the language is
“broader than the ‘new rule of constitutional law’ expressly required for second or successive
§
2255 motions), abrogated in part on other grounds by Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357
(2005); see also Boatwright v. Warden Fairton fCI, No. 17-3534, 2018 WL 3640305, at *2 (3d
Cir. July 31, 201$) (explaining same). Furthermore, under
§ 2255(3), both the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts can decide the retroactive applicability of a new rule of constitutional
law announced by the Supreme Court when reviewing an initial (as opposed to successive)
petition. See US. v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 487 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that “the statute of
limitations provision of § 2255 allows district courts and courts of appeals to make retroactivity
decisions”). Thus, if Mathis recognized a new right for purposes of § 2255(0(3), Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s plea agreement stipulates that he is a career offender under Section 4B1.1. (See 07143, ECF no. 282, Schedule A at § 9.) Based on the Presentence Report (“PSR”), it appears that
Petitioner’s career offender status was premised on his prior state court convictions for several
controlled substance offenses and a conviction for aggravated assault. Because Petitioner
appears to challenge only the enhancement based on his controlled substance offenses, and the
controlled substance offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C;25-7 are sufficient to render Petitioner a career
offender, the Court does not address the conviction for aggravated assault.
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petition would be timely if brought as a
§ 2255 motion because he filed it within one year of the
date Mathis was decided. (See ECF No. 1.)
At issue in Math is was an Iowa burglary statute that proscribed entry into or onto
locations that included a building, a structure, land, water or an air vehicle. Because generic
burglary does not proscribe burglary of vehicles, the Iowa offense was overly inclusive; it
included conduct that was not generic burglary. The sentencing court looked to the documents
pertaining to Mathis’s prior convictions, which revealed that Mathis had burgled structures not
vehicles, and the district court concluded that the sentencing enhancement under the ACCA
applied. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that whether the itemized list of places
“amount[ed] to alternative elements or merely alternative means to fulfilling an element, the
statute is divisible, and we must apply the modified categorical approach.” The Supreme Court
disagreed and reversed the Eighth Circuit because the Iowa Supreme Court has held that the
Iowa statute sets forth “alternative method[s] of committing [the] single crime,” and an Iowa
‘jury need not agree on which of the locations was actually involved.” See Mathis, 136 S.Ct.
2250-51. Thus, under Mathis, a state crime does not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense when
its elements are broader than the elements of a listed generic offense. The Third Circuit has
applied the reasoning of Mathis in determining whether a state crime qualifies as a predicate
offense for career offender enhancement under
§ 4B 1.1 See United States v. Glass, No. 16-2906,
2018 WL 4443889, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2018) (precedential).
The Third Circuit has not yet decided in a published decision whether Math is recognized
a new right for purposes of an initial §2255 petition under
§ 2255(f)(3); it has, however, cited
approvingly to the reasoning of several circuit courts that have determined that there is nothing
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new about Mathis, and its predecessor Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013).2 See
Boatwright, 2018 WL 3640305, at *2. As recently explained by the Third Circuit,
Every Court of Appeals to have addressed Mathis in [the context
of an initial petition] or the context of successiveness—which
requires a “new rule,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)—has [concluded
that Mathis is not new]. See, e.g., Dimott v. United States, 881 f.3d
232, 237 (lstCir. 2018), cert. denied,No. 17-1251,———— U.S.
,2018WL 1243146(U.S.June
,—L.Ed.2d
—S.Ct.
25, 2018); In re Conzelmann, 872 F.3d 375, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2017)
(collecting cases). Other courts have concluded that Math is
immediate predecessor, Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254,
133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), is not “new” for purposes
of § 2255(0(3) either. See, e.g., Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d
1215, 1219-20(11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Morgan, 845 F.3d
664, 666-67 (5th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). Their reasoning
would appear to apply with equal force to Mathis as well.
Boatwright, 2018 WL 3640305, at *2 (considering a Mathis claim brought under
declining to decide whether Mathis announces a new right under
§ 2241 and
§ 2255(f)(3)).3
The Court agrees with the circuit courts that have held that Math is is not new. In Math is,
the Supreme Court stated that its “precedents make [it] a straightforward case,” observing that its
prior rulings concerning the ACCA dictated its conclusion. Math is, 136 $.Ct. at 2257. The
Court essentially stated that its holding was predicated on 25 years of precedent. Id. Because
In Descamps i’. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), the Supreme Court held that sentencing
courts may not apply the modified categorical approach to a defendant’s crime of conviction that
has a single, indivisible set of elements.
As the Third Circuit further explained in BoaP’vright that “[t]o the extent Mathis is not new, the
challenge brought by Boatwright was available at least by the time the Supreme Court decided
Descamps on June 20, 2013.” His conviction became final about six months before that on
January 13, 2013. Thus, Boatwright would have had approximately six months to raise a claim
under Descamps that would have been timely as measured from the date of his conviction, see 28
U.S.C. § 2255(0(1), regardless of whether Descamps itself was “new.” Here, Petitioner’s
conviction became final fourteen days after he was sentenced on June 19, 2012. Descamps was
decided on June 20, 2012. As such, Petitioner also could have raised a claim under Descamps
prior to the expiration of the one-year limitations period measured from the date of his
conviction.
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S
Mathis does not announce a new right but simply applies the Court’s prior precedents to a new
factual scenario, Petitioner’s motion does not fall within the exception under 28 U.S.C.
§
225 5(f)(3), and his claim is untimely and subject to dismissal on that basis.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to find that Petitioner could proceed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(0(3), his claim fails on the merits. Petitioner appears to contend that he was designated
as a career offender under the Guidelines based on his prior drug convictions under N.J.S.A.
2C:35-7 in violation of Mathis, and that the Third Circuit’s decision in Chang-Cruz v. Attorney
Gen. United States ofAm., 659 F. App’x 114 (3d Cir. 2016) supports his claim for relief. He is
incorrect.
As relevant here, a defendant qualifies for a career-offender enhancement under the
Guidelines if he or she “has at least two prior felony convictions of
offense.” U.S.S.G.
...
a controlled substance
§ 4B1.1(a). A “controlled substance offense” is an offense that (1)is
punishable by a term of imprisonment that exceeds one year and (2) “prohibits the manufacture,
import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id.
§ 4B1.2(b). A state conviction cannot
qualify as a “controlled substance offense” if its elements are broader than those listed in
§
4B1.2(b). See Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2251; see also Glass, 2018 WL 4443889, at *2 (applying
Mathis to analysis of 4B1.1); United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 574 (5th Cir. 2016)
(same).
At the time of Petitioner’s conviction, the guidelines defined a predicate drug offense as
“the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a
counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
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with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual
§ 431.2(b) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2011) (emphasis supplied). Petitioner has at least
two convictions under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, which defines a drug offense as the “distributing,
dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled
substance analog while on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or
leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such
school property or a school bus, or while on any school bus[.J” N.J.S.A.
§ 2C:35-7. Because the
state drug offense includes the same proscribed conduct, i.e., distribution or dispensing or
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, it qualifies as a predicate offense. See
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 224$ (“To determine whether a prior conviction [qualifies as a predicate
offense], courts apply what is known as the categorical approach: They focus solely on whether
the elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements [of the predicate
offense], while ignoring the particular facts of the case.”).
Furthennore, as explained by another court in this District, the fact that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7
criminalizes the distribution or dispensing of controlled substances within 1000 feet of a school
makes the statutory crimes narrower (not broader) than those defined by the guidelines. Under
Math is, a narrower definition in the state statute does not disqualify a conviction under it from
counting as a predicate offense. See Gonzalez v. United States, No. CV 16-9412 (K$H), 2017
WL 2304645, at *2 (D.N.J. May25, 2017), reconsideration denied, No. CV 16-9412 (KSH),
2017 WL 4119585 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2017), and certUicate ofappealability denied, No. CV 1723$ 1, 2017 WL 6606668 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2017).
finally, Petitioner relies on the Third Circuit’s decision in Chang-Cruz v. Attorney Gen.
United States ofAm., 659 F. App’x 114 (3d Cir. 2016) as support for his Mathis claim. There,
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the Third Circuit held that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, of which alien had previously been convicted,
swept more broadly than the generic federal offense because the New Jersey offense could be
committed by means either of distribution or dispensing of controlled substance, and thus did not
qualify as “aggravated felony.” Under the immigration code, an aggravated felony is determined
by reference to the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C.
§ $02. The Court in Chang
Cruz determined that N.J.S.A. 2C:35—7 sweeps more broadly than
§ 860, which criminalizes
distribution but not dispensing, and thus could not form the basis for an aggravated felony in the
immigration context. See Chang-Cruz, 659 F. App’x at 118. As explained above, the relevant
comparison here is between NJ.S.A. 2C:35—7 and
§ 4B1.2(b). See United States v. Jackson, 711
F. App’x 90, 92 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that “unlike
§ 860, the Career Offender Guideline
does cover ‘dispensing’ in its disjunctive list of elements” and finding that the petitioner’s
“reliance on Chang—Cruz is misplaced”) (emphasis added). As such, Chang-Cruz does not
provide Petitioner a basis for relief.
For the reasons explained in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court will dismiss the
Petition at screening pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the
United States District Courts.
The Court also denies a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Pursuant to 2$ U.S.C.
§
2253(c), “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may
not be taken from” a final order in a proceeding under 2$ U.S.C.
§ 2255. A certificate of
appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
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encouragement to proceed further.” Miller—El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Here,
Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and no
certificate of appealability shall issue. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2.
For the reasons explained herein, the Court dismisses this matter at screening and denies
a certificate of appealability. An appropriate Order follows.
-‘S
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ANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
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